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* selinux: avoid dereference of garbage after mount failureChristian Göttsche2024-04-101-5/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 37801a36b4d68892ce807264f784d818f8d0d39b upstream. In case kern_mount() fails and returns an error pointer return in the error branch instead of continuing and dereferencing the error pointer. While on it drop the never read static variable selinuxfs_mount. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 0619f0f5e36f ("selinux: wrap selinuxfs state") Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* landlock: Warn once if a Landlock action is requested while disabledMickaël Salaün2024-04-031-3/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 782191c74875cc33b50263e21d76080b1411884d ] Because sandboxing can be used as an opportunistic security measure, user space may not log unsupported features. Let the system administrator know if an application tries to use Landlock but failed because it isn't enabled at boot time. This may be caused by boot loader configurations with outdated "lsm" kernel's command-line parameter. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 265885daf3e5 ("landlock: Add syscall implementations") Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227110550.3702236-2-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* smack: Handle SMACK64TRANSMUTE in smack_inode_setsecurity()Roberto Sassu2024-04-031-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit ac02f007d64eb2769d0bde742aac4d7a5fc6e8a5 ] If the SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr is provided, and the inode is a directory, update the in-memory inode flags by setting SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5c6d1125f8db ("Smack: Transmute labels on specified directories") # v2.6.38.x Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* smack: Set SMACK64TRANSMUTE only for dirs in smack_inode_setxattr()Roberto Sassu2024-04-031-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 9c82169208dde516510aaba6bbd8b13976690c5d ] Since the SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr makes sense only for directories, enforce this restriction in smack_inode_setxattr(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5c6d1125f8db ("Smack: Transmute labels on specified directories") # v2.6.38.x Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* landlock: Fix asymmetric private inodes referringMickaël Salaün2024-03-061-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit d9818b3e906a0ee1ab02ea79e74a2f755fc5461a upstream. When linking or renaming a file, if only one of the source or destination directory is backed by an S_PRIVATE inode, then the related set of layer masks would be used as uninitialized by is_access_to_paths_allowed(). This would result to indeterministic access for one side instead of always being allowed. This bug could only be triggered with a mounted filesystem containing both S_PRIVATE and !S_PRIVATE inodes, which doesn't seem possible. The collect_domain_accesses() calls return early if is_nouser_or_private() returns false, which means that the directory's superblock has SB_NOUSER or its inode has S_PRIVATE. Because rename or link actions are only allowed on the same mounted filesystem, the superblock is always the same for both source and destination directories. However, it might be possible in theory to have an S_PRIVATE parent source inode with an !S_PRIVATE parent destination inode, or vice versa. To make sure this case is not an issue, explicitly initialized both set of layer masks to 0, which means to allow all actions on the related side. If at least on side has !S_PRIVATE, then collect_domain_accesses() and is_access_to_paths_allowed() check for the required access rights. Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Shervin Oloumi <enlightened@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: b91c3e4ea756 ("landlock: Add support for file reparenting with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240219190345.2928627-1-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* tomoyo: fix UAF write bug in tomoyo_write_control()Tetsuo Handa2024-03-061-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 2f03fc340cac9ea1dc63cbf8c93dd2eb0f227815 upstream. Since tomoyo_write_control() updates head->write_buf when write() of long lines is requested, we need to fetch head->write_buf after head->io_sem is held. Otherwise, concurrent write() requests can cause use-after-free-write and double-free problems. Reported-by: Sam Sun <samsun1006219@gmail.com> Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAEkJfYNDspuGxYx5kym8Lvp--D36CMDUErg4rxfWFJuPbbji8g@mail.gmail.com Fixes: bd03a3e4c9a9 ("TOMOYO: Add policy namespace support.") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # Linux 3.1+ Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* lsm: fix the logic in security_inode_getsecctx()Ondrej Mosnacek2024-02-231-1/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 99b817c173cd213671daecd25ca27f56b0c7c4ec upstream. The inode_getsecctx LSM hook has previously been corrected to have -EOPNOTSUPP instead of 0 as the default return value to fix BPF LSM behavior. However, the call_int_hook()-generated loop in security_inode_getsecctx() was left treating 0 as the neutral value, so after an LSM returns 0, the loop continues to try other LSMs, and if one of them returns a non-zero value, the function immediately returns with said value. So in a situation where SELinux and the BPF LSMs registered this hook, -EOPNOTSUPP would be incorrectly returned whenever SELinux returned 0. Fix this by open-coding the call_int_hook() loop and making it use the correct LSM_RET_DEFAULT() value as the neutral one, similar to what other hooks do. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/CAEjxPJ4ev-pasUwGx48fDhnmjBnq_Wh90jYPwRQRAqXxmOKD4Q@mail.gmail.com/ Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2257983 Fixes: b36995b8609a ("lsm: fix default return value for inode_getsecctx") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* lsm: fix default return value of the socket_getpeersec_*() hooksOndrej Mosnacek2024-02-231-4/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 5a287d3d2b9de2b3e747132c615599907ba5c3c1 upstream. For these hooks the true "neutral" value is -EOPNOTSUPP, which is currently what is returned when no LSM provides this hook and what LSMs return when there is no security context set on the socket. Correct the value in <linux/lsm_hooks.h> and adjust the dispatch functions in security/security.c to avoid issues when the BPF LSM is enabled. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 98e828a0650f ("security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hookAlfred Piccioni2024-01-314-0/+48
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit f1bb47a31dff6d4b34fb14e99850860ee74bb003 upstream. Some ioctl commands do not require ioctl permission, but are routed to other permissions such as FILE_GETATTR or FILE_SETATTR. This routing is done by comparing the ioctl cmd to a set of 64-bit flags (FS_IOC_*). However, if a 32-bit process is running on a 64-bit kernel, it emits 32-bit flags (FS_IOC32_*) for certain ioctl operations. These flags are being checked erroneously, which leads to these ioctl operations being routed to the ioctl permission, rather than the correct file permissions. This was also noted in a RED-PEN finding from a while back - "/* RED-PEN how should LSM module know it's handling 32bit? */". This patch introduces a new hook, security_file_ioctl_compat(), that is called from the compat ioctl syscall. All current LSMs have been changed to support this hook. Reviewing the three places where we are currently using security_file_ioctl(), it appears that only SELinux needs a dedicated compat change; TOMOYO and SMACK appear to be functional without any change. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 0b24dcb7f2f7 ("Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking"") Signed-off-by: Alfred Piccioni <alpic@google.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> [PM: subject tweak, line length fixes, and alignment corrections] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Revert "KEYS: encrypted: Add check for strsep"Mimi Zohar2024-01-251-4/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 1ed4b563100230ea68821a2b25a3d9f25388a3e6 upstream. This reverts commit b4af096b5df5dd131ab796c79cedc7069d8f4882. New encrypted keys are created either from kernel-generated random numbers or user-provided decrypted data. Revert the change requiring user-provided decrypted data. Reported-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* apparmor: avoid crash when parsed profile name is emptyFedor Pchelkin2024-01-251-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 55a8210c9e7d21ff2644809699765796d4bfb200 ] When processing a packed profile in unpack_profile() described like "profile :ns::samba-dcerpcd /usr/lib*/samba/{,samba/}samba-dcerpcd {...}" a string ":samba-dcerpcd" is unpacked as a fully-qualified name and then passed to aa_splitn_fqname(). aa_splitn_fqname() treats ":samba-dcerpcd" as only containing a namespace. Thus it returns NULL for tmpname, meanwhile tmpns is non-NULL. Later aa_alloc_profile() crashes as the new profile name is NULL now. general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 6 PID: 1657 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 6.7.0-rc2-dirty #16 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1e/0xa0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? strlen+0x1e/0xa0 aa_policy_init+0x1bb/0x230 aa_alloc_profile+0xb1/0x480 unpack_profile+0x3bc/0x4960 aa_unpack+0x309/0x15e0 aa_replace_profiles+0x213/0x33c0 policy_update+0x261/0x370 profile_replace+0x20e/0x2a0 vfs_write+0x2af/0xe00 ksys_write+0x126/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x46/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1e/0xa0 It seems such behaviour of aa_splitn_fqname() is expected and checked in other places where it is called (e.g. aa_remove_profiles). Well, there is an explicit comment "a ns name without a following profile is allowed" inside. AFAICS, nothing can prevent unpacked "name" to be in form like ":samba-dcerpcd" - it is passed from userspace. Deny the whole profile set replacement in such case and inform user with EPROTO and an explaining message. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). Fixes: 04dc715e24d0 ("apparmor: audit policy ns specified in policy load") Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* apparmor: fix possible memory leak in unpack_trans_tableFedor Pchelkin2024-01-252-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 1342ad786073e96fa813ad943c19f586157ae297 ] If we fail to unpack the transition table then the table elements which have been already allocated are not freed on error path. unreferenced object 0xffff88802539e000 (size 128): comm "apparmor_parser", pid 903, jiffies 4294914938 (age 35.085s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 20 73 6f 6d 65 20 6e 61 73 74 79 20 73 74 72 69 some nasty stri 6e 67 20 73 6f 6d 65 20 6e 61 73 74 79 20 73 74 ng some nasty st backtrace: [<ffffffff81ddb312>] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1e2/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81c47194>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x54/0x170 [<ffffffff81c225b9>] kmemdup+0x29/0x60 [<ffffffff83e1ee65>] aa_unpack_strdup+0xe5/0x1b0 [<ffffffff83e20808>] unpack_pdb+0xeb8/0x2700 [<ffffffff83e23567>] unpack_profile+0x1507/0x4a30 [<ffffffff83e27bfa>] aa_unpack+0x36a/0x1560 [<ffffffff83e194c3>] aa_replace_profiles+0x213/0x33c0 [<ffffffff83de9461>] policy_update+0x261/0x370 [<ffffffff83de978e>] profile_replace+0x20e/0x2a0 [<ffffffff81eac8bf>] vfs_write+0x2af/0xe00 [<ffffffff81eaddd6>] ksys_write+0x126/0x250 [<ffffffff88f34fb6>] do_syscall_64+0x46/0xf0 [<ffffffff890000ea>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 Call aa_free_str_table() on error path as was done before the blamed commit. It implements all necessary checks, frees str_table if it is available and nullifies the pointers. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). Fixes: a0792e2ceddc ("apparmor: make transition table unpack generic so it can be reused") Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* apparmor: Fix ref count leak in task_killJohn Johansen2024-01-251-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 2cb54a19ac7153b9a26a72098c495187f64c2276 ] apparmor_task_kill was not putting the task_cred reference tc, or the cred_label reference tc when dealing with a passed in cred, fix this by using a single fn exit. Fixes: 90c436a64a6e ("apparmor: pass cred through to audit info.") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* selinux: Fix error priority for bind with AF_UNSPEC on PF_INET6 socketMickaël Salaün2024-01-251-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit bbf5a1d0e5d0fb3bdf90205aa872636122692a50 ] The IPv6 network stack first checks the sockaddr length (-EINVAL error) before checking the family (-EAFNOSUPPORT error). This was discovered thanks to commit a549d055a22e ("selftests/landlock: Add network tests"). Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Cc: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Reported-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0584f91c-537c-4188-9e4f-04f192565667@collabora.com Fixes: 0f8db8cc73df ("selinux: add AF_UNSPEC and INADDR_ANY checks to selinux_socket_bind()") Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Tested-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* KEYS: encrypted: Add check for strsepChen Ni2024-01-251-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit b4af096b5df5dd131ab796c79cedc7069d8f4882 ] Add check for strsep() in order to transfer the error. Fixes: cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data") Signed-off-by: Chen Ni <nichen@iscas.ac.cn> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* apparmor: Fix move_mount mediation by detecting if source is detachedJohn Johansen2024-01-102-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 8026e40608b4d552216d2a818ca7080a4264bb44 ] Prevent move_mount from applying the attach_disconnected flag to move_mount(). This prevents detached mounts from appearing as / when applying mount mediation, which is not only incorrect but could result in bad policy being generated. Basic mount rules like allow mount, allow mount options=(move) -> /target/, will allow detached mounts, allowing older policy to continue to function. New policy gains the ability to specify `detached` as a source option allow mount detached -> /target/, In addition make sure support of move_mount is advertised as a feature to userspace so that applications that generate policy can respond to the addition. Note: this fixes mediation of move_mount when a detached mount is used, it does not fix the broader regression of apparmor mediation of mounts under the new mount api. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/68c166b8-5b4d-4612-8042-1dee3334385b@leemhuis.info/T/#mb35fdde37f999f08f0b02d58dc1bf4e6b65b8da2 Fixes: 157a3537d6bc ("apparmor: Fix regression in mount mediation") Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* keys, dns: Allow key types (eg. DNS) to be reclaimed immediately on expiryDavid Howells2024-01-014-22/+37
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 39299bdd2546688d92ed9db4948f6219ca1b9542 ] If a key has an expiration time, then when that time passes, the key is left around for a certain amount of time before being collected (5 mins by default) so that EKEYEXPIRED can be returned instead of ENOKEY. This is a problem for DNS keys because we want to redo the DNS lookup immediately at that point. Fix this by allowing key types to be marked such that keys of that type don't have this extra period, but are reclaimed as soon as they expire and turn this on for dns_resolver-type keys. To make this easier to handle, key->expiry is changed to be permanent if TIME64_MAX rather than 0. Furthermore, give such new-style negative DNS results a 1s default expiry if no other expiry time is set rather than allowing it to stick around indefinitely. This shouldn't be zero as ls will follow a failing stat call immediately with a second with AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW added. Fixes: 1a4240f4764a ("DNS: Separate out CIFS DNS Resolver code") Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Markus Suvanto <markus.suvanto@gmail.com> cc: Wang Lei <wang840925@gmail.com> cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> cc: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* cred: get rid of CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALSJens Axboe2023-12-201-6/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | commit ae1914174a63a558113e80d24ccac2773f9f7b2b upstream. This code is rarely (never?) enabled by distros, and it hasn't caught anything in decades. Let's kill off this legacy debug code. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* apparmor: Fix regression in mount mediationJohn Johansen2023-11-283-22/+51
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 157a3537d6bc28ceb9a11fc8cb67f2152d860146 ] commit 2db154b3ea8e ("vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around") introduced a new move_mount(2) system call and a corresponding new LSM security_move_mount hook but did not implement this hook for any existing LSM. This creates a regression for AppArmor mediation of mount. This patch provides a base mapping of the move_mount syscall to the existing mount mediation. In the future we may introduce additional mediations around the new mount calls. Fixes: 2db154b3ea8e ("vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Andreas Steinmetz <anstein99@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* apparmor: pass cred through to audit info.John Johansen2023-11-2820-211/+388
| | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 90c436a64a6e20482a9a613c47eb4af2e8a5328e ] The cred is needed to properly audit some messages, and will be needed in the future for uid conditional mediation. So pass it through to where the apparmor_audit_data struct gets defined. Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Stable-dep-of: 157a3537d6bc ("apparmor: Fix regression in mount mediation") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* apparmor: rename audit_data->label to audit_data->subj_labelJohn Johansen2023-11-2810-18/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit d20f5a1a6e792d22199c9989ec7ab9e95c48d60c ] rename audit_data's label field to subj_label to better reflect its use. Also at the same time drop unneeded assignments to ->subj_label as the later call to aa_check_perms will do the assignment if needed. Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Stable-dep-of: 157a3537d6bc ("apparmor: Fix regression in mount mediation") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* apparmor: combine common_audit_data and apparmor_audit_dataJohn Johansen2023-11-2815-245/+257
| | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit bd7bd201ca46c211c3ab251ca9854787d1331a2f ] Everywhere where common_audit_data is used apparmor audit_data is also used. We can simplify the code and drop the use of the aad macro everywhere by combining the two structures. Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Stable-dep-of: 157a3537d6bc ("apparmor: Fix regression in mount mediation") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* apparmor: Fix kernel-doc warnings in apparmor/policy.cGaosheng Cui2023-11-281-7/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 25ff0ff2d6286928dc516c74b879809c691c2dd8 ] Fix kernel-doc warnings: security/apparmor/policy.c:294: warning: Function parameter or member 'proxy' not described in 'aa_alloc_profile' security/apparmor/policy.c:785: warning: Function parameter or member 'label' not described in 'aa_policy_view_capable' security/apparmor/policy.c:785: warning: Function parameter or member 'ns' not described in 'aa_policy_view_capable' security/apparmor/policy.c:847: warning: Function parameter or member 'ns' not described in 'aa_may_manage_policy' security/apparmor/policy.c:964: warning: Function parameter or member 'hname' not described in '__lookup_replace' security/apparmor/policy.c:964: warning: Function parameter or member 'info' not described in '__lookup_replace' security/apparmor/policy.c:964: warning: Function parameter or member 'noreplace' not described in '__lookup_replace' security/apparmor/policy.c:964: warning: Function parameter or member 'ns' not described in '__lookup_replace' security/apparmor/policy.c:964: warning: Function parameter or member 'p' not described in '__lookup_replace' Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Stable-dep-of: 157a3537d6bc ("apparmor: Fix regression in mount mediation") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* apparmor: Fix kernel-doc warnings in apparmor/resource.cGaosheng Cui2023-11-281-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 13c1748e217078d437727eef333cb0387d13bc0e ] Fix kernel-doc warnings: security/apparmor/resource.c:111: warning: Function parameter or member 'label' not described in 'aa_task_setrlimit' security/apparmor/resource.c:111: warning: Function parameter or member 'new_rlim' not described in 'aa_task_setrlimit' security/apparmor/resource.c:111: warning: Function parameter or member 'resource' not described in 'aa_task_setrlimit' security/apparmor/resource.c:111: warning: Function parameter or member 'task' not described in 'aa_task_setrlimit' Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Stable-dep-of: 157a3537d6bc ("apparmor: Fix regression in mount mediation") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* apparmor: Fix kernel-doc warnings in apparmor/lib.cGaosheng Cui2023-11-281-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 8921482286116af193980f04f2f2755775a410a5 ] Fix kernel-doc warnings: security/apparmor/lib.c:33: warning: Excess function parameter 'str' description in 'aa_free_str_table' security/apparmor/lib.c:33: warning: Function parameter or member 't' not described in 'aa_free_str_table' security/apparmor/lib.c:94: warning: Function parameter or member 'n' not described in 'skipn_spaces' security/apparmor/lib.c:390: warning: Excess function parameter 'deny' description in 'aa_check_perms' Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Stable-dep-of: 157a3537d6bc ("apparmor: Fix regression in mount mediation") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* apparmor: Fix kernel-doc warnings in apparmor/audit.cGaosheng Cui2023-11-281-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 26c9ecb34f5f5fa43c041a220de01d7cbea97dd0 ] Fix kernel-doc warnings: security/apparmor/audit.c:150: warning: Function parameter or member 'type' not described in 'aa_audit_msg' Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Stable-dep-of: 157a3537d6bc ("apparmor: Fix regression in mount mediation") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* ima: detect changes to the backing overlay fileMimi Zohar2023-11-283-1/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit b836c4d29f2744200b2af41e14bf50758dddc818 upstream. Commit 18b44bc5a672 ("ovl: Always reevaluate the file signature for IMA") forced signature re-evaulation on every file access. Instead of always re-evaluating the file's integrity, detect a change to the backing file, by comparing the cached file metadata with the backing file's metadata. Verifying just the i_version has not changed is insufficient. In addition save and compare the i_ino and s_dev as well. Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Tested-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Tested-by: Raul E Rangel <rrangel@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ima: annotate iint mutex to avoid lockdep false positive warningsAmir Goldstein2023-11-281-11/+37
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit e044374a8a0a99e46f4e6d6751d3042b6d9cc12e upstream. It is not clear that IMA should be nested at all, but as long is it measures files both on overlayfs and on underlying fs, we need to annotate the iint mutex to avoid lockdep false positives related to IMA + overlayfs, same as overlayfs annotates the inode mutex. Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+b42fe626038981fb7bfa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* integrity: powerpc: Do not select CA_MACHINE_KEYRINGMichal Suchanek2023-11-281-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 3edc22655647378dea01900f7b04e017ff96bda9 upstream. No other platform needs CA_MACHINE_KEYRING, either. This is policy that should be decided by the administrator, not Kconfig dependencies. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.6+ Fixes: d7d91c4743c4 ("integrity: PowerVM machine keyring enablement") Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* KEYS: trusted: Rollback init_trusted() consistentlyJarkko Sakkinen2023-11-281-10/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 31de287345f41bbfaec36a5c8cbdba035cf76442 upstream. Do bind neither static calls nor trusted_key_exit() before a successful init, in order to maintain a consistent state. In addition, depart the init_trusted() in the case of a real error (i.e. getting back something else than -ENODEV). Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/CAHk-=whOPoLaWM8S8GgoOPT7a2+nMH5h3TLKtn=R_3w4R1_Uvg@mail.gmail.com/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+ Fixes: 5d0682be3189 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* KEYS: trusted: tee: Refactor register SHM usageSumit Garg2023-11-281-44/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit c745cd1718b7825d69315fe7127e2e289e617598 upstream. The OP-TEE driver using the old SMC based ABI permits overlapping shared buffers, but with the new FF-A based ABI each physical page may only be registered once. As the key and blob buffer are allocated adjancently, there is no need for redundant register shared memory invocation. Also, it is incompatibile with FF-A based ABI limitation. So refactor register shared memory implementation to use only single invocation to register both key and blob buffers. [jarkko: Added cc to stable.] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.16+ Fixes: 4615e5a34b95 ("optee: add FF-A support") Reported-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Tested-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* apparmor: fix invalid reference on profile->disconnectedGeorgia Garcia2023-11-202-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 8884ba07786c718771cf7b78cb3024924b27ec2b ] profile->disconnected was storing an invalid reference to the disconnected path. Fix it by duplicating the string using aa_unpack_strdup and freeing accordingly. Fixes: 72c8a768641d ("apparmor: allow profiles to provide info to disconnected paths") Signed-off-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* KEYS: trusted: Remove redundant static calls usageSumit Garg2023-10-101-8/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Static calls invocations aren't well supported from module __init and __exit functions. Especially the static call from cleanup_trusted() led to a crash on x86 kernel with CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y. However, the usage of static call invocations for trusted_key_init() and trusted_key_exit() don't add any value from either a performance or security perspective. Hence switch to use indirect function calls instead. Note here that although it will fix the current crash report, ultimately the static call infrastructure should be fixed to either support its future usage from module __init and __exit functions or not. Reported-and-tested-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZRhKq6e5nF%2F4ZIV1@fedora/#t Fixes: 5d0682be3189 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework") Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* ima: rework CONFIG_IMA dependency blockArnd Bergmann2023-09-271-12/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Changing the direct dependencies of IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING and IMA_LOAD_X509 caused them to no longer depend on IMA, but a a configuration without IMA results in link failures: arm-linux-gnueabi-ld: security/integrity/iint.o: in function `integrity_load_keys': iint.c:(.init.text+0xd8): undefined reference to `ima_load_x509' aarch64-linux-ld: security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.o: in function `asymmetric_verify': digsig_asymmetric.c:(.text+0x104): undefined reference to `ima_blacklist_keyring' Adding explicit dependencies on IMA would fix this, but a more reliable way to do this is to enclose the entire Kconfig file in an 'if IMA' block. This also allows removing the existing direct dependencies. Fixes: be210c6d3597f ("ima: Finish deprecation of IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Kconfig") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
* ima: Finish deprecation of IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING KconfigOleksandr Tymoshenko2023-09-261-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The removal of IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING made IMA_LOAD_X509 and IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING unavailable because the latter two depend on the former. Since IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING was deprecated in favor of INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING use it as a dependency for the two Kconfigs affected by the deprecation. Fixes: 5087fd9e80e5 ("ima: Remove deprecated IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Kconfig") Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tymoshenko <ovt@google.com> Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
* selinux: fix handling of empty opts in selinux_fs_context_submount()Ondrej Mosnacek2023-09-121-2/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | selinux_set_mnt_opts() relies on the fact that the mount options pointer is always NULL when all options are unset (specifically in its !selinux_initialized() branch. However, the new selinux_fs_context_submount() hook breaks this rule by allocating a new structure even if no options are set. That causes any submount created before a SELinux policy is loaded to be rejected in selinux_set_mnt_opts(). Fix this by making selinux_fs_context_submount() leave fc->security set to NULL when there are no options to be copied from the reference superblock. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: Adam Williamson <awilliam@redhat.com> Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2236345 Fixes: d80a8f1b58c2 ("vfs, security: Fix automount superblock LSM init problem, preventing NFS sb sharing") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* Merge tag 'landlock-6.6-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2023-09-081-1/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux Pull landlock updates from Mickaël Salaün: "One test fix and a __counted_by annotation" * tag 'landlock-6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux: selftests/landlock: Fix a resource leak landlock: Annotate struct landlock_rule with __counted_by
| * landlock: Annotate struct landlock_rule with __counted_byKees Cook2023-08-181-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Prepare for the coming implementation by GCC and Clang of the __counted_by attribute. Flexible array members annotated with __counted_by can have their accesses bounds-checked at run-time checking via CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS (for array indexing) and CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE (for strcpy/memcpy-family functions). As found with Coccinelle[1], add __counted_by for struct landlock_rule. [1] https://github.com/kees/kernel-tools/blob/trunk/coccinelle/examples/counted_by.cocci Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com> Reviewed-by: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230817210257.never.920-kees@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
* | Merge tag 'tomoyo-pr-20230903' of git://git.osdn.net/gitroot/tomoyo/tomoyo-test1Linus Torvalds2023-09-043-7/+5
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull tomoyo updates from Tetsuo Handa: "Three cleanup patches, no behavior changes" * tag 'tomoyo-pr-20230903' of git://git.osdn.net/gitroot/tomoyo/tomoyo-test1: tomoyo: remove unused function declaration tomoyo: refactor deprecated strncpy tomoyo: add format attributes to functions
| * | tomoyo: remove unused function declarationGONG, Ruiqi2023-08-131-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The last usage of tomoyo_check_flags() has been removed by commit 57c2590fb7fd ("TOMOYO: Update profile structure."). Clean up its residual declaration. Signed-off-by: GONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
| * | tomoyo: refactor deprecated strncpyJustin Stitt2023-08-051-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | `strncpy` is deprecated for use on NUL-terminated destination strings [1]. A suitable replacement is `strscpy` [2] due to the fact that it guarantees NUL-termination on its destination buffer argument which is _not_ the case for `strncpy`! It should be noted that the destination buffer is zero-initialized and had a max length of `sizeof(dest) - 1`. There is likely _not_ a bug present in the current implementation. However, by switching to `strscpy` we get the benefit of no longer needing the `- 1`'s from the string copy invocations on top of `strscpy` being a safer interface all together. [1]: www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#strncpy-on-nul-terminated-strings [2]: https://manpages.debian.org/testing/linux-manual-4.8/strscpy.9.en.html Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/90 Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
| * | tomoyo: add format attributes to functionsChristian Göttsche2023-07-232-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Format attributes on functions taking format string can help compilers detect argument type or count mismatches. Please the compiler when building with W=1: security/tomoyo/audit.c: In function ‘tomoyo_init_log’: security/tomoyo/audit.c:290:9: error: function ‘tomoyo_init_log’ might be a candidate for ‘gnu_printf’ format attribute [-Werror=suggest-attribute=format] 290 | vsnprintf(buf + pos, len - pos, fmt, args); | ^~~~~~~~~ security/tomoyo/audit.c: In function ‘tomoyo_write_log2’: security/tomoyo/audit.c:376:9: error: function ‘tomoyo_write_log2’ might be a candidate for ‘gnu_printf’ format attribute [-Werror=suggest-attribute=format] 376 | buf = tomoyo_init_log(r, len, fmt, args); | ^~~ security/tomoyo/common.c: In function ‘tomoyo_addprintf’: security/tomoyo/common.c:193:9: error: function ‘tomoyo_addprintf’ might be a candidate for ‘gnu_printf’ format attribute [-Werror=suggest-attribute=format] 193 | vsnprintf(buffer + pos, len - pos - 1, fmt, args); | ^~~~~~~~~ Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
* | | Merge tag 'Smack-for-6.6' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-nextLinus Torvalds2023-08-301-2/+2
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler: "Two minor fixes: is a simple spelling fix. The other is a bounds check for a very likely underflow" * tag 'Smack-for-6.6' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next: smackfs: Prevent underflow in smk_set_cipso() security: smack: smackfs: fix typo (lables->labels)
| * | | smackfs: Prevent underflow in smk_set_cipso()Dan Carpenter2023-08-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is a upper bound to "catlen" but no lower bound to prevent negatives. I don't see that this necessarily causes a problem but we may as well be safe. Fixes: e114e473771c ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * | | security: smack: smackfs: fix typo (lables->labels)Tóth János2023-08-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix a spelling error in smakcfs. Signed-off-by: Tóth János <gomba007@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* | | | Merge tag 'integrity-v6.6' of ↵Linus Torvalds2023-08-305-30/+16
|\ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar: - With commit 099f26f22f58 ("integrity: machine keyring CA configuration") certificates may be loaded onto the IMA keyring, directly or indirectly signed by keys on either the "builtin" or the "machine" keyrings. With the ability for the system/machine owner to sign the IMA policy itself without needing to recompile the kernel, update the IMA architecture specific policy rules to require the IMA policy itself be signed. [ As commit 099f26f22f58 was upstreamed in linux-6.4, updating the IMA architecture specific policy now to require signed IMA policies may break userspace expectations. ] - IMA only checked the file data hash was not on the system blacklist keyring for files with an appended signature (e.g. kernel modules, Power kernel image). Check all file data hashes regardless of how it was signed - Code cleanup, and a kernel-doc update * tag 'integrity-v6.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: kexec_lock: Replace kexec_mutex() by kexec_lock() in two comments ima: require signed IMA policy when UEFI secure boot is enabled integrity: Always reference the blacklist keyring with appraisal ima: Remove deprecated IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Kconfig
| * | | | kexec_lock: Replace kexec_mutex() by kexec_lock() in two commentsWenyu Liu2023-08-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | kexec_mutex is replaced by an atomic variable in 05c6257433b (panic, kexec: make __crash_kexec() NMI safe). But there are still two comments that referenced kexec_mutex, replace them by kexec_lock. Signed-off-by: Wenyu Liu <liuwenyu7@huawei.com> Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| * | | | ima: require signed IMA policy when UEFI secure boot is enabledCoiby Xu2023-08-011-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With commit 099f26f22f58 ("integrity: machine keyring CA configuration"), users are able to add custom IMA CA keys via MOK. This allows users to sign their own IMA polices without recompiling the kernel. For the sake of security, mandate signed IMA policy when UEFI secure boot is enabled. Note this change may affect existing users/tests i.e users won't be able to load an unsigned IMA policy when the IMA architecture specific policy is configured and UEFI secure boot is enabled. Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| * | | | integrity: Always reference the blacklist keyring with appraisalEric Snowberg2023-08-012-17/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 273df864cf746 ("ima: Check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig") introduced an appraise_flag option for referencing the blacklist keyring. Any matching binary found on this keyring fails signature validation. This flag only works with module appended signatures. An important part of a PKI infrastructure is to have the ability to do revocation at a later time should a vulnerability be found. Expand the revocation flag usage to all appraisal functions. The flag is now enabled by default. Setting the flag with an IMA policy has been deprecated. Without a revocation capability like this in place, only authenticity can be maintained. With this change, integrity can now be achieved with digital signature based IMA appraisal. Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| * | | | ima: Remove deprecated IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING KconfigNayna Jain2023-08-011-12/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Time to remove "IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING". Fixes: f4dc37785e9b ("integrity: define '.evm' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring") # v4.5+ Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-04-14 12:40:33 +0000