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* security: Fix nommu build.Paul Mundt2012-07-031-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The security + nommu configuration presently blows up with an undefined reference to BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP: security/security.c: In function 'mmap_prot': security/security.c:687:36: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type security/security.c:688:16: error: 'BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP' undeclared (first use in this function) security/security.c:688:16: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in include backing-dev.h directly to fix it up. Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2012-06-017-72/+80
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull vfs changes from Al Viro. "A lot of misc stuff. The obvious groups: * Miklos' atomic_open series; kills the damn abuse of ->d_revalidate() by NFS, which was the major stumbling block for all work in that area. * ripping security_file_mmap() and dealing with deadlocks in the area; sanitizing the neighborhood of vm_mmap()/vm_munmap() in general. * ->encode_fh() switched to saner API; insane fake dentry in mm/cleancache.c gone. * assorted annotations in fs (endianness, __user) * parts of Artem's ->s_dirty work (jff2 and reiserfs parts) * ->update_time() work from Josef. * other bits and pieces all over the place. Normally it would've been in two or three pull requests, but signal.git stuff had eaten a lot of time during this cycle ;-/" Fix up trivial conflicts in Documentation/filesystems/vfs.txt (the 'truncate_range' inode method was removed by the VM changes, the VFS update adds an 'update_time()' method), and in fs/btrfs/ulist.[ch] (due to sparse fix added twice, with other changes nearby). * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (95 commits) nfs: don't open in ->d_revalidate vfs: retry last component if opening stale dentry vfs: nameidata_to_filp(): don't throw away file on error vfs: nameidata_to_filp(): inline __dentry_open() vfs: do_dentry_open(): don't put filp vfs: split __dentry_open() vfs: do_last() common post lookup vfs: do_last(): add audit_inode before open vfs: do_last(): only return EISDIR for O_CREAT vfs: do_last(): check LOOKUP_DIRECTORY vfs: do_last(): make ENOENT exit RCU safe vfs: make follow_link check RCU safe vfs: do_last(): use inode variable vfs: do_last(): inline walk_component() vfs: do_last(): make exit RCU safe vfs: split do_lookup() Btrfs: move over to use ->update_time fs: introduce inode operation ->update_time reiserfs: get rid of resierfs_sync_super reiserfs: mark the superblock as dirty a bit later ...
| * take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helperAl Viro2012-06-011-18/+28
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * take security_mmap_file() outside of ->mmap_semAl Viro2012-06-011-3/+30
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * split ->file_mmap() into ->mmap_addr()/->mmap_file()Al Viro2012-05-316-51/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | ... i.e. file-dependent and address-dependent checks. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * split cap_mmap_addr() out of cap_file_mmap()Al Viro2012-05-314-12/+26
| | | | | | | | | | | | ... switch callers. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * selinuxfs snprintf() misusesAl Viro2012-05-291-29/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | a) %d does _not_ produce a page worth of output b) snprintf() doesn't return negatives - it used to in old glibc, but that's the kernel... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2012-05-313-51/+44
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/signal Pull second pile of signal handling patches from Al Viro: "This one is just task_work_add() series + remaining prereqs for it. There probably will be another pull request from that tree this cycle - at least for helpers, to get them out of the way for per-arch fixes remaining in the tree." Fix trivial conflict in kernel/irq/manage.c: the merge of Andrew's pile had brought in commit 97fd75b7b8e0 ("kernel/irq/manage.c: use the pr_foo() infrastructure to prefix printks") which changed one of the pr_err() calls that this merge moves around. * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/signal: keys: kill task_struct->replacement_session_keyring keys: kill the dummy key_replace_session_keyring() keys: change keyctl_session_to_parent() to use task_work_add() genirq: reimplement exit_irq_thread() hook via task_work_add() task_work_add: generic process-context callbacks avr32: missed _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME on one of do_notify_resume callers parisc: need to check NOTIFY_RESUME when exiting from syscall move key_repace_session_keyring() into tracehook_notify_resume() TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME is defined on all targets now
| * | keys: change keyctl_session_to_parent() to use task_work_add()Oleg Nesterov2012-05-233-41/+44
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Change keyctl_session_to_parent() to use task_work_add() and move key_replace_session_keyring() logic into task_work->func(). Note that we do task_work_cancel() before task_work_add() to ensure that only one work can be pending at any time. This is important, we must not allow user-space to abuse the parent's ->task_works list. The callback, replace_session_keyring(), checks PF_EXITING. I guess this is not really needed but looks better. As a side effect, this fixes the (unlikely) race. The callers of key_replace_session_keyring() and keyctl_session_to_parent() lack the necessary barriers, the parent can miss the request. Now we can remove task_struct->replacement_session_keyring and related code. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@redhat.com> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com> Cc: "Frank Ch. Eigler" <fche@redhat.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * | TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME is defined on all targets nowAl Viro2012-05-231-10/+0
| |/ | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | aio/vfs: cleanup of rw_copy_check_uvector() and compat_rw_copy_check_uvector()Christopher Yeoh2012-05-312-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A cleanup of rw_copy_check_uvector and compat_rw_copy_check_uvector after changes made to support CMA in an earlier patch. Rather than having an additional check_access parameter to these functions, the first paramater type is overloaded to allow the caller to specify CHECK_IOVEC_ONLY which means check that the contents of the iovec are valid, but do not check the memory that they point to. This is used by process_vm_readv/writev where we need to validate that a iovec passed to the syscall is valid but do not want to check the memory that it points to at this point because it refers to an address space in another process. Signed-off-by: Chris Yeoh <yeohc@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | kmod: convert two call sites to call_usermodehelper_fns()Boaz Harrosh2012-05-311-10/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Both kernel/sys.c && security/keys/request_key.c where inlining the exact same code as call_usermodehelper_fns(); So simply convert these sites to directly use call_usermodehelper_fns(). Signed-off-by: Boaz Harrosh <bharrosh@panasas.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | security/keys/keyctl.c: suppress memory allocation failure warningAndrew Morton2012-05-311-1/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | This allocation may be large. The code is probing to see if it will succeed and if not, it falls back to vmalloc(). We should suppress any page-allocation failure messages when the fallback happens. Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2012-05-234-29/+41
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull user namespace enhancements from Eric Biederman: "This is a course correction for the user namespace, so that we can reach an inexpensive, maintainable, and reasonably complete implementation. Highlights: - Config guards make it impossible to enable the user namespace and code that has not been converted to be user namespace safe. - Use of the new kuid_t type ensures the if you somehow get past the config guards the kernel will encounter type errors if you enable user namespaces and attempt to compile in code whose permission checks have not been updated to be user namespace safe. - All uids from child user namespaces are mapped into the initial user namespace before they are processed. Removing the need to add an additional check to see if the user namespace of the compared uids remains the same. - With the user namespaces compiled out the performance is as good or better than it is today. - For most operations absolutely nothing changes performance or operationally with the user namespace enabled. - The worst case performance I could come up with was timing 1 billion cache cold stat operations with the user namespace code enabled. This went from 156s to 164s on my laptop (or 156ns to 164ns per stat operation). - (uid_t)-1 and (gid_t)-1 are reserved as an internal error value. Most uid/gid setting system calls treat these value specially anyway so attempting to use -1 as a uid would likely cause entertaining failures in userspace. - If setuid is called with a uid that can not be mapped setuid fails. I have looked at sendmail, login, ssh and every other program I could think of that would call setuid and they all check for and handle the case where setuid fails. - If stat or a similar system call is called from a context in which we can not map a uid we lie and return overflowuid. The LFS experience suggests not lying and returning an error code might be better, but the historical precedent with uids is different and I can not think of anything that would break by lying about a uid we can't map. - Capabilities are localized to the current user namespace making it safe to give the initial user in a user namespace all capabilities. My git tree covers all of the modifications needed to convert the core kernel and enough changes to make a system bootable to runlevel 1." Fix up trivial conflicts due to nearby independent changes in fs/stat.c * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (46 commits) userns: Silence silly gcc warning. cred: use correct cred accessor with regards to rcu read lock userns: Convert the move_pages, and migrate_pages permission checks to use uid_eq userns: Convert cgroup permission checks to use uid_eq userns: Convert tmpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate userns: Convert sysfs to use kgid/kuid where appropriate userns: Convert sysctl permission checks to use kuid and kgids. userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert ext4 to user kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert ext3 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert ext2 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate. userns: Convert devpts to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert binary formats to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Add negative depends on entries to avoid building code that is userns unsafe userns: signal remove unnecessary map_cred_ns userns: Teach inode_capable to understand inodes whose uids map to other namespaces. userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace. userns: Convert stat to return values mapped from kuids and kgids userns: Convert user specfied uids and gids in chown into kuids and kgid userns: Use uid_eq gid_eq helpers when comparing kuids and kgids in the vfs ...
| * userns: Convert capabilities related permsion checksEric W. Biederman2012-05-031-15/+26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Use uid_eq when comparing kuids Use gid_eq when comparing kgids - Use make_kuid(user_ns, 0) to talk about the user_namespace root uid Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
| * userns: Store uid and gid values in struct cred with kuid_t and kgid_t typesEric W. Biederman2012-05-031-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | cred.h and a few trivial users of struct cred are changed. The rest of the users of struct cred are left for other patches as there are too many changes to make in one go and leave the change reviewable. If the user namespace is disabled and CONFIG_UIDGID_STRICT_TYPE_CHECKS are disabled the code will contiue to compile and behave correctly. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
| * userns: Convert group_info values from gid_t to kgid_t.Eric W. Biederman2012-05-031-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As a first step to converting struct cred to be all kuid_t and kgid_t values convert the group values stored in group_info to always be kgid_t values. Unless user namespaces are used this change should have no effect. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
| * userns: Simplify the user_namespace by making userns->creator a kuid.Eric W. Biederman2012-04-261-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Transform userns->creator from a user_struct reference to a simple kuid_t, kgid_t pair. In cap_capable this allows the check to see if we are the creator of a namespace to become the classic suser style euid permission check. This allows us to remove the need for a struct cred in the mapping functions and still be able to dispaly the user namespace creators uid and gid as 0. - Remove the now unnecessary delayed_work in free_user_ns. All that is left for free_user_ns to do is to call kmem_cache_free and put_user_ns. Those functions can be called in any context so call them directly from free_user_ns removing the need for delayed work. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
| * userns: Add an explicit reference to the parent user namespaceEric W. Biederman2012-04-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I am about to remove the struct user_namespace reference from struct user_struct. So keep an explicit track of the parent user namespace. Take advantage of this new reference and replace instances of user_ns->creator->user_ns with user_ns->parent. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
| * cred: Refcount the user_ns pointed to by the cred.Eric W. Biederman2012-04-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | struct user_struct will shortly loose it's user_ns reference so make the cred user_ns reference a proper reference complete with reference counting. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
| * userns: Use cred->user_ns instead of cred->user->user_nsEric W. Biederman2012-04-074-10/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Optimize performance and prepare for the removal of the user_ns reference from user_struct. Remove the slow long walk through cred->user->user_ns and instead go straight to cred->user_ns. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* | Merge branch 'for-3.5' of ↵Linus Torvalds2012-05-221-8/+2
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup Pull cgroup updates from Tejun Heo: "cgroup file type addition / removal is updated so that file types are added and removed instead of individual files so that dynamic file type addition / removal can be implemented by cgroup and used by controllers. blkio controller changes which will come through block tree are dependent on this. Other changes include res_counter cleanup and disallowing kthread / PF_THREAD_BOUND threads to be attached to non-root cgroups. There's a reported bug with the file type addition / removal handling which can lead to oops on cgroup umount. The issue is being looked into. It shouldn't cause problems for most setups and isn't a security concern." Fix up trivial conflict in Documentation/feature-removal-schedule.txt * 'for-3.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup: (21 commits) res_counter: Account max_usage when calling res_counter_charge_nofail() res_counter: Merge res_counter_charge and res_counter_charge_nofail cgroups: disallow attaching kthreadd or PF_THREAD_BOUND threads cgroup: remove cgroup_subsys->populate() cgroup: get rid of populate for memcg cgroup: pass struct mem_cgroup instead of struct cgroup to socket memcg cgroup: make css->refcnt clearing on cgroup removal optional cgroup: use negative bias on css->refcnt to block css_tryget() cgroup: implement cgroup_rm_cftypes() cgroup: introduce struct cfent cgroup: relocate __d_cgrp() and __d_cft() cgroup: remove cgroup_add_file[s]() cgroup: convert memcg controller to the new cftype interface memcg: always create memsw files if CONFIG_CGROUP_MEM_RES_CTLR_SWAP cgroup: convert all non-memcg controllers to the new cftype interface cgroup: relocate cftype and cgroup_subsys definitions in controllers cgroup: merge cft_release_agent cftype array into the base files array cgroup: implement cgroup_add_cftypes() and friends cgroup: build list of all cgroups under a given cgroupfs_root cgroup: move cgroup_clear_directory() call out of cgroup_populate_dir() ...
| * | cgroup: convert all non-memcg controllers to the new cftype interfaceTejun Heo2012-04-011-8/+2
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Convert debug, freezer, cpuset, cpu_cgroup, cpuacct, net_prio, blkio, net_cls and device controllers to use the new cftype based interface. Termination entry is added to cftype arrays and populate callbacks are replaced with cgroup_subsys->base_cftypes initializations. This is functionally identical transformation. There shouldn't be any visible behavior change. memcg is rather special and will be converted separately. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Paul Menage <paul@paulmenage.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
* | Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2012-05-2150-1102/+1857
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "New notable features: - The seccomp work from Will Drewry - PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS from Andy Lutomirski - Longer security labels for Smack from Casey Schaufler - Additional ptrace restriction modes for Yama by Kees Cook" Fix up trivial context conflicts in arch/x86/Kconfig and include/linux/filter.h * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (65 commits) apparmor: fix long path failure due to disconnected path apparmor: fix profile lookup for unconfined ima: fix filename hint to reflect script interpreter name KEYS: Don't check for NULL key pointer in key_validate() Smack: allow for significantly longer Smack labels v4 gfp flags for security_inode_alloc()? Smack: recursive tramsmute Yama: replace capable() with ns_capable() TOMOYO: Accept manager programs which do not start with / . KEYS: Add invalidation support KEYS: Do LRU discard in full keyrings KEYS: Permit in-place link replacement in keyring list KEYS: Perform RCU synchronisation on keys prior to key destruction KEYS: Announce key type (un)registration KEYS: Reorganise keys Makefile KEYS: Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig KEYS: Use the compat keyctl() syscall wrapper on Sparc64 for Sparc32 compat Yama: remove an unused variable samples/seccomp: fix dependencies on arch macros Yama: add additional ptrace scopes ...
| * \ Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux into nextJames Morris2012-05-2229-335/+415
| |\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | Per pull request, for 3.5.
| | * | SELinux: remove unused common_audit_data in flush_unauthorized_filesEric Paris2012-04-091-4/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We don't need this variable and it just eats stack space. Remove it. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: avc: remove the useless fields in avc_add_callbackWanlong Gao2012-04-096-47/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | avc_add_callback now just used for registering reset functions in initcalls, and the callback functions just did reset operations. So, reducing the arguments to only one event is enough now. Signed-off-by: Wanlong Gao <gaowanlong@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: replace weak GFP_ATOMIC to GFP_KERNEL in avc_add_callbackWanlong Gao2012-04-091-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | avc_add_callback now only called from initcalls, so replace the weak GFP_ATOMIC to GFP_KERNEL, and mark this function __init to make a warning when not been called from initcalls. Signed-off-by: Wanlong Gao <gaowanlong@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: unify the selinux_audit_data and selinux_late_audit_dataEric Paris2012-04-093-91/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We no longer need the distinction. We only need data after we decide to do an audit. So turn the "late" audit data into just "data" and remove what we currently have as "data". Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: remove auditdeny from selinux_audit_dataEric Paris2012-04-091-8/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It's just takin' up space. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | LSM: do not initialize common_audit_data to 0Eric Paris2012-04-0911-44/+44
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It isn't needed. If you don't set the type of the data associated with that type it is a pretty obvious programming bug. So why waste the cycles? Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | LSM: BUILD_BUG_ON if the common_audit_data union ever growsEric Paris2012-04-091-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We did a lot of work to shrink the common_audit_data. Add a BUILD_BUG_ON so future programers (let's be honest, probably me) won't do something foolish like make it large again! Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | LSM: remove the task field from common_audit_dataEric Paris2012-04-092-7/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There are no legitimate users. Always use current and get back some stack space for the common_audit_data. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | apparmor: move task from common_audit_data to apparmor_audit_dataEric Paris2012-04-093-3/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | apparmor is the only LSM that uses the common_audit_data tsk field. Instead of making all LSMs pay for the stack space move the aa usage into the apparmor_audit_data. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | LSM: remove the COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT type expansionEric Paris2012-04-0910-43/+43
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Just open code it so grep on the source code works better. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: move common_audit_data to a noinline slow path functionEric Paris2012-04-091-11/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | selinux_inode_has_perm is a hot path. Instead of declaring the common_audit_data on the stack move it to a noinline function only used in the rare case we need to send an audit message. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: remove inode_has_perm_noadpEric Paris2012-04-091-24/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Both callers could better be using file_has_perm() to get better audit results. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: delay initialization of audit data in selinux_inode_permissionEric Paris2012-04-093-70/+105
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We pay a rather large overhead initializing the common_audit_data. Since we only need this information if we actually emit an audit message there is little need to set it up in the hot path. This patch splits the functionality of avc_has_perm() into avc_has_perm_noaudit(), avc_audit_required() and slow_avc_audit(). But we take care of setting up to audit between required() and the actual audit call. Thus saving measurable time in a hot path. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: if sel_make_bools errors don't leave inconsistent stateEric Paris2012-04-091-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We reset the bool names and values array to NULL, but do not reset the number of entries in these arrays to 0. If we error out and then get back into this function we will walk these NULL pointers based on the belief that they are non-zero length. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> cc: stable@kernel.org
| | * | SELinux: remove needless sel_div functionEric Paris2012-04-091-6/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I'm not really sure what the idea behind the sel_div function is, but it's useless. Since a and b are both unsigned, it's impossible for a % b < 0. That means that part of the function never does anything. Thus it's just a normal /. Just do that instead. I don't even understand what that operation was supposed to mean in the signed case however.... If it was signed: sel_div(-2, 4) == ((-2 / 4) - ((-2 % 4) < 0)) ((0) - ((-2) < 0)) ((0) - (1)) (-1) What actually happens: sel_div(-2, 4) == ((18446744073709551614 / 4) - ((18446744073709551614 % 4) < 0)) ((4611686018427387903) - ((2 < 0)) (4611686018427387903 - 0) ((unsigned int)4611686018427387903) (4294967295) Neither makes a whole ton of sense to me. So I'm getting rid of the function entirely. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: possible NULL deref in context_struct_to_stringEric Paris2012-04-091-3/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It's possible that the caller passed a NULL for scontext. However if this is a defered mapping we might still attempt to call *scontext=kstrdup(). This is bad. Instead just return the len. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: audit failed attempts to set invalid labelsEric Paris2012-04-091-2/+34
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We know that some yum operation is causing CAP_MAC_ADMIN failures. This implies that an RPM is laying down (or attempting to lay down) a file with an invalid label. The problem is that we don't have any information to track down the cause. This patch will cause such a failure to report the failed label in an SELINUX_ERR audit message. This is similar to the SELINUX_ERR reports on invalid transitions and things like that. It should help run down problems on what is trying to set invalid labels in the future. Resulting records look something like: type=AVC msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): avc: denied { mac_admin } for pid=2594 comm="chcon" capability=33 scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=capability2 type=SELINUX_ERR msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): op=setxattr invalid_context=unconfined_u:object_r:hello:s0 type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): arch=c000003e syscall=188 success=no exit=-22 a0=a2c0e0 a1=390341b79b a2=a2d620 a3=1f items=1 ppid=2519 pid=2594 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=1 comm="chcon" exe="/usr/bin/chcon" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) type=CWD msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): cwd="/root" type=PATH msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): item=0 name="test" inode=785879 dev=fc:03 mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:admin_home_t:s0 Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: rename dentry_open to file_openEric Paris2012-04-096-15/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | dentry_open takes a file, rename it to file_open Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: check OPEN on truncate callsEric Paris2012-04-091-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In RH BZ 578841 we realized that the SELinux sandbox program was allowed to truncate files outside of the sandbox. The reason is because sandbox confinement is determined almost entirely by the 'open' permission. The idea was that if the sandbox was unable to open() files it would be unable to do harm to those files. This turns out to be false in light of syscalls like truncate() and chmod() which don't require a previous open() call. I looked at the syscalls that did not have an associated 'open' check and found that truncate(), did not have a seperate permission and even if it did have a separate permission such a permission owuld be inadequate for use by sandbox (since it owuld have to be granted so liberally as to be useless). This patch checks the OPEN permission on truncate. I think a better solution for sandbox is a whole new permission, but at least this fixes what we have today. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: add default_type statementsEric Paris2012-04-094-6/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Because Fedora shipped userspace based on my development tree we now have policy version 27 in the wild defining only default user, role, and range. Thus to add default_type we need a policy.28. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: allow default source/target selectors for user/role/rangeEric Paris2012-04-096-8/+109
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When new objects are created we have great and flexible rules to determine the type of the new object. We aren't quite as flexible or mature when it comes to determining the user, role, and range. This patch adds a new ability to specify the place a new objects user, role, and range should come from. For users and roles it can come from either the source or the target of the operation. aka for files the user can either come from the source (the running process and todays default) or it can come from the target (aka the parent directory of the new file) examples always are done with directory context: system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512 process context: unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 [no rule] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_none [default user source] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_source [default user target] system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_target [default role source] unconfined_u:unconfined_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_source [default role target] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_target [default range source low] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_source_low [default range source high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_high [default range source low-high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_low-high [default range target low] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_target_low [default range target high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_high [default range target low-high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_low-high Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: loosen DAC perms on reading policyEric Paris2012-04-091-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is no reason the DAC perms on reading the policy file need to be root only. There are selinux checks which should control this access. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: allow seek operations on the file exposing policyEric Paris2012-04-091-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | sesearch uses: lseek(3, 0, SEEK_SET) = -1 ESPIPE (Illegal seek) Make that work. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | | apparmor: fix long path failure due to disconnected pathJohn Johansen2012-05-181-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/955892 All failures from __d_path where being treated as disconnected paths, however __d_path can also fail when the generated pathname is too long. The initial ENAMETOOLONG error was being lost, and ENAMETOOLONG was only returned if the subsequent dentry_path call resulted in that error. Other wise if the path was split across a mount point such that the dentry_path fit within the buffer when the __d_path did not the failure was treated as a disconnected path. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | | apparmor: fix profile lookup for unconfinedJohn Johansen2012-05-181-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/978038 also affects apparmor portion of BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/987371 The unconfined profile is not stored in the regular profile list, but change_profile and exec transitions may want access to it when setting up specialized transitions like switch to the unconfined profile of a new policy namespace. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>