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* selinux: free contexts previously transferred in selinux_add_opt()Christian Göttsche2022-06-151-7/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | `selinux_add_opt()` stopped taking ownership of the passed context since commit 70f4169ab421 ("selinux: parse contexts for mount options early"). unreferenced object 0xffff888114dfd140 (size 64): comm "mount", pid 15182, jiffies 4295687028 (age 796.340s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 73 79 73 74 65 6d 5f 75 3a 6f 62 6a 65 63 74 5f system_u:object_ 72 3a 74 65 73 74 5f 66 69 6c 65 73 79 73 74 65 r:test_filesyste backtrace: [<ffffffffa07dbef4>] kmemdup_nul+0x24/0x80 [<ffffffffa0d34253>] selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts+0x293/0x560 [<ffffffffa0d13f08>] security_sb_eat_lsm_opts+0x58/0x80 [<ffffffffa0af1eb2>] generic_parse_monolithic+0x82/0x180 [<ffffffffa0a9c1a5>] do_new_mount+0x1f5/0x550 [<ffffffffa0a9eccb>] path_mount+0x2ab/0x1570 [<ffffffffa0aa019e>] __x64_sys_mount+0x20e/0x280 [<ffffffffa1f47124>] do_syscall_64+0x34/0x80 [<ffffffffa200007e>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 unreferenced object 0xffff888108e71640 (size 64): comm "fsmount", pid 7607, jiffies 4295044974 (age 1601.016s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 73 79 73 74 65 6d 5f 75 3a 6f 62 6a 65 63 74 5f system_u:object_ 72 3a 74 65 73 74 5f 66 69 6c 65 73 79 73 74 65 r:test_filesyste backtrace: [<ffffffff861dc2b1>] memdup_user+0x21/0x90 [<ffffffff861dc367>] strndup_user+0x47/0xa0 [<ffffffff864f6965>] __do_sys_fsconfig+0x485/0x9f0 [<ffffffff87940124>] do_syscall_64+0x34/0x80 [<ffffffff87a0007e>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 70f4169ab421 ("selinux: parse contexts for mount options early") Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* KEYS: trusted: tpm2: Fix migratable logicDavid Safford2022-06-081-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When creating (sealing) a new trusted key, migratable trusted keys have the FIXED_TPM and FIXED_PARENT attributes set, and non-migratable keys don't. This is backwards, and also causes creation to fail when creating a migratable key under a migratable parent. (The TPM thinks you are trying to seal a non-migratable blob under a migratable parent.) The following simple patch fixes the logic, and has been tested for all four combinations of migratable and non-migratable trusted keys and parent storage keys. With this logic, you will get a proper failure if you try to create a non-migratable trusted key under a migratable parent storage key, and all other combinations work correctly. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+ Fixes: e5fb5d2c5a03 ("security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable") Signed-off-by: David Safford <david.safford@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* Merge tag 'pull-18-rc1-work.mount' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-06-041-0/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull mount handling updates from Al Viro: "Cleanups (and one fix) around struct mount handling. The fix is usermode_driver.c one - once you've done kern_mount(), you must kern_unmount(); simple mntput() will end up with a leak. Several failure exits in there messed up that way... In practice you won't hit those particular failure exits without fault injection, though" * tag 'pull-18-rc1-work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: move mount-related externs from fs.h to mount.h blob_to_mnt(): kern_unmount() is needed to undo kern_mount() m->mnt_root->d_inode->i_sb is a weird way to spell m->mnt_sb... linux/mount.h: trim includes uninline may_mount() and don't opencode it in fspick(2)/fsopen(2)
| * move mount-related externs from fs.h to mount.hAl Viro2022-05-191-0/+1
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | Merge tag 'linux-kselftest-kunit-5.19-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-05-251-3/+3
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest Pull KUnit updates from Shuah Khan: "Several fixes, cleanups, and enhancements to tests and framework: - introduce _NULL and _NOT_NULL macros to pointer error checks - rework kunit_resource allocation policy to fix memory leaks when caller doesn't specify free() function to be used when allocating memory using kunit_add_resource() and kunit_alloc_resource() funcs. - add ability to specify suite-level init and exit functions" * tag 'linux-kselftest-kunit-5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest: (41 commits) kunit: tool: Use qemu-system-i386 for i386 runs kunit: fix executor OOM error handling logic on non-UML kunit: tool: update riscv QEMU config with new serial dependency kcsan: test: use new suite_{init,exit} support kunit: tool: Add list of all valid test configs on UML kunit: take `kunit_assert` as `const` kunit: tool: misc cleanups kunit: tool: minor cosmetic cleanups in kunit_parser.py kunit: tool: make parser stop overwriting status of suites w/ no_tests kunit: tool: remove dead parse_crash_in_log() logic kunit: tool: print clearer error message when there's no TAP output kunit: tool: stop using a shell to run kernel under QEMU kunit: tool: update test counts summary line format kunit: bail out of test filtering logic quicker if OOM lib/Kconfig.debug: change KUnit tests to default to KUNIT_ALL_TESTS kunit: Rework kunit_resource allocation policy kunit: fix debugfs code to use enum kunit_status, not bool kfence: test: use new suite_{init/exit} support, add .kunitconfig kunit: add ability to specify suite-level init and exit functions kunit: rename print_subtest_{start,end} for clarity (s/subtest/suite) ...
| * | apparmor: test: Use NULL macrosRicardo Ribalda2022-04-041-3/+3
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace the PTR_EQ NULL checks with the more idiomatic and specific NULL macros. Acked-by: Daniel Latypov <dlatypov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@chromium.org> Acked-by: Brendan Higgins <brendanhiggins@google.com> Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
* | Merge tag 'integrity-v5.19' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-05-2416-52/+395
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar: "New is IMA support for including fs-verity file digests and signatures in the IMA measurement list as well as verifying the fs-verity file digest based signatures, both based on policy. In addition, are two bug fixes: - avoid reading UEFI variables, which cause a page fault, on Apple Macs with T2 chips. - remove the original "ima" template Kconfig option to address a boot command line ordering issue. The rest is a mixture of code/documentation cleanup" * tag 'integrity-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: integrity: Fix sparse warnings in keyring_handler evm: Clean up some variables evm: Return INTEGRITY_PASS for enum integrity_status value '0' efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs fsverity: update the documentation ima: support fs-verity file digest based version 3 signatures ima: permit fsverity's file digests in the IMA measurement list ima: define a new template field named 'd-ngv2' and templates fs-verity: define a function to return the integrity protected file digest ima: use IMA default hash algorithm for integrity violations ima: fix 'd-ng' comments and documentation ima: remove the IMA_TEMPLATE Kconfig option ima: remove redundant initialization of pointer 'file'.
| * | integrity: Fix sparse warnings in keyring_handlerStefan Berger2022-05-161-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix the following sparse warnings: CHECK security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c:76:16: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c:91:16: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c:106:16: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| * | evm: Clean up some variablesStefan Berger2022-05-162-4/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make hmac_tfm static since it's not used anywhere else besides the file it is in. Remove declaration of hash_tfm since it doesn't exist. Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| * | evm: Return INTEGRITY_PASS for enum integrity_status value '0'Stefan Berger2022-05-161-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Return INTEGRITY_PASS for the enum integrity_status rather than 0. Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| * | efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 MacsAditya Garg2022-05-152-0/+41
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | On Apple T2 Macs, when Linux attempts to read the db and dbx efi variables at early boot to load UEFI Secure Boot certificates, a page fault occurs in Apple firmware code and EFI runtime services are disabled with the following logs: [Firmware Bug]: Page fault caused by firmware at PA: 0xffffb1edc0068000 WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 104 at arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c:735 efi_crash_gracefully_on_page_fault+0x50/0xf0 (Removed some logs from here) Call Trace: <TASK> page_fault_oops+0x4f/0x2c0 ? search_bpf_extables+0x6b/0x80 ? search_module_extables+0x50/0x80 ? search_exception_tables+0x5b/0x60 kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x9e/0x110 __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x155/0x190 bad_area_nosemaphore+0x16/0x20 do_kern_addr_fault+0x8c/0xa0 exc_page_fault+0xd8/0x180 asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 (Removed some logs from here) ? __efi_call+0x28/0x30 ? switch_mm+0x20/0x30 ? efi_call_rts+0x19a/0x8e0 ? process_one_work+0x222/0x3f0 ? worker_thread+0x4a/0x3d0 ? kthread+0x17a/0x1a0 ? process_one_work+0x3f0/0x3f0 ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40 ? ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 </TASK> ---[ end trace 1f82023595a5927f ]--- efi: Froze efi_rts_wq and disabled EFI Runtime Services integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015 integrity: MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list efi: EFI Runtime Services are disabled! integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015 integrity: Couldn't get UEFI dbx list integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015 integrity: Couldn't get mokx list integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x80000000 So we avoid reading these UEFI variables and thus prevent the crash. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@live.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| * | ima: support fs-verity file digest based version 3 signaturesMimi Zohar2022-05-055-16/+177
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | IMA may verify a file's integrity against a "good" value stored in the 'security.ima' xattr or as an appended signature, based on policy. When the "good value" is stored in the xattr, the xattr may contain a file hash or signature. In either case, the "good" value is preceded by a header. The first byte of the xattr header indicates the type of data - hash, signature - stored in the xattr. To support storing fs-verity signatures in the 'security.ima' xattr requires further differentiating the fs-verity signature from the existing IMA signature. In addition the signatures stored in 'security.ima' xattr, need to be disambiguated. Instead of directly signing the fs-verity digest, a new signature format version 3 is defined as the hash of the ima_file_id structure, which identifies the type of signature and the digest. The IMA policy defines "which" files are to be measured, verified, and/or audited. For those files being verified, the policy rules indicate "how" the file should be verified. For example to require a file be signed, the appraise policy rule must include the 'appraise_type' option. appraise_type:= [imasig] | [imasig|modsig] | [sigv3] where 'imasig' is the original or signature format v2 (default), where 'modsig' is an appended signature, where 'sigv3' is the signature format v3. The policy rule must also indicate the type of digest, if not the IMA default, by first specifying the digest type: digest_type:= [verity] The following policy rule requires fsverity signatures. The rule may be constrained, for example based on a fsuuid or LSM label. appraise func=BPRM_CHECK digest_type=verity appraise_type=sigv3 Acked-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| * | ima: permit fsverity's file digests in the IMA measurement listMimi Zohar2022-05-055-8/+90
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Permit fsverity's file digest (a hash of struct fsverity_descriptor) to be included in the IMA measurement list, based on the new measurement policy rule 'digest_type=verity' option. To differentiate between a regular IMA file hash from an fsverity's file digest, use the new d-ngv2 format field included in the ima-ngv2 template. The following policy rule requires fsverity file digests and specifies the new 'ima-ngv2' template, which contains the new 'd-ngv2' field. The policy rule may be constrained, for example based on a fsuuid or LSM label. measure func=FILE_CHECK digest_type=verity template=ima-ngv2 Acked-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| * | ima: define a new template field named 'd-ngv2' and templatesMimi Zohar2022-05-053-11/+73
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In preparation to differentiate between unsigned regular IMA file hashes and fs-verity's file digests in the IMA measurement list, define a new template field named 'd-ngv2'. Also define two new templates named 'ima-ngv2' and 'ima-sigv2', which include the new 'd-ngv2' field. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| * | ima: use IMA default hash algorithm for integrity violationsMimi Zohar2022-05-011-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Integrity file violations - ToM/ToU, open writers - are recorded in the IMA measurement list, containing 0x00's in both the template data and file data hash fields, but 0xFF's are actually extended into TPM PCRs. Although the original 'ima' template data field ('d') is limited to 20 bytes, the 'd-ng' template digest field is not. The violation file data hash template field ('d-ng') is unnecessarily hard coded to SHA1. Instead of simply replacing the hard coded SHA1 hash algorithm with a larger hash algorithm, use the hash algorithm as defined in "ima_hash_algo". ima_hash_algo is set to either the Kconfig IMA default hash algorithm or as defined on the boot command line (ima_hash=). Including a non-SHA1 file data hash algorithm in the 'd-ng' field of violations is a cosmetic change. The template data hash field, which is extended into the TPM PCRs, is not affected by this change and should not affect attestation of the IMA measurement list. Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| * | ima: fix 'd-ng' comments and documentationMimi Zohar2022-05-011-3/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Initially the 'd-ng' template field did not prefix the digest with either "md5" or "sha1" hash algorithms. Prior to being upstreamed this changed, but the comments and documentation were not updated. Fix the comments and documentation. Fixes: 4d7aeee73f53 ("ima: define new template ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng") Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| * | ima: remove the IMA_TEMPLATE Kconfig optionGUO Zihua2022-04-071-8/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The original 'ima' measurement list template contains a hash, defined as 20 bytes, and a null terminated pathname, limited to 255 characters. Other measurement list templates permit both larger hashes and longer pathnames. When the "ima" template is configured as the default, a new measurement list template (ima_template=) must be specified before specifying a larger hash algorithm (ima_hash=) on the boot command line. To avoid this boot command line ordering issue, remove the legacy "ima" template configuration option, allowing it to still be specified on the boot command line. The root cause of this issue is that during the processing of ima_hash, we would try to check whether the hash algorithm is compatible with the template. If the template is not set at the moment we do the check, we check the algorithm against the configured default template. If the default template is "ima", then we reject any hash algorithm other than sha1 and md5. For example, if the compiled default template is "ima", and the default algorithm is sha1 (which is the current default). In the cmdline, we put in "ima_hash=sha256 ima_template=ima-ng". The expected behavior would be that ima starts with ima-ng as the template and sha256 as the hash algorithm. However, during the processing of "ima_hash=", "ima_template=" has not been processed yet, and hash_setup would check the configured hash algorithm against the compiled default: ima, and reject sha256. So at the end, the hash algorithm that is actually used will be sha1. With template "ima" removed from the configured default, we ensure that the default tempalte would at least be "ima-ng" which allows for basically any hash algorithm. This change would not break the algorithm compatibility checks for IMA. Fixes: 4286587dccd43 ("ima: add Kconfig default measurement list template") Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| * | ima: remove redundant initialization of pointer 'file'.Colin Ian King2022-04-041-1/+1
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The pointer 'file' is being initialized with a value that is never read, it is being re-assigned the same value later on closer to where it is being first used. The initialization is redundant and can be removed. Cleans up clang scan build warning: security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:434:15: warning: Value stored to 'file' during its initialization is never read [deadcode.DeadStores] Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.i.king@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
* | Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.19-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-05-246-43/+174
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen: - Tightened validation of key hashes for SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST. An invalid hash format causes a compilation error. Previously, they got included to the kernel binary but were silently ignored at run-time. - Allow root user to append new hashes to the blacklist keyring. - Trusted keys backed with Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM), which part of some of the new NXP's SoC's. Now there is total three hardware backends for trusted keys: TPM, ARM TEE and CAAM. - A scattered set of fixes and small improvements for the TPM driver. * tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd: MAINTAINERS: add KEYS-TRUSTED-CAAM doc: trusted-encrypted: describe new CAAM trust source KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys crypto: caam - add in-kernel interface for blob generator crypto: caam - determine whether CAAM supports blob encap/decap KEYS: trusted: allow use of kernel RNG for key material KEYS: trusted: allow use of TEE as backend without TCG_TPM support tpm: Add field upgrade mode support for Infineon TPM2 modules tpm: Fix buffer access in tpm2_get_tpm_pt() char: tpm: cr50_i2c: Suppress duplicated error message in .remove() tpm: cr50: Add new device/vendor ID 0x504a6666 tpm: Remove read16/read32/write32 calls from tpm_tis_phy_ops tpm: ibmvtpm: Correct the return value in tpm_ibmvtpm_probe() tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee: Return true/false (not 1/0) from bool functions certs: Explain the rationale to call panic() certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
| * | KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keysAhmad Fatoum2022-05-234-2/+97
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP. The CAAM does crypto acceleration, hardware number generation and has a blob mechanism for encapsulation/decapsulation of sensitive material. This blob mechanism depends on a device specific random 256-bit One Time Programmable Master Key that is fused in each SoC at manufacturing time. This key is unreadable and can only be used by the CAAM for AES encryption/decryption of user data. This makes it a suitable backend (source) for kernel trusted keys. Previous commits generalized trusted keys to support multiple backends and added an API to access the CAAM blob mechanism. Based on these, provide the necessary glue to use the CAAM for trusted keys. Reviewed-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Tim Harvey <tharvey@gateworks.com> Tested-by: Matthias Schiffer <matthias.schiffer@ew.tq-group.com> Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com> Tested-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> # on ls1028a (non-E and E) Tested-by: John Ernberg <john.ernberg@actia.se> # iMX8QXP Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
| * | KEYS: trusted: allow use of kernel RNG for key materialAhmad Fatoum2022-05-231-1/+34
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The two existing trusted key sources don't make use of the kernel RNG, but instead let the hardware doing the sealing/unsealing also generate the random key material. However, both users and future backends may want to place less trust into the quality of the trust source's random number generator and instead reuse the kernel entropy pool, which can be seeded from multiple entropy sources. Make this possible by adding a new trusted.rng parameter, that will force use of the kernel RNG. In its absence, it's up to the trust source to decide, which random numbers to use, maintaining the existing behavior. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Acked-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Acked-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com> Tested-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> # on ls1028a (non-E and E) Tested-by: John Ernberg <john.ernberg@actia.se> # iMX8QXP Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
| * | KEYS: trusted: allow use of TEE as backend without TCG_TPM supportAhmad Fatoum2022-05-234-17/+42
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With recent rework, trusted keys are no longer limited to TPM as trust source. The Kconfig symbol is unchanged however leading to a few issues: - TCG_TPM is required, even if only TEE is to be used - Enabling TCG_TPM, but excluding it from available trusted sources is not possible - TEE=m && TRUSTED_KEYS=y will lead to TEE support being silently dropped, which is not the best user experience Remedy these issues by introducing two new boolean Kconfig symbols: TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM and TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE with the appropriate dependencies. Any new code depending on the TPM trusted key backend in particular or symbols exported by it will now need to explicitly state that it depends on TRUSTED_KEYS && TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM The latter to ensure the dependency is built and the former to ensure it's reachable for module builds. There are no such users yet. Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com> Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com> Tested-by: Andreas Rammhold <andreas@rammhold.de> Tested-by: Tim Harvey <tharvey@gateworks.com> Tested-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> # on ls1028a (non-E and E) Tested-by: John Ernberg <john.ernberg@actia.se> # iMX8QXP Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
| * | certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creationMickaël Salaün2022-05-231-24/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Factor out the blacklist hash creation with the get_raw_hash() helper. This also centralize the "tbs" and "bin" prefixes and make them private, which help to manage them consistently. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-5-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* | | Merge tag 'Smack-for-5.19' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-nextLinus Torvalds2022-05-241-1/+0
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull smack update from Casey Schaufler: "A single change to remove a pointless assignment" * tag 'Smack-for-5.19' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next: smack: Remove redundant assignments
| * | | smack: Remove redundant assignmentsMichal Orzel2022-05-231-1/+0
| |/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Get rid of redundant assignments which end up in values not being read either because they are overwritten or the function ends. Reported by clang-tidy [deadcode.DeadStores] Signed-off-by: Michal Orzel <michalorzel.eng@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* | | Merge tag 'landlock-5.19-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-05-2414-286/+848
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux Pull Landlock updates from Mickaël Salaün: - improve the path_rename LSM hook implementations for RENAME_EXCHANGE; - fix a too-restrictive filesystem control for a rare corner case; - set the nested sandbox limitation to 16 layers; - add a new LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER access right to properly handle file reparenting (i.e. full rename and link support); - add new tests and documentation; - format code with clang-format to make it easier to maintain and contribute. * tag 'landlock-5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux: (30 commits) landlock: Explain how to support Landlock landlock: Add design choices documentation for filesystem access rights landlock: Document good practices about filesystem policies landlock: Document LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER and ABI versioning samples/landlock: Add support for file reparenting selftests/landlock: Add 11 new test suites dedicated to file reparenting landlock: Add support for file reparenting with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER LSM: Remove double path_rename hook calls for RENAME_EXCHANGE landlock: Move filesystem helpers and add a new one landlock: Fix same-layer rule unions landlock: Create find_rule() from unmask_layers() landlock: Reduce the maximum number of layers to 16 landlock: Define access_mask_t to enforce a consistent access mask size selftests/landlock: Test landlock_create_ruleset(2) argument check ordering landlock: Change landlock_restrict_self(2) check ordering landlock: Change landlock_add_rule(2) argument check ordering selftests/landlock: Add tests for O_PATH selftests/landlock: Fully test file rename with "remove" access selftests/landlock: Extend access right tests to directories selftests/landlock: Add tests for unknown access rights ...
| * | | landlock: Add support for file reparenting with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFERMickaël Salaün2022-05-233-76/+528
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a new LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER access right to enable policy writers to allow sandboxed processes to link and rename files from and to a specific set of file hierarchies. This access right should be composed with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_* for the destination of a link or rename, and with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_* for a source of a rename. This lift a Landlock limitation that always denied changing the parent of an inode. Renaming or linking to the same directory is still always allowed, whatever LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER is used or not, because it is not considered a threat to user data. However, creating multiple links or renaming to a different parent directory may lead to privilege escalations if not handled properly. Indeed, we must be sure that the source doesn't gain more privileges by being accessible from the destination. This is handled by making sure that the source hierarchy (including the referenced file or directory itself) restricts at least as much the destination hierarchy. If it is not the case, an EXDEV error is returned, making it potentially possible for user space to copy the file hierarchy instead of moving or linking it. Instead of creating different access rights for the source and the destination, we choose to make it simple and consistent for users. Indeed, considering the previous constraint, it would be weird to require such destination access right to be also granted to the source (to make it a superset). Moreover, RENAME_EXCHANGE would also add to the confusion because of paths being both a source and a destination. See the provided documentation for additional details. New tests are provided with a following commit. Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-8-mic@digikod.net
| * | | LSM: Remove double path_rename hook calls for RENAME_EXCHANGEMickaël Salaün2022-05-234-15/+46
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In order to be able to identify a file exchange with renameat2(2) and RENAME_EXCHANGE, which will be useful for Landlock [1], propagate the rename flags to LSMs. This may also improve performance because of the switch from two set of LSM hook calls to only one, and because LSMs using this hook may optimize the double check (e.g. only one lock, reduce the number of path walks). AppArmor, Landlock and Tomoyo are updated to leverage this change. This should not change the current behavior (same check order), except (different level of) speed boosts. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220221212522.320243-1-mic@digikod.net Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-7-mic@digikod.net
| * | | landlock: Move filesystem helpers and add a new oneMickaël Salaün2022-05-231-41/+46
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move the SB_NOUSER and IS_PRIVATE dentry check to a standalone is_nouser_or_private() helper. This will be useful for a following commit. Move get_mode_access() and maybe_remove() to make them usable by new code provided by a following commit. Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-6-mic@digikod.net
| * | | landlock: Fix same-layer rule unionsMickaël Salaün2022-05-232-26/+54
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The original behavior was to check if the full set of requested accesses was allowed by at least a rule of every relevant layer. This didn't take into account requests for multiple accesses and same-layer rules allowing the union of these accesses in a complementary way. As a result, multiple accesses requested on a file hierarchy matching rules that, together, allowed these accesses, but without a unique rule allowing all of them, was illegitimately denied. This case should be rare in practice and it can only be triggered by the path_rename or file_open hook implementations. For instance, if, for the same layer, a rule allows execution beneath /a/b and another rule allows read beneath /a, requesting access to read and execute at the same time for /a/b should be allowed for this layer. This was an inconsistency because the union of same-layer rule accesses was already allowed if requested once at a time anyway. This fix changes the way allowed accesses are gathered over a path walk. To take into account all these rule accesses, we store in a matrix all layer granting the set of requested accesses, according to the handled accesses. To avoid heap allocation, we use an array on the stack which is 2*13 bytes. A following commit bringing the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER access right will increase this size to reach 112 bytes (2*14*4) in case of link or rename actions. Add a new layout1.layer_rule_unions test to check that accesses from different rules pertaining to the same layer are ORed in a file hierarchy. Also test that it is not the case for rules from different layers. Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-5-mic@digikod.net Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
| * | | landlock: Create find_rule() from unmask_layers()Mickaël Salaün2022-05-231-13/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This refactoring will be useful in a following commit. Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-4-mic@digikod.net Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
| * | | landlock: Reduce the maximum number of layers to 16Mickaël Salaün2022-05-233-11/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The maximum number of nested Landlock domains is currently 64. Because of the following fix and to help reduce the stack size, let's reduce it to 16. This seems large enough for a lot of use cases (e.g. sandboxed init service, spawning a sandboxed SSH service, in nested sandboxed containers). Reducing the number of nested domains may also help to discover misuse of Landlock (e.g. creating a domain per rule). Add and use a dedicated layer_mask_t typedef to fit with the number of layers. This might be useful when changing it and to keep it consistent with the maximum number of layers. Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-3-mic@digikod.net Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
| * | | landlock: Define access_mask_t to enforce a consistent access mask sizeMickaël Salaün2022-05-235-15/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Create and use the access_mask_t typedef to enforce a consistent access mask size and uniformly use a 16-bits type. This will helps transition to a 32-bits value one day. Add a build check to make sure all (filesystem) access rights fit in. This will be extended with a following commit. Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-2-mic@digikod.net Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
| * | | landlock: Change landlock_restrict_self(2) check orderingMickaël Salaün2022-05-231-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | According to the Landlock goal to be a security feature available to unprivileges processes, it makes more sense to first check for no_new_privs before checking anything else (i.e. syscall arguments). Merge inval_fd_enforce and unpriv_enforce_without_no_new_privs tests into the new restrict_self_checks_ordering. This is similar to the previous commit checking other syscalls. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506160820.524344-10-mic@digikod.net Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
| * | | landlock: Change landlock_add_rule(2) argument check orderingMickaël Salaün2022-05-231-9/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This makes more sense to first check the ruleset FD and then the rule attribute. It will be useful to factor out code for other rule types. Add inval_add_rule_arguments tests, extension of empty_path_beneath_attr tests, to also check error ordering for landlock_add_rule(2). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506160820.524344-9-mic@digikod.net Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
| * | | landlock: Fix landlock_add_rule(2) documentationMickaël Salaün2022-05-231-4/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It is not mandatory to pass a file descriptor obtained with the O_PATH flag. Also, replace rule's accesses with ruleset's accesses. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506160820.524344-2-mic@digikod.net Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
| * | | landlock: Format with clang-formatMickaël Salaün2022-05-0910-136/+142
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Let's follow a consistent and documented coding style. Everything may not be to our liking but it is better than tacit knowledge. Moreover, this will help maintain style consistency between different developers. This contains only whitespace changes. Automatically formatted with: clang-format-14 -i security/landlock/*.[ch] include/uapi/linux/landlock.h Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506160513.523257-3-mic@digikod.net Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
| * | | landlock: Add clang-format exceptionsMickaël Salaün2022-05-092-0/+6
| | |/ | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In preparation to a following commit, add clang-format on and clang-format off stanzas around constant definitions. This enables to keep aligned values, which is much more readable than packed definitions. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506160513.523257-2-mic@digikod.net Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
* | | Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20220523' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-05-2421-81/+93
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: "We've got twelve patches queued for v5.19, with most being fairly minor. The highlights are below: - The checkreqprot and runtime disable knobs have been deprecated for some time with no active users that we can find. In an effort to move things along we are adding a pause when the knobs are used to help make the deprecation more noticeable in case anyone is still using these hacks in the shadows. - We've added the anonymous inode class name to the AVC audit records when anonymous inodes are involved. This should make writing policy easier when anonymous inodes are involved. - More constification work. This is fairly straightforward and the source of most of the diffstat. - The usual minor cleanups: remove unnecessary assignments, assorted style/checkpatch fixes, kdoc fixes, macro while-loop encapsulations, #include tweaks, etc" * tag 'selinux-pr-20220523' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: security: declare member holding string literal const selinux: log anon inode class name selinux: declare data arrays const selinux: fix indentation level of mls_ops block selinux: include necessary headers in headers selinux: avoid extra semicolon selinux: update parameter documentation selinux: resolve checkpatch errors selinux: don't sleep when CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE is true selinux: checkreqprot is deprecated, add some ssleep() discomfort selinux: runtime disable is deprecated, add some ssleep() discomfort selinux: Remove redundant assignments
| * | | security: declare member holding string literal constChristian Göttsche2022-05-131-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The struct security_hook_list member lsm is assigned in security_add_hooks() with string literals passed from the individual security modules. Declare the function parameter and the struct member const to signal their immutability. Reported by Clang [-Wwrite-strings]: security/selinux/hooks.c:7388:63: error: passing 'const char [8]' to parameter of type 'char *' discards qualifiers [-Werror,-Wincompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers] security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), selinux); ^~~~~~~~~ ./include/linux/lsm_hooks.h:1629:11: note: passing argument to parameter 'lsm' here char *lsm); ^ Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | selinux: log anon inode class nameChristian Göttsche2022-05-032-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Log the anonymous inode class name in the security hook inode_init_security_anon. This name is the key for name based type transitions on the anon_inode security class on creation. Example: type=AVC msg=audit(02/16/22 22:02:50.585:216) : avc: granted \ { create } for pid=2136 comm=mariadbd anonclass=[io_uring] \ scontext=system_u:system_r:mysqld_t:s0 \ tcontext=system_u:system_r:mysqld_iouring_t:s0 tclass=anon_inode Add a new LSM audit data type holding the inode and the class name. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> [PM: adjusted 'anonclass' to be a trusted string, cgzones approved] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | selinux: declare data arrays constChristian Göttsche2022-05-039-26/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The arrays for the policy capability names, the initial sid identifiers and the class and permission names are not changed at runtime. Declare them const to avoid accidental modification. Do not override the classmap and the initial sid list in the build time script genheaders. Check flose(3) is successful in genheaders.c, otherwise the written data might be corrupted or incomplete. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> [PM: manual merge due to fuzz, minor style tweaks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | selinux: fix indentation level of mls_ops blockChristian Göttsche2022-05-031-21/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add one level of indentation to the code block of the label mls_ops in constraint_expr_eval(), to adjust the trailing break; to the parent case: branch. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | selinux: include necessary headers in headersChristian Göttsche2022-05-036-1/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Include header files required for struct or typedef declarations in header files. This is for example helpful when working with an IDE, which needs to resolve those symbols. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | selinux: avoid extra semicolonChristian Göttsche2022-05-031-9/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Wrap macro into `do { } while (0)` to avoid Clang emitting warnings about extra semicolons. Similar to userspace commit https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/commit/9d85aa60d12e468e7fd510c2b5475b5299b71622 Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> [PM: whitespace/indenting tweaks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | selinux: update parameter documentationChristian Göttsche2022-05-032-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | security/selinux/include/audit.h:54: warning: Function parameter or member 'krule' not described in 'selinux_audit_rule_known' security/selinux/include/audit.h:54: warning: Excess function parameter 'rule' description in 'selinux_audit_rule_known' security/selinux/include/avc.h:130: warning: Function parameter or member 'state' not described in 'avc_audit' This also bring the parameter name of selinux_audit_rule_known() in sync between declaration and definition. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | selinux: resolve checkpatch errorsChristian Göttsche2022-05-033-18/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Reported by checkpatch: security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c --------------------------- ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line #29: FILE: security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c:29: +static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_route_perms[] = +{ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line #97: FILE: security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c:97: +static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms[] = +{ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line #105: FILE: security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c:105: +static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_xfrm_perms[] = +{ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line #134: FILE: security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c:134: +static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] = +{ security/selinux/ss/policydb.c ------------------------------ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line #318: FILE: security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:318: +static int (*destroy_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = +{ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line #674: FILE: security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:674: +static int (*index_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = +{ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line #1643: FILE: security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:1643: +static int (*read_f[SYM_NUM]) (struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp) = +{ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line #3246: FILE: security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:3246: + void *datap) = +{ Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | selinux: don't sleep when CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE is truePaul Moore2022-04-142-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Unfortunately commit 81200b0265b1 ("selinux: checkreqprot is deprecated, add some ssleep() discomfort") added a five second sleep during early kernel boot, e.g. start_kernel(), which could cause a "scheduling while atomic" panic. This patch fixes this problem by moving the sleep out of checkreqprot_set() and into sel_write_checkreqprot() so that we only sleep when the checkreqprot setting is set during runtime, after the kernel has booted. The error message remains the same in both cases. Fixes: 81200b0265b1 ("selinux: checkreqprot is deprecated, add some ssleep() discomfort") Reported-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | selinux: checkreqprot is deprecated, add some ssleep() discomfortPaul Moore2022-04-043-3/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The checkreqprot functionality was disabled by default back in Linux v4.4 (2015) with commit 2a35d196c160e3 ("selinux: change CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE default") and it was officially marked as deprecated in Linux v5.7. It was always a bit of a hack to workaround very old userspace and to the best of our knowledge, the checkreqprot functionality has been disabled by Linux distributions for quite some time. This patch moves the deprecation messages from KERN_WARNING to KERN_ERR and adds a five second sleep to anyone using it to help draw their attention to the deprecation and provide a URL which helps explain things in more detail. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | selinux: runtime disable is deprecated, add some ssleep() discomfortPaul Moore2022-04-041-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We deprecated the SELinux runtime disable functionality in Linux v5.6, and it is time to get a bit more serious about removing it. Add a five second sleep to anyone using it to help draw their attention to the deprecation and provide a URL which helps explain things in more detail, including how to add kernel command line parameters to some of the more popular Linux distributions. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-27 02:04:12 +0000