summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/security
Commit message (Collapse)AuthorAgeFilesLines
* apparmor: remove POLICY_MEDIATES_SAFEJohn Johansen2018-03-132-12/+2
| | | | | | | The unpack code now makes sure every profile has a dfa so the safe version of POLICY_MEDIATES is no longer needed. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediationJohn Johansen2018-03-1313-8/+786
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | version 2 - Force an abi break. Network mediation will only be available in v8 abi complaint policy. Provide a basic mediation of sockets. This is not a full net mediation but just whether a spcific family of socket can be used by an application, along with setting up some basic infrastructure for network mediation to follow. the user space rule hav the basic form of NETWORK RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'network' [ DOMAIN ] [ TYPE | PROTOCOL ] DOMAIN = ( 'inet' | 'ax25' | 'ipx' | 'appletalk' | 'netrom' | 'bridge' | 'atmpvc' | 'x25' | 'inet6' | 'rose' | 'netbeui' | 'security' | 'key' | 'packet' | 'ash' | 'econet' | 'atmsvc' | 'sna' | 'irda' | 'pppox' | 'wanpipe' | 'bluetooth' | 'netlink' | 'unix' | 'rds' | 'llc' | 'can' | 'tipc' | 'iucv' | 'rxrpc' | 'isdn' | 'phonet' | 'ieee802154' | 'caif' | 'alg' | 'nfc' | 'vsock' | 'mpls' | 'ib' | 'kcm' ) ',' TYPE = ( 'stream' | 'dgram' | 'seqpacket' | 'rdm' | 'raw' | 'packet' ) PROTOCOL = ( 'tcp' | 'udp' | 'icmp' ) eg. network, network inet, Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
* apparmor: improve overlapping domain attachment resolutionJohn Johansen2018-02-094-14/+158
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Overlapping domain attachments using the current longest left exact match fail in some simple cases, and with the fix to ensure consistent behavior by failing unresolvable attachments it becomes important to do a better job. eg. under the current match the following are unresolvable where the alternation is clearly a better match under the most specific left match rule. /** /{bin/,}usr/ Use a counting match that detects when a loop in the state machine is enter, and return the match count to provide a better specific left match resolution. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* apparmor: convert attaching profiles via xattrs to use dfa matchingJohn Johansen2018-02-095-57/+43
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This converts profile attachment based on xattrs to a fixed extended conditional using dfa matching. This has a couple of advantages - pattern matching can be used for the xattr match - xattrs can be optional for an attachment or marked as required - the xattr attachment conditional will be able to be combined with other extended conditionals when the flexible extended conditional work lands. The xattr fixed extended conditional is appended to the xmatch conditional. If an xattr attachment is specified the profile xmatch will be generated regardless of whether there is a pattern match on the executable name. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
* apparmor: Add support for attaching profiles via xattr, presence and valueMatthew Garrett2018-02-094-34/+217
| | | | | | | | | | | Make it possible to tie Apparmor profiles to the presence of one or more extended attributes, and optionally their values. An example usecase for this is to automatically transition to a more privileged Apparmor profile if an executable has a valid IMA signature, which can then be appraised by the IMA subsystem. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* apparmor: cleanup: simplify code to get ns symlink nameJohn Johansen2018-02-091-19/+6
| | | | | | ns_get_name() is called in only one place and can be folded in. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* apparmor: cleanup create_aafs() error pathJohn Johansen2018-02-091-20/+12
| | | | Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* apparmor: dfa split verification of table headersJohn Johansen2018-02-091-48/+68
| | | | | | | separate the different types of verification so they are logically separate and can be reused separate of each other. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* apparmor: dfa add support for state differential encodingJohn Johansen2018-02-092-1/+29
| | | | | | | State differential encoding can provide better compression for apparmor policy, without having significant impact on match time. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* apparmor: dfa move character match into a macroJohn Johansen2018-02-091-47/+27
| | | | Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* apparmor: update domain transitions that are subsets of confinement at nnpJohn Johansen2018-02-094-65/+110
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Domain transition so far have been largely blocked by no new privs, unless the transition has been provably a subset of the previous confinement. There was a couple problems with the previous implementations, - transitions that weren't explicitly a stack but resulted in a subset of confinement were disallowed - confinement subsets were only calculated from the previous confinement instead of the confinement being enforced at the time of no new privs, so transitions would have to get progressively tighter. Fix this by detecting and storing a reference to the task's confinement at the "time" no new privs is set. This reference is then used to determine whether a transition is a subsystem of the confinement at the time no new privs was set. Unfortunately the implementation is less than ideal in that we have to detect no new privs after the fact when a task attempts a domain transition. This is adequate for the currently but will not work in a stacking situation where no new privs could be conceivably be set in both the "host" and in the container. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* apparmor: move context.h to cred.hJohn Johansen2018-02-0915-14/+14
| | | | | | | | | Now that file contexts have been moved into file, and task context fns() and data have been split from the context, only the cred context remains in context.h so rename to cred.h to better reflect what it deals with. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* apparmor: move task related defines and fns to task.X filesJohn Johansen2018-02-096-98/+105
| | | | Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* apparmor: cleanup, drop unused fn __aa_task_is_confined()John Johansen2018-02-091-11/+0
| | | | Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* apparmor: cleanup fixup description of aa_replace_profilesJohn Johansen2018-02-091-2/+3
| | | | Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* apparmor: rename tctx to ctxJohn Johansen2018-02-093-30/+29
| | | | | | | now that cred_ctx has been removed we can rename task_ctxs from tctx without causing confusion. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* apparmor: drop cred_ctx and reference the label directlyJohn Johansen2018-02-094-129/+47
| | | | | | | | | With the task domain change information now stored in the task->security context, the cred->security context only stores the label. We can get rid of the cred_ctx and directly reference the label, removing a layer of indirection, and unneeded extra allocations. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* apparmor: move task domain change info to task securityJohn Johansen2018-02-094-52/+132
| | | | | | | | The task domain change info is task specific and its and abuse of the cred to store the information in there. Now that a task->security field exists store it in the proper place. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* apparmor: rename task_ctx to the more accurate cred_ctxJohn Johansen2018-02-095-46/+45
| | | | Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* apparmor: audit unknown signal numbersJohn Johansen2018-02-093-4/+12
| | | | | | | | Allow apparmor to audit the number of a signal that it does not provide a mapping for and is currently being reported only as unknown. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* apparmor: make signal label match work when matching stacked labelsJohn Johansen2018-02-091-28/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Given a label with a profile stack of A//&B or A//&C ... A ptrace rule should be able to specify a generic trace pattern with a rule like signal send A//&**, however this is failing because while the correct label match routine is called, it is being done post label decomposition so it is always being done against a profile instead of the stacked label. To fix this refactor the cross check to pass the full peer label in to the label_match. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* security: apparmor: remove duplicate includesPravin Shedge2018-02-091-1/+0
| | | | | | | | These duplicate includes have been found with scripts/checkincludes.pl but they have been removed manually to avoid removing false positives. Signed-off-by: Pravin Shedge <pravin.shedge4linux@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* apparmor: root view labels should not be under user controlJohn Johansen2018-02-091-3/+2
| | | | | | | | The root view of the label parse should not be exposed to user control. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
* apparmor: cleanup add proper line wrapping to nulldfa.inJohn Johansen2018-02-091-1/+107
| | | | | | | nulldfa.in makes for a very long unwrapped line, which certain tools do not like. So add line breaks. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* apparmor: provide a bounded version of label_parseJohn Johansen2018-02-092-11/+27
| | | | | | | | some label/context sources might not be guaranteed to be null terminiated provide a size bounded version of label parse to deal with these. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
* apparmor: use the dfa to do label parse string splittingJohn Johansen2018-02-095-11/+170
| | | | | | | | | | | | The current split scheme is actually wrong in that it splits ///& where that is invalid and should fail. Use the dfa to do a proper bounded split without having to worry about getting the string processing right in code. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
* apparmor: add first substr match to dfaJohn Johansen2018-02-092-0/+124
| | | | | Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
* apparmor: split load data into management struct and data blobJohn Johansen2018-02-092-4/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | Splitting the management struct from the actual data blob will allow us in the future to do some sharing and other data reduction techniques like replacing the the raw data with compressed data. Prepare for this by separating the management struct from the data blob. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* apparmor: fix logging of the existence test for signalsJohn Johansen2018-02-092-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The existence test is not being properly logged as the signal mapping maps it to the last entry in the named signal table. This is done to help catch bugs by making the 0 mapped signal value invalid so that we can catch the signal value not being filled in. When fixing the off-by-one comparision logic the reporting of the existence test was broken, because the logic behind the mapped named table was hidden. Fix this by adding a define for the name lookup and using it. Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: f7dc4c9a855a1 ("apparmor: fix off-by-one comparison on MAXMAPPED_SIG") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* apparmor: fix resource audit messages when auditing peerJohn Johansen2018-02-091-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Resource auditing is using the peer field which is not available when the rlim data struct is used, because it is a different element of the same union. Accessing peer during resource auditing could cause garbage log entries or even oops the kernel. Move the rlim data block into the same struct as the peer field so they can be used together. CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 86b92cb782b3 ("apparmor: move resource checks to using labels") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* apparmor: fix display of .ns_name for containersJohn Johansen2018-02-091-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The .ns_name should not be virtualized by the current ns view. It needs to report the ns base name as that is being used during startup as part of determining apparmor policy namespace support. BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1746463 Fixes: d9f02d9c237aa ("apparmor: fix display of ns name") Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Tested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2018-01-141-1/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 pti updates from Thomas Gleixner: "This contains: - a PTI bugfix to avoid setting reserved CR3 bits when PCID is disabled. This seems to cause issues on a virtual machine at least and is incorrect according to the AMD manual. - a PTI bugfix which disables the perf BTS facility if PTI is enabled. The BTS AUX buffer is not globally visible and causes the CPU to fault when the mapping disappears on switching CR3 to user space. A full fix which restores BTS on PTI is non trivial and will be worked on. - PTI bugfixes for EFI and trusted boot which make sure that the user space visible page table entries have the NX bit cleared - removal of dead code in the PTI pagetable setup functions - add PTI documentation - add a selftest for vsyscall to verify that the kernel actually implements what it advertises. - a sysfs interface to expose vulnerability and mitigation information so there is a coherent way for users to retrieve the status. - the initial spectre_v2 mitigations, aka retpoline: + The necessary ASM thunk and compiler support + The ASM variants of retpoline and the conversion of affected ASM code + Make LFENCE serializing on AMD so it can be used as speculation trap + The RSB fill after vmexit - initial objtool support for retpoline As I said in the status mail this is the most of the set of patches which should go into 4.15 except two straight forward patches still on hold: - the retpoline add on of LFENCE which waits for ACKs - the RSB fill after context switch Both should be ready to go early next week and with that we'll have covered the major holes of spectre_v2 and go back to normality" * 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (28 commits) x86,perf: Disable intel_bts when PTI security/Kconfig: Correct the Documentation reference for PTI x86/pti: Fix !PCID and sanitize defines selftests/x86: Add test_vsyscall x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace assembler indirect jumps x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support objtool: Allow alternatives to be ignored objtool: Detect jumps to retpoline thunks x86/pti: Make unpoison of pgd for trusted boot work for real x86/alternatives: Fix optimize_nops() checking sysfs/cpu: Fix typos in vulnerability documentation x86/cpu/AMD: Use LFENCE_RDTSC in preference to MFENCE_RDTSC ...
| * security/Kconfig: Correct the Documentation reference for PTIW. Trevor King2018-01-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When the config option for PTI was added a reference to documentation was added as well. But the documentation did not exist at that point. The final documentation has a different file name. Fix it up to point to the proper file. Fixes: 385ce0ea ("x86/mm/pti: Add Kconfig") Signed-off-by: W. Trevor King <wking@tremily.us> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3009cc8ccbddcd897ec1e0cb6dda524929de0d14.1515799398.git.wking@tremily.us
* | apparmor: Fix regression in profile conflict logicMatthew Garrett2018-01-121-4/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The intended behaviour in apparmor profile matching is to flag a conflict if two profiles match equally well. However, right now a conflict is generated if another profile has the same match length even if that profile doesn't actually match. Fix the logic so we only generate a conflict if the profiles match. Fixes: 844b8292b631 ("apparmor: ensure that undecidable profile attachments fail") Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* | apparmor: fix ptrace label match when matching stacked labelsJohn Johansen2018-01-122-21/+35
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Given a label with a profile stack of A//&B or A//&C ... A ptrace rule should be able to specify a generic trace pattern with a rule like ptrace trace A//&**, however this is failing because while the correct label match routine is called, it is being done post label decomposition so it is always being done against a profile instead of the stacked label. To fix this refactor the cross check to pass the full peer label in to the label_match. Fixes: 290f458a4f16 ("apparmor: allow ptrace checks to be finer grained than just capability") Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Tested-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* | Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-01-07' of ↵Linus Torvalds2018-01-071-1/+11
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor Pull apparmor fix from John Johansen: "This fixes a regression when the kernel feature set is reported as supporting mount and policy is pinned to a feature set that does not support mount mediation" * tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-01-07' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: apparmor: fix regression in mount mediation when feature set is pinned
| * | apparmor: fix regression in mount mediation when feature set is pinnedJohn Johansen2018-01-051-1/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When the mount code was refactored for Labels it was not correctly updated to check whether policy supported mediation of the mount class. This causes a regression when the kernel feature set is reported as supporting mount and policy is pinned to a feature set that does not support mount mediation. BugLink: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=882697#41 Fixes: 2ea3ffb7782a ("apparmor: add mount mediation") Reported-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com> Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* | | Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2018-01-031-0/+1
|\ \ \ | | |/ | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 page table isolation fixes from Thomas Gleixner: "A couple of urgent fixes for PTI: - Fix a PTE mismatch between user and kernel visible mapping of the cpu entry area (differs vs. the GLB bit) and causes a TLB mismatch MCE on older AMD K8 machines - Fix the misplaced CR3 switch in the SYSCALL compat entry code which causes access to unmapped kernel memory resulting in double faults. - Fix the section mismatch of the cpu_tss_rw percpu storage caused by using a different mechanism for declaration and definition. - Two fixes for dumpstack which help to decode entry stack issues better - Enable PTI by default in Kconfig. We should have done that earlier, but it slipped through the cracks. - Exclude AMD from the PTI enforcement. Not necessarily a fix, but if AMD is so confident that they are not affected, then we should not burden users with the overhead" * 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/process: Define cpu_tss_rw in same section as declaration x86/pti: Switch to kernel CR3 at early in entry_SYSCALL_compat() x86/dumpstack: Print registers for first stack frame x86/dumpstack: Fix partial register dumps x86/pti: Make sure the user/kernel PTEs match x86/cpu, x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on AMD processors x86/pti: Enable PTI by default
| * | x86/pti: Enable PTI by defaultThomas Gleixner2018-01-031-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This really want's to be enabled by default. Users who know what they are doing can disable it either in the config or on the kernel command line. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
* | | capabilities: fix buffer overread on very short xattrEric Biggers2018-01-021-12/+9
| |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If userspace attempted to set a "security.capability" xattr shorter than 4 bytes (e.g. 'setfattr -n security.capability -v x file'), then cap_convert_nscap() read past the end of the buffer containing the xattr value because it accessed the ->magic_etc field without verifying that the xattr value is long enough to contain that field. Fix it by validating the xattr value size first. This bug was found using syzkaller with KASAN. The KASAN report was as follows (cleaned up slightly): BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cap_convert_nscap+0x514/0x630 security/commoncap.c:498 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88002d8741c0 by task syz-executor1/2852 CPU: 0 PID: 2852 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc6-00200-gcc0aac99d977 #253 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0xe3/0x195 lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_address_description+0x73/0x260 mm/kasan/report.c:252 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline] kasan_report+0x235/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409 cap_convert_nscap+0x514/0x630 security/commoncap.c:498 setxattr+0x2bd/0x350 fs/xattr.c:446 path_setxattr+0x168/0x1b0 fs/xattr.c:472 SYSC_setxattr fs/xattr.c:487 [inline] SyS_setxattr+0x36/0x50 fs/xattr.c:483 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x18/0x85 Fixes: 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* | Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2017-12-291-0/+10
|\| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 page table isolation updates from Thomas Gleixner: "This is the final set of enabling page table isolation on x86: - Infrastructure patches for handling the extra page tables. - Patches which map the various bits and pieces which are required to get in and out of user space into the user space visible page tables. - The required changes to have CR3 switching in the entry/exit code. - Optimizations for the CR3 switching along with documentation how the ASID/PCID mechanism works. - Updates to dump pagetables to cover the user space page tables for W+X scans and extra debugfs files to analyze both the kernel and the user space visible page tables The whole functionality is compile time controlled via a config switch and can be turned on/off on the command line as well" * 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (32 commits) x86/ldt: Make the LDT mapping RO x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Allow dumping current pagetables x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Check user space page table for WX pages x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Add page table directory to the debugfs VFS hierarchy x86/mm/pti: Add Kconfig x86/dumpstack: Indicate in Oops whether PTI is configured and enabled x86/mm: Clarify the whole ASID/kernel PCID/user PCID naming x86/mm: Use INVPCID for __native_flush_tlb_single() x86/mm: Optimize RESTORE_CR3 x86/mm: Use/Fix PCID to optimize user/kernel switches x86/mm: Abstract switching CR3 x86/mm: Allow flushing for future ASID switches x86/pti: Map the vsyscall page if needed x86/pti: Put the LDT in its own PGD if PTI is on x86/mm/64: Make a full PGD-entry size hole in the memory map x86/events/intel/ds: Map debug buffers in cpu_entry_area x86/cpu_entry_area: Add debugstore entries to cpu_entry_area x86/mm/pti: Map ESPFIX into user space x86/mm/pti: Share entry text PMD x86/entry: Align entry text section to PMD boundary ...
| * x86/mm/pti: Add KconfigDave Hansen2017-12-231-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Finally allow CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION to be enabled. PARAVIRT generally requires that the kernel not manage its own page tables. It also means that the hypervisor and kernel must agree wholeheartedly about what format the page tables are in and what they contain. PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION, unfortunately, changes the rules and they can not be used together. I've seen conflicting feedback from maintainers lately about whether they want the Kconfig magic to go first or last in a patch series. It's going last here because the partially-applied series leads to kernels that can not boot in a bunch of cases. I did a run through the entire series with CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y to look for build errors, though. [ tglx: Removed SMP and !PARAVIRT dependencies as they not longer exist ] Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* | KEYS: reject NULL restriction string when type is specifiedEric Biggers2017-12-081-14/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | keyctl_restrict_keyring() allows through a NULL restriction when the "type" is non-NULL, which causes a NULL pointer dereference in asymmetric_lookup_restriction() when it calls strcmp() on the restriction string. But no key types actually use a "NULL restriction" to mean anything, so update keyctl_restrict_keyring() to reject it with EINVAL. Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Fixes: 97d3aa0f3134 ("KEYS: Add a lookup_restriction function for the asymmetric key type") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | security: keys: remove redundant assignment to key_refColin Ian King2017-12-081-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Variable key_ref is being assigned a value that is never read; key_ref is being re-assigned a few statements later. Hence this assignment is redundant and can be removed. Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* | KEYS: add missing permission check for request_key() destinationEric Biggers2017-12-081-9/+37
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When the request_key() syscall is not passed a destination keyring, it links the requested key (if constructed) into the "default" request-key keyring. This should require Write permission to the keyring. However, there is actually no permission check. This can be abused to add keys to any keyring to which only Search permission is granted. This is because Search permission allows joining the keyring. keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING) then will set the default request-key keyring to the session keyring. Then, request_key() can be used to add keys to the keyring. Both negatively and positively instantiated keys can be added using this method. Adding negative keys is trivial. Adding a positive key is a bit trickier. It requires that either /sbin/request-key positively instantiates the key, or that another thread adds the key to the process keyring at just the right time, such that request_key() misses it initially but then finds it in construct_alloc_key(). Fix this bug by checking for Write permission to the keyring in construct_get_dest_keyring() when the default keyring is being used. We don't do the permission check for non-default keyrings because that was already done by the earlier call to lookup_user_key(). Also, request_key_and_link() is currently passed a 'struct key *' rather than a key_ref_t, so the "possessed" bit is unavailable. We also don't do the permission check for the "requestor keyring", to continue to support the use case described by commit 8bbf4976b59f ("KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument") where /sbin/request-key recursively calls request_key() to add keys to the original requestor's destination keyring. (I don't know of any users who actually do that, though...) Fixes: 3e30148c3d52 ("[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.13+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | KEYS: remove unnecessary get/put of explicit dest_keyringEric Biggers2017-12-081-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In request_key_and_link(), in the case where the dest_keyring was explicitly specified, there is no need to get another reference to dest_keyring before calling key_link(), then drop it afterwards. This is because by definition, we already have a reference to dest_keyring. This change is useful because we'll be making construct_get_dest_keyring() able to return an error code, and we don't want to have to handle that error here for no reason. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2017-11-30' of ↵Linus Torvalds2017-11-301-5/+7
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor Pull apparmor bugfix from John Johansen: "Fix oops in audit_signal_cb hook marked for stable" * tag 'apparmor-pr-2017-11-30' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: apparmor: fix oops in audit_signal_cb hook
| * | apparmor: fix oops in audit_signal_cb hookJohn Johansen2017-11-271-5/+7
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The apparmor_audit_data struct ordering got messed up during a merge conflict, resulting in the signal integer and peer pointer being in a union instead of a struct. For most of the 4.13 and 4.14 life cycle, this was hidden by commit 651e28c5537a ("apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation") which fixed the apparmor_audit_data struct when its data was added. When that commit was reverted in -rc7 the signal audit bug was exposed, and unfortunately it never showed up in any of the testing until after 4.14 was released. Shaun Khan, Zephaniah E. Loss-Cutler-Hull filed nearly simultaneous bug reports (with different oopes, the smaller of which is included below). Full credit goes to Tetsuo Handa for jumping on this as well and noticing the audit data struct problem and reporting it. [ 76.178568] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffff0eee3bc0 [ 76.178579] IP: audit_signal_cb+0x6c/0xe0 [ 76.178581] PGD 1a640a067 P4D 1a640a067 PUD 0 [ 76.178586] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 76.178589] Modules linked in: fuse rfcomm bnep usblp uvcvideo btusb btrtl btbcm btintel bluetooth ecdh_generic ip6table_filter ip6_tables xt_tcpudp nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables intel_rapl joydev wmi_bmof serio_raw iwldvm iwlwifi shpchp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass autofs4 algif_skcipher nls_iso8859_1 nls_cp437 crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel [ 76.178620] CPU: 0 PID: 10675 Comm: pidgin Not tainted 4.14.0-f1-dirty #135 [ 76.178623] Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP EliteBook Folio 9470m/18DF, BIOS 68IBD Ver. F.62 10/22/2015 [ 76.178625] task: ffff9c7a94c31dc0 task.stack: ffffa09b02a4c000 [ 76.178628] RIP: 0010:audit_signal_cb+0x6c/0xe0 [ 76.178631] RSP: 0018:ffffa09b02a4fc08 EFLAGS: 00010292 [ 76.178634] RAX: ffffa09b02a4fd60 RBX: ffff9c7aee0741f8 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 76.178636] RDX: ffffffffee012290 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: ffff9c7a9493d800 [ 76.178638] RBP: ffffa09b02a4fd40 R08: 000000000000004d R09: ffffa09b02a4fc46 [ 76.178641] R10: ffffa09b02a4fcb8 R11: ffff9c7ab44f5072 R12: ffffa09b02a4fd40 [ 76.178643] R13: ffffffff9e447be0 R14: ffff9c7a94c31dc0 R15: 0000000000000001 [ 76.178646] FS: 00007f8b11ba2a80(0000) GS:ffff9c7afea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 76.178648] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 76.178650] CR2: ffffffff0eee3bc0 CR3: 00000003d5209002 CR4: 00000000001606f0 [ 76.178652] Call Trace: [ 76.178660] common_lsm_audit+0x1da/0x780 [ 76.178665] ? d_absolute_path+0x60/0x90 [ 76.178669] ? aa_check_perms+0xcd/0xe0 [ 76.178672] aa_check_perms+0xcd/0xe0 [ 76.178675] profile_signal_perm.part.0+0x90/0xa0 [ 76.178679] aa_may_signal+0x16e/0x1b0 [ 76.178686] apparmor_task_kill+0x51/0x120 [ 76.178690] security_task_kill+0x44/0x60 [ 76.178695] group_send_sig_info+0x25/0x60 [ 76.178699] kill_pid_info+0x36/0x60 [ 76.178703] SYSC_kill+0xdb/0x180 [ 76.178707] ? preempt_count_sub+0x92/0xd0 [ 76.178712] ? _raw_write_unlock_irq+0x13/0x30 [ 76.178716] ? task_work_run+0x6a/0x90 [ 76.178720] ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x80/0xa0 [ 76.178723] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x94 [ 76.178727] RIP: 0033:0x7f8b0e58b767 [ 76.178729] RSP: 002b:00007fff19efd4d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000003e [ 76.178732] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000557f3e3c2050 RCX: 00007f8b0e58b767 [ 76.178735] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000000000263b [ 76.178737] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000557f3e3c2270 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 76.178739] R10: 000000000000022d R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 76.178741] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000557f3e3c13c0 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 76.178745] Code: 48 8b 55 18 48 89 df 41 b8 20 00 08 01 5b 5d 48 8b 42 10 48 8b 52 30 48 63 48 4c 48 8b 44 c8 48 31 c9 48 8b 70 38 e9 f4 fd 00 00 <48> 8b 14 d5 40 27 e5 9e 48 c7 c6 7d 07 19 9f 48 89 df e8 fd 35 [ 76.178794] RIP: audit_signal_cb+0x6c/0xe0 RSP: ffffa09b02a4fc08 [ 76.178796] CR2: ffffffff0eee3bc0 [ 76.178799] ---[ end trace 514af9529297f1a3 ]--- Fixes: cd1dbf76b23d ("apparmor: add the ability to mediate signals") Reported-by: Zephaniah E. Loss-Cutler-Hull <warp-spam_kernel@aehallh.com> Reported-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com> Suggested-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Tested-by: Ivan Kozik <ivan@ludios.org> Tested-by: Zephaniah E. Loss-Cutler-Hull <warp-spam_kernel@aehallh.com> Tested-by: Christian Boltz <apparmor@cboltz.de> Tested-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* | Rename superblock flags (MS_xyz -> SB_xyz)Linus Torvalds2017-11-272-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is a pure automated search-and-replace of the internal kernel superblock flags. The s_flags are now called SB_*, with the names and the values for the moment mirroring the MS_* flags that they're equivalent to. Note how the MS_xyz flags are the ones passed to the mount system call, while the SB_xyz flags are what we then use in sb->s_flags. The script to do this was: # places to look in; re security/*: it generally should *not* be # touched (that stuff parses mount(2) arguments directly), but # there are two places where we really deal with superblock flags. FILES="drivers/mtd drivers/staging/lustre fs ipc mm \ include/linux/fs.h include/uapi/linux/bfs_fs.h \ security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c security/apparmor/include/lib.h" # the list of MS_... constants SYMS="RDONLY NOSUID NODEV NOEXEC SYNCHRONOUS REMOUNT MANDLOCK \ DIRSYNC NOATIME NODIRATIME BIND MOVE REC VERBOSE SILENT \ POSIXACL UNBINDABLE PRIVATE SLAVE SHARED RELATIME KERNMOUNT \ I_VERSION STRICTATIME LAZYTIME SUBMOUNT NOREMOTELOCK NOSEC BORN \ ACTIVE NOUSER" SED_PROG= for i in $SYMS; do SED_PROG="$SED_PROG -e s/MS_$i/SB_$i/g"; done # we want files that contain at least one of MS_..., # with fs/namespace.c and fs/pnode.c excluded. L=$(for i in $SYMS; do git grep -w -l MS_$i $FILES; done| sort|uniq|grep -v '^fs/namespace.c'|grep -v '^fs/pnode.c') for f in $L; do sed -i $f $SED_PROG; done Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | Merge branch 'timers-urgent-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2017-11-251-2/+2
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull timer updates from Thomas Gleixner: - The final conversion of timer wheel timers to timer_setup(). A few manual conversions and a large coccinelle assisted sweep and the removal of the old initialization mechanisms and the related code. - Remove the now unused VSYSCALL update code - Fix permissions of /proc/timer_list. I still need to get rid of that file completely - Rename a misnomed clocksource function and remove a stale declaration * 'timers-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (27 commits) m68k/macboing: Fix missed timer callback assignment treewide: Remove TIMER_FUNC_TYPE and TIMER_DATA_TYPE casts timer: Remove redundant __setup_timer*() macros timer: Pass function down to initialization routines timer: Remove unused data arguments from macros timer: Switch callback prototype to take struct timer_list * argument timer: Pass timer_list pointer to callbacks unconditionally Coccinelle: Remove setup_timer.cocci timer: Remove setup_*timer() interface timer: Remove init_timer() interface treewide: setup_timer() -> timer_setup() (2 field) treewide: setup_timer() -> timer_setup() treewide: init_timer() -> setup_timer() treewide: Switch DEFINE_TIMER callbacks to struct timer_list * s390: cmm: Convert timers to use timer_setup() lightnvm: Convert timers to use timer_setup() drivers/net: cris: Convert timers to use timer_setup() drm/vc4: Convert timers to use timer_setup() block/laptop_mode: Convert timers to use timer_setup() net/atm/mpc: Avoid open-coded assignment of timer callback function ...
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-07-19 15:39:23 +0000