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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2023-08-30 08:17:35 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2023-08-30 08:17:35 -0700 |
commit | 3ea67c4f462e1eab16ced755816143cbd1ebfc7d (patch) | |
tree | ba26d373e1eed9b0d00bbdf0c7765ae3bef1da42 | |
parent | 6c1b980a7e79e55e951b4b2c47eefebc75071209 (diff) | |
parent | b1a0f64cc65ea2ebfaae9e0ce623e993a7d24257 (diff) | |
download | linux-3ea67c4f462e1eab16ced755816143cbd1ebfc7d.tar.gz linux-3ea67c4f462e1eab16ced755816143cbd1ebfc7d.tar.bz2 linux-3ea67c4f462e1eab16ced755816143cbd1ebfc7d.zip |
Merge tag 'audit-pr-20230829' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"Six audit patches, the highlights are:
- Add an explicit cond_resched() call when generating PATH records
Certain tracefs/debugfs operations can generate a *lot* of audit
PATH entries and if one has an aggressive system configuration (not
the default) this can cause a soft lockup in the audit code as it
works to process all of these new entries.
This is in sharp contrast to the common case where only one or two
PATH entries are logged. In order to fix this corner case without
excessively impacting the common case we're adding a single
cond_rescued() call between two of the most intensive loops in the
__audit_inode_child() function.
- Various minor cleanups
We removed a conditional header file as the included header already
had the necessary logic in place, fixed a dummy function's return
value, and the usual collection of checkpatch.pl noise (whitespace,
brace, and trailing statement tweaks)"
* tag 'audit-pr-20230829' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: move trailing statements to next line
audit: cleanup function braces and assignment-in-if-condition
audit: add space before parenthesis and around '=', "==", and '<'
audit: fix possible soft lockup in __audit_inode_child()
audit: correct audit_filter_inodes() definition
audit: include security.h unconditionally
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/acct.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/audit.c | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/audit.h | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/auditfilter.c | 19 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/auditsc.c | 10 |
5 files changed, 21 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/acct.c b/kernel/acct.c index 10f769e13f72..1a9f929fe629 100644 --- a/kernel/acct.c +++ b/kernel/acct.c @@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ static void fill_ac(acct_t *ac) do_div(elapsed, AHZ); btime = ktime_get_real_seconds() - elapsed; ac->ac_btime = clamp_t(time64_t, btime, 0, U32_MAX); -#if ACCT_VERSION==2 +#if ACCT_VERSION == 2 ac->ac_ahz = AHZ; #endif diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 9bc0b0301198..16205dd29843 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -53,9 +53,7 @@ #include <net/sock.h> #include <net/netlink.h> #include <linux/skbuff.h> -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY #include <linux/security.h> -#endif #include <linux/freezer.h> #include <linux/pid_namespace.h> #include <net/netns/generic.h> @@ -323,7 +321,8 @@ static inline int audit_rate_check(void) unsigned long now; int retval = 0; - if (!audit_rate_limit) return 1; + if (!audit_rate_limit) + return 1; spin_lock_irqsave(&lock, flags); if (++messages < audit_rate_limit) { diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h index 94738bce40b2..a60d2840559e 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.h +++ b/kernel/audit.h @@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ static inline int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) return 0; } -#define audit_filter_inodes(t, c) AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED +#define audit_filter_inodes(t, c) do { } while (0) #endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */ extern char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len); diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index 42d99896e7a6..8317a37dea0b 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ static int audit_match_signal(struct audit_entry *entry) entry->rule.mask)); } - switch(audit_classify_arch(arch->val)) { + switch (audit_classify_arch(arch->val)) { case 0: /* native */ return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL, entry->rule.mask)); @@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule_data * err = -EINVAL; listnr = rule->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; - switch(listnr) { + switch (listnr) { default: goto exit_err; #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL @@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ static int audit_field_valid(struct audit_entry *entry, struct audit_field *f) switch (entry->rule.listnr) { case AUDIT_FILTER_FS: - switch(f->type) { + switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_FSTYPE: case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: break; @@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule) data->fields[i] = f->type; data->fieldflags[i] = audit_ops[f->op]; - switch(f->type) { + switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: @@ -694,7 +694,8 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule) data->values[i] = f->val; } } - for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) data->mask[i] = krule->mask[i]; + for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) + data->mask[i] = krule->mask[i]; return data; } @@ -717,7 +718,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b) a->fields[i].op != b->fields[i].op) return 1; - switch(a->fields[i].type) { + switch (a->fields[i].type) { case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: @@ -946,7 +947,7 @@ static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry) int dont_count = 0; /* If any of these, don't count towards total */ - switch(entry->rule.listnr) { + switch (entry->rule.listnr) { case AUDIT_FILTER_USER: case AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE: case AUDIT_FILTER_FS: @@ -1029,7 +1030,7 @@ int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry) int dont_count = 0; /* If any of these, don't count towards total */ - switch(entry->rule.listnr) { + switch (entry->rule.listnr) { case AUDIT_FILTER_USER: case AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE: case AUDIT_FILTER_FS: @@ -1083,7 +1084,7 @@ static void audit_list_rules(int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q) /* This is a blocking read, so use audit_filter_mutex instead of rcu * iterator to sync with list writers. */ - for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) { list_for_each_entry(r, &audit_rules_list[i], list) { struct audit_rule_data *data; diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index addeed3df15d..b0cb7631e48b 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -880,7 +880,8 @@ static void audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, */ static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_names *n, - struct audit_context *ctx) { + struct audit_context *ctx) +{ int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino); struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h]; @@ -1064,7 +1065,8 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) return 0; } - if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) { + context = audit_alloc_context(state); + if (!context) { kfree(key); audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc"); return -ENOMEM; @@ -2124,7 +2126,7 @@ retry: d = dentry; rcu_read_lock(); seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock); - for(;;) { + for (;;) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(d); if (inode && unlikely(inode->i_fsnotify_marks)) { @@ -2456,6 +2458,8 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, } } + cond_resched(); + /* is there a matching child entry? */ list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { /* can only match entries that have a name */ |