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* Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240131' of ↵Linus Torvalds2024-02-011-5/+40
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm Pull lsm fixes from Paul Moore: "Two small patches to fix some problems relating to LSM hook return values and how the individual LSMs interact" * tag 'lsm-pr-20240131' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: lsm: fix default return value of the socket_getpeersec_*() hooks lsm: fix the logic in security_inode_getsecctx()
| * lsm: fix default return value of the socket_getpeersec_*() hooksOndrej Mosnacek2024-01-301-4/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For these hooks the true "neutral" value is -EOPNOTSUPP, which is currently what is returned when no LSM provides this hook and what LSMs return when there is no security context set on the socket. Correct the value in <linux/lsm_hooks.h> and adjust the dispatch functions in security/security.c to avoid issues when the BPF LSM is enabled. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 98e828a0650f ("security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * lsm: fix the logic in security_inode_getsecctx()Ondrej Mosnacek2024-01-261-1/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The inode_getsecctx LSM hook has previously been corrected to have -EOPNOTSUPP instead of 0 as the default return value to fix BPF LSM behavior. However, the call_int_hook()-generated loop in security_inode_getsecctx() was left treating 0 as the neutral value, so after an LSM returns 0, the loop continues to try other LSMs, and if one of them returns a non-zero value, the function immediately returns with said value. So in a situation where SELinux and the BPF LSMs registered this hook, -EOPNOTSUPP would be incorrectly returned whenever SELinux returned 0. Fix this by open-coding the call_int_hook() loop and making it use the correct LSM_RET_DEFAULT() value as the neutral one, similar to what other hooks do. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/CAEjxPJ4ev-pasUwGx48fDhnmjBnq_Wh90jYPwRQRAqXxmOKD4Q@mail.gmail.com/ Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2257983 Fixes: b36995b8609a ("lsm: fix default return value for inode_getsecctx") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | Merge tag 'integrity-v6.8-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2024-01-241-4/+0
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull integrity fix from Mimi Zohar: "Revert patch that required user-provided key data, since keys can be created from kernel-generated random numbers" * tag 'integrity-v6.8-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: Revert "KEYS: encrypted: Add check for strsep"
| * | Revert "KEYS: encrypted: Add check for strsep"Mimi Zohar2024-01-241-4/+0
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit b4af096b5df5dd131ab796c79cedc7069d8f4882. New encrypted keys are created either from kernel-generated random numbers or user-provided decrypted data. Revert the change requiring user-provided decrypted data. Reported-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
* / exec: Check __FMODE_EXEC instead of in_execve for LSMsKees Cook2024-01-242-2/+5
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | After commit 978ffcbf00d8 ("execve: open the executable file before doing anything else"), current->in_execve was no longer in sync with the open(). This broke AppArmor and TOMOYO which depend on this flag to distinguish "open" operations from being "exec" operations. Instead of moving around in_execve, switch to using __FMODE_EXEC, which is where the "is this an exec?" intent is stored. Note that TOMOYO still uses in_execve around cred handling. Reported-by: Kevin Locke <kevin@kevinlocke.name> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZbE4qn9_h14OqADK@kevinlocke.name Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Fixes: 978ffcbf00d8 ("execve: open the executable file before doing anything else") Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org> Cc: <linux-mm@kvack.org> Cc: <apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com> Cc: <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2024-01-18' of ↵Linus Torvalds2024-01-199-74/+54
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor Pull AppArmor updates from John Johansen: "This adds a single feature, switch the hash used to check policy from sha1 to sha256 There are fixes for two memory leaks, and refcount bug and a potential crash when a profile name is empty. Along with a couple minor code cleanups. Summary: Features - switch policy hash from sha1 to sha256 Bug Fixes - Fix refcount leak in task_kill - Fix leak of pdb objects and trans_table - avoid crash when parse profie name is empty Cleanups - add static to stack_msg and nulldfa - more kernel-doc cleanups" * tag 'apparmor-pr-2024-01-18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: apparmor: Fix memory leak in unpack_profile() apparmor: avoid crash when parsed profile name is empty apparmor: fix possible memory leak in unpack_trans_table apparmor: free the allocated pdb objects apparmor: Fix ref count leak in task_kill apparmor: cleanup network hook comments apparmor: add missing params to aa_may_ptrace kernel-doc comments apparmor: declare nulldfa as static apparmor: declare stack_msg as static apparmor: switch SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH from sha1 to sha256
| * apparmor: Fix memory leak in unpack_profile()Gaosheng Cui2024-01-091-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The aa_put_pdb(rules->file) should be called when rules->file is reassigned, otherwise there may be a memory leak. This was found via kmemleak: unreferenced object 0xffff986c17056600 (size 192): comm "apparmor_parser", pid 875, jiffies 4294893488 hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 89 14 04 6c 98 ff ff ............l... 00 00 8c 11 6c 98 ff ff bc 0c 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....l........... backtrace (crc e28c80c4): [<ffffffffba25087f>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4f/0x90 [<ffffffffb95ecd42>] kmalloc_trace+0x2d2/0x340 [<ffffffffb98a7b3d>] aa_alloc_pdb+0x4d/0x90 [<ffffffffb98ab3b8>] unpack_pdb+0x48/0x660 [<ffffffffb98ac073>] unpack_profile+0x693/0x1090 [<ffffffffb98acf5a>] aa_unpack+0x10a/0x6e0 [<ffffffffb98a93e3>] aa_replace_profiles+0xa3/0x1210 [<ffffffffb989a183>] policy_update+0x163/0x2a0 [<ffffffffb989a381>] profile_replace+0xb1/0x130 [<ffffffffb966cb64>] vfs_write+0xd4/0x3d0 [<ffffffffb966d05b>] ksys_write+0x6b/0xf0 [<ffffffffb966d10e>] __x64_sys_write+0x1e/0x30 [<ffffffffba242316>] do_syscall_64+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffffba4000e5>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74 So add aa_put_pdb(rules->file) to fix it when rules->file is reassigned. Fixes: 98b824ff8984 ("apparmor: refcount the pdb") Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * apparmor: avoid crash when parsed profile name is emptyFedor Pchelkin2024-01-041-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When processing a packed profile in unpack_profile() described like "profile :ns::samba-dcerpcd /usr/lib*/samba/{,samba/}samba-dcerpcd {...}" a string ":samba-dcerpcd" is unpacked as a fully-qualified name and then passed to aa_splitn_fqname(). aa_splitn_fqname() treats ":samba-dcerpcd" as only containing a namespace. Thus it returns NULL for tmpname, meanwhile tmpns is non-NULL. Later aa_alloc_profile() crashes as the new profile name is NULL now. general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 6 PID: 1657 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 6.7.0-rc2-dirty #16 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1e/0xa0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? strlen+0x1e/0xa0 aa_policy_init+0x1bb/0x230 aa_alloc_profile+0xb1/0x480 unpack_profile+0x3bc/0x4960 aa_unpack+0x309/0x15e0 aa_replace_profiles+0x213/0x33c0 policy_update+0x261/0x370 profile_replace+0x20e/0x2a0 vfs_write+0x2af/0xe00 ksys_write+0x126/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x46/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1e/0xa0 It seems such behaviour of aa_splitn_fqname() is expected and checked in other places where it is called (e.g. aa_remove_profiles). Well, there is an explicit comment "a ns name without a following profile is allowed" inside. AFAICS, nothing can prevent unpacked "name" to be in form like ":samba-dcerpcd" - it is passed from userspace. Deny the whole profile set replacement in such case and inform user with EPROTO and an explaining message. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). Fixes: 04dc715e24d0 ("apparmor: audit policy ns specified in policy load") Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * apparmor: fix possible memory leak in unpack_trans_tableFedor Pchelkin2024-01-042-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If we fail to unpack the transition table then the table elements which have been already allocated are not freed on error path. unreferenced object 0xffff88802539e000 (size 128): comm "apparmor_parser", pid 903, jiffies 4294914938 (age 35.085s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 20 73 6f 6d 65 20 6e 61 73 74 79 20 73 74 72 69 some nasty stri 6e 67 20 73 6f 6d 65 20 6e 61 73 74 79 20 73 74 ng some nasty st backtrace: [<ffffffff81ddb312>] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1e2/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81c47194>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x54/0x170 [<ffffffff81c225b9>] kmemdup+0x29/0x60 [<ffffffff83e1ee65>] aa_unpack_strdup+0xe5/0x1b0 [<ffffffff83e20808>] unpack_pdb+0xeb8/0x2700 [<ffffffff83e23567>] unpack_profile+0x1507/0x4a30 [<ffffffff83e27bfa>] aa_unpack+0x36a/0x1560 [<ffffffff83e194c3>] aa_replace_profiles+0x213/0x33c0 [<ffffffff83de9461>] policy_update+0x261/0x370 [<ffffffff83de978e>] profile_replace+0x20e/0x2a0 [<ffffffff81eac8bf>] vfs_write+0x2af/0xe00 [<ffffffff81eaddd6>] ksys_write+0x126/0x250 [<ffffffff88f34fb6>] do_syscall_64+0x46/0xf0 [<ffffffff890000ea>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 Call aa_free_str_table() on error path as was done before the blamed commit. It implements all necessary checks, frees str_table if it is available and nullifies the pointers. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). Fixes: a0792e2ceddc ("apparmor: make transition table unpack generic so it can be reused") Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * apparmor: free the allocated pdb objectsFedor Pchelkin2024-01-031-6/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | policy_db objects are allocated with kzalloc() inside aa_alloc_pdb() and are not cleared in the corresponding aa_free_pdb() function causing leak: unreferenced object 0xffff88801f0a1400 (size 192): comm "apparmor_parser", pid 1247, jiffies 4295122827 (age 2306.399s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<ffffffff81ddc612>] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1e2/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81c47c55>] kmalloc_trace+0x25/0xc0 [<ffffffff83eb9a12>] aa_alloc_pdb+0x82/0x140 [<ffffffff83ec4077>] unpack_pdb+0xc7/0x2700 [<ffffffff83ec6b10>] unpack_profile+0x450/0x4960 [<ffffffff83ecc129>] aa_unpack+0x309/0x15e0 [<ffffffff83ebdb23>] aa_replace_profiles+0x213/0x33c0 [<ffffffff83e8d341>] policy_update+0x261/0x370 [<ffffffff83e8d66e>] profile_replace+0x20e/0x2a0 [<ffffffff81eadfaf>] vfs_write+0x2af/0xe00 [<ffffffff81eaf4c6>] ksys_write+0x126/0x250 [<ffffffff890fa0b6>] do_syscall_64+0x46/0xf0 [<ffffffff892000ea>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 Free the pdbs inside aa_free_pdb(). While at it, rename the variable representing an aa_policydb object to make the function more unified with aa_pdb_free_kref() and aa_alloc_pdb(). Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). Fixes: 98b824ff8984 ("apparmor: refcount the pdb") Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * apparmor: Fix ref count leak in task_killJohn Johansen2023-12-291-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | apparmor_task_kill was not putting the task_cred reference tc, or the cred_label reference tc when dealing with a passed in cred, fix this by using a single fn exit. Fixes: 90c436a64a6e ("apparmor: pass cred through to audit info.") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * apparmor: cleanup network hook commentsJohn Johansen2023-11-261-44/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Drop useless partial kernel doc style comments. Finish/update kerneldoc comment where there is useful information Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * apparmor: add missing params to aa_may_ptrace kernel-doc commentsJohn Johansen2023-11-191-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When the cred was explicit passed through to aa_may_ptrace() the kernel-doc comment was not properly updated. Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202311040508.AUhi04RY-lkp@intel.com/ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * apparmor: declare nulldfa as staticJohn Johansen2023-11-191-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With the conversion to a refcounted pdb the nulldfa is now only used in security/apparmor/lsm.c so declar it as static. Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202311092038.lqfYnvmf-lkp@intel.com/ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * apparmor: declare stack_msg as staticJohn Johansen2023-11-191-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | stack_msg in upstream code is only used in securit/apparmor/domain.c so declare it as static. Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202311092251.TwKSNZ0u-lkp@intel.com/ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * apparmor: switch SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH from sha1 to sha256Dimitri John Ledkov2023-11-193-17/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | sha1 is insecure and has colisions, thus it is not useful for even lightweight policy hash checks. Switch to sha256, which on modern hardware is fast enough. Separately as per NIST Policy on Hash Functions, sha1 usage must be withdrawn by 2030. This config option currently is one of many that holds up sha1 usage. Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* | Merge tag 'pull-misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfsLinus Torvalds2024-01-111-6/+1
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull misc filesystem updates from Al Viro: "Misc cleanups (the part that hadn't been picked by individual fs trees)" * tag 'pull-misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: apparmorfs: don't duplicate kfree_link() orangefs: saner arguments passing in readdir guts ocfs2_find_match(): there's no such thing as NULL or negative ->d_parent reiserfs_add_entry(): get rid of pointless namelen checks __ocfs2_add_entry(), ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert(): namelen checks ext4_add_entry(): ->d_name.len is never 0 befs: d_obtain_alias(ERR_PTR(...)) will do the right thing affs: d_obtain_alias(ERR_PTR(...)) will do the right thing /proc/sys: use d_splice_alias() calling conventions to simplify failure exits hostfs: use d_splice_alias() calling conventions to simplify failure exits udf_fiiter_add_entry(): check for zero ->d_name.len is bogus... udf: d_obtain_alias(ERR_PTR(...)) will do the right thing... udf: d_splice_alias() will do the right thing on ERR_PTR() inode nfsd: kill stale comment about simple_fill_super() requirements bfs_add_entry(): get rid of pointless ->d_name.len checks nilfs2: d_obtain_alias(ERR_PTR(...)) will do the right thing... zonefs: d_splice_alias() will do the right thing on ERR_PTR() inode
| * | apparmorfs: don't duplicate kfree_link()Al Viro2023-12-211-6/+1
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | rawdata_link_cb() is identical to it Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | Merge tag 'for-6.8/io_uring-2024-01-08' of git://git.kernel.dk/linuxLinus Torvalds2024-01-112-2/+2
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull io_uring updates from Jens Axboe: "Mostly just come fixes and cleanups, but one feature as well. In detail: - Harden the check for handling IOPOLL based on return (Pavel) - Various minor optimizations (Pavel) - Drop remnants of SCM_RIGHTS fd passing support, now that it's no longer supported since 6.7 (me) - Fix for a case where bytes_done wasn't initialized properly on a failure condition for read/write requests (me) - Move the register related code to a separate file (me) - Add support for returning the provided ring buffer head (me) - Add support for adding a direct descriptor to the normal file table (me, Christian Brauner) - Fix for ensuring pending task_work for a ring with DEFER_TASKRUN is run even if we timeout waiting (me)" * tag 'for-6.8/io_uring-2024-01-08' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux: io_uring: ensure local task_work is run on wait timeout io_uring/kbuf: add method for returning provided buffer ring head io_uring/rw: ensure io->bytes_done is always initialized io_uring: drop any code related to SCM_RIGHTS io_uring/unix: drop usage of io_uring socket io_uring/register: move io_uring_register(2) related code to register.c io_uring/openclose: add support for IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL io_uring/cmd: inline io_uring_cmd_get_task io_uring/cmd: inline io_uring_cmd_do_in_task_lazy io_uring: split out cmd api into a separate header io_uring: optimise ltimeout for inline execution io_uring: don't check iopoll if request completes
| * | io_uring: split out cmd api into a separate headerPavel Begunkov2023-12-122-2/+2
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | linux/io_uring.h is slowly becoming a rubbish bin where we put anything exposed to other subsystems. For instance, the task exit hooks and io_uring cmd infra are completely orthogonal and don't need each other's definitions. Start cleaning it up by splitting out all command bits into a new header file. Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7ec50bae6e21f371d3850796e716917fc141225a.1701391955.git.asml.silence@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
* | Merge tag 'header_cleanup-2024-01-10' of https://evilpiepirate.org/git/bcachefsLinus Torvalds2024-01-102-0/+2
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull header cleanups from Kent Overstreet: "The goal is to get sched.h down to a type only header, so the main thing happening in this patchset is splitting out various _types.h headers and dependency fixups, as well as moving some things out of sched.h to better locations. This is prep work for the memory allocation profiling patchset which adds new sched.h interdepencencies" * tag 'header_cleanup-2024-01-10' of https://evilpiepirate.org/git/bcachefs: (51 commits) Kill sched.h dependency on rcupdate.h kill unnecessary thread_info.h include Kill unnecessary kernel.h include preempt.h: Kill dependency on list.h rseq: Split out rseq.h from sched.h LoongArch: signal.c: add header file to fix build error restart_block: Trim includes lockdep: move held_lock to lockdep_types.h sem: Split out sem_types.h uidgid: Split out uidgid_types.h seccomp: Split out seccomp_types.h refcount: Split out refcount_types.h uapi/linux/resource.h: fix include x86/signal: kill dependency on time.h syscall_user_dispatch.h: split out *_types.h mm_types_task.h: Trim dependencies Split out irqflags_types.h ipc: Kill bogus dependency on spinlock.h shm: Slim down dependencies workqueue: Split out workqueue_types.h ...
| * | shm: Slim down dependenciesKent Overstreet2023-12-202-0/+2
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | list_head is in types.h, not list.h., and the uapi header wasn't needed. Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
* | Merge tag 'integrity-v6.8' of ↵Linus Torvalds2024-01-094-7/+51
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar: - Add a new IMA/EVM maintainer and reviewer - Disable EVM on overlayfs The EVM HMAC and the original file signatures contain filesystem specific metadata (e.g. i_ino, i_generation and s_uuid), preventing the security.evm xattr from directly being copied up to the overlay. Further before calculating and writing out the overlay file's EVM HMAC, EVM must first verify the existing backing file's 'security.evm' value. For now until a solution is developed, disable EVM on overlayfs. - One bug fix and two cleanups * tag 'integrity-v6.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: overlay: disable EVM evm: add support to disable EVM on unsupported filesystems evm: don't copy up 'security.evm' xattr MAINTAINERS: Add Eric Snowberg as a reviewer to IMA MAINTAINERS: Add Roberto Sassu as co-maintainer to IMA and EVM KEYS: encrypted: Add check for strsep ima: Remove EXPERIMENTAL from Kconfig ima: Reword IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY
| * | evm: add support to disable EVM on unsupported filesystemsMimi Zohar2023-12-201-1/+34
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Identify EVM unsupported filesystems by defining a new flag SB_I_EVM_UNSUPPORTED. Don't verify, write, remove or update 'security.evm' on unsupported filesystems. Acked-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| * | evm: don't copy up 'security.evm' xattrMimi Zohar2023-12-202-1/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The security.evm HMAC and the original file signatures contain filesystem specific data. As a result, the HMAC and signature are not the same on the stacked and backing filesystems. Don't copy up 'security.evm'. Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| * | KEYS: encrypted: Add check for strsepChen Ni2023-11-271-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add check for strsep() in order to transfer the error. Fixes: cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data") Signed-off-by: Chen Ni <nichen@iscas.ac.cn> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| * | ima: Remove EXPERIMENTAL from KconfigEric Snowberg2023-11-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove the EXPERIMENTAL from the IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY Kconfig now that digitalSignature usage enforcement is set. Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230508220708.2888510-4-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| * | ima: Reword IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARYEric Snowberg2023-11-271-5/+5
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When the machine keyring is enabled, it may be used as a trust source for the .ima keyring. Add a reference to this in IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY. Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
* | Merge tag 'landlock-6.8-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2024-01-092-16/+17
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux Pull Landlock updates from Mickaël Salaün: "New tests, a slight optimization, and some cosmetic changes" * tag 'landlock-6.8-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux: landlock: Optimize the number of calls to get_access_mask slightly selftests/landlock: Rename "permitted" to "allowed" in ftruncate tests landlock: Remove remaining "inline" modifiers in .c files [v6.6] landlock: Remove remaining "inline" modifiers in .c files [v6.1] landlock: Remove remaining "inline" modifiers in .c files [v5.15] selftests/landlock: Add tests to check unhandled rule's access rights selftests/landlock: Add tests to check unknown rule's access rights
| * | landlock: Optimize the number of calls to get_access_mask slightlyGünther Noack2024-01-031-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This call is now going through a function pointer, and it is not as obvious any more that it will be inlined. Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231208155121.1943775-4-gnoack@google.com Fixes: 7a11275c3787 ("landlock: Refactor layer helpers") Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
| * | landlock: Remove remaining "inline" modifiers in .c files [v6.6]Günther Noack2024-01-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For module-internal static functions, compilers are already in a good position to decide whether to inline them or not. Suggested-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231208155121.1943775-2-gnoack@google.com [mic: Split patch for Linux 6.6] Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
| * | landlock: Remove remaining "inline" modifiers in .c files [v6.1]Günther Noack2024-01-031-9/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For module-internal static functions, compilers are already in a good position to decide whether to inline them or not. Suggested-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231208155121.1943775-2-gnoack@google.com [mic: Split patch for Linux 6.1] Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
| * | landlock: Remove remaining "inline" modifiers in .c files [v5.15]Günther Noack2024-01-032-4/+4
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For module-internal static functions, compilers are already in a good position to decide whether to inline them or not. Suggested-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231208155121.1943775-2-gnoack@google.com [mic: Split patch for Linux 5.15] Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
* | Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of ↵Linus Torvalds2024-01-0921-69/+769
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm Pull security module updates from Paul Moore: - Add three new syscalls: lsm_list_modules(), lsm_get_self_attr(), and lsm_set_self_attr(). The first syscall simply lists the LSMs enabled, while the second and third get and set the current process' LSM attributes. Yes, these syscalls may provide similar functionality to what can be found under /proc or /sys, but they were designed to support multiple, simultaneaous (stacked) LSMs from the start as opposed to the current /proc based solutions which were created at a time when only one LSM was allowed to be active at a given time. We have spent considerable time discussing ways to extend the existing /proc interfaces to support multiple, simultaneaous LSMs and even our best ideas have been far too ugly to support as a kernel API; after +20 years in the kernel, I felt the LSM layer had established itself enough to justify a handful of syscalls. Support amongst the individual LSM developers has been nearly unanimous, with a single objection coming from Tetsuo (TOMOYO) as he is worried that the LSM_ID_XXX token concept will make it more difficult for out-of-tree LSMs to survive. Several members of the LSM community have demonstrated the ability for out-of-tree LSMs to continue to exist by picking high/unused LSM_ID values as well as pointing out that many kernel APIs rely on integer identifiers, e.g. syscalls (!), but unfortunately Tetsuo's objections remain. My personal opinion is that while I have no interest in penalizing out-of-tree LSMs, I'm not going to penalize in-tree development to support out-of-tree development, and I view this as a necessary step forward to support the push for expanded LSM stacking and reduce our reliance on /proc and /sys which has occassionally been problematic for some container users. Finally, we have included the linux-api folks on (all?) recent revisions of the patchset and addressed all of their concerns. - Add a new security_file_ioctl_compat() LSM hook to handle the 32-bit ioctls on 64-bit systems problem. This patch includes support for all of the existing LSMs which provide ioctl hooks, although it turns out only SELinux actually cares about the individual ioctls. It is worth noting that while Casey (Smack) and Tetsuo (TOMOYO) did not give explicit ACKs to this patch, they did both indicate they are okay with the changes. - Fix a potential memory leak in the CALIPSO code when IPv6 is disabled at boot. While it's good that we are fixing this, I doubt this is something users are seeing in the wild as you need to both disable IPv6 and then attempt to configure IPv6 labeled networking via NetLabel/CALIPSO; that just doesn't make much sense. Normally this would go through netdev, but Jakub asked me to take this patch and of all the trees I maintain, the LSM tree seemed like the best fit. - Update the LSM MAINTAINERS entry with additional information about our process docs, patchwork, bug reporting, etc. I also noticed that the Lockdown LSM is missing a dedicated MAINTAINERS entry so I've added that to the pull request. I've been working with one of the major Lockdown authors/contributors to see if they are willing to step up and assume a Lockdown maintainer role; hopefully that will happen soon, but in the meantime I'll continue to look after it. - Add a handful of mailmap entries for Serge Hallyn and myself. * tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (27 commits) lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook lsm: Add a __counted_by() annotation to lsm_ctx.ctx calipso: fix memory leak in netlbl_calipso_add_pass() selftests: remove the LSM_ID_IMA check in lsm/lsm_list_modules_test MAINTAINERS: add an entry for the lockdown LSM MAINTAINERS: update the LSM entry mailmap: add entries for Serge Hallyn's dead accounts mailmap: update/replace my old email addresses lsm: mark the lsm_id variables are marked as static lsm: convert security_setselfattr() to use memdup_user() lsm: align based on pointer length in lsm_fill_user_ctx() lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx() lsm: correct error codes in security_getselfattr() lsm: cleanup the size counters in security_getselfattr() lsm: don't yet account for IMA in LSM_CONFIG_COUNT calculation lsm: drop LSM_ID_IMA LSM: selftests for Linux Security Module syscalls SELinux: Add selfattr hooks AppArmor: Add selfattr hooks Smack: implement setselfattr and getselfattr hooks ...
| * | lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hookAlfred Piccioni2023-12-244-0/+48
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Some ioctl commands do not require ioctl permission, but are routed to other permissions such as FILE_GETATTR or FILE_SETATTR. This routing is done by comparing the ioctl cmd to a set of 64-bit flags (FS_IOC_*). However, if a 32-bit process is running on a 64-bit kernel, it emits 32-bit flags (FS_IOC32_*) for certain ioctl operations. These flags are being checked erroneously, which leads to these ioctl operations being routed to the ioctl permission, rather than the correct file permissions. This was also noted in a RED-PEN finding from a while back - "/* RED-PEN how should LSM module know it's handling 32bit? */". This patch introduces a new hook, security_file_ioctl_compat(), that is called from the compat ioctl syscall. All current LSMs have been changed to support this hook. Reviewing the three places where we are currently using security_file_ioctl(), it appears that only SELinux needs a dedicated compat change; TOMOYO and SMACK appear to be functional without any change. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 0b24dcb7f2f7 ("Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking"") Signed-off-by: Alfred Piccioni <alpic@google.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> [PM: subject tweak, line length fixes, and alignment corrections] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | lsm: mark the lsm_id variables are marked as staticPaul Moore2023-11-129-9/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As the kernel test robot helpfully reminded us, all of the lsm_id instances defined inside the various LSMs should be marked as static. The one exception is Landlock which uses its lsm_id variable across multiple source files with an extern declaration in a header file. Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Suggested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | lsm: convert security_setselfattr() to use memdup_user()Paul Moore2023-11-121-8/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As suggested by the kernel test robot, memdup_user() is a better option than the combo of kmalloc()/copy_from_user(). Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202310270805.2ArE52i5-lkp@intel.com/ Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | lsm: align based on pointer length in lsm_fill_user_ctx()Paul Moore2023-11-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Using the size of a void pointer is much cleaner than BITS_PER_LONG / 8. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx()Paul Moore2023-11-124-74/+63
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While we have a lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper function designed to make life easier for LSMs which return lsm_ctx structs to userspace, we didn't include all of the buffer length safety checks and buffer padding adjustments in the helper. This led to code duplication across the different LSMs and the possibility for mistakes across the different LSM subsystems. In order to reduce code duplication and decrease the chances of silly mistakes, we're consolidating all of this code into the lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper. The buffer padding is also modified from a fixed 8-byte alignment to an alignment that matches the word length of the machine (BITS_PER_LONG / 8). Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | lsm: correct error codes in security_getselfattr()Paul Moore2023-11-121-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We should return -EINVAL if the user specifies LSM_FLAG_SINGLE without supplying a valid lsm_ctx struct buffer. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | lsm: cleanup the size counters in security_getselfattr()Paul Moore2023-11-121-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Zero out all of the size counters in the -E2BIG case (buffer too small) to help make the current code a bit more robust in the face of future code changes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | lsm: don't yet account for IMA in LSM_CONFIG_COUNT calculationRoberto Sassu2023-11-121-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since IMA is not yet an LSM, don't account for it in the LSM_CONFIG_COUNT calculation, used to limit how many LSMs can invoke security_add_hooks(). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | SELinux: Add selfattr hooksCasey Schaufler2023-11-121-27/+107
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add hooks for setselfattr and getselfattr. These hooks are not very different from their setprocattr and getprocattr equivalents, and much of the code is shared. Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | AppArmor: Add selfattr hooksCasey Schaufler2023-11-123-11/+92
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add hooks for setselfattr and getselfattr. These hooks are not very different from their setprocattr and getprocattr equivalents, and much of the code is shared. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> [PM: forward ported beyond v6.6 due merge window changes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | Smack: implement setselfattr and getselfattr hooksCasey Schaufler2023-11-121-5/+90
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Implement Smack support for security_[gs]etselfattr. Refactor the setprocattr hook to avoid code duplication. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | LSM: Helpers for attribute names and filling lsm_ctxCasey Schaufler2023-11-122-0/+65
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add lsm_name_to_attr(), which translates a text string to a LSM_ATTR value if one is available. Add lsm_fill_user_ctx(), which fills a struct lsm_ctx, including the trailing attribute value. Both are used in module specific components of LSM system calls. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | LSM: Create lsm_list_modules system callCasey Schaufler2023-11-121-0/+39
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Create a system call to report the list of Linux Security Modules that are active on the system. The list is provided as an array of LSM ID numbers. The calling application can use this list determine what LSM specific actions it might take. That might include choosing an output format, determining required privilege or bypassing security module specific behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | LSM: syscalls for current process attributesCasey Schaufler2023-11-123-0/+210
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Create a system call lsm_get_self_attr() to provide the security module maintained attributes of the current process. Create a system call lsm_set_self_attr() to set a security module maintained attribute of the current process. Historically these attributes have been exposed to user space via entries in procfs under /proc/self/attr. The attribute value is provided in a lsm_ctx structure. The structure identifies the size of the attribute, and the attribute value. The format of the attribute value is defined by the security module. A flags field is included for LSM specific information. It is currently unused and must be 0. The total size of the data, including the lsm_ctx structure and any padding, is maintained as well. struct lsm_ctx { __u64 id; __u64 flags; __u64 len; __u64 ctx_len; __u8 ctx[]; }; Two new LSM hooks are used to interface with the LSMs. security_getselfattr() collects the lsm_ctx values from the LSMs that support the hook, accounting for space requirements. security_setselfattr() identifies which LSM the attribute is intended for and passes it along. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | proc: Use lsmids instead of lsm names for attrsCasey Schaufler2023-11-121-8/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Use the LSM ID number instead of the LSM name to identify which security module's attibute data should be shown in /proc/self/attr. The security_[gs]etprocattr() functions have been changed to expect the LSM ID. The change from a string comparison to an integer comparison in these functions will provide a minor performance improvement. Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-22 18:20:09 +0000