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* Merge branch 'master' into for-nextJiri Kosina2011-04-2615-71/+163
|\ | | | | | | | | Fast-forwarded to current state of Linus' tree as there are patches to be applied for files that didn't exist on the old branch.
| * SELINUX: Make selinux cache VFS RCU walks safeEric Paris2011-04-253-25/+55
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that the security modules can decide whether they support the dcache RCU walk or not it's possible to make selinux a bit more RCU friendly. The SELinux AVC and security server access decision code is RCU safe. A specific piece of the LSM audit code may not be RCU safe. This patch makes the VFS RCU walk retry if it would hit the non RCU safe chunk of code. It will normally just work under RCU. This is done simply by passing the VFS RCU state as a flag down into the avc_audit() code and returning ECHILD there if it would have an issue. Based-on-patch-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * SECURITY: Move exec_permission RCU checks into security modulesAndi Kleen2011-04-224-7/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active. This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails RCU walks. Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * Fix common misspellingsLucas De Marchi2011-03-318-13/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | Fixes generated by 'codespell' and manually reviewed. Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi>
| * selinux: Fix regression for XorgStephen Smalley2011-03-291-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 6f5317e730505d5cbc851c435a2dfe3d5a21d343 introduced a bug in the handling of userspace object classes that is causing breakage for Xorg when XSELinux is enabled. Fix the bug by changing map_class() to return SECCLASS_NULL when the class cannot be mapped to a kernel object class. Reported-by: "Justin P. Mattock" <justinmattock@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * userns: rename is_owner_or_cap to inode_owner_or_capableSerge E. Hallyn2011-03-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | And give it a kernel-doc comment. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: btrfs changed in linux-next] Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * userns: allow ptrace from non-init user namespacesSerge E. Hallyn2011-03-231-8/+32
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ptrace is allowed to tasks in the same user namespace according to the usual rules (i.e. the same rules as for two tasks in the init user namespace). ptrace is also allowed to a user namespace to which the current task the has CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability. Changelog: Dec 31: Address feedback by Eric: . Correct ptrace uid check . Rename may_ptrace_ns to ptrace_capable . Also fix the cap_ptrace checks. Jan 1: Use const cred struct Jan 11: use task_ns_capable() in place of ptrace_capable(). Feb 23: same_or_ancestore_user_ns() was not an appropriate check to constrain cap_issubset. Rather, cap_issubset() only is meaningful when both capsets are in the same user_ns. Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * userns: security: make capabilities relative to the user namespaceSerge E. Hallyn2011-03-234-20/+52
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default user namespace. - Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default user namespace. The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new namespaces. It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with only potential uid confusion issues left. I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals. Changelog: 11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor 12/14/2010: [serge] fix capabilities to created user namespaces Without this, if user serge creates a user_ns, he won't have capabilities to the user_ns he created. THis is because we were first checking whether his effective caps had the caps he needed and returning -EPERM if not, and THEN checking whether he was the creator. Reverse those checks. 12/16/2010: [serge] security_real_capable needs ns argument in !security case 01/11/2011: [serge] add task_ns_capable helper 01/11/2011: [serge] add nsown_capable() helper per Bastian Blank suggestion 02/16/2011: [serge] fix a logic bug: the root user is always creator of init_user_ns, but should not always have capabilities to it! Fix the check in cap_capable(). 02/21/2011: Add the required user_ns parameter to security_capable, fixing a compile failure. 02/23/2011: Convert some macros to functions as per akpm comments. Some couldn't be converted because we can't easily forward-declare them (they are inline if !SECURITY, extern if SECURITY). Add a current_user_ns function so we can use it in capability.h without #including cred.h. Move all forward declarations together to the top of the #ifdef __KERNEL__ section, and use kernel-doc format. 02/23/2011: Per dhowells, clean up comment in cap_capable(). 02/23/2011: Per akpm, remove unreachable 'return -EPERM' in cap_capable. (Original written and signed off by Eric; latest, modified version acked by him) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: export current_user_ns() for ecryptfs] [serge.hallyn@canonical.com: remove unneeded extra argument in selinux's task_has_capability] Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | treewide: remove extra semicolonsJustin P. Mattock2011-04-101-4/+4
|/ | | | | Signed-off-by: Justin P. Mattock <justinmattock@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
* Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next-2.6Linus Torvalds2011-03-166-13/+15
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next-2.6: (1480 commits) bonding: enable netpoll without checking link status xfrm: Refcount destination entry on xfrm_lookup net: introduce rx_handler results and logic around that bonding: get rid of IFF_SLAVE_INACTIVE netdev->priv_flag bonding: wrap slave state work net: get rid of multiple bond-related netdevice->priv_flags bonding: register slave pointer for rx_handler be2net: Bump up the version number be2net: Copyright notice change. Update to Emulex instead of ServerEngines e1000e: fix kconfig for crc32 dependency netfilter ebtables: fix xt_AUDIT to work with ebtables xen network backend driver bonding: Improve syslog message at device creation time bonding: Call netif_carrier_off after register_netdevice bonding: Incorrect TX queue offset net_sched: fix ip_tos2prio xfrm: fix __xfrm_route_forward() be2net: Fix UDP packet detected status in RX compl Phonet: fix aligned-mode pipe socket buffer header reserve netxen: support for GbE port settings ... Fix up conflicts in drivers/staging/brcm80211/brcmsmac/wl_mac80211.c with the staging updates.
| * net: Put flowi_* prefix on AF independent members of struct flowiDavid S. Miller2011-03-123-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I intend to turn struct flowi into a union of AF specific flowi structs. There will be a common structure that each variant includes first, much like struct sock_common. This is the first step to move in that direction. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * netlink: kill eff_cap from struct netlink_skb_parmsPatrick McHardy2011-03-031-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Netlink message processing in the kernel is synchronous these days, capabilities can be checked directly in security_netlink_recv() from the current process. Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> [chrisw: update to include pohmelfs and uvesafb] Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * netlink: kill loginuid/sessionid/sid members from struct netlink_skb_parmsPatrick McHardy2011-03-031-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Netlink message processing in the kernel is synchronous these days, the session information can be collected when needed. Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * xfrm: Mark flowi arg to security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match() const.David S. Miller2011-02-224-4/+5
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2011-03-1633-578/+1243
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (33 commits) AppArmor: kill unused macros in lsm.c AppArmor: cleanup generated files correctly KEYS: Add an iovec version of KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE KEYS: Add a new keyctl op to reject a key with a specified error code KEYS: Add a key type op to permit the key description to be vetted KEYS: Add an RCU payload dereference macro AppArmor: Cleanup make file to remove cruft and make it easier to read SELinux: implement the new sb_remount LSM hook LSM: Pass -o remount options to the LSM SELinux: Compute SID for the newly created socket SELinux: Socket retains creator role and MLS attribute SELinux: Auto-generate security_is_socket_class TOMOYO: Fix memory leak upon file open. Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking" selinux: drop unused packet flow permissions selinux: Fix packet forwarding checks on postrouting selinux: Fix wrong checks for selinux_policycap_netpeer selinux: Fix check for xfrm selinux context algorithm ima: remove unnecessary call to ima_must_measure IMA: remove IMA imbalance checking ...
| * \ Merge branch 'security-next' of ↵James Morris2011-03-092-7/+33
| |\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/apparmor-dev into next
| | * | AppArmor: kill unused macros in lsm.cShan Wei2011-03-081-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove unused macros. Signed-off-by: Shan Wei <shanwei@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| | * | AppArmor: cleanup generated files correctlyMichal Hocko2011-03-081-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | clean-files should be defined as a variable not a target. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| | * | AppArmor: Cleanup make file to remove cruft and make it easier to readJohn Johansen2011-03-051-5/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Cleanups based on comments from Sam Ravnborg, * remove references to the currently unused af_names.h * add rlim_names.h to clean-files: * rework cmd_make-XXX to make them more readable by adding comments, reworking the expressions to put logical components on individual lines, and keep lines < 80 characters. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
| * | | Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux into nextJames Morris2011-03-0813-216/+434
| |\ \ \
| | * | | SELinux: implement the new sb_remount LSM hookEric Paris2011-03-031-0/+86
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For SELinux we do not allow security information to change during a remount operation. Thus this hook simply strips the security module options from the data and verifies that those are the same options as exist on the current superblock. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| | * | | LSM: Pass -o remount options to the LSMEric Paris2011-03-032-0/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The VFS mount code passes the mount options to the LSM. The LSM will remove options it understands from the data and the VFS will then pass the remaining options onto the underlying filesystem. This is how options like the SELinux context= work. The problem comes in that -o remount never calls into LSM code. So if you include an LSM specific option it will get passed to the filesystem and will cause the remount to fail. An example of where this is a problem is the 'seclabel' option. The SELinux LSM hook will print this word in /proc/mounts if the filesystem is being labeled using xattrs. If you pass this word on mount it will be silently stripped and ignored. But if you pass this word on remount the LSM never gets called and it will be passed to the FS. The FS doesn't know what seclabel means and thus should fail the mount. For example an ext3 fs mounted over loop # mount -o loop /tmp/fs /mnt/tmp # cat /proc/mounts | grep /mnt/tmp /dev/loop0 /mnt/tmp ext3 rw,seclabel,relatime,errors=continue,barrier=0,data=ordered 0 0 # mount -o remount /mnt/tmp mount: /mnt/tmp not mounted already, or bad option # dmesg EXT3-fs (loop0): error: unrecognized mount option "seclabel" or missing value This patch passes the remount mount options to an new LSM hook. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| | * | | SELinux: Compute SID for the newly created socketHarry Ciao2011-03-031-6/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The security context for the newly created socket shares the same user, role and MLS attribute as its creator but may have a different type, which could be specified by a type_transition rule in the relevant policy package. Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com> [fix call to security_transition_sid to include qstr, Eric Paris] Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
| | * | | SELinux: Socket retains creator role and MLS attributeHarry Ciao2011-03-033-7/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The socket SID would be computed on creation and no longer inherit its creator's SID by default. Socket may have a different type but needs to retain the creator's role and MLS attribute in order not to break labeled networking and network access control. The kernel value for a class would be used to determine if the class if one of socket classes. If security_compute_sid is called from userspace the policy value for a class would be mapped to the relevant kernel value first. Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
| | * | | SELinux: Auto-generate security_is_socket_classHarry Ciao2011-03-031-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The security_is_socket_class() is auto-generated by genheaders based on classmap.h to reduce maintenance effort when a new class is defined in SELinux kernel. The name for any socket class should be suffixed by "socket" and doesn't contain more than one substr of "socket". Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
| | * | | Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking"Eric Paris2011-02-251-8/+42
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit 242631c49d4cf39642741d6627750151b058233b. Conflicts: security/selinux/hooks.c SELinux used to recognize certain individual ioctls and check permissions based on the knowledge of the individual ioctl. In commit 242631c49d4cf396 the SELinux code stopped trying to understand individual ioctls and to instead looked at the ioctl access bits to determine in we should check read or write for that operation. This same suggestion was made to SMACK (and I believe copied into TOMOYO). But this suggestion is total rubbish. The ioctl access bits are actually the access requirements for the structure being passed into the ioctl, and are completely unrelated to the operation of the ioctl or the object the ioctl is being performed upon. Take FS_IOC_FIEMAP as an example. FS_IOC_FIEMAP is defined as: FS_IOC_FIEMAP _IOWR('f', 11, struct fiemap) So it has access bits R and W. What this really means is that the kernel is going to both read and write to the struct fiemap. It has nothing at all to do with the operations that this ioctl might perform on the file itself! Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
| | * | | selinux: drop unused packet flow permissionsEric Paris2011-02-251-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | These permissions are not used and can be dropped in the kernel definitions. Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
| | * | | selinux: Fix packet forwarding checks on postroutingSteffen Klassert2011-02-251-18/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The IPSKB_FORWARDED and IP6SKB_FORWARDED flags are used only in the multicast forwarding case to indicate that a packet looped back after forward. So these flags are not a good indicator for packet forwarding. A better indicator is the incoming interface. If we have no socket context, but an incoming interface and we see the packet in the ip postroute hook, the packet is going to be forwarded. With this patch we use the incoming interface as an indicator on packet forwarding. Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | | selinux: Fix wrong checks for selinux_policycap_netpeerSteffen Klassert2011-02-251-18/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat and selinux_ip_postroute_compat are just called if selinux_policycap_netpeer is not set. However in these functions we check if selinux_policycap_netpeer is set. This leads to some dead code and to the fact that selinux_xfrm_postroute_last is never executed. This patch removes the dead code and the checks for selinux_policycap_netpeer in the compatibility functions. Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | | selinux: Fix check for xfrm selinux context algorithmSteffen Klassert2011-02-251-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc accidentally checks the xfrm domain of interpretation against the selinux context algorithm. This patch fixes this by checking ctx_alg against the selinux context algorithm. Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | | security: remove unused security_sysctl hookLucian Adrian Grijincu2011-02-012-11/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The only user for this hook was selinux. sysctl routes every call through /proc/sys/. Selinux and other security modules use the file system checks for sysctl too, so no need for this hook any more. Signed-off-by: Lucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | | security/selinux: fix /proc/sys/ labelingLucian Adrian Grijincu2011-02-011-102/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This fixes an old (2007) selinux regression: filesystem labeling for /proc/sys returned -r--r--r-- unknown /proc/sys/fs/file-nr instead of -r--r--r-- system_u:object_r:sysctl_fs_t:s0 /proc/sys/fs/file-nr Events that lead to breaking of /proc/sys/ selinux labeling: 1) sysctl was reimplemented to route all calls through /proc/sys/ commit 77b14db502cb85a031fe8fde6c85d52f3e0acb63 [PATCH] sysctl: reimplement the sysctl proc support 2) proc_dir_entry was removed from ctl_table: commit 3fbfa98112fc3962c416452a0baf2214381030e6 [PATCH] sysctl: remove the proc_dir_entry member for the sysctl tables 3) selinux still walked the proc_dir_entry tree to apply labeling. Because ctl_tables don't have a proc_dir_entry, we did not label /proc/sys/ inodes any more. To achieve this the /proc/sys/ inodes were marked private and private inodes were ignored by selinux. commit bbaca6c2e7ef0f663bc31be4dad7cf530f6c4962 [PATCH] selinux: enhance selinux to always ignore private inodes commit 86a71dbd3e81e8870d0f0e56b87875f57e58222b [PATCH] sysctl: hide the sysctl proc inodes from selinux Access control checks have been done by means of a special sysctl hook that was called for read/write accesses to any /proc/sys/ entry. We don't have to do this because, instead of walking the proc_dir_entry tree we can walk the dentry tree (as done in this patch). With this patch: * we don't mark /proc/sys/ inodes as private * we don't need the sysclt security hook * we walk the dentry tree to find the path to the inode. We have to strip the PID in /proc/PID/ entries that have a proc_dir_entry because selinux does not know how to label paths like '/1/net/rpc/nfsd.fh' (and defaults to 'proc_t' labeling). Selinux does know of '/net/rpc/nfsd.fh' (and applies the 'sysctl_rpc_t' label). PID stripping from the path was done implicitly in the previous code because the proc_dir_entry tree had the root in '/net' in the example from above. The dentry tree has the root in '/1'. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Lucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | | SELinux: Use dentry name in new object labelingEric Paris2011-02-016-37/+197
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently SELinux has rules which label new objects according to 3 criteria. The label of the process creating the object, the label of the parent directory, and the type of object (reg, dir, char, block, etc.) This patch adds a 4th criteria, the dentry name, thus we can distinguish between creating a file in an etc_t directory called shadow and one called motd. There is no file globbing, regex parsing, or anything mystical. Either the policy exactly (strcmp) matches the dentry name of the object or it doesn't. This patch has no changes from today if policy does not implement the new rules. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | | fs/vfs/security: pass last path component to LSM on inode creationEric Paris2011-02-014-6/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SELinux would like to implement a new labeling behavior of newly created inodes. We currently label new inodes based on the parent and the creating process. This new behavior would also take into account the name of the new object when deciding the new label. This is not the (supposed) full path, just the last component of the path. This is very useful because creating /etc/shadow is different than creating /etc/passwd but the kernel hooks are unable to differentiate these operations. We currently require that userspace realize it is doing some difficult operation like that and than userspace jumps through SELinux hoops to get things set up correctly. This patch does not implement new behavior, that is obviously contained in a seperate SELinux patch, but it does pass the needed name down to the correct LSM hook. If no such name exists it is fine to pass NULL. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | | | KEYS: Add an iovec version of KEYCTL_INSTANTIATEDavid Howells2011-03-083-7/+150
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a keyctl op (KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV) that is like KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE, but takes an iovec array and concatenates the data in-kernel into one buffer. Since the KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE copies the data anyway, this isn't too much of a problem. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | | | KEYS: Add a new keyctl op to reject a key with a specified error codeDavid Howells2011-03-086-13/+56
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a new keyctl op to reject a key with a specified error code. This works much the same as negating a key, and so keyctl_negate_key() is made a special case of keyctl_reject_key(). The difference is that keyctl_negate_key() selects ENOKEY as the error to be reported. Typically the key would be rejected with EKEYEXPIRED, EKEYREVOKED or EKEYREJECTED, but this is not mandatory. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | | | KEYS: Add a key type op to permit the key description to be vettedDavid Howells2011-03-081-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a key type operation to permit the key type to vet the description of a new key that key_alloc() is about to allocate. The operation may reject the description if it wishes with an error of its choosing. If it does this, the key will not be allocated. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | | | KEYS: Add an RCU payload dereference macroDavid Howells2011-03-083-6/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add an RCU payload dereference macro as this seems to be a common piece of code amongst key types that use RCU referenced payloads. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | | | Merge branch 'master'; commit 'v2.6.38-rc7' into nextJames Morris2011-03-0824-671/+930
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| * | | TOMOYO: Fix memory leak upon file open.Tetsuo Handa2011-03-031-4/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In tomoyo_check_open_permission() since 2.6.36, TOMOYO was by error recalculating already calculated pathname when checking allow_rewrite permission. As a result, memory will leak whenever a file is opened for writing without O_APPEND flag. Also, performance will degrade because TOMOYO is calculating pathname regardless of profile configuration. This patch fixes the leak and performance degrade. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | | ima: remove unnecessary call to ima_must_measureMimi Zohar2011-02-233-15/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The original ima_must_measure() function based its results on cached iint information, which required an iint be allocated for all files. Currently, an iint is allocated only for files in policy. As a result, for those files in policy, ima_must_measure() is now called twice: once to determine if the inode is in the measurement policy and, the second time, to determine if it needs to be measured/re-measured. The second call to ima_must_measure() unnecessarily checks to see if the file is in policy. As we already know the file is in policy, this patch removes the second unnecessary call to ima_must_measure(), removes the vestige iint parameter, and just checks the iint directly to determine if the inode has been measured or needs to be measured/re-measured. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | | IMA: remove IMA imbalance checkingMimi Zohar2011-02-102-104/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that i_readcount is maintained by the VFS layer, remove the imbalance checking in IMA. Cleans up the IMA code nicely. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | | IMA: maintain i_readcount in the VFS layerMimi Zohar2011-02-102-19/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ima_counts_get() updated the readcount and invalidated the PCR, as necessary. Only update the i_readcount in the VFS layer. Move the PCR invalidation checks to ima_file_check(), where it belongs. Maintaining the i_readcount in the VFS layer, will allow other subsystems to use i_readcount. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | | IMA: convert i_readcount to atomicMimi Zohar2011-02-102-8/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Convert the inode's i_readcount from an unsigned int to atomic. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | | Smack: correct final mmap check comparisonCasey Schaufler2011-02-091-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The mmap policy enforcement checks the access of the SMACK64MMAP subject against the current subject incorrectly. The check as written works correctly only if the access rules involved have the same access. This is the common case, so initial testing did not find a problem. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * | | security:smack: kill unused SMACK_LIST_MAX, MAY_ANY and MAY_ANYWRITEShan Wei2011-02-091-8/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Kill unused macros of SMACK_LIST_MAX, MAY_ANY and MAY_ANYWRITE. v2: As Casey Schaufler's advice, also remove MAY_ANY. Signed-off-by: Shan Wei <shanwei@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * | | Smack: correct behavior in the mmap hookCasey Schaufler2011-02-091-36/+49
| | |/ | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The mmap policy enforcement was not properly handling the interaction between the global and local rule lists. Instead of going through one and then the other, which missed the important case where a rule specified that there should be no access, combine the access limitations where there is a rule in each list. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | CacheFiles: Add calls to path-based security hooksDavid Howells2011-01-241-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add calls to path-based security hooks into CacheFiles as, unlike inode-based security, these aren't implicit in the vfs_mkdir() and similar calls. Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | security:selinux: kill unused MAX_AVTAB_HASH_MASK and ebitmap_startbitShan Wei2011-01-242-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Kill unused MAX_AVTAB_HASH_MASK and ebitmap_startbit. Signed-off-by: Shan Wei <shanwei@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | Subject: [PATCH] Smack: mmap controls for library containmentCasey Schaufler2011-01-174-178/+522
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In the embedded world there are often situations where libraries are updated from a variety of sources, for a variety of reasons, and with any number of security characteristics. These differences might include privilege required for a given library provided interface to function properly, as occurs from time to time in graphics libraries. There are also cases where it is important to limit use of libraries based on the provider of the library and the security aware application may make choices based on that criteria. These issues are addressed by providing an additional Smack label that may optionally be assigned to an object, the SMACK64MMAP attribute. An mmap operation is allowed if there is no such attribute. If there is a SMACK64MMAP attribute the mmap is permitted only if a subject with that label has all of the access permitted a subject with the current task label. Security aware applications may from time to time wish to reduce their "privilege" to avoid accidental use of privilege. One case where this arises is the environment in which multiple sources provide libraries to perform the same functions. An application may know that it should eschew services made available from a particular vendor, or of a particular version. In support of this a secondary list of Smack rules has been added that is local to the task. This list is consulted only in the case where the global list has approved access. It can only further restrict access. Unlike the global last, if no entry is found on the local list access is granted. An application can add entries to its own list by writing to /smack/load-self. The changes appear large as they involve refactoring the list handling to accomodate there being more than one rule list. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>