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* ima: Don't ignore errors from crypto_shash_update()Roberto Sassu2020-10-291-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 60386b854008adc951c470067f90a2d85b5d520f upstream. Errors returned by crypto_shash_update() are not checked in ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm() and thus can be overwritten at the next iteration of the loop. This patch adds a check after calling crypto_shash_update() and returns immediately if the result is not zero. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 3323eec921efd ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* selinux: sel_avc_get_stat_idx should increase position indexVasily Averin2020-10-011-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 8d269a8e2a8f0bca89022f4ec98de460acb90365 ] If seq_file .next function does not change position index, read after some lseek can generate unexpected output. $ dd if=/sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats # usual output lookups hits misses allocations reclaims frees 817223 810034 7189 7189 6992 7037 1934894 1926896 7998 7998 7632 7683 1322812 1317176 5636 5636 5456 5507 1560571 1551548 9023 9023 9056 9115 0+1 records in 0+1 records out 189 bytes copied, 5,1564e-05 s, 3,7 MB/s $# read after lseek to midle of last line $ dd if=/sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats bs=180 skip=1 dd: /sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats: cannot skip to specified offset 056 9115 <<<< end of last line 1560571 1551548 9023 9023 9056 9115 <<< whole last line once again 0+1 records in 0+1 records out 45 bytes copied, 8,7221e-05 s, 516 kB/s $# read after lseek beyond end of of file $ dd if=/sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats bs=1000 skip=1 dd: /sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats: cannot skip to specified offset 1560571 1551548 9023 9023 9056 9115 <<<< generates whole last line 0+1 records in 0+1 records out 36 bytes copied, 9,0934e-05 s, 396 kB/s https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206283 Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* Smack: prevent underflow in smk_set_cipso()Dan Carpenter2020-08-211-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 42a2df3e829f3c5562090391b33714b2e2e5ad4a ] We have an upper bound on "maplevel" but forgot to check for negative values. Fixes: e114e473771c ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* Smack: fix another vsscanf out of boundsDan Carpenter2020-08-211-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit a6bd4f6d9b07452b0b19842044a6c3ea384b0b88 ] This is similar to commit 84e99e58e8d1 ("Smack: slab-out-of-bounds in vsscanf") where we added a bounds check on "rule". Reported-by: syzbot+a22c6092d003d6fe1122@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: f7112e6c9abf ("Smack: allow for significantly longer Smack labels v4") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* Smack: fix use-after-free in smk_write_relabel_self()Eric Biggers2020-08-211-2/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit beb4ee6770a89646659e6a2178538d2b13e2654e upstream. smk_write_relabel_self() frees memory from the task's credentials with no locking, which can easily cause a use-after-free because multiple tasks can share the same credentials structure. Fix this by using prepare_creds() and commit_creds() to correctly modify the task's credentials. Reproducer for "BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in smk_write_relabel_self": #include <fcntl.h> #include <pthread.h> #include <unistd.h> static void *thrproc(void *arg) { int fd = open("/sys/fs/smackfs/relabel-self", O_WRONLY); for (;;) write(fd, "foo", 3); } int main() { pthread_t t; pthread_create(&t, NULL, thrproc, NULL); thrproc(NULL); } Reported-by: syzbot+e6416dabb497a650da40@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 38416e53936e ("Smack: limited capability for changing process label") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.4+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* selinux: fix double freeTom Rix2020-06-301-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 65de50969a77509452ae590e9449b70a22b923bb upstream. Clang's static analysis tool reports these double free memory errors. security/selinux/ss/services.c:2987:4: warning: Attempt to free released memory [unix.Malloc] kfree(bnames[i]); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ security/selinux/ss/services.c:2990:2: warning: Attempt to free released memory [unix.Malloc] kfree(bvalues); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~ So improve the security_get_bools error handling by freeing these variables and setting their return pointers to NULL and the return len to 0 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* evm: Fix possible memory leak in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash()Roberto Sassu2020-06-201-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 0c4395fb2aa77341269ea619c5419ea48171883f upstream. Don't immediately return if the signature is portable and security.ima is not present. Just set error so that memory allocated is freed before returning from evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(). Fixes: 50b977481fce9 ("EVM: Add support for portable signature format") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ima: Directly assign the ima_default_policy pointer to ima_rulesRoberto Sassu2020-06-201-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 067a436b1b0aafa593344fddd711a755a58afb3b upstream. This patch prevents the following oops: [ 10.771813] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000 [...] [ 10.779790] RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0xf7/0xb80 [...] [ 10.798576] Call Trace: [ 10.798993] ? ima_lsm_policy_change+0x2b0/0x2b0 [ 10.799753] ? inode_init_owner+0x1a0/0x1a0 [ 10.800484] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x7a/0xd0 [ 10.801592] ima_must_appraise.part.0+0xb6/0xf0 [ 10.802313] ? ima_fix_xattr.isra.0+0xd0/0xd0 [ 10.803167] ima_must_appraise+0x4f/0x70 [ 10.804004] ima_post_path_mknod+0x2e/0x80 [ 10.804800] do_mknodat+0x396/0x3c0 It occurs when there is a failure during IMA initialization, and ima_init_policy() is not called. IMA hooks still call ima_match_policy() but ima_rules is NULL. This patch prevents the crash by directly assigning the ima_default_policy pointer to ima_rules when ima_rules is defined. This wouldn't alter the existing behavior, as ima_rules is always set at the end of ima_init_policy(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.7.x Fixes: 07f6a79415d7d ("ima: add appraise action keywords and default rules") Reported-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ima: Fix ima digest hash table key calculationKrzysztof Struczynski2020-06-201-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 1129d31b55d509f15e72dc68e4b5c3a4d7b4da8d upstream. Function hash_long() accepts unsigned long, while currently only one byte is passed from ima_hash_key(), which calculates a key for ima_htable. Given that hashing the digest does not give clear benefits compared to using the digest itself, remove hash_long() and return the modulus calculated on the first two bytes of the digest with the number of slots. Also reduce the depth of the hash table by doubling the number of slots. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 3323eec921ef ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider") Co-developed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com> Acked-by: David.Laight@aculab.com (big endian system concerns) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Smack: slab-out-of-bounds in vsscanfCasey Schaufler2020-06-201-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 84e99e58e8d1e26f04c097f4266e431a33987f36 upstream. Add barrier to soob. Return -EOVERFLOW if the buffer is exceeded. Suggested-by: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Reported-by: syzbot+bfdd4a2f07be52351350@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* exec: Always set cap_ambient in cap_bprm_set_credsEric W. Biederman2020-06-031-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit a4ae32c71fe90794127b32d26d7ad795813b502e ] An invariant of cap_bprm_set_creds is that every field in the new cred structure that cap_bprm_set_creds might set, needs to be set every time to ensure the fields does not get a stale value. The field cap_ambient is not set every time cap_bprm_set_creds is called, which means that if there is a suid or sgid script with an interpreter that has neither the suid nor the sgid bits set the interpreter should be able to accept ambient credentials. Unfortuantely because cap_ambient is not reset to it's original value the interpreter can not accept ambient credentials. Given that the ambient capability set is expected to be controlled by the caller, I don't think this is particularly serious. But it is definitely worth fixing so the code works correctly. I have tested to verify my reading of the code is correct and the interpreter of a sgid can receive ambient capabilities with this change and cannot receive ambient capabilities without this change. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Fixes: 58319057b784 ("capabilities: ambient capabilities") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* ima: Fix return value of ima_write_policy()Roberto Sassu2020-05-271-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 2e3a34e9f409ebe83d1af7cd2f49fca7af97dfac ] This patch fixes the return value of ima_write_policy() when a new policy is directly passed to IMA and the current policy requires appraisal of the file containing the policy. Currently, if appraisal is not in ENFORCE mode, ima_write_policy() returns 0 and leads user space applications to an endless loop. Fix this issue by denying the operation regardless of the appraisal mode. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.10.x Fixes: 19f8a84713edc ("ima: measure and appraise the IMA policy itself") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer in init_desc()Roberto Sassu2020-05-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 53de3b080d5eae31d0de219617155dcc34e7d698 ] This patch avoids a kernel panic due to accessing an error pointer set by crypto_alloc_shash(). It occurs especially when there are many files that require an unsupported algorithm, as it would increase the likelihood of the following race condition: Task A: *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash() <= error pointer Task B: if (*tfm == NULL) <= *tfm is not NULL, use it Task B: rc = crypto_shash_init(desc) <= panic Task A: *tfm = NULL This patch uses the IS_ERR_OR_NULL macro to determine whether or not a new crypto context must be created. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: d46eb3699502b ("evm: crypto hash replaced by shash") Co-developed-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* selinux: properly handle multiple messages in selinux_netlink_send()Paul Moore2020-05-051-24/+44
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit fb73974172ffaaf57a7c42f35424d9aece1a5af6 upstream. Fix the SELinux netlink_send hook to properly handle multiple netlink messages in a single sk_buff; each message is parsed and subject to SELinux access control. Prior to this patch, SELinux only inspected the first message in the sk_buff. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* KEYS: reaching the keys quotas correctlyYang Xu2020-04-242-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 2e356101e72ab1361821b3af024d64877d9a798d upstream. Currently, when we add a new user key, the calltrace as below: add_key() key_create_or_update() key_alloc() __key_instantiate_and_link generic_key_instantiate key_payload_reserve ...... Since commit a08bf91ce28e ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly"), we can reach max bytes/keys in key_alloc, but we forget to remove this limit when we reserver space for payload in key_payload_reserve. So we can only reach max keys but not max bytes when having delta between plen and type->def_datalen. Remove this limit when instantiating the key, so we can keep consistent with key_alloc. Also, fix the similar problem in keyctl_chown_key(). Fixes: 0b77f5bfb45c ("keys: make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys") Fixes: a08bf91ce28e ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.0.x Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Xu <xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in avc_update()Jaihind Yadav2020-02-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 030b995ad9ece9fa2d218af4429c1c78c2342096 ] In AVC update we don't call avc_node_kill() when avc_xperms_populate() fails, resulting in the avc->avc_cache.active_nodes counter having a false value. In last patch this changes was missed , so correcting it. Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls") Signed-off-by: Jaihind Yadav <jaihindyadav@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Ravi Kumar Siddojigari <rsiddoji@codeaurora.org> [PM: merge fuzz, minor description cleanup] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* keys: Timestamp new keysDavid Howells2020-01-291-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 7c1857bdbdf1e4c541e45eab477ee23ed4333ea4 ] Set the timestamp on new keys rather than leaving it unset. Fixes: 31d5a79d7f3d ("KEYS: Do LRU discard in full keyrings") Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* ima: always return negative code for errorSascha Hauer2019-10-171-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit f5e1040196dbfe14c77ce3dfe3b7b08d2d961e88 ] integrity_kernel_read() returns the number of bytes read. If this is a short read then this positive value is returned from ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(). Currently this is only indirectly called from ima_calc_file_hash() and this function only tests for the return value being zero or nonzero and also doesn't forward the return value. Nevertheless there's no point in returning a positive value as an error, so translate a short read into -EINVAL. Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* smack: use GFP_NOFS while holding inode_smack::smk_lockEric Biggers2019-10-072-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit e5bfad3d7acc5702f32aafeb388362994f4d7bd0 upstream. inode_smack::smk_lock is taken during smack_d_instantiate(), which is called during a filesystem transaction when creating a file on ext4. Therefore to avoid a deadlock, all code that takes this lock must use GFP_NOFS, to prevent memory reclaim from waiting for the filesystem transaction to complete. Reported-by: syzbot+0eefc1e06a77d327a056@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Smack: Don't ignore other bprm->unsafe flags if LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is setJann Horn2019-10-071-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 3675f052b43ba51b99b85b073c7070e083f3e6fb upstream. There is a logic bug in the current smack_bprm_set_creds(): If LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set, but the ptrace state is deemed to be acceptable (e.g. because the ptracer detached in the meantime), the other ->unsafe flags aren't checked. As far as I can tell, this means that something like the following could work (but I haven't tested it): - task A: create task B with fork() - task B: set NO_NEW_PRIVS - task B: install a seccomp filter that makes open() return 0 under some conditions - task B: replace fd 0 with a malicious library - task A: attach to task B with PTRACE_ATTACH - task B: execve() a file with an SMACK64EXEC extended attribute - task A: while task B is still in the middle of execve(), exit (which destroys the ptrace relationship) Make sure that if any flags other than LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE are set in bprm->unsafe, we reject the execve(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5663884caab1 ("Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* security: smack: Fix possible null-pointer dereferences in ↵Jia-Ju Bai2019-10-071-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb() [ Upstream commit 3f4287e7d98a2954f20bf96c567fdffcd2b63eb9 ] In smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(), there is an if statement on line 3920 to check whether skb is NULL: if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) This check indicates skb can be NULL in some cases. But on lines 3931 and 3932, skb is used: ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL); Thus, possible null-pointer dereferences may occur when skb is NULL. To fix these possible bugs, an if statement is added to check skb. These bugs are found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us. Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* keys: Fix missing null pointer check in request_key_auth_describe()Hillf Danton2019-09-211-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit d41a3effbb53b1bcea41e328d16a4d046a508381 ] If a request_key authentication token key gets revoked, there's a window in which request_key_auth_describe() can see it with a NULL payload - but it makes no check for this and something like the following oops may occur: BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000038 Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000004ddf30 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] ... NIP [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x90/0xd0 LR [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x54/0xd0 Call Trace: [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x54/0xd0 (unreliable) [...] proc_keys_show+0x308/0x4c0 [...] seq_read+0x3d0/0x540 [...] proc_reg_read+0x90/0x110 [...] __vfs_read+0x3c/0x70 [...] vfs_read+0xb4/0x1b0 [...] ksys_read+0x7c/0x130 [...] system_call+0x5c/0x70 Fix this by checking for a NULL pointer when describing such a key. Also make the read routine check for a NULL pointer to be on the safe side. [DH: Modified to not take already-held rcu lock and modified to also check in the read routine] Fixes: 04c567d9313e ("[PATCH] Keys: Fix race between two instantiators of a key") Reported-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* selinux: fix memory leak in policydb_init()Ondrej Mosnacek2019-08-061-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 45385237f65aeee73641f1ef737d7273905a233f upstream. Since roles_init() adds some entries to the role hash table, we need to destroy also its keys/values on error, otherwise we get a memory leak in the error path. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: syzbot+fee3a14d4cdf92646287@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* apparmor: enforce nullbyte at end of tag stringJann Horn2019-07-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 8404d7a674c49278607d19726e0acc0cae299357 upstream. A packed AppArmor policy contains null-terminated tag strings that are read by unpack_nameX(). However, unpack_nameX() uses string functions on them without ensuring that they are actually null-terminated, potentially leading to out-of-bounds accesses. Make sure that the tag string is null-terminated before passing it to strcmp(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 736ec752d95e ("AppArmor: policy routines for loading and unpacking policy") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* selinux: never allow relabeling on context mountsOndrej Mosnacek2019-05-081-9/+31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit a83d6ddaebe541570291205cb538e35ad4ff94f9 upstream. In the SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT case we never want to allow relabeling files/directories, so we should never set the SBLABEL_MNT flag. The 'special handling' in selinux_is_sblabel_mnt() is only intended for when the behavior is set to SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS. While there, make the logic in selinux_is_sblabel_mnt() more explicit and add a BUILD_BUG_ON() to make sure that introducing a new SECURITY_FS_USE_* forces a review of the logic. Fixes: d5f3a5f6e7e7 ("selinux: add security in-core xattr support for pstore and debugfs") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* device_cgroup: fix RCU imbalance in error caseJann Horn2019-04-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 0fcc4c8c044e117ac126ab6df4138ea9a67fa2a9 upstream. When dev_exception_add() returns an error (due to a failed memory allocation), make sure that we move the RCU preemption count back to where it was before we were called. We dropped the RCU read lock inside the loop body, so we can't just "break". sparse complains about this, too: $ make -s C=2 security/device_cgroup.o ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:647:9: warning: context imbalance in 'propagate_exception' - unexpected unlock Fixes: d591fb56618f ("device_cgroup: simplify cgroup tree walk in propagate_exception()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* selinux: do not override context on context mountsOndrej Mosnacek2019-04-051-1/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 53e0c2aa9a59a48e3798ef193d573ade85aa80f5 ] Ignore all selinux_inode_notifysecctx() calls on mounts with SBLABEL_MNT flag unset. This is achived by returning -EOPNOTSUPP for this case in selinux_inode_setsecurtity() (because that function should not be called in such case anyway) and translating this error to 0 in selinux_inode_notifysecctx(). This fixes behavior of kernfs-based filesystems when mounted with the 'context=' option. Before this patch, if a node's context had been explicitly set to a non-default value and later the filesystem has been remounted with the 'context=' option, then this node would show up as having the manually-set context and not the mount-specified one. Steps to reproduce: # mount -t cgroup2 cgroup2 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified # chcon unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/cgroup.stat # ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified total 0 -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs -r--r--r--. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads # umount /sys/fs/cgroup/unified # mount -o context=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 -t cgroup2 cgroup2 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified Result before: # ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified total 0 -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs -r--r--r--. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads Result after: # ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified total 0 -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* missing barriers in some of unix_sock ->addr and ->path accessesAl Viro2019-03-191-4/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit ae3b564179bfd06f32d051b9e5d72ce4b2a07c37 ] Several u->addr and u->path users are not holding any locks in common with unix_bind(). unix_state_lock() is useless for those purposes. u->addr is assign-once and *(u->addr) is fully set up by the time we set u->addr (all under unix_table_lock). u->path is also set in the same critical area, also before setting u->addr, and any unix_sock with ->path filled will have non-NULL ->addr. So setting ->addr with smp_store_release() is all we need for those "lockless" users - just have them fetch ->addr with smp_load_acquire() and don't even bother looking at ->path if they see NULL ->addr. Users of ->addr and ->path fall into several classes now: 1) ones that do smp_load_acquire(u->addr) and access *(u->addr) and u->path only if smp_load_acquire() has returned non-NULL. 2) places holding unix_table_lock. These are guaranteed that *(u->addr) is seen fully initialized. If unix_sock is in one of the "bound" chains, so's ->path. 3) unix_sock_destructor() using ->addr is safe. All places that set u->addr are guaranteed to have seen all stores *(u->addr) while holding a reference to u and unix_sock_destructor() is called when (atomic) refcount hits zero. 4) unix_release_sock() using ->path is safe. unix_bind() is serialized wrt unix_release() (normally - by struct file refcount), and for the instances that had ->path set by unix_bind() unix_release_sock() comes from unix_release(), so they are fine. Instances that had it set in unix_stream_connect() either end up attached to a socket (in unix_accept()), in which case the call chain to unix_release_sock() and serialization are the same as in the previous case, or they never get accept'ed and unix_release_sock() is called when the listener is shut down and its queue gets purged. In that case the listener's queue lock provides the barriers needed - unix_stream_connect() shoves our unix_sock into listener's queue under that lock right after having set ->path and eventual unix_release_sock() caller picks them from that queue under the same lock right before calling unix_release_sock(). 5) unix_find_other() use of ->path is pointless, but safe - it happens with successful lookup by (abstract) name, so ->path.dentry is guaranteed to be NULL there. earlier-variant-reviewed-by: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* KEYS: restrict /proc/keys by credentials at open timeEric Biggers2019-03-191-6/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 4aa68e07d845562561f5e73c04aa521376e95252 upstream. When checking for permission to view keys whilst reading from /proc/keys, we should use the credentials with which the /proc/keys file was opened. This is because, in a classic type of exploit, it can be possible to bypass checks for the *current* credentials by passing the file descriptor to a suid program. Following commit 34dbbcdbf633 ("Make file credentials available to the seqfile interfaces") we can finally fix it. So let's do it. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Zubin Mithra <zsm@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* KEYS: always initialize keyring_index_key::desc_lenEric Biggers2019-02-274-6/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit ede0fa98a900e657d1fcd80b50920efc896c1a4c upstream. syzbot hit the 'BUG_ON(index_key->desc_len == 0);' in __key_link_begin() called from construct_alloc_key() during sys_request_key(), because the length of the key description was never calculated. The problem is that we rely on ->desc_len being initialized by search_process_keyrings(), specifically by search_nested_keyrings(). But, if the process isn't subscribed to any keyrings that never happens. Fix it by always initializing keyring_index_key::desc_len as soon as the description is set, like we already do in some places. The following program reproduces the BUG_ON() when it's run as root and no session keyring has been installed. If it doesn't work, try removing pam_keyinit.so from /etc/pam.d/login and rebooting. #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <keyutils.h> int main(void) { int id = add_key("keyring", "syz", NULL, 0, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING); keyctl_setperm(id, KEY_OTH_WRITE); setreuid(5000, 5000); request_key("user", "desc", "", id); } Reported-by: syzbot+ec24e95ea483de0a24da@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: b2a4df200d57 ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactlyEric Biggers2019-02-271-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit a08bf91ce28ed3ae7b6fef35d843fef8dc8c2cd9 upstream. If the sysctl 'kernel.keys.maxkeys' is set to some number n, then actually users can only add up to 'n - 1' keys. Likewise for 'kernel.keys.maxbytes' and the root_* versions of these sysctls. But these sysctls are apparently supposed to be *maximums*, as per their names and all documentation I could find -- the keyrings(7) man page, Documentation/security/keys/core.rst, and all the mentions of EDQUOT meaning that the key quota was *exceeded* (as opposed to reached). Thus, fix the code to allow reaching the quotas exactly. Fixes: 0b77f5bfb45c ("keys: make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* smack: fix access permissions for keyringZoran Markovic2019-02-121-3/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 5b841bfab695e3b8ae793172a9ff7990f99cc3e2 ] Function smack_key_permission() only issues smack requests for the following operations: - KEY_NEED_READ (issues MAY_READ) - KEY_NEED_WRITE (issues MAY_WRITE) - KEY_NEED_LINK (issues MAY_WRITE) - KEY_NEED_SETATTR (issues MAY_WRITE) A blank smack request is issued in all other cases, resulting in smack access being granted if there is any rule defined between subject and object, or denied with -EACCES otherwise. Request MAY_READ access for KEY_NEED_SEARCH and KEY_NEED_VIEW. Fix the logic in the unlikely case when both MAY_READ and MAY_WRITE are needed. Validate access permission field for valid contents. Signed-off-by: Zoran Markovic <zmarkovic@sierrawireless.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* selinux: always allow mounting submountsOndrej Mosnacek2019-01-261-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 2cbdcb882f97a45f7475c67ac6257bbc16277dfe ] If a superblock has the MS_SUBMOUNT flag set, we should always allow mounting it. These mounts are done automatically by the kernel either as part of mounting some parent mount (e.g. debugfs always mounts tracefs under "tracing" for compatibility) or they are mounted automatically as needed on subdirectory accesses (e.g. NFS crossmnt mounts). Since such automounts are either an implicit consequence of the parent mount (which is already checked) or they can happen during regular accesses (where it doesn't make sense to check against the current task's context), the mount permission check should be skipped for them. Without this patch, attempts to access contents of an automounted directory can cause unexpected SELinux denials. In the current kernel tree, the MS_SUBMOUNT flag is set only via vfs_submount(), which is called only from the following places: - AFS, when automounting special "symlinks" referencing other cells - CIFS, when automounting "referrals" - NFS, when automounting subtrees - debugfs, when automounting tracefs In all cases the submounts are meant to be transparent to the user and it makes sense that if mounting the master is allowed, then so should be the automounts. Note that CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability checking is already skipped for (SB_KERNMOUNT|SB_SUBMOUNT) in: - sget_userns() in fs/super.c: if (!(flags & (SB_KERNMOUNT|SB_SUBMOUNT)) && !(type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_MOUNT) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); - sget() in fs/super.c: /* Ensure the requestor has permissions over the target filesystem */ if (!(flags & (SB_KERNMOUNT|SB_SUBMOUNT)) && !ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); Verified internally on patched RHEL 7.6 with a reproducer using NFS+httpd and selinux-tesuite. Fixes: 93faccbbfa95 ("fs: Better permission checking for submounts") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* selinux: fix GPF on invalid policyStephen Smalley2019-01-231-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 5b0e7310a2a33c06edc7eb81ffc521af9b2c5610 upstream. levdatum->level can be NULL if we encounter an error while loading the policy during sens_read prior to initializing it. Make sure sens_destroy handles that case correctly. Reported-by: syzbot+6664500f0f18f07a5c0e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* LSM: Check for NULL cred-security on freeJames Morris2019-01-231-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit a5795fd38ee8194451ba3f281f075301a3696ce2 upstream. From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Check that the cred security blob has been set before trying to clean it up. There is a case during credential initialization that could result in this. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Reported-by: syzbot+69ca07954461f189e808@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Yama: Check for pid death before checking ancestryKees Cook2019-01-231-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 9474f4e7cd71a633fa1ef93b7daefd44bbdfd482 upstream. It's possible that a pid has died before we take the rcu lock, in which case we can't walk the ancestry list as it may be detached. Instead, check for death first before doing the walk. Reported-by: syzbot+a9ac39bf55329e206219@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 2d514487faf1 ("security: Yama LSM") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ima: re-initialize iint->atomic_flagsMimi Zohar2018-12-011-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit e2598077dc6a26c9644393e5c21f22a90dbdccdb upstream. Intermittently security.ima is not being written for new files. This patch re-initializes the new slab iint->atomic_flags field before freeing it. Fixes: commit 0d73a55208e9 ("ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lock") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Aditya Kali <adityakali@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lockDmitry Kasatkin2018-12-014-40/+77
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 0d73a55208e94fc9fb6deaeea61438cd3280d4c0 upstream. Before IMA appraisal was introduced, IMA was using own integrity cache lock along with i_mutex. process_measurement and ima_file_free took the iint->mutex first and then the i_mutex, while setxattr, chmod and chown took the locks in reverse order. To resolve the potential deadlock, i_mutex was moved to protect entire IMA functionality and the redundant iint->mutex was eliminated. Solution was based on the assumption that filesystem code does not take i_mutex further. But when file is opened with O_DIRECT flag, direct-io implementation takes i_mutex and produces deadlock. Furthermore, certain other filesystem operations, such as llseek, also take i_mutex. More recently some filesystems have replaced their filesystem specific lock with the global i_rwsem to read a file. As a result, when IMA attempts to calculate the file hash, reading the file attempts to take the i_rwsem again. To resolve O_DIRECT related deadlock problem, this patch re-introduces iint->mutex. But to eliminate the original chmod() related deadlock problem, this patch eliminates the requirement for chmod hooks to take the iint->mutex by introducing additional atomic iint->attr_flags to indicate calling of the hooks. The allowed locking order is to take the iint->mutex first and then the i_rwsem. Original flags were cleared in chmod(), setxattr() or removwxattr() hooks and tested when file was closed or opened again. New atomic flags are set or cleared in those hooks and tested to clear iint->flags on close or on open. Atomic flags are following: * IMA_CHANGE_ATTR - indicates that chATTR() was called (chmod, chown, chgrp) and file attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA to clear iint->flags to re-evaluate policy and perform IMA functions again. * IMA_CHANGE_XATTR - indicates that setxattr or removexattr was called and extended attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA to clear iint->flags IMA_DONE_MASK to re-appraise. * IMA_UPDATE_XATTR - indicates that security.ima needs to be updated. It is cleared if file policy changes and no update is needed. * IMA_DIGSIG - indicates that file security.ima has signature and file security.ima must not update to file has on file close. * IMA_MUST_MEASURE - indicates the file is in the measurement policy. Fixes: Commit 6552321831dc ("xfs: remove i_iolock and use i_rwsem in the VFS inode instead") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Aditya Kali <adityakali@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* EVM: Add support for portable signature formatMatthew Garrett2018-12-015-21/+91
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 50b977481fce90aa5fbda55e330b9d722733e358 upstream. The EVM signature includes the inode number and (optionally) the filesystem UUID, making it impractical to ship EVM signatures in packages. This patch adds a new portable format intended to allow distributions to include EVM signatures. It is identical to the existing format but hardcodes the inode and generation numbers to 0 and does not include the filesystem UUID even if the kernel is configured to do so. Removing the inode means that the metadata and signature from one file could be copied to another file without invalidating it. This is avoided by ensuring that an IMA xattr is present during EVM validation. Portable signatures are intended to be immutable - ie, they will never be transformed into HMACs. Based on earlier work by Dmitry Kasatkin and Mikhail Kurinnoi. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Cc: Mikhail Kurinnoi <viewizard@viewizard.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Aditya Kali <adityakali@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ima: always measure and audit files in policyMimi Zohar2018-12-013-30/+56
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit f3cc6b25dcc5616f0d5c720009b2ac66f97df2ff upstream. All files matching a "measure" rule must be included in the IMA measurement list, even when the file hash cannot be calculated. Similarly, all files matching an "audit" rule must be audited, even when the file hash can not be calculated. The file data hash field contained in the IMA measurement list template data will contain 0's instead of the actual file hash digest. Note: In general, adding, deleting or in anyway changing which files are included in the IMA measurement list is not a good idea, as it might result in not being able to unseal trusted keys sealed to a specific TPM PCR value. This patch not only adds file measurements that were not previously measured, but specifies that the file hash value for these files will be 0's. As the IMA measurement list ordering is not consistent from one boot to the next, it is unlikely that anyone is sealing keys based on the IMA measurement list. Remote attestation servers should be able to process these new measurement records, but might complain about these unknown records. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Cc: Aditya Kali <adityakali@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Revert "evm: Translate user/group ids relative to s_user_ns when computing HMAC"Eric W. Biederman2018-12-011-2/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 19339c251607a3defc7f089511ce8561936fee45 upstream. This reverts commit 0b3c9761d1e405514a551ed24d3ea89aea26ce14. Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> writes: > All right, I think 0b3c9761d1e405514a551ed24d3ea89aea26ce14 should be > reverted then. EVM is a machine-local integrity mechanism, and so it > makes sense that the signature would be based on the kernel's notion of > the uid and not the filesystem's. I added a commment explaining why the EVM hmac needs to be in the kernel's notion of uid and gid, not the filesystems to prevent remounting the filesystem and gaining unwaranted trust in files. Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Aditya Kali <adityakali@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* selinux: Add __GFP_NOWARN to allocation at str_read()Tetsuo Handa2018-12-011-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 4458bba09788e70e8fb39ad003f087cd9dfbd6ac upstream. syzbot is hitting warning at str_read() [1] because len parameter can become larger than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. We don't need to emit warning for this case. [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=7f2f5aad79ea8663c296a2eedb81978401a908f0 Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+ac488b9811036cea7ea0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ima: fix showing large 'violations' or 'runtime_measurements_count'Eric Biggers2018-11-131-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 1e4c8dafbb6bf72fb5eca035b861e39c5896c2b7 upstream. The 12 character temporary buffer is not necessarily long enough to hold a 'long' value. Increase it. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* evm: Don't deadlock if a crypto algorithm is unavailableMatthew Garrett2018-09-261-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit e2861fa71641c6414831d628a1f4f793b6562580 ] When EVM attempts to appraise a file signed with a crypto algorithm the kernel doesn't have support for, it will cause the kernel to trigger a module load. If the EVM policy includes appraisal of kernel modules this will in turn call back into EVM - since EVM is holding a lock until the crypto initialisation is complete, this triggers a deadlock. Add a CRYPTO_NOLOAD flag and skip module loading if it's set, and add that flag in the EVM case in order to fail gracefully with an error message instead of deadlocking. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Smack: Fix handling of IPv4 traffic received by PF_INET6 socketsPiotr Sawicki2018-09-261-5/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 129a99890936766f4b69b9da7ed88366313a9210 ] A socket which has sk_family set to PF_INET6 is able to receive not only IPv6 but also IPv4 traffic (IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses). Prior to this patch, the smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6() could have been called for socket buffers containing IPv4 packets, in result such traffic was allowed. Signed-off-by: Piotr Sawicki <p.sawicki2@partner.samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* selinux: use GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC kmem_cachesMichal Hocko2018-09-191-8/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 476accbe2f6ef69caeebe99f52a286e12ac35aee upstream. There is a strange __GFP_NOMEMALLOC usage pattern in SELinux, specifically GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC which doesn't make much sense. GFP_ATOMIC on its own allows to access memory reserves while __GFP_NOMEMALLOC dictates we cannot use memory reserves. Replace this with the much more sane GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC code as we can tolerate memory allocation failures in that code. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Smack: Mark inode instant in smack_task_to_inodeCasey Schaufler2018-08-241-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 7b4e88434c4e7982fb053c49657e1c8bbb8692d9 ] Smack: Mark inode instant in smack_task_to_inode /proc clean-up in commit 1bbc55131e59bd099fdc568d3aa0b42634dbd188 resulted in smack_task_to_inode() being called before smack_d_instantiate. This resulted in the smk_inode value being ignored, even while present for files in /proc/self. Marking the inode as instant here fixes that. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ima: based on policy verify firmware signatures (pre-allocated buffer)Mimi Zohar2018-08-031-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit fd90bc559bfba743ae8de87ff23b92a5e4668062 ] Don't differentiate, for now, between kernel_read_file_id READING_FIRMWARE and READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER enumerations. Fixes: a098ecd firmware: support loading into a pre-allocated buffer (since 4.8) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <stephen.boyd@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* selinux: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xattr_getsecuritySachin Grover2018-06-061-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit efe3de79e0b52ca281ef6691480c8c68c82a4657 upstream. Call trace: [<ffffff9203a8d7a8>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x428 [<ffffff9203a8dbf8>] show_stack+0x28/0x38 [<ffffff920409bfb8>] dump_stack+0xd4/0x124 [<ffffff9203d187e8>] print_address_description+0x68/0x258 [<ffffff9203d18c00>] kasan_report.part.2+0x228/0x2f0 [<ffffff9203d1927c>] kasan_report+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffff9203d1776c>] check_memory_region+0x12c/0x1c0 [<ffffff9203d17cdc>] memcpy+0x34/0x68 [<ffffff9203d75348>] xattr_getsecurity+0xe0/0x160 [<ffffff9203d75490>] vfs_getxattr+0xc8/0x120 [<ffffff9203d75d68>] getxattr+0x100/0x2c8 [<ffffff9203d76fb4>] SyS_fgetxattr+0x64/0xa0 [<ffffff9203a83f70>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28 If user get root access and calls security.selinux setxattr() with an embedded NUL on a file and then if some process performs a getxattr() on that file with a length greater than the actual length of the string, it would result in a panic. To fix this, add the actual length of the string to the security context instead of the length passed by the userspace process. Signed-off-by: Sachin Grover <sgrover@codeaurora.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Revert "ima: limit file hash setting by user to fix and log modes"Mimi Zohar2018-06-061-6/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit f5acb3dcba1ffb7f0b8cbb9dba61500eea5d610b upstream. Userspace applications have been modified to write security xattrs, but they are not context aware. In the case of security.ima, the security xattr can be either a file hash or a file signature. Permitting writing one, but not the other requires the application to be context aware. In addition, userspace applications might write files to a staging area, which might not be in policy, and then change some file metadata (eg. owner) making it in policy. As a result, these files are not labeled properly. This reverts commit c68ed80c97d9720f51ef31fe91560fdd1e121533, which prevents writing file hashes as security.ima xattrs. Requested-by: Patrick Ohly <patrick.ohly@intel.com> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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