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| * | | | | selinux: Cleanup printk logging in sidtabpeter enderborg2018-06-191-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | | | selinux: Cleanup printk logging in netlinkpeter enderborg2018-06-191-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | | | selinux: Cleanup printk logging in selinuxfspeter enderborg2018-06-191-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | | | selinux: Cleanup printk logging in servicespeter enderborg2018-06-191-36/+35
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | | | selinux: Cleanup printk logging in avtabpeter enderborg2018-06-191-25/+26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | | | selinux: Cleanup printk logging in hookspeter enderborg2018-06-191-35/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | | | selinux: Cleanup printk logging in policydbpeter enderborg2018-06-191-45/+46
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings and replace KERN_CONT with 2 longer prints. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com> [PM: fixed some missing newlines identified by Joe Perches] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | | | selinux: Cleanup printk logging in ebitmappeter enderborg2018-06-191-8/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | | | selinux: Cleanup printk logging in conditionalpeter enderborg2018-06-191-8/+8
| | |/ / / | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | | | | Merge branch 'next-general' of ↵Linus Torvalds2018-08-157-17/+192
|\ \ \ \ \ | | |_|/ / | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: - kstrdup() return value fix from Eric Biggers - Add new security_load_data hook to differentiate security checking of kernel-loaded binaries in the case of there being no associated file descriptor, from Mimi Zohar. - Add ability to IMA to specify a policy at build-time, rather than just via command line params or by loading a custom policy, from Mimi. - Allow IMA and LSMs to prevent sysfs firmware load fallback (e.g. if using signed firmware), from Mimi. - Allow IMA to deny loading of kexec kernel images, as they cannot be measured by IMA, from Mimi. * 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: security: check for kstrdup() failure in lsm_append() security: export security_kernel_load_data function ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer) module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_module ima: add build time policy ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback) firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel images kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall security: define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data MAINTAINERS: remove the outdated "LINUX SECURITY MODULE (LSM) FRAMEWORK" entry
| * | | | security: check for kstrdup() failure in lsm_append()Eric Biggers2018-07-171-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | lsm_append() should return -ENOMEM if memory allocation failed. Fixes: d69dece5f5b6 ("LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
| * | | | security: export security_kernel_load_data functionArnd Bergmann2018-07-171-0/+1
| | |_|/ | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The firmware_loader can be built as a loadable module, which now fails when CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled, because a call to the security_kernel_load_data() function got added, and this is not exported to modules: ERROR: "security_kernel_load_data" [drivers/base/firmware_loader/firmware_class.ko] undefined! Add an EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL() to make it available here. Fixes: 6e852651f28e ("firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
| * | | ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer)Mimi Zohar2018-07-161-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Some systems are memory constrained but they need to load very large firmwares. The firmware subsystem allows drivers to request this firmware be loaded from the filesystem, but this requires that the entire firmware be loaded into kernel memory first before it's provided to the driver. This can lead to a situation where we map the firmware twice, once to load the firmware into kernel memory and once to copy the firmware into the final resting place. To resolve this problem, commit a098ecd2fa7d ("firmware: support loading into a pre-allocated buffer") introduced request_firmware_into_buf() API that allows drivers to request firmware be loaded directly into a pre-allocated buffer. Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the firmware being accessible to the device prior to the completion of IMA's signature verification any more than when using two buffers? (Refer to mailing list discussion[1]). Only on systems with an IOMMU can the access be prevented. As long as the signature verification completes prior to the DMA map is performed, the device can not access the buffer. This implies that the same buffer can not be re-used. Can we ensure the buffer has not been DMA mapped before using the pre-allocated buffer? [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/7/10/56 Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org> Cc: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
| * | | module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_moduleMimi Zohar2018-07-163-13/+31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Both the init_module and finit_module syscalls call either directly or indirectly the security_kernel_read_file LSM hook. This patch replaces the direct call in init_module with a call to the new security_kernel_load_data hook and makes the corresponding changes in SELinux, LoadPin, and IMA. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
| * | | ima: add build time policyMimi Zohar2018-07-162-3/+101
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | IMA by default does not measure, appraise or audit files, but can be enabled at runtime by specifying a builtin policy on the boot command line or by loading a custom policy. This patch defines a build time policy, which verifies kernel modules, firmware, kexec image, and/or the IMA policy signatures. This build time policy is automatically enabled at runtime and persists after loading a custom policy. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
| * | | ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback)Mimi Zohar2018-07-161-1/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With an IMA policy requiring signed firmware, this patch prevents the sysfs fallback method of loading firmware. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
| * | | ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel imagesMimi Zohar2018-07-164-1/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The original kexec_load syscall can not verify file signatures, nor can the kexec image be measured. Based on policy, deny the kexec_load syscall. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
| * | | security: define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_dataMimi Zohar2018-07-161-0/+5
| |/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Differentiate between the kernel reading a file specified by userspace from the kernel loading a buffer containing data provided by userspace. This patch defines a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data(). Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
* | | Merge tag 'hardened-usercopy-v4.19-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2018-08-151-1/+0
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux Pull hardened usercopy updates from Kees Cook: "This cleans up a minor Kconfig issue and adds a kernel boot option for disabling hardened usercopy for distro users that may have corner-case performance issues (e.g. high bandwidth small-packet UDP traffic). Summary: - drop unneeded Kconfig "select BUG" (Kamal Mostafa) - add "hardened_usercopy=off" rare performance needs (Chris von Recklinghausen)" * tag 'hardened-usercopy-v4.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: usercopy: Allow boot cmdline disabling of hardening usercopy: Do not select BUG with HARDENED_USERCOPY
| * | | usercopy: Do not select BUG with HARDENED_USERCOPYKamal Mostafa2018-07-021-1/+0
| |/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is no need to "select BUG" when CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled. The kernel thread will always die, regardless of the CONFIG_BUG. Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> [kees: tweak commit log] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* | | Merge branch 'work.open3' of ↵Linus Torvalds2018-08-138-22/+22
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull vfs open-related updates from Al Viro: - "do we need fput() or put_filp()" rules are gone - it's always fput() now. We keep track of that state where it belongs - in ->f_mode. - int *opened mess killed - in finish_open(), in ->atomic_open() instances and in fs/namei.c code around do_last()/lookup_open()/atomic_open(). - alloc_file() wrappers with saner calling conventions are introduced (alloc_file_clone() and alloc_file_pseudo()); callers converted, with much simplification. - while we are at it, saner calling conventions for path_init() and link_path_walk(), simplifying things inside fs/namei.c (both on open-related paths and elsewhere). * 'work.open3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (40 commits) few more cleanups of link_path_walk() callers allow link_path_walk() to take ERR_PTR() make path_init() unconditionally paired with terminate_walk() document alloc_file() changes make alloc_file() static do_shmat(): grab shp->shm_file earlier, switch to alloc_file_clone() new helper: alloc_file_clone() create_pipe_files(): switch the first allocation to alloc_file_pseudo() anon_inode_getfile(): switch to alloc_file_pseudo() hugetlb_file_setup(): switch to alloc_file_pseudo() ocxlflash_getfile(): switch to alloc_file_pseudo() cxl_getfile(): switch to alloc_file_pseudo() ... and switch shmem_file_setup() to alloc_file_pseudo() __shmem_file_setup(): reorder allocations new wrapper: alloc_file_pseudo() kill FILE_{CREATED,OPENED} switch atomic_open() and lookup_open() to returning 0 in all success cases document ->atomic_open() changes ->atomic_open(): return 0 in all success cases get rid of 'opened' in path_openat() and the helpers downstream ...
| * | | IMA: don't propagate opened through the entire thingAl Viro2018-07-123-12/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | just check ->f_mode in ima_appraise_measurement() Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * | | ->file_open(): lose cred argumentAl Viro2018-07-125-9/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * | | security_file_open(): lose cred argumentAl Viro2018-07-121-2/+2
| |/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | / x86/pti: Allow CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION for x86_32Joerg Roedel2018-07-201-1/+1
| |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Allow PTI to be compiled on x86_32. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com> Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca> Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-38-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
* | Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20180629' of ↵Linus Torvalds2018-06-301-45/+33
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux fix from Paul Moore: "One fairly straightforward patch to fix a longstanding issue where a process could stall while accessing files in selinuxfs and block everyone else due to a held mutex. The patch passes all our tests and looks to apply cleanly to your current tree" * tag 'selinux-pr-20180629' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: move user accesses in selinuxfs out of locked regions
| * | selinux: move user accesses in selinuxfs out of locked regionsJann Horn2018-06-281-45/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If a user is accessing a file in selinuxfs with a pointer to a userspace buffer that is backed by e.g. a userfaultfd, the userspace access can stall indefinitely, which can block fsi->mutex if it is held. For sel_read_policy(), remove the locking, since this method doesn't seem to access anything that requires locking. For sel_read_bool(), move the user access below the locked region. For sel_write_bool() and sel_commit_bools_write(), move the user access up above the locked region. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: removed an unused variable in sel_read_policy()] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | | dh key: fix rounding up KDF output lengthEric Biggers2018-06-261-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 383203eff718 ("dh key: get rid of stack allocated array") changed kdf_ctr() to assume that the length of key material to derive is a multiple of the digest size. The length was supposed to be rounded up accordingly. However, the round_up() macro was used which only gives the correct result on power-of-2 arguments, whereas not all hash algorithms have power-of-2 digest sizes. In some cases this resulted in a write past the end of the 'outbuf' buffer. Fix it by switching to roundup(), which works for non-power-of-2 inputs. Reported-by: syzbot+486f97f892efeb2075a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+29d17b7898b41ee120a5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+8a608baf8751184ec727@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d04e58bd384f1fe0b112@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 383203eff718 ("dh key: get rid of stack allocated array") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
* | | Smack: Mark inode instant in smack_task_to_inodeCasey Schaufler2018-06-231-0/+1
| |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Smack: Mark inode instant in smack_task_to_inode /proc clean-up in commit 1bbc55131e59bd099fdc568d3aa0b42634dbd188 resulted in smack_task_to_inode() being called before smack_d_instantiate. This resulted in the smk_inode value being ignored, even while present for files in /proc/self. Marking the inode as instant here fixes that. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
* | docs: Fix some broken referencesMauro Carvalho Chehab2018-06-151-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As we move stuff around, some doc references are broken. Fix some of them via this script: ./scripts/documentation-file-ref-check --fix Manually checked if the produced result is valid, removing a few false-positives. Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Acked-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org> Acked-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com> Acked-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* | docs: fix broken references with multiple hintsMauro Carvalho Chehab2018-06-151-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The script: ./scripts/documentation-file-ref-check --fix Gives multiple hints for broken references on some files. Manually use the one that applies for some files. Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Acked-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* | Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-06-13' of ↵Linus Torvalds2018-06-1414-71/+310
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor Pull AppArmor updates from John Johansen: "Features - add support for mapping secids and using secctxes - add the ability to get a task's secid - add support for audit rule filtering Cleanups: - multiple typo fixes - Convert to use match_string() helper - update git and wiki locations in AppArmor docs - improve get_buffers macro by using get_cpu_ptr - Use an IDR to allocate apparmor secids Bug fixes: - fix '*seclen' is never less than zero - fix mediation of prlimit - fix memory leak when deduping profile load - fix ptrace read check - fix memory leak of rule on error exit path" * tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-06-13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: (21 commits) apparmor: fix ptrace read check apparmor: fix memory leak when deduping profile load apparmor: fix mediation of prlimit apparmor: fixup secid map conversion to using IDR apparmor: Use an IDR to allocate apparmor secids apparmor: Fix memory leak of rule on error exit path apparmor: modify audit rule support to support profile stacks apparmor: Add support for audit rule filtering apparmor: update git and wiki locations in AppArmor docs apparmor: Convert to use match_string() helper apparmor: improve get_buffers macro by using get_cpu_ptr apparmor: fix '*seclen' is never less than zero apparmor: fix typo "preconfinement" apparmor: fix typo "independent" apparmor: fix typo "traverse" apparmor: fix typo "type" apparmor: fix typo "replace" apparmor: fix typo "comparison" apparmor: fix typo "loosen" apparmor: add the ability to get a task's secid ...
| * | apparmor: fix ptrace read checkJohn Johansen2018-06-071-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The ptrace read check is incorrect resulting in policy that is broader than it needs to be. Fix the check so that read access permission can be properly detected when other ptrace flags are set. Fixes: b2d09ae449ce ("apparmor: move ptrace checks to using labels") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: fix memory leak when deduping profile loadJohn Johansen2018-06-071-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | AppArmor is leaking the newly loaded profile and its proxy when the profile is an exact match to the currently loaded version. In this case the dedup check results in the profile being skipped and put without dealing with the proxy ref thus not breaking a circular refcount and causing a leak. BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1750594 Fixes: 5d5182cae401 ("apparmor: move to per loaddata files, instead of replicating in profiles") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: fix mediation of prlimitJohn Johansen2018-06-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For primit apparmor requires that if target confinement does not match the setting task's confinement, the setting task requires CAP_SYS_RESOURCE. Unfortunately this was broken when rlimit enforcement was reworked to support labels. Fixes: 86b92cb782b3 ("apparmor: move resource checks to using labels") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: fixup secid map conversion to using IDRJohn Johansen2018-06-074-8/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The IDR conversion did not handle an error case for when allocating a mapping fails, and it did not ensure that mappings did not allocate or use a 0 value, which is used as an invalid secid. Which is used when a mapping fails. Fixes: 3ae7eb49a2be ("apparmor: Use an IDR to allocate apparmor secids") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: Use an IDR to allocate apparmor secidsMatthew Wilcox2018-06-071-103/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace the custom usage of the radix tree to store a list of free IDs with the IDR. Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: Fix memory leak of rule on error exit pathTyler Hicks2018-06-071-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently on the error exit path the allocated rule is not free'd causing a memory leak. Fix this by calling aa_audit_rule_free(). Detected by CoverityScan, CID#1468966 ("Resource leaks") Fixes: cb740f574c7b ("apparmor: modify audit rule support to support profile stacks") Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: modify audit rule support to support profile stacksJohn Johansen2018-06-071-17/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Allows for audit rules, where a rule could specify a profile stack A//&B, while extending the current semantic so if the label specified in the audit rule is a subset of the secid it is considered a match. Eg. if the secid resolves to the label stack A//&B//&C Then an audit rule specifying a label of A - would match B - would match C - would match D - would not A//&B - would match as a subset A//&C - would match as a subset B//&C - would match as a subset A//&B//&C - would match A//&D - would not match, because while A does match, D is also specified and does not Note: audit rules are currently assumed to be coming from the root namespace. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: Add support for audit rule filteringMatthew Garrett2018-06-073-1/+107
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds support to Apparmor for integrating with audit rule filtering. Right now it only handles SUBJ_ROLE, interpreting it as a single component of a label. This is sufficient to get Apparmor working with IMA's appraisal rules without any modifications on the IMA side. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: Convert to use match_string() helperAndy Shevchenko2018-06-071-14/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The new helper returns index of the matching string in an array. We are going to use it here. Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jay Freyensee <why2jjj.linux@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: improve get_buffers macro by using get_cpu_ptrJohn Johansen2018-06-071-17/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Refactor get_buffers so the cpu_ptr can be obtained in the outer layer, instead of inside the macro. This also enables us to cleanup the code and use get_cpu_ptr, to handle the preempt_disable() Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: fix '*seclen' is never less than zeroJohn Johansen2018-05-081-9/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | smatch warnings: security/apparmor/secid.c:162 apparmor_secid_to_secctx() warn: unsigned '*seclen' is never less than zero. vim +162 security/apparmor/secid.c 140 141 int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) 142 { 143 /* TODO: cache secctx and ref count so we don't have to recreate */ 144 struct aa_label *label = aa_secid_to_label(secid); 145 146 AA_BUG(!secdata); 147 AA_BUG(!seclen); 148 149 if (!label) 150 return -EINVAL; 151 152 if (secdata) 153 *seclen = aa_label_asxprint(secdata, root_ns, label, 154 FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | 155 FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED | 156 FLAG_ABS_ROOT, GFP_ATOMIC); 157 else 158 *seclen = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, root_ns, label, 159 FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | 160 FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED | 161 FLAG_ABS_ROOT); > 162 if (*seclen < 0) 163 return -ENOMEM; 164 165 return 0; 166 } 167 Fixes: c092921219d2 ("apparmor: add support for mapping secids and using secctxes") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: fix typo "preconfinement"Zygmunt Krynicki2018-05-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Zygmunt Krynicki <zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com> Acked-by: Christian Boltz <apparmor@cboltz.de> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: fix typo "independent"Zygmunt Krynicki2018-05-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Zygmunt Krynicki <zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com> Acked-by: Christian Boltz <apparmor@cboltz.de> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: fix typo "traverse"Zygmunt Krynicki2018-05-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Zygmunt Krynicki <zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com> Acked-by: Christian Boltz <apparmor@cboltz.de> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: fix typo "type"Zygmunt Krynicki2018-05-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Zygmunt Krynicki <zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com> Acked-by: Christian Boltz <apparmor@cboltz.de> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: fix typo "replace"Zygmunt Krynicki2018-05-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Zygmunt Krynicki <zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com> Acked-by: Christian Boltz <apparmor@cboltz.de> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: fix typo "comparison"Zygmunt Krynicki2018-05-031-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Zygmunt Krynicki <zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com> Acked-by: Christian Boltz <apparmor@cboltz.de> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: fix typo "loosen"Zygmunt Krynicki2018-05-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Zygmunt Krynicki <zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com> Acked-by: Christian Boltz <apparmor@cboltz.de> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-03-18 10:02:10 +0000