Merge tag 'hardening-v6.2-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

Pull kernel hardening updates from Kees Cook:

 - Convert flexible array members, fix -Wstringop-overflow warnings, and
   fix KCFI function type mismatches that went ignored by maintainers
   (Gustavo A. R. Silva, Nathan Chancellor, Kees Cook)

 - Remove the remaining side-effect users of ksize() by converting
   dma-buf, btrfs, and coredump to using kmalloc_size_roundup(), add
   more __alloc_size attributes, and introduce full testing of all
   allocator functions. Finally remove the ksize() side-effect so that
   each allocation-aware checker can finally behave without exceptions

 - Introduce oops_limit (default 10,000) and warn_limit (default off) to
   provide greater granularity of control for panic_on_oops and
   panic_on_warn (Jann Horn, Kees Cook)

 - Introduce overflows_type() and castable_to_type() helpers for cleaner
   overflow checking

 - Improve code generation for strscpy() and update str*() kern-doc

 - Convert strscpy and sigphash tests to KUnit, and expand memcpy tests

 - Always use a non-NULL argument for prepare_kernel_cred()

 - Disable structleak plugin in FORTIFY KUnit test (Anders Roxell)

 - Adjust orphan linker section checking to respect CONFIG_WERROR (Xin
   Li)

 - Make sure siginfo is cleared for forced SIGKILL (haifeng.xu)

 - Fix um vs FORTIFY warnings for always-NULL arguments

* tag 'hardening-v6.2-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (31 commits)
  ksmbd: replace one-element arrays with flexible-array members
  hpet: Replace one-element array with flexible-array member
  um: virt-pci: Avoid GCC non-NULL warning
  signal: Initialize the info in ksignal
  lib: fortify_kunit: build without structleak plugin
  panic: Expose "warn_count" to sysfs
  panic: Introduce warn_limit
  panic: Consolidate open-coded panic_on_warn checks
  exit: Allow oops_limit to be disabled
  exit: Expose "oops_count" to sysfs
  exit: Put an upper limit on how often we can oops
  panic: Separate sysctl logic from CONFIG_SMP
  mm/pgtable: Fix multiple -Wstringop-overflow warnings
  mm: Make ksize() a reporting-only function
  kunit/fortify: Validate __alloc_size attribute results
  drm/sti: Fix return type of sti_{dvo,hda,hdmi}_connector_mode_valid()
  drm/fsl-dcu: Fix return type of fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid()
  driver core: Add __alloc_size hint to devm allocators
  overflow: Introduce overflows_type() and castable_to_type()
  coredump: Proactively round up to kmalloc bucket size
  ...

61 files changed, 1533 insertions, 463 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..156cca9dbc96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+What:		/sys/kernel/oops_count
+Date:		November 2022
+KernelVersion:	6.2.0
+Contact:	Linux Kernel Hardening List <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>
+Description:
+		Shows how many times the system has Oopsed since last boot.
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..08f083d2fd51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+What:		/sys/kernel/oops_count
+Date:		November 2022
+KernelVersion:	6.2.0
+Contact:	Linux Kernel Hardening List <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>
+Description:
+		Shows how many times the system has Warned since last boot.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
index 39e7a2d46e1e..659d7bc47d7b 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
@@ -670,6 +670,15 @@ This is the default behavior.
 an oops event is detected.
 
 
+oops_limit
+==========
+
+Number of kernel oopses after which the kernel should panic when
+``panic_on_oops`` is not set. Setting this to 0 disables checking
+the count. Setting this to  1 has the same effect as setting
+``panic_on_oops=1``. The default value is 10000.
+
+
 osrelease, ostype & version
 ===========================
 
@@ -1526,6 +1535,16 @@ entry will default to 2 instead of 0.
 2 Unprivileged calls to ``bpf()`` are disabled
 = =============================================================
 
+
+warn_limit
+==========
+
+Number of kernel warnings after which the kernel should panic when
+``panic_on_warn`` is not set. Setting this to 0 disables checking
+the warning count. Setting this to 1 has the same effect as setting
+``panic_on_warn=1``. The default value is 0.
+
+
 watchdog
 ========
 
diff --git a/Documentation/core-api/kernel-api.rst b/Documentation/core-api/kernel-api.rst
index c9412eb85552..62f961610773 100644
--- a/Documentation/core-api/kernel-api.rst
+++ b/Documentation/core-api/kernel-api.rst
@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ String Conversions
 String Manipulation
 -------------------
 
+.. kernel-doc:: include/linux/fortify-string.h
+   :internal:
+
 .. kernel-doc:: lib/string.c
    :export:
 
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 5b40ea59553e..5296b2d74b33 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -8105,6 +8105,8 @@ S:	Supported
 T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git for-next/hardening
 F:	include/linux/fortify-string.h
 F:	lib/fortify_kunit.c
+F:	lib/memcpy_kunit.c
+F:	lib/strscpy_kunit.c
 F:	lib/test_fortify/*
 F:	scripts/test_fortify.sh
 K:	\b__NO_FORTIFY\b
@@ -11208,6 +11210,8 @@ M:	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
 L:	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
 S:	Supported
 T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git for-next/hardening
+F:	Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count
+F:	Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count
 F:	include/linux/overflow.h
 F:	include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
 F:	mm/usercopy.c
@@ -19050,7 +19054,7 @@ M:	Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
 S:	Maintained
 F:	include/linux/siphash.h
 F:	lib/siphash.c
-F:	lib/test_siphash.c
+F:	lib/siphash_kunit.c
 
 SIS 190 ETHERNET DRIVER
 M:	Francois Romieu <romieu@fr.zoreil.com>
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index bb60045526c4..5aa604a9a5b9 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1120,7 +1120,7 @@ endif
 # We never want expected sections to be placed heuristically by the
 # linker. All sections should be explicitly named in the linker script.
 ifdef CONFIG_LD_ORPHAN_WARN
-LDFLAGS_vmlinux += --orphan-handling=warn
+LDFLAGS_vmlinux += --orphan-handling=$(CONFIG_LD_ORPHAN_WARN_LEVEL)
 endif
 
 # Align the bit size of userspace programs with the kernel
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile
index 8c63f0a26f56..2ef651a78fa2 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ LDFLAGS_vmlinux += --no-undefined
 LDFLAGS_vmlinux += -X
 # Report orphan sections
 ifdef CONFIG_LD_ORPHAN_WARN
-LDFLAGS_vmlinux += --orphan-handling=warn
+LDFLAGS_vmlinux += --orphan-handling=$(CONFIG_LD_ORPHAN_WARN_LEVEL)
 endif
 # Next argument is a linker script
 LDFLAGS_vmlinux += -T
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile
index 619e2dc7ee14..beaf9586338f 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ldflags-y := -shared -soname=linux-vdso.so.1 --hash-style=sysv	\
 	     -Bsymbolic --build-id=sha1 -n $(btildflags-y)
 
 ifdef CONFIG_LD_ORPHAN_WARN
-  ldflags-y += --orphan-handling=warn
+  ldflags-y += --orphan-handling=$(CONFIG_LD_ORPHAN_WARN_LEVEL)
 endif
 
 ldflags-y += -T
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso32/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso32/Makefile
index 36c8f66cad25..f59bd1a4ead6 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso32/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso32/Makefile
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ VDSO_AFLAGS += -D__ASSEMBLY__
 VDSO_LDFLAGS += -Bsymbolic --no-undefined -soname=linux-vdso.so.1
 VDSO_LDFLAGS += -z max-page-size=4096 -z common-page-size=4096
 VDSO_LDFLAGS += -shared --hash-style=sysv --build-id=sha1
-VDSO_LDFLAGS += --orphan-handling=warn
+VDSO_LDFLAGS += --orphan-handling=$(CONFIG_LD_ORPHAN_WARN_LEVEL)
 
 
 # Borrow vdsomunge.c from the arm vDSO
diff --git a/arch/um/drivers/virt-pci.c b/arch/um/drivers/virt-pci.c
index acb55b302b14..3ac220dafec4 100644
--- a/arch/um/drivers/virt-pci.c
+++ b/arch/um/drivers/virt-pci.c
@@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ static int um_pci_send_cmd(struct um_pci_device *dev,
 	}
 
 	buf = get_cpu_var(um_pci_msg_bufs);
-	memcpy(buf, cmd, cmd_size);
+	if (buf)
+		memcpy(buf, cmd, cmd_size);
 
 	if (posted) {
 		u8 *ncmd = kmalloc(cmd_size + extra_size, GFP_ATOMIC);
@@ -182,6 +183,7 @@ static unsigned long um_pci_cfgspace_read(void *priv, unsigned int offset,
 	struct um_pci_message_buffer *buf;
 	u8 *data;
 	unsigned long ret = ULONG_MAX;
+	size_t bytes = sizeof(buf->data);
 
 	if (!dev)
 		return ULONG_MAX;
@@ -189,7 +191,8 @@ static unsigned long um_pci_cfgspace_read(void *priv, unsigned int offset,
 	buf = get_cpu_var(um_pci_msg_bufs);
 	data = buf->data;
 
-	memset(buf->data, 0xff, sizeof(buf->data));
+	if (buf)
+		memset(data, 0xff, bytes);
 
 	switch (size) {
 	case 1:
@@ -204,7 +207,7 @@ static unsigned long um_pci_cfgspace_read(void *priv, unsigned int offset,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (um_pci_send_cmd(dev, &hdr, sizeof(hdr), NULL, 0, data, 8))
+	if (um_pci_send_cmd(dev, &hdr, sizeof(hdr), NULL, 0, data, bytes))
 		goto out;
 
 	switch (size) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
index 3dc5db651dd0..1acff356d97a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ KBUILD_LDFLAGS += $(call ld-option,--no-ld-generated-unwind-info)
 # address by the bootloader.
 LDFLAGS_vmlinux := -pie $(call ld-option, --no-dynamic-linker)
 ifdef CONFIG_LD_ORPHAN_WARN
-LDFLAGS_vmlinux += --orphan-handling=warn
+LDFLAGS_vmlinux += --orphan-handling=$(CONFIG_LD_ORPHAN_WARN_LEVEL)
 endif
 LDFLAGS_vmlinux += -z noexecstack
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_LD_IS_BFD),y)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index 8525f2876fb4..e4f499eb0f29 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -299,9 +299,6 @@ static void pgd_prepopulate_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgd, pmd_t *pmds[])
 	pud_t *pud;
 	int i;
 
-	if (PREALLOCATED_PMDS == 0) /* Work around gcc-3.4.x bug */
-		return;
-
 	p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, 0);
 	pud = pud_offset(p4d, 0);
 
@@ -434,10 +431,12 @@ pgd_t *pgd_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm)
 
 	mm->pgd = pgd;
 
-	if (preallocate_pmds(mm, pmds, PREALLOCATED_PMDS) != 0)
+	if (sizeof(pmds) != 0 &&
+			preallocate_pmds(mm, pmds, PREALLOCATED_PMDS) != 0)
 		goto out_free_pgd;
 
-	if (preallocate_pmds(mm, u_pmds, PREALLOCATED_USER_PMDS) != 0)
+	if (sizeof(u_pmds) != 0 &&
+			preallocate_pmds(mm, u_pmds, PREALLOCATED_USER_PMDS) != 0)
 		goto out_free_pmds;
 
 	if (paravirt_pgd_alloc(mm) != 0)
@@ -451,17 +450,22 @@ pgd_t *pgd_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm)
 	spin_lock(&pgd_lock);
 
 	pgd_ctor(mm, pgd);
-	pgd_prepopulate_pmd(mm, pgd, pmds);
-	pgd_prepopulate_user_pmd(mm, pgd, u_pmds);
+	if (sizeof(pmds) != 0)
+		pgd_prepopulate_pmd(mm, pgd, pmds);
+
+	if (sizeof(u_pmds) != 0)
+		pgd_prepopulate_user_pmd(mm, pgd, u_pmds);
 
 	spin_unlock(&pgd_lock);
 
 	return pgd;
 
 out_free_user_pmds:
-	free_pmds(mm, u_pmds, PREALLOCATED_USER_PMDS);
+	if (sizeof(u_pmds) != 0)
+		free_pmds(mm, u_pmds, PREALLOCATED_USER_PMDS);
 out_free_pmds:
-	free_pmds(mm, pmds, PREALLOCATED_PMDS);
+	if (sizeof(pmds) != 0)
+		free_pmds(mm, pmds, PREALLOCATED_PMDS);
 out_free_pgd:
 	_pgd_free(pgd);
 out:
diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
index 7c3590fd97c2..017c4cdb219e 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
@@ -821,7 +821,7 @@ _request_firmware(const struct firmware **firmware_p, const char *name,
 	 * called by a driver when serving an unrelated request from userland, we use
 	 * the kernel credentials to read the file.
 	 */
-	kern_cred = prepare_kernel_cred(NULL);
+	kern_cred = prepare_kernel_cred(&init_task);
 	if (!kern_cred) {
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
diff --git a/drivers/dma-buf/dma-resv.c b/drivers/dma-buf/dma-resv.c
index e3885c90a3ac..1c76aed8e262 100644
--- a/drivers/dma-buf/dma-resv.c
+++ b/drivers/dma-buf/dma-resv.c
@@ -98,12 +98,17 @@ static void dma_resv_list_set(struct dma_resv_list *list,
 static struct dma_resv_list *dma_resv_list_alloc(unsigned int max_fences)
 {
 	struct dma_resv_list *list;
+	size_t size;
 
-	list = kmalloc(struct_size(list, table, max_fences), GFP_KERNEL);
+	/* Round up to the next kmalloc bucket size. */
+	size = kmalloc_size_roundup(struct_size(list, table, max_fences));
+
+	list = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!list)
 		return NULL;
 
-	list->max_fences = (ksize(list) - offsetof(typeof(*list), table)) /
+	/* Given the resulting bucket size, recalculated max_fences. */
+	list->max_fences = (size - offsetof(typeof(*list), table)) /
 		sizeof(*list->table);
 
 	return list;
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/fsl-dcu/fsl_dcu_drm_rgb.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/fsl-dcu/fsl_dcu_drm_rgb.c
index 4d4a715b429d..2c2b92324a2e 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/fsl-dcu/fsl_dcu_drm_rgb.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/fsl-dcu/fsl_dcu_drm_rgb.c
@@ -60,8 +60,9 @@ static int fsl_dcu_drm_connector_get_modes(struct drm_connector *connector)
 	return drm_panel_get_modes(fsl_connector->panel, connector);
 }
 
-static int fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
-					    struct drm_display_mode *mode)
+static enum drm_mode_status
+fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
+				 struct drm_display_mode *mode)
 {
 	if (mode->hdisplay & 0xf)
 		return MODE_ERROR;
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_user_extensions.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_user_extensions.c
index c822d0aafd2d..e3f808372c47 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_user_extensions.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_user_extensions.c
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ int i915_user_extensions(struct i915_user_extension __user *ext,
 			return err;
 
 		if (get_user(next, &ext->next_extension) ||
-		    overflows_type(next, ext))
+		    overflows_type(next, uintptr_t))
 			return -EFAULT;
 
 		ext = u64_to_user_ptr(next);
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_utils.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_utils.h
index 6c14d13364bf..67a66d4d5c70 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_utils.h
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_utils.h
@@ -111,10 +111,6 @@ bool i915_error_injected(void);
 #define range_overflows_end_t(type, start, size, max) \
 	range_overflows_end((type)(start), (type)(size), (type)(max))
 
-/* Note we don't consider signbits :| */
-#define overflows_type(x, T) \
-	(sizeof(x) > sizeof(T) && (x) >> BITS_PER_TYPE(T))
-
 #define ptr_mask_bits(ptr, n) ({					\
 	unsigned long __v = (unsigned long)(ptr);			\
 	(typeof(ptr))(__v & -BIT(n));					\
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_dvo.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_dvo.c
index f3a5616b7daf..577c477b5f46 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_dvo.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_dvo.c
@@ -346,8 +346,9 @@ static int sti_dvo_connector_get_modes(struct drm_connector *connector)
 
 #define CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ 50
 
-static int sti_dvo_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
-					struct drm_display_mode *mode)
+static enum drm_mode_status
+sti_dvo_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
+			     struct drm_display_mode *mode)
 {
 	int target = mode->clock * 1000;
 	int target_min = target - CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ;
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hda.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hda.c
index ec6656b9ee7c..15097ac67931 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hda.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hda.c
@@ -601,8 +601,9 @@ static int sti_hda_connector_get_modes(struct drm_connector *connector)
 
 #define CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ 50
 
-static int sti_hda_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
-					struct drm_display_mode *mode)
+static enum drm_mode_status
+sti_hda_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
+			     struct drm_display_mode *mode)
 {
 	int target = mode->clock * 1000;
 	int target_min = target - CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ;
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hdmi.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hdmi.c
index fcc2194869d6..8539fe1fedc4 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hdmi.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hdmi.c
@@ -1004,8 +1004,9 @@ fail:
 
 #define CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ 50
 
-static int sti_hdmi_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
-					struct drm_display_mode *mode)
+static enum drm_mode_status
+sti_hdmi_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
+			      struct drm_display_mode *mode)
 {
 	int target = mode->clock * 1000;
 	int target_min = target - CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ;
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/send.c b/fs/btrfs/send.c
index 67f7c698ade3..e65e6b6600a7 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/send.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/send.c
@@ -486,6 +486,11 @@ static int fs_path_ensure_buf(struct fs_path *p, int len)
 	old_buf_len = p->buf_len;
 
 	/*
+	 * Allocate to the next largest kmalloc bucket size, to let
+	 * the fast path happen most of the time.
+	 */
+	len = kmalloc_size_roundup(len);
+	/*
 	 * First time the inline_buf does not suffice
 	 */
 	if (p->buf == p->inline_buf) {
@@ -498,11 +503,7 @@ static int fs_path_ensure_buf(struct fs_path *p, int len)
 	if (!tmp_buf)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	p->buf = tmp_buf;
-	/*
-	 * The real size of the buffer is bigger, this will let the fast path
-	 * happen most of the time
-	 */
-	p->buf_len = ksize(p->buf);
+	p->buf_len = len;
 
 	if (p->reversed) {
 		tmp_buf = p->buf + old_buf_len - path_len - 1;
diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c b/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c
index 342717bf1dc2..6f3285f1dfee 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ init_cifs_spnego(void)
 	 * spnego upcalls.
 	 */
 
-	cred = prepare_kernel_cred(NULL);
+	cred = prepare_kernel_cred(&init_task);
 	if (!cred)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c
index c647f0d56518..bbf58c2439da 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c
@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ init_cifs_idmap(void)
 	 * this is used to prevent malicious redirections from being installed
 	 * with add_key().
 	 */
-	cred = prepare_kernel_cred(NULL);
+	cred = prepare_kernel_cred(&init_task);
 	if (!cred)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
diff --git a/fs/coredump.c b/fs/coredump.c
index a4c30bb900fe..de78bde2991b 100644
--- a/fs/coredump.c
+++ b/fs/coredump.c
@@ -68,7 +68,10 @@ struct core_name {
 
 static int expand_corename(struct core_name *cn, int size)
 {
-	char *corename = krealloc(cn->corename, size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	char *corename;
+
+	size = kmalloc_size_roundup(size);
+	corename = krealloc(cn->corename, size, GFP_KERNEL);
 
 	if (!corename)
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -76,7 +79,7 @@ static int expand_corename(struct core_name *cn, int size)
 	if (size > core_name_size) /* racy but harmless */
 		core_name_size = size;
 
-	cn->size = ksize(corename);
+	cn->size = size;
 	cn->corename = corename;
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c
index 9306e10753f9..ae7a3b000c61 100644
--- a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c
@@ -3438,7 +3438,7 @@ static int smb2_populate_readdir_entry(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, int info_level,
 		goto free_conv_name;
 	}
 
-	struct_sz = readdir_info_level_struct_sz(info_level) - 1 + conv_len;
+	struct_sz = readdir_info_level_struct_sz(info_level) + conv_len;
 	next_entry_offset = ALIGN(struct_sz, KSMBD_DIR_INFO_ALIGNMENT);
 	d_info->last_entry_off_align = next_entry_offset - struct_sz;
 
@@ -3690,7 +3690,7 @@ static int reserve_populate_dentry(struct ksmbd_dir_info *d_info,
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
 	conv_len = (d_info->name_len + 1) * 2;
-	next_entry_offset = ALIGN(struct_sz - 1 + conv_len,
+	next_entry_offset = ALIGN(struct_sz + conv_len,
 				  KSMBD_DIR_INFO_ALIGNMENT);
 
 	if (next_entry_offset > d_info->out_buf_len) {
diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.h b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.h
index 092fdd3f8750..aa5dbe54f5a1 100644
--- a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.h
+++ b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.h
@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ struct smb2_posix_info {
 	/* SidBuffer contain two sids (UNIX user sid(16), UNIX group sid(16)) */
 	u8 SidBuffer[32];
 	__le32 name_len;
-	u8 name[1];
+	u8 name[];
 	/*
 	 * var sized owner SID
 	 * var sized group SID
diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/smb_common.c b/fs/ksmbd/smb_common.c
index d96da872d70a..2a4fbbd55b91 100644
--- a/fs/ksmbd/smb_common.c
+++ b/fs/ksmbd/smb_common.c
@@ -623,7 +623,7 @@ int ksmbd_override_fsids(struct ksmbd_work *work)
 	if (share->force_gid != KSMBD_SHARE_INVALID_GID)
 		gid = share->force_gid;
 
-	cred = prepare_kernel_cred(NULL);
+	cred = prepare_kernel_cred(&init_task);
 	if (!cred)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/smb_common.h b/fs/ksmbd/smb_common.h
index 318c16fa81da..e663ab9ea759 100644
--- a/fs/ksmbd/smb_common.h
+++ b/fs/ksmbd/smb_common.h
@@ -277,14 +277,14 @@ struct file_directory_info {
 	__le64 AllocationSize;
 	__le32 ExtFileAttributes;
 	__le32 FileNameLength;
-	char FileName[1];
+	char FileName[];
 } __packed;   /* level 0x101 FF resp data */
 
 struct file_names_info {
 	__le32 NextEntryOffset;
 	__u32 FileIndex;
 	__le32 FileNameLength;
-	char FileName[1];
+	char FileName[];
 } __packed;   /* level 0xc FF resp data */
 
 struct file_full_directory_info {
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ struct file_full_directory_info {
 	__le32 ExtFileAttributes;
 	__le32 FileNameLength;
 	__le32 EaSize;
-	char FileName[1];
+	char FileName[];
 } __packed; /* level 0x102 FF resp */
 
 struct file_both_directory_info {
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ struct file_both_directory_info {
 	__u8   ShortNameLength;
 	__u8   Reserved;
 	__u8   ShortName[24];
-	char FileName[1];
+	char FileName[];
 } __packed; /* level 0x104 FFrsp data */
 
 struct file_id_both_directory_info {
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ struct file_id_both_directory_info {
 	__u8   ShortName[24];
 	__le16 Reserved2;
 	__le64 UniqueId;
-	char FileName[1];
+	char FileName[];
 } __packed;
 
 struct file_id_full_dir_info {
@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ struct file_id_full_dir_info {
 	__le32 EaSize; /* EA size */
 	__le32 Reserved;
 	__le64 UniqueId; /* inode num - le since Samba puts ino in low 32 bit*/
-	char FileName[1];
+	char FileName[];
 } __packed; /* level 0x105 FF rsp data */
 
 struct smb_version_values {
diff --git a/fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c b/fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c
index 1ec79ccf89ad..7deb3cd76abe 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c
@@ -493,10 +493,10 @@ ff_layout_alloc_lseg(struct pnfs_layout_hdr *lh,
 		gid = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, id);
 
 		if (gfp_flags & __GFP_FS)
-			kcred = prepare_kernel_cred(NULL);
+			kcred = prepare_kernel_cred(&init_task);
 		else {
 			unsigned int nofs_flags = memalloc_nofs_save();
-			kcred = prepare_kernel_cred(NULL);
+			kcred = prepare_kernel_cred(&init_task);
 			memalloc_nofs_restore(nofs_flags);
 		}
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c
index e3fdd2f45b01..25a7c771cfd8 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ int nfs_idmap_init(void)
 	printk(KERN_NOTICE "NFS: Registering the %s key type\n",
 		key_type_id_resolver.name);
 
-	cred = prepare_kernel_cred(NULL);
+	cred = prepare_kernel_cred(&init_task);
 	if (!cred)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c
index 1b57f2c2f0bb..d6e1d3894c82 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c
@@ -942,7 +942,7 @@ static const struct cred *get_backchannel_cred(struct nfs4_client *clp, struct r
 	} else {
 		struct cred *kcred;
 
-		kcred = prepare_kernel_cred(NULL);
+		kcred = prepare_kernel_cred(&init_task);
 		if (!kcred)
 			return NULL;
 
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler.h b/include/linux/compiler.h
index 973a1bfd7ef5..947a60b801db 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler.h
@@ -236,6 +236,7 @@ static inline void *offset_to_ptr(const int *off)
  * bool and also pointer types.
  */
 #define is_signed_type(type) (((type)(-1)) < (__force type)1)
+#define is_unsigned_type(type) (!is_signed_type(type))
 
 /*
  * This is needed in functions which generate the stack canary, see
diff --git a/include/linux/device.h b/include/linux/device.h
index c90a444be1c4..7bcfaf54fea3 100644
--- a/include/linux/device.h
+++ b/include/linux/device.h
@@ -197,9 +197,9 @@ void devres_remove_group(struct device *dev, void *id);
 int devres_release_group(struct device *dev, void *id);
 
 /* managed devm_k.alloc/kfree for device drivers */
-void *devm_kmalloc(struct device *dev, size_t size, gfp_t gfp) __malloc;
+void *devm_kmalloc(struct device *dev, size_t size, gfp_t gfp) __alloc_size(2);
 void *devm_krealloc(struct device *dev, void *ptr, size_t size,
-		    gfp_t gfp) __must_check;
+		    gfp_t gfp) __must_check __realloc_size(3);
 __printf(3, 0) char *devm_kvasprintf(struct device *dev, gfp_t gfp,
 				     const char *fmt, va_list ap) __malloc;
 __printf(3, 4) char *devm_kasprintf(struct device *dev, gfp_t gfp,
@@ -226,7 +226,8 @@ static inline void *devm_kcalloc(struct device *dev,
 void devm_kfree(struct device *dev, const void *p);
 char *devm_kstrdup(struct device *dev, const char *s, gfp_t gfp) __malloc;
 const char *devm_kstrdup_const(struct device *dev, const char *s, gfp_t gfp);
-void *devm_kmemdup(struct device *dev, const void *src, size_t len, gfp_t gfp);
+void *devm_kmemdup(struct device *dev, const void *src, size_t len, gfp_t gfp)
+	__realloc_size(3);
 
 unsigned long devm_get_free_pages(struct device *dev,
 				  gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order);
diff --git a/include/linux/fortify-string.h b/include/linux/fortify-string.h
index 1067a8450826..7cad8bb031e9 100644
--- a/include/linux/fortify-string.h
+++ b/include/linux/fortify-string.h
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ void __write_overflow_field(size_t avail, size_t wanted) __compiletime_warning("
 
 #define __compiletime_strlen(p)					\
 ({								\
-	unsigned char *__p = (unsigned char *)(p);		\
+	char *__p = (char *)(p);				\
 	size_t __ret = SIZE_MAX;				\
 	size_t __p_size = __member_size(p);			\
 	if (__p_size != SIZE_MAX &&				\
@@ -119,13 +119,13 @@ extern char *__underlying_strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size)
  * Instead, please choose an alternative, so that the expectation
  * of @p's contents is unambiguous:
  *
- * +--------------------+-----------------+------------+
- * | @p needs to be:    | padded to @size | not padded |
- * +====================+=================+============+
- * |     NUL-terminated | strscpy_pad()   | strscpy()  |
- * +--------------------+-----------------+------------+
- * | not NUL-terminated | strtomem_pad()  | strtomem() |
- * +--------------------+-----------------+------------+
+ * +--------------------+--------------------+------------+
+ * | **p** needs to be: | padded to **size** | not padded |
+ * +====================+====================+============+
+ * |     NUL-terminated | strscpy_pad()      | strscpy()  |
+ * +--------------------+--------------------+------------+
+ * | not NUL-terminated | strtomem_pad()     | strtomem() |
+ * +--------------------+--------------------+------------+
  *
  * Note strscpy*()'s differing return values for detecting truncation,
  * and strtomem*()'s expectation that the destination is marked with
@@ -144,6 +144,21 @@ char *strncpy(char * const POS p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size)
 	return __underlying_strncpy(p, q, size);
 }
 
+/**
+ * strcat - Append a string to an existing string
+ *
+ * @p: pointer to NUL-terminated string to append to
+ * @q: pointer to NUL-terminated source string to append from
+ *
+ * Do not use this function. While FORTIFY_SOURCE tries to avoid
+ * read and write overflows, this is only possible when the
+ * destination buffer size is known to the compiler. Prefer
+ * building the string with formatting, via scnprintf() or similar.
+ * At the very least, use strncat().
+ *
+ * Returns @p.
+ *
+ */
 __FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strcat, 1, 2)
 char *strcat(char * const POS p, const char *q)
 {
@@ -157,6 +172,16 @@ char *strcat(char * const POS p, const char *q)
 }
 
 extern __kernel_size_t __real_strnlen(const char *, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(strnlen);
+/**
+ * strnlen - Return bounded count of characters in a NUL-terminated string
+ *
+ * @p: pointer to NUL-terminated string to count.
+ * @maxlen: maximum number of characters to count.
+ *
+ * Returns number of characters in @p (NOT including the final NUL), or
+ * @maxlen, if no NUL has been found up to there.
+ *
+ */
 __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char * const POS p, __kernel_size_t maxlen)
 {
 	size_t p_size = __member_size(p);
@@ -182,6 +207,19 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char * const POS p, __kernel_size
  * possible for strlen() to be used on compile-time strings for use in
  * static initializers (i.e. as a constant expression).
  */
+/**
+ * strlen - Return count of characters in a NUL-terminated string
+ *
+ * @p: pointer to NUL-terminated string to count.
+ *
+ * Do not use this function unless the string length is known at
+ * compile-time. When @p is unterminated, this function may crash
+ * or return unexpected counts that could lead to memory content
+ * exposures. Prefer strnlen().
+ *
+ * Returns number of characters in @p (NOT including the final NUL).
+ *
+ */
 #define strlen(p)							\
 	__builtin_choose_expr(__is_constexpr(__builtin_strlen(p)),	\
 		__builtin_strlen(p), __fortify_strlen(p))
@@ -200,8 +238,26 @@ __kernel_size_t __fortify_strlen(const char * const POS p)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-/* defined after fortified strlen to reuse it */
+/* Defined after fortified strlen() to reuse it. */
 extern size_t __real_strlcpy(char *, const char *, size_t) __RENAME(strlcpy);
+/**
+ * strlcpy - Copy a string into another string buffer
+ *
+ * @p: pointer to destination of copy
+ * @q: pointer to NUL-terminated source string to copy
+ * @size: maximum number of bytes to write at @p
+ *
+ * If strlen(@q) >= @size, the copy of @q will be truncated at
+ * @size - 1 bytes. @p will always be NUL-terminated.
+ *
+ * Do not use this function. While FORTIFY_SOURCE tries to avoid
+ * over-reads when calculating strlen(@q), it is still possible.
+ * Prefer strscpy(), though note its different return values for
+ * detecting truncation.
+ *
+ * Returns total number of bytes written to @p, including terminating NUL.
+ *
+ */
 __FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, size_t size)
 {
 	size_t p_size = __member_size(p);
@@ -227,8 +283,32 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, si
 	return q_len;
 }
 
-/* defined after fortified strnlen to reuse it */
+/* Defined after fortified strnlen() to reuse it. */
 extern ssize_t __real_strscpy(char *, const char *, size_t) __RENAME(strscpy);
+/**
+ * strscpy - Copy a C-string into a sized buffer
+ *
+ * @p: Where to copy the string to
+ * @q: Where to copy the string from
+ * @size: Size of destination buffer
+ *
+ * Copy the source string @p, or as much of it as fits, into the destination
+ * @q buffer. The behavior is undefined if the string buffers overlap. The
+ * destination @p buffer is always NUL terminated, unless it's zero-sized.
+ *
+ * Preferred to strlcpy() since the API doesn't require reading memory
+ * from the source @q string beyond the specified @size bytes, and since
+ * the return value is easier to error-check than strlcpy()'s.
+ * In addition, the implementation is robust to the string changing out
+ * from underneath it, unlike the current strlcpy() implementation.
+ *
+ * Preferred to strncpy() since it always returns a valid string, and
+ * doesn't unnecessarily force the tail of the destination buffer to be
+ * zero padded. If padding is desired please use strscpy_pad().
+ *
+ * Returns the number of characters copied in @p (not including the
+ * trailing %NUL) or -E2BIG if @size is 0 or the copy of @q was truncated.
+ */
 __FORTIFY_INLINE ssize_t strscpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, size_t size)
 {
 	size_t len;
@@ -247,6 +327,16 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE ssize_t strscpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, s
 	if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size))
 		__write_overflow();
 
+	/* Short-circuit for compile-time known-safe lengths. */
+	if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, SIZE_MAX)) {
+		len = __compiletime_strlen(q);
+
+		if (len < SIZE_MAX && __compiletime_lessthan(len, size)) {
+			__underlying_memcpy(p, q, len + 1);
+			return len;
+		}
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * This call protects from read overflow, because len will default to q
 	 * length if it smaller than size.
@@ -274,7 +364,26 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE ssize_t strscpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, s
 	return __real_strscpy(p, q, len);
 }
 
-/* defined after fortified strlen and strnlen to reuse them */
+/**
+ * strncat - Append a string to an existing string
+ *
+ * @p: pointer to NUL-terminated string to append to
+ * @q: pointer to source string to append from
+ * @count: Maximum bytes to read from @q
+ *
+ * Appends at most @count bytes from @q (stopping at the first
+ * NUL byte) after the NUL-terminated string at @p. @p will be
+ * NUL-terminated.
+ *
+ * Do not use this function. While FORTIFY_SOURCE tries to avoid
+ * read and write overflows, this is only possible when the sizes
+ * of @p and @q are known to the compiler. Prefer building the
+ * string with formatting, via scnprintf() or similar.
+ *
+ * Returns @p.
+ *
+ */
+/* Defined after fortified strlen() and strnlen() to reuse them. */
 __FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strncat, 1, 2, 3)
 char *strncat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, __kernel_size_t count)
 {
@@ -573,7 +682,8 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr_inv(const void * const POS0 p, int c, size_t size)
 	return __real_memchr_inv(p, c, size);
 }
 
-extern void *__real_kmemdup(const void *src, size_t len, gfp_t gfp) __RENAME(kmemdup);
+extern void *__real_kmemdup(const void *src, size_t len, gfp_t gfp) __RENAME(kmemdup)
+								    __realloc_size(2);
 __FORTIFY_INLINE void *kmemdup(const void * const POS0 p, size_t size, gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	size_t p_size = __struct_size(p);
@@ -585,6 +695,20 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *kmemdup(const void * const POS0 p, size_t size, gfp_t gfp
 	return __real_kmemdup(p, size, gfp);
 }
 
+/**
+ * strcpy - Copy a string into another string buffer
+ *
+ * @p: pointer to destination of copy
+ * @q: pointer to NUL-terminated source string to copy
+ *
+ * Do not use this function. While FORTIFY_SOURCE tries to avoid
+ * overflows, this is only possible when the sizes of @q and @p are
+ * known to the compiler. Prefer strscpy(), though note its different
+ * return values for detecting truncation.
+ *
+ * Returns @p.
+ *
+ */
 /* Defined after fortified strlen to reuse it. */
 __FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strcpy, 1, 2)
 char *strcpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q)
diff --git a/include/linux/hpet.h b/include/linux/hpet.h
index 8604564b985d..21e69eaf7a36 100644
--- a/include/linux/hpet.h
+++ b/include/linux/hpet.h
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ struct hpet {
 			unsigned long _hpet_compare;
 		} _u1;
 		u64 hpet_fsb[2];	/* FSB route */
-	} hpet_timers[1];
+	} hpet_timers[];
 };
 
 #define	hpet_mc		_u0._hpet_mc
diff --git a/include/linux/overflow.h b/include/linux/overflow.h
index 1d3be1a2204c..0e33b5cbdb9f 100644
--- a/include/linux/overflow.h
+++ b/include/linux/overflow.h
@@ -128,6 +128,53 @@ static inline bool __must_check __must_check_overflow(bool overflow)
 	(*_d >> _to_shift) != _a);					\
 }))
 
+#define __overflows_type_constexpr(x, T) (			\
+	is_unsigned_type(typeof(x)) ?				\
+		(x) > type_max(typeof(T)) :			\
+	is_unsigned_type(typeof(T)) ?				\
+		(x) < 0 || (x) > type_max(typeof(T)) :		\
+	(x) < type_min(typeof(T)) || (x) > type_max(typeof(T)))
+
+#define __overflows_type(x, T)		({	\
+	typeof(T) v = 0;			\
+	check_add_overflow((x), v, &v);		\
+})
+
+/**
+ * overflows_type - helper for checking the overflows between value, variables,
+ *		    or data type
+ *
+ * @n: source constant value or variable to be checked
+ * @T: destination variable or data type proposed to store @x
+ *
+ * Compares the @x expression for whether or not it can safely fit in
+ * the storage of the type in @T. @x and @T can have different types.
+ * If @x is a constant expression, this will also resolve to a constant
+ * expression.
+ *
+ * Returns: true if overflow can occur, false otherwise.
+ */
+#define overflows_type(n, T)					\
+	__builtin_choose_expr(__is_constexpr(n),		\
+			      __overflows_type_constexpr(n, T),	\
+			      __overflows_type(n, T))
+
+/**
+ * castable_to_type - like __same_type(), but also allows for casted literals
+ *
+ * @n: variable or constant value
+ * @T: variable or data type
+ *
+ * Unlike the __same_type() macro, this allows a constant value as the
+ * first argument. If this value would not overflow into an assignment
+ * of the second argument's type, it returns true. Otherwise, this falls
+ * back to __same_type().
+ */
+#define castable_to_type(n, T)						\
+	__builtin_choose_expr(__is_constexpr(n),			\
+			      !__overflows_type_constexpr(n, T),	\
+			      __same_type(n, T))
+
 /**
  * size_mul() - Calculate size_t multiplication with saturation at SIZE_MAX
  * @factor1: first factor
diff --git a/include/linux/panic.h b/include/linux/panic.h
index c7759b3f2045..979b776e3bcb 100644
--- a/include/linux/panic.h
+++ b/include/linux/panic.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ extern long (*panic_blink)(int state);
 __printf(1, 2)
 void panic(const char *fmt, ...) __noreturn __cold;
 void nmi_panic(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *msg);
+void check_panic_on_warn(const char *origin);
 extern void oops_enter(void);
 extern void oops_exit(void);
 extern bool oops_may_print(void);
diff --git a/include/linux/string.h b/include/linux/string.h
index cf7607b32102..db28802ab0a6 100644
--- a/include/linux/string.h
+++ b/include/linux/string.h
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ extern void kfree_const(const void *x);
 extern char *kstrdup(const char *s, gfp_t gfp) __malloc;
 extern const char *kstrdup_const(const char *s, gfp_t gfp);
 extern char *kstrndup(const char *s, size_t len, gfp_t gfp);
-extern void *kmemdup(const void *src, size_t len, gfp_t gfp);
+extern void *kmemdup(const void *src, size_t len, gfp_t gfp) __realloc_size(2);
 extern char *kmemdup_nul(const char *s, size_t len, gfp_t gfp);
 
 extern char **argv_split(gfp_t gfp, const char *str, int *argcp);
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index e1938e3a753e..7e5c3ddc341d 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -159,10 +159,12 @@ config WERROR
 	help
 	  A kernel build should not cause any compiler warnings, and this
 	  enables the '-Werror' (for C) and '-Dwarnings' (for Rust) flags
-	  to enforce that rule by default.
+	  to enforce that rule by default. Certain warnings from other tools
+	  such as the linker may be upgraded to errors with this option as
+	  well.
 
-	  However, if you have a new (or very old) compiler with odd and
-	  unusual warnings, or you have some architecture with problems,
+	  However, if you have a new (or very old) compiler or linker with odd
+	  and unusual warnings, or you have some architecture with problems,
 	  you may need to disable this config option in order to
 	  successfully build the kernel.
 
@@ -1454,6 +1456,13 @@ config LD_ORPHAN_WARN
 	def_bool y
 	depends on ARCH_WANT_LD_ORPHAN_WARN
 	depends on $(ld-option,--orphan-handling=warn)
+	depends on $(ld-option,--orphan-handling=error)
+
+config LD_ORPHAN_WARN_LEVEL
+        string
+        depends on LD_ORPHAN_WARN
+        default "error" if WERROR
+        default "warn"
 
 config SYSCTL
 	bool
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index e10c15f51c1f..811ad654abd1 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -701,9 +701,9 @@ void __init cred_init(void)
  * override a task's own credentials so that work can be done on behalf of that
  * task that requires a different subjective context.
  *
- * @daemon is used to provide a base for the security record, but can be NULL.
- * If @daemon is supplied, then the security data will be derived from that;
- * otherwise they'll be set to 0 and no groups, full capabilities and no keys.
+ * @daemon is used to provide a base cred, with the security data derived from
+ * that; if this is "&init_task", they'll be set to 0, no groups, full
+ * capabilities, and no keys.
  *
  * The caller may change these controls afterwards if desired.
  *
@@ -714,17 +714,16 @@ struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
 	const struct cred *old;
 	struct cred *new;
 
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!daemon))
+		return NULL;
+
 	new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!new)
 		return NULL;
 
 	kdebug("prepare_kernel_cred() alloc %p", new);
 
-	if (daemon)
-		old = get_task_cred(daemon);
-	else
-		old = get_cred(&init_cred);
-
+	old = get_task_cred(daemon);
 	validate_creds(old);
 
 	*new = *old;
diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index 35e0a31a0315..deffb8e4b1b2 100644
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -67,11 +67,58 @@
 #include <linux/io_uring.h>
 #include <linux/kprobes.h>
 #include <linux/rethook.h>
+#include <linux/sysfs.h>
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 
+/*
+ * The default value should be high enough to not crash a system that randomly
+ * crashes its kernel from time to time, but low enough to at least not permit
+ * overflowing 32-bit refcounts or the ldsem writer count.
+ */
+static unsigned int oops_limit = 10000;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+static struct ctl_table kern_exit_table[] = {
+	{
+		.procname       = "oops_limit",
+		.data           = &oops_limit,
+		.maxlen         = sizeof(oops_limit),
+		.mode           = 0644,
+		.proc_handler   = proc_douintvec,
+	},
+	{ }
+};
+
+static __init int kernel_exit_sysctls_init(void)
+{
+	register_sysctl_init("kernel", kern_exit_table);
+	return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(kernel_exit_sysctls_init);
+#endif
+
+static atomic_t oops_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
+static ssize_t oops_count_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+			       char *page)
+{
+	return sysfs_emit(page, "%d\n", atomic_read(&oops_count));
+}
+
+static struct kobj_attribute oops_count_attr = __ATTR_RO(oops_count);
+
+static __init int kernel_exit_sysfs_init(void)
+{
+	sysfs_add_file_to_group(kernel_kobj, &oops_count_attr.attr, NULL);
+	return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(kernel_exit_sysfs_init);
+#endif
+
 static void __unhash_process(struct task_struct *p, bool group_dead)
 {
 	nr_threads--;
@@ -898,6 +945,19 @@ void __noreturn make_task_dead(int signr)
 	}
 
 	/*
+	 * Every time the system oopses, if the oops happens while a reference
+	 * to an object was held, the reference leaks.
+	 * If the oops doesn't also leak memory, repeated oopsing can cause
+	 * reference counters to wrap around (if they're not using refcount_t).
+	 * This means that repeated oopsing can make unexploitable-looking bugs
+	 * exploitable through repeated oopsing.
+	 * To make sure this can't happen, place an upper bound on how often the
+	 * kernel may oops without panic().
+	 */
+	if (atomic_inc_return(&oops_count) >= READ_ONCE(oops_limit) && oops_limit)
+		panic("Oopsed too often (kernel.oops_limit is %d)", oops_limit);
+
+	/*
 	 * We're taking recursive faults here in make_task_dead. Safest is to just
 	 * leave this task alone and wait for reboot.
 	 */
diff --git a/kernel/kcsan/report.c b/kernel/kcsan/report.c
index 67794404042a..e95ce7d7a76e 100644
--- a/kernel/kcsan/report.c
+++ b/kernel/kcsan/report.c
@@ -492,8 +492,7 @@ static void print_report(enum kcsan_value_change value_change,
 	dump_stack_print_info(KERN_DEFAULT);
 	pr_err("==================================================================\n");
 
-	if (panic_on_warn)
-		panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
+	check_panic_on_warn("KCSAN");
 }
 
 static void release_report(unsigned long *flags, struct other_info *other_info)
diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c
index 75fe389e8814..326d91505f04 100644
--- a/kernel/panic.c
+++ b/kernel/panic.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #include <linux/bug.h>
 #include <linux/ratelimit.h>
 #include <linux/debugfs.h>
+#include <linux/sysfs.h>
 #include <trace/events/error_report.h>
 #include <asm/sections.h>
 
@@ -59,6 +60,7 @@ bool crash_kexec_post_notifiers;
 int panic_on_warn __read_mostly;
 unsigned long panic_on_taint;
 bool panic_on_taint_nousertaint = false;
+static unsigned int warn_limit __read_mostly;
 
 int panic_timeout = CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(panic_timeout);
@@ -76,8 +78,9 @@ ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(panic_notifier_list);
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic_notifier_list);
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_SMP) && defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL)
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
 static struct ctl_table kern_panic_table[] = {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 	{
 		.procname       = "oops_all_cpu_backtrace",
 		.data           = &sysctl_oops_all_cpu_backtrace,
@@ -87,6 +90,14 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_panic_table[] = {
 		.extra1         = SYSCTL_ZERO,
 		.extra2         = SYSCTL_ONE,
 	},
+#endif
+	{
+		.procname       = "warn_limit",
+		.data           = &warn_limit,
+		.maxlen         = sizeof(warn_limit),
+		.mode           = 0644,
+		.proc_handler   = proc_douintvec,
+	},
 	{ }
 };
 
@@ -98,6 +109,25 @@ static __init int kernel_panic_sysctls_init(void)
 late_initcall(kernel_panic_sysctls_init);
 #endif
 
+static atomic_t warn_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
+static ssize_t warn_count_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+			       char *page)
+{
+	return sysfs_emit(page, "%d\n", atomic_read(&warn_count));
+}
+
+static struct kobj_attribute warn_count_attr = __ATTR_RO(warn_count);
+
+static __init int kernel_panic_sysfs_init(void)
+{
+	sysfs_add_file_to_group(kernel_kobj, &warn_count_attr.attr, NULL);
+	return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(kernel_panic_sysfs_init);
+#endif
+
 static long no_blink(int state)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -200,6 +230,16 @@ static void panic_print_sys_info(bool console_flush)
 		ftrace_dump(DUMP_ALL);
 }
 
+void check_panic_on_warn(const char *origin)
+{
+	if (panic_on_warn)
+		panic("%s: panic_on_warn set ...\n", origin);
+
+	if (atomic_inc_return(&warn_count) >= READ_ONCE(warn_limit) && warn_limit)
+		panic("%s: system warned too often (kernel.warn_limit is %d)",
+		      origin, warn_limit);
+}
+
 /**
  *	panic - halt the system
  *	@fmt: The text string to print
@@ -618,8 +658,7 @@ void __warn(const char *file, int line, void *caller, unsigned taint,
 	if (regs)
 		show_regs(regs);
 
-	if (panic_on_warn)
-		panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
+	check_panic_on_warn("kernel");
 
 	if (!regs)
 		dump_stack();
diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
index 9e3c89c253cb..25b582b6ee5f 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -5782,8 +5782,7 @@ static noinline void __schedule_bug(struct task_struct *prev)
 		pr_err("Preemption disabled at:");
 		print_ip_sym(KERN_ERR, preempt_disable_ip);
 	}
-	if (panic_on_warn)
-		panic("scheduling while atomic\n");
+	check_panic_on_warn("scheduling while atomic");
 
 	dump_stack();
 	add_taint(TAINT_WARN, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index 848d5c282d35..ae26da61c4d9 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -2693,6 +2693,7 @@ relock:
 		/* Has this task already been marked for death? */
 		if ((signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT) ||
 		     signal->group_exec_task) {
+			clear_siginfo(&ksig->info);
 			ksig->info.si_signo = signr = SIGKILL;
 			sigdelset(&current->pending.signal, SIGKILL);
 			trace_signal_deliver(SIGKILL, SEND_SIG_NOINFO,
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
index 1b2bdc02abf4..6831b798152d 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
@@ -2234,9 +2234,6 @@ config STRING_SELFTEST
 config TEST_STRING_HELPERS
 	tristate "Test functions located in the string_helpers module at runtime"
 
-config TEST_STRSCPY
-	tristate "Test strscpy*() family of functions at runtime"
-
 config TEST_KSTRTOX
 	tristate "Test kstrto*() family of functions at runtime"
 
@@ -2271,15 +2268,6 @@ config TEST_RHASHTABLE
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
-config TEST_SIPHASH
-	tristate "Perform selftest on siphash functions"
-	help
-	  Enable this option to test the kernel's siphash (<linux/siphash.h>) hash
-	  functions on boot (or module load).
-
-	  This is intended to help people writing architecture-specific
-	  optimized versions.  If unsure, say N.
-
 config TEST_IDA
 	tristate "Perform selftest on IDA functions"
 
@@ -2607,6 +2595,22 @@ config HW_BREAKPOINT_KUNIT_TEST
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
+config STRSCPY_KUNIT_TEST
+	tristate "Test strscpy*() family of functions at runtime" if !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
+	depends on KUNIT
+	default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
+
+config SIPHASH_KUNIT_TEST
+	tristate "Perform selftest on siphash functions" if !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
+	depends on KUNIT
+	default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
+	help
+	  Enable this option to test the kernel's siphash (<linux/siphash.h>) hash
+	  functions on boot (or module load).
+
+	  This is intended to help people writing architecture-specific
+	  optimized versions.  If unsure, say N.
+
 config TEST_UDELAY
 	tristate "udelay test driver"
 	help
diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
index 59bd7c2f793a..4d9461bfea42 100644
--- a/lib/Makefile
+++ b/lib/Makefile
@@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_BITOPS) += test_bitops.o
 CFLAGS_test_bitops.o += -Werror
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPUMASK_KUNIT_TEST) += cpumask_kunit.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_SYSCTL) += test_sysctl.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_SIPHASH) += test_siphash.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_HASH_KUNIT_TEST) += test_hash.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_IDA) += test_ida.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_UBSAN) += test_ubsan.o
@@ -82,7 +81,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_DYNAMIC_DEBUG) += test_dynamic_debug.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_PRINTF) += test_printf.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_SCANF) += test_scanf.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_BITMAP) += test_bitmap.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_STRSCPY) += test_strscpy.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_UUID) += test_uuid.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_XARRAY) += test_xarray.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_MAPLE_TREE) += test_maple_tree.o
@@ -377,10 +375,15 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CMDLINE_KUNIT_TEST) += cmdline_kunit.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SLUB_KUNIT_TEST) += slub_kunit.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_MEMCPY_KUNIT_TEST) += memcpy_kunit.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_IS_SIGNED_TYPE_KUNIT_TEST) += is_signed_type_kunit.o
+CFLAGS_overflow_kunit.o = $(call cc-disable-warning, tautological-constant-out-of-range-compare)
 obj-$(CONFIG_OVERFLOW_KUNIT_TEST) += overflow_kunit.o
 CFLAGS_stackinit_kunit.o += $(call cc-disable-warning, switch-unreachable)
 obj-$(CONFIG_STACKINIT_KUNIT_TEST) += stackinit_kunit.o
+CFLAGS_fortify_kunit.o += $(call cc-disable-warning, unsequenced)
+CFLAGS_fortify_kunit.o += $(DISABLE_STRUCTLEAK_PLUGIN)
 obj-$(CONFIG_FORTIFY_KUNIT_TEST) += fortify_kunit.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_STRSCPY_KUNIT_TEST) += strscpy_kunit.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SIPHASH_KUNIT_TEST) += siphash_kunit.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_LIB_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED) += devmem_is_allowed.o
 
diff --git a/lib/fortify_kunit.c b/lib/fortify_kunit.c
index 409af07f340a..c8c33cbaae9e 100644
--- a/lib/fortify_kunit.c
+++ b/lib/fortify_kunit.c
@@ -16,7 +16,10 @@
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
 
 #include <kunit/test.h>
+#include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 
 static const char array_of_10[] = "this is 10";
 static const char *ptr_of_11 = "this is 11!";
@@ -60,9 +63,261 @@ static void control_flow_split_test(struct kunit *test)
 	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, want_minus_one(pick), SIZE_MAX);
 }
 
+#define KUNIT_EXPECT_BOS(test, p, expected, name)			\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test, __builtin_object_size(p, 1),		\
+		expected,						\
+		"__alloc_size() not working with __bos on " name "\n")
+
+#if !__has_builtin(__builtin_dynamic_object_size)
+#define KUNIT_EXPECT_BDOS(test, p, expected, name)			\
+	/* Silence "unused variable 'expected'" warning. */		\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, expected, expected)
+#else
+#define KUNIT_EXPECT_BDOS(test, p, expected, name)			\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test, __builtin_dynamic_object_size(p, 1),	\
+		expected,						\
+		"__alloc_size() not working with __bdos on " name "\n")
+#endif
+
+/* If the execpted size is a constant value, __bos can see it. */
+#define check_const(_expected, alloc, free)		do {		\
+	size_t expected = (_expected);					\
+	void *p = alloc;						\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE_MSG(test, p != NULL, #alloc " failed?!\n");	\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_BOS(test, p, expected, #alloc);			\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_BDOS(test, p, expected, #alloc);			\
+	free;								\
+} while (0)
+
+/* If the execpted size is NOT a constant value, __bos CANNOT see it. */
+#define check_dynamic(_expected, alloc, free)		do {		\
+	size_t expected = (_expected);					\
+	void *p = alloc;						\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE_MSG(test, p != NULL, #alloc " failed?!\n");	\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_BOS(test, p, SIZE_MAX, #alloc);			\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_BDOS(test, p, expected, #alloc);			\
+	free;								\
+} while (0)
+
+/* Assortment of constant-value kinda-edge cases. */
+#define CONST_TEST_BODY(TEST_alloc)	do {				\
+	/* Special-case vmalloc()-family to skip 0-sized allocs. */	\
+	if (strcmp(#TEST_alloc, "TEST_vmalloc") != 0)			\
+		TEST_alloc(check_const, 0, 0);				\
+	TEST_alloc(check_const, 1, 1);					\
+	TEST_alloc(check_const, 128, 128);				\
+	TEST_alloc(check_const, 1023, 1023);				\
+	TEST_alloc(check_const, 1025, 1025);				\
+	TEST_alloc(check_const, 4096, 4096);				\
+	TEST_alloc(check_const, 4097, 4097);				\
+} while (0)
+
+static volatile size_t zero_size;
+static volatile size_t unknown_size = 50;
+
+#if !__has_builtin(__builtin_dynamic_object_size)
+#define DYNAMIC_TEST_BODY(TEST_alloc)					\
+	kunit_skip(test, "Compiler is missing __builtin_dynamic_object_size() support\n")
+#else
+#define DYNAMIC_TEST_BODY(TEST_alloc)	do {				\
+	size_t size = unknown_size;					\
+									\
+	/*								\
+	 * Expected size is "size" in each test, before it is then	\
+	 * internally incremented in each test.	Requires we disable	\
+	 * -Wunsequenced.						\
+	 */								\
+	TEST_alloc(check_dynamic, size, size++);			\
+	/* Make sure incrementing actually happened. */			\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_NE(test, size, unknown_size);			\
+} while (0)
+#endif
+
+#define DEFINE_ALLOC_SIZE_TEST_PAIR(allocator)				\
+static void alloc_size_##allocator##_const_test(struct kunit *test)	\
+{									\
+	CONST_TEST_BODY(TEST_##allocator);				\
+}									\
+static void alloc_size_##allocator##_dynamic_test(struct kunit *test)	\
+{									\
+	DYNAMIC_TEST_BODY(TEST_##allocator);				\
+}
+
+#define TEST_kmalloc(checker, expected_size, alloc_size)	do {	\
+	gfp_t gfp = GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN;				\
+	void *orig;							\
+	size_t len;							\
+									\
+	checker(expected_size, kmalloc(alloc_size, gfp),		\
+		kfree(p));						\
+	checker(expected_size,						\
+		kmalloc_node(alloc_size, gfp, NUMA_NO_NODE),		\
+		kfree(p));						\
+	checker(expected_size, kzalloc(alloc_size, gfp),		\
+		kfree(p));						\
+	checker(expected_size,						\
+		kzalloc_node(alloc_size, gfp, NUMA_NO_NODE),		\
+		kfree(p));						\
+	checker(expected_size, kcalloc(1, alloc_size, gfp),		\
+		kfree(p));						\
+	checker(expected_size, kcalloc(alloc_size, 1, gfp),		\
+		kfree(p));						\
+	checker(expected_size,						\
+		kcalloc_node(1, alloc_size, gfp, NUMA_NO_NODE),		\
+		kfree(p));						\
+	checker(expected_size,						\
+		kcalloc_node(alloc_size, 1, gfp, NUMA_NO_NODE),		\
+		kfree(p));						\
+	checker(expected_size, kmalloc_array(1, alloc_size, gfp),	\
+		kfree(p));						\
+	checker(expected_size, kmalloc_array(alloc_size, 1, gfp),	\
+		kfree(p));						\
+	checker(expected_size,						\
+		kmalloc_array_node(1, alloc_size, gfp, NUMA_NO_NODE),	\
+		kfree(p));						\
+	checker(expected_size,						\
+		kmalloc_array_node(alloc_size, 1, gfp, NUMA_NO_NODE),	\
+		kfree(p));						\
+	checker(expected_size, __kmalloc(alloc_size, gfp),		\
+		kfree(p));						\
+	checker(expected_size,						\
+		__kmalloc_node(alloc_size, gfp, NUMA_NO_NODE),		\
+		kfree(p));						\
+									\
+	orig = kmalloc(alloc_size, gfp);				\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, orig != NULL);				\
+	checker((expected_size) * 2,					\
+		krealloc(orig, (alloc_size) * 2, gfp),			\
+		kfree(p));						\
+	orig = kmalloc(alloc_size, gfp);				\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, orig != NULL);				\
+	checker((expected_size) * 2,					\
+		krealloc_array(orig, 1, (alloc_size) * 2, gfp),		\
+		kfree(p));						\
+	orig = kmalloc(alloc_size, gfp);				\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, orig != NULL);				\
+	checker((expected_size) * 2,					\
+		krealloc_array(orig, (alloc_size) * 2, 1, gfp),		\
+		kfree(p));						\
+									\
+	len = 11;							\
+	/* Using memdup() with fixed size, so force unknown length. */	\
+	if (!__builtin_constant_p(expected_size))			\
+		len += zero_size;					\
+	checker(len, kmemdup("hello there", len, gfp), kfree(p));	\
+} while (0)
+DEFINE_ALLOC_SIZE_TEST_PAIR(kmalloc)
+
+/* Sizes are in pages, not bytes. */
+#define TEST_vmalloc(checker, expected_pages, alloc_pages)	do {	\
+	gfp_t gfp = GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN;				\
+	checker((expected_pages) * PAGE_SIZE,				\
+		vmalloc((alloc_pages) * PAGE_SIZE),	   vfree(p));	\
+	checker((expected_pages) * PAGE_SIZE,				\
+		vzalloc((alloc_pages) * PAGE_SIZE),	   vfree(p));	\
+	checker((expected_pages) * PAGE_SIZE,				\
+		__vmalloc((alloc_pages) * PAGE_SIZE, gfp), vfree(p));	\
+} while (0)
+DEFINE_ALLOC_SIZE_TEST_PAIR(vmalloc)
+
+/* Sizes are in pages (and open-coded for side-effects), not bytes. */
+#define TEST_kvmalloc(checker, expected_pages, alloc_pages)	do {	\
+	gfp_t gfp = GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN;				\
+	size_t prev_size;						\
+	void *orig;							\
+									\
+	checker((expected_pages) * PAGE_SIZE,				\
+		kvmalloc((alloc_pages) * PAGE_SIZE, gfp),		\
+		vfree(p));						\
+	checker((expected_pages) * PAGE_SIZE,				\
+		kvmalloc_node((alloc_pages) * PAGE_SIZE, gfp, NUMA_NO_NODE), \
+		vfree(p));						\
+	checker((expected_pages) * PAGE_SIZE,				\
+		kvzalloc((alloc_pages) * PAGE_SIZE, gfp),		\
+		vfree(p));						\
+	checker((expected_pages) * PAGE_SIZE,				\
+		kvzalloc_node((alloc_pages) * PAGE_SIZE, gfp, NUMA_NO_NODE), \
+		vfree(p));						\
+	checker((expected_pages) * PAGE_SIZE,				\
+		kvcalloc(1, (alloc_pages) * PAGE_SIZE, gfp),		\
+		vfree(p));						\
+	checker((expected_pages) * PAGE_SIZE,				\
+		kvcalloc((alloc_pages) * PAGE_SIZE, 1, gfp),		\
+		vfree(p));						\
+	checker((expected_pages) * PAGE_SIZE,				\
+		kvmalloc_array(1, (alloc_pages) * PAGE_SIZE, gfp),	\
+		vfree(p));						\
+	checker((expected_pages) * PAGE_SIZE,				\
+		kvmalloc_array((alloc_pages) * PAGE_SIZE, 1, gfp),	\
+		vfree(p));						\
+									\
+	prev_size = (expected_pages) * PAGE_SIZE;			\
+	orig = kvmalloc(prev_size, gfp);				\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, orig != NULL);				\
+	checker(((expected_pages) * PAGE_SIZE) * 2,			\
+		kvrealloc(orig, prev_size,				\
+			  ((alloc_pages) * PAGE_SIZE) * 2, gfp),	\
+		kvfree(p));						\
+} while (0)
+DEFINE_ALLOC_SIZE_TEST_PAIR(kvmalloc)
+
+#define TEST_devm_kmalloc(checker, expected_size, alloc_size)	do {	\
+	gfp_t gfp = GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN;				\
+	const char dev_name[] = "fortify-test";				\
+	struct device *dev;						\
+	void *orig;							\
+	size_t len;							\
+									\
+	/* Create dummy device for devm_kmalloc()-family tests. */	\
+	dev = root_device_register(dev_name);				\
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_FALSE_MSG(test, IS_ERR(dev),			\
+			       "Cannot register test device\n");	\
+									\
+	checker(expected_size, devm_kmalloc(dev, alloc_size, gfp),	\
+		devm_kfree(dev, p));					\
+	checker(expected_size, devm_kzalloc(dev, alloc_size, gfp),	\
+		devm_kfree(dev, p));					\
+	checker(expected_size,						\
+		devm_kmalloc_array(dev, 1, alloc_size, gfp),		\
+		devm_kfree(dev, p));					\
+	checker(expected_size,						\
+		devm_kmalloc_array(dev, alloc_size, 1, gfp),		\
+		devm_kfree(dev, p));					\
+	checker(expected_size,						\
+		devm_kcalloc(dev, 1, alloc_size, gfp),			\
+		devm_kfree(dev, p));					\
+	checker(expected_size,						\
+		devm_kcalloc(dev, alloc_size, 1, gfp),			\
+		devm_kfree(dev, p));					\
+									\
+	orig = devm_kmalloc(dev, alloc_size, gfp);			\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, orig != NULL);				\
+	checker((expected_size) * 2,					\
+		devm_krealloc(dev, orig, (alloc_size) * 2, gfp),	\
+		devm_kfree(dev, p));					\
+									\
+	len = 4;							\
+	/* Using memdup() with fixed size, so force unknown length. */	\
+	if (!__builtin_constant_p(expected_size))			\
+		len += zero_size;					\
+	checker(len, devm_kmemdup(dev, "Ohai", len, gfp),		\
+		devm_kfree(dev, p));					\
+									\
+	device_unregister(dev);						\
+} while (0)
+DEFINE_ALLOC_SIZE_TEST_PAIR(devm_kmalloc)
+
 static struct kunit_case fortify_test_cases[] = {
 	KUNIT_CASE(known_sizes_test),
 	KUNIT_CASE(control_flow_split_test),
+	KUNIT_CASE(alloc_size_kmalloc_const_test),
+	KUNIT_CASE(alloc_size_kmalloc_dynamic_test),
+	KUNIT_CASE(alloc_size_vmalloc_const_test),
+	KUNIT_CASE(alloc_size_vmalloc_dynamic_test),
+	KUNIT_CASE(alloc_size_kvmalloc_const_test),
+	KUNIT_CASE(alloc_size_kvmalloc_dynamic_test),
+	KUNIT_CASE(alloc_size_devm_kmalloc_const_test),
+	KUNIT_CASE(alloc_size_devm_kmalloc_dynamic_test),
 	{}
 };
 
diff --git a/lib/memcpy_kunit.c b/lib/memcpy_kunit.c
index 7513e6d5dc90..89128551448d 100644
--- a/lib/memcpy_kunit.c
+++ b/lib/memcpy_kunit.c
@@ -292,6 +292,208 @@ static void memset_test(struct kunit *test)
 #undef TEST_OP
 }
 
+static u8 large_src[1024];
+static u8 large_dst[2048];
+static const u8 large_zero[2048];
+
+static void set_random_nonzero(struct kunit *test, u8 *byte)
+{
+	int failed_rng = 0;
+
+	while (*byte == 0) {
+		get_random_bytes(byte, 1);
+		KUNIT_ASSERT_LT_MSG(test, failed_rng++, 100,
+				    "Is the RNG broken?");
+	}
+}
+
+static void init_large(struct kunit *test)
+{
+
+	/* Get many bit patterns. */
+	get_random_bytes(large_src, ARRAY_SIZE(large_src));
+
+	/* Make sure we have non-zero edges. */
+	set_random_nonzero(test, &large_src[0]);
+	set_random_nonzero(test, &large_src[ARRAY_SIZE(large_src) - 1]);
+
+	/* Explicitly zero the entire destination. */
+	memset(large_dst, 0, ARRAY_SIZE(large_dst));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Instead of an indirect function call for "copy" or a giant macro,
+ * use a bool to pick memcpy or memmove.
+ */
+static void copy_large_test(struct kunit *test, bool use_memmove)
+{
+	init_large(test);
+
+	/* Copy a growing number of non-overlapping bytes ... */
+	for (int bytes = 1; bytes <= ARRAY_SIZE(large_src); bytes++) {
+		/* Over a shifting destination window ... */
+		for (int offset = 0; offset < ARRAY_SIZE(large_src); offset++) {
+			int right_zero_pos = offset + bytes;
+			int right_zero_size = ARRAY_SIZE(large_dst) - right_zero_pos;
+
+			/* Copy! */
+			if (use_memmove)
+				memmove(large_dst + offset, large_src, bytes);
+			else
+				memcpy(large_dst + offset, large_src, bytes);
+
+			/* Did we touch anything before the copy area? */
+			KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ_MSG(test,
+				memcmp(large_dst, large_zero, offset), 0,
+				"with size %d at offset %d", bytes, offset);
+			/* Did we touch anything after the copy area? */
+			KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ_MSG(test,
+				memcmp(&large_dst[right_zero_pos], large_zero, right_zero_size), 0,
+				"with size %d at offset %d", bytes, offset);
+
+			/* Are we byte-for-byte exact across the copy? */
+			KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ_MSG(test,
+				memcmp(large_dst + offset, large_src, bytes), 0,
+				"with size %d at offset %d", bytes, offset);
+
+			/* Zero out what we copied for the next cycle. */
+			memset(large_dst + offset, 0, bytes);
+		}
+		/* Avoid stall warnings if this loop gets slow. */
+		cond_resched();
+	}
+}
+
+static void memcpy_large_test(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	copy_large_test(test, false);
+}
+
+static void memmove_large_test(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	copy_large_test(test, true);
+}
+
+/*
+ * On the assumption that boundary conditions are going to be the most
+ * sensitive, instead of taking a full step (inc) each iteration,
+ * take single index steps for at least the first "inc"-many indexes
+ * from the "start" and at least the last "inc"-many indexes before
+ * the "end". When in the middle, take full "inc"-wide steps. For
+ * example, calling next_step(idx, 1, 15, 3) with idx starting at 0
+ * would see the following pattern: 1 2 3 4 7 10 11 12 13 14 15.
+ */
+static int next_step(int idx, int start, int end, int inc)
+{
+	start += inc;
+	end -= inc;
+
+	if (idx < start || idx + inc > end)
+		inc = 1;
+	return idx + inc;
+}
+
+static void inner_loop(struct kunit *test, int bytes, int d_off, int s_off)
+{
+	int left_zero_pos, left_zero_size;
+	int right_zero_pos, right_zero_size;
+	int src_pos, src_orig_pos, src_size;
+	int pos;
+
+	/* Place the source in the destination buffer. */
+	memcpy(&large_dst[s_off], large_src, bytes);
+
+	/* Copy to destination offset. */
+	memmove(&large_dst[d_off], &large_dst[s_off], bytes);
+
+	/* Make sure destination entirely matches. */
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ_MSG(test, memcmp(&large_dst[d_off], large_src, bytes), 0,
+		"with size %d at src offset %d and dest offset %d",
+		bytes, s_off, d_off);
+
+	/* Calculate the expected zero spans. */
+	if (s_off < d_off) {
+		left_zero_pos = 0;
+		left_zero_size = s_off;
+
+		right_zero_pos = d_off + bytes;
+		right_zero_size = ARRAY_SIZE(large_dst) - right_zero_pos;
+
+		src_pos = s_off;
+		src_orig_pos = 0;
+		src_size = d_off - s_off;
+	} else {
+		left_zero_pos = 0;
+		left_zero_size = d_off;
+
+		right_zero_pos = s_off + bytes;
+		right_zero_size = ARRAY_SIZE(large_dst) - right_zero_pos;
+
+		src_pos = d_off + bytes;
+		src_orig_pos = src_pos - s_off;
+		src_size = right_zero_pos - src_pos;
+	}
+
+	/* Check non-overlapping source is unchanged.*/
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ_MSG(test,
+		memcmp(&large_dst[src_pos], &large_src[src_orig_pos], src_size), 0,
+		"with size %d at src offset %d and dest offset %d",
+		bytes, s_off, d_off);
+
+	/* Check leading buffer contents are zero. */
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ_MSG(test,
+		memcmp(&large_dst[left_zero_pos], large_zero, left_zero_size), 0,
+		"with size %d at src offset %d and dest offset %d",
+		bytes, s_off, d_off);
+	/* Check trailing buffer contents are zero. */
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ_MSG(test,
+		memcmp(&large_dst[right_zero_pos], large_zero, right_zero_size), 0,
+		"with size %d at src offset %d and dest offset %d",
+		bytes, s_off, d_off);
+
+	/* Zero out everything not already zeroed.*/
+	pos = left_zero_pos + left_zero_size;
+	memset(&large_dst[pos], 0, right_zero_pos - pos);
+}
+
+static void memmove_overlap_test(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Running all possible offset and overlap combinations takes a
+	 * very long time. Instead, only check up to 128 bytes offset
+	 * into the destination buffer (which should result in crossing
+	 * cachelines), with a step size of 1 through 7 to try to skip some
+	 * redundancy.
+	 */
+	static const int offset_max = 128; /* less than ARRAY_SIZE(large_src); */
+	static const int bytes_step = 7;
+	static const int window_step = 7;
+
+	static const int bytes_start = 1;
+	static const int bytes_end = ARRAY_SIZE(large_src) + 1;
+
+	init_large(test);
+
+	/* Copy a growing number of overlapping bytes ... */
+	for (int bytes = bytes_start; bytes < bytes_end;
+	     bytes = next_step(bytes, bytes_start, bytes_end, bytes_step)) {
+
+		/* Over a shifting destination window ... */
+		for (int d_off = 0; d_off < offset_max; d_off++) {
+			int s_start = max(d_off - bytes, 0);
+			int s_end = min_t(int, d_off + bytes, ARRAY_SIZE(large_src));
+
+			/* Over a shifting source window ... */
+			for (int s_off = s_start; s_off < s_end;
+			     s_off = next_step(s_off, s_start, s_end, window_step))
+				inner_loop(test, bytes, d_off, s_off);
+
+			/* Avoid stall warnings. */
+			cond_resched();
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 static void strtomem_test(struct kunit *test)
 {
 	static const char input[sizeof(unsigned long)] = "hi";
@@ -347,7 +549,10 @@ static void strtomem_test(struct kunit *test)
 static struct kunit_case memcpy_test_cases[] = {
 	KUNIT_CASE(memset_test),
 	KUNIT_CASE(memcpy_test),
+	KUNIT_CASE(memcpy_large_test),
 	KUNIT_CASE(memmove_test),
+	KUNIT_CASE(memmove_large_test),
+	KUNIT_CASE(memmove_overlap_test),
 	KUNIT_CASE(strtomem_test),
 	{}
 };
diff --git a/lib/overflow_kunit.c b/lib/overflow_kunit.c
index b8556a2e7bb1..dcd3ba102db6 100644
--- a/lib/overflow_kunit.c
+++ b/lib/overflow_kunit.c
@@ -736,6 +736,384 @@ static void overflow_size_helpers_test(struct kunit *test)
 #undef check_one_size_helper
 }
 
+static void overflows_type_test(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	int count = 0;
+	unsigned int var;
+
+#define __TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(func, arg1, arg2, of)	do {		\
+	bool __of = func(arg1, arg2);					\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test, __of, of,				\
+		"expected " #func "(" #arg1 ", " #arg2 " to%s overflow\n",\
+		of ? "" : " not");					\
+	count++;							\
+} while (0)
+
+/* Args are: first type, second type, value, overflow expected */
+#define TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(__t1, __t2, v, of) do {			\
+	__t1 t1 = (v);							\
+	__t2 t2;							\
+	__TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(__overflows_type, t1, t2, of);		\
+	__TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(__overflows_type, t1, __t2, of);		\
+	__TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(__overflows_type_constexpr, t1, t2, of);	\
+	__TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(__overflows_type_constexpr, t1, __t2, of);\
+} while (0)
+
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u8, u8, U8_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u8, u16, U8_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u8, s8, U8_MAX, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u8, s8, S8_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u8, s8, (u8)S8_MAX + 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u8, s16, U8_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s8, u8, S8_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s8, u8, -1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s8, u8, S8_MIN, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s8, u16, S8_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s8, u16, -1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s8, u16, S8_MIN, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s8, u32, S8_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s8, u32, -1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s8, u32, S8_MIN, true);
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s8, u64, S8_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s8, u64, -1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s8, u64, S8_MIN, true);
+#endif
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s8, s8, S8_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s8, s8, S8_MIN, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s8, s16, S8_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s8, s16, S8_MIN, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u16, u8, U8_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u16, u8, (u16)U8_MAX + 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u16, u8, U16_MAX, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u16, s8, S8_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u16, s8, (u16)S8_MAX + 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u16, s8, U16_MAX, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u16, s16, S16_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u16, s16, (u16)S16_MAX + 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u16, s16, U16_MAX, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u16, u32, U16_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u16, s32, U16_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s16, u8, U8_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s16, u8, (s16)U8_MAX + 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s16, u8, -1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s16, u8, S16_MIN, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s16, u16, S16_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s16, u16, -1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s16, u16, S16_MIN, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s16, u32, S16_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s16, u32, -1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s16, u32, S16_MIN, true);
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s16, u64, S16_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s16, u64, -1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s16, u64, S16_MIN, true);
+#endif
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s16, s8, S8_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s16, s8, S8_MIN, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s16, s8, (s16)S8_MAX + 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s16, s8, (s16)S8_MIN - 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s16, s8, S16_MAX, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s16, s8, S16_MIN, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s16, s16, S16_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s16, s16, S16_MIN, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s16, s32, S16_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s16, s32, S16_MIN, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u32, u8, U8_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u32, u8, (u32)U8_MAX + 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u32, u8, U32_MAX, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u32, s8, S8_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u32, s8, (u32)S8_MAX + 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u32, s8, U32_MAX, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u32, u16, U16_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u32, u16, U16_MAX + 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u32, u16, U32_MAX, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u32, s16, S16_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u32, s16, (u32)S16_MAX + 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u32, s16, U32_MAX, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u32, u32, U32_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u32, s32, S32_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u32, s32, U32_MAX, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u32, s32, (u32)S32_MAX + 1, true);
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u32, u64, U32_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u32, s64, U32_MAX, false);
+#endif
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, u8, U8_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, u8, (s32)U8_MAX + 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, u16, S32_MAX, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, u8, -1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, u8, S32_MIN, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, u16, U16_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, u16, (s32)U16_MAX + 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, u16, S32_MAX, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, u16, -1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, u16, S32_MIN, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, u32, S32_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, u32, -1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, u32, S32_MIN, true);
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, u64, S32_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, u64, -1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, u64, S32_MIN, true);
+#endif
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, s8, S8_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, s8, S8_MIN, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, s8, (s32)S8_MAX + 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, s8, (s32)S8_MIN - 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, s8, S32_MAX, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, s8, S32_MIN, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, s16, S16_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, s16, S16_MIN, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, s16, (s32)S16_MAX + 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, s16, (s32)S16_MIN - 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, s16, S32_MAX, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, s16, S32_MIN, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, s32, S32_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, s32, S32_MIN, false);
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, s64, S32_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s32, s64, S32_MIN, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u64, u8, U64_MAX, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u64, u8, U8_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u64, u8, (u64)U8_MAX + 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u64, u16, U64_MAX, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u64, u16, U16_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u64, u16, (u64)U16_MAX + 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u64, u32, U64_MAX, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u64, u32, U32_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u64, u32, (u64)U32_MAX + 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u64, u64, U64_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u64, s8, S8_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u64, s8, (u64)S8_MAX + 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u64, s8, U64_MAX, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u64, s16, S16_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u64, s16, (u64)S16_MAX + 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u64, s16, U64_MAX, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u64, s32, S32_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u64, s32, (u64)S32_MAX + 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u64, s32, U64_MAX, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u64, s64, S64_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u64, s64, U64_MAX, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(u64, s64, (u64)S64_MAX + 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, u8, S64_MAX, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, u8, S64_MIN, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, u8, -1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, u8, U8_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, u8, (s64)U8_MAX + 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, u16, S64_MAX, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, u16, S64_MIN, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, u16, -1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, u16, U16_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, u16, (s64)U16_MAX + 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, u32, S64_MAX, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, u32, S64_MIN, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, u32, -1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, u32, U32_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, u32, (s64)U32_MAX + 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, u64, S64_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, u64, S64_MIN, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, u64, -1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, s8, S8_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, s8, S8_MIN, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, s8, (s64)S8_MAX + 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, s8, (s64)S8_MIN - 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, s8, S64_MAX, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, s16, S16_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, s16, S16_MIN, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, s16, (s64)S16_MAX + 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, s16, (s64)S16_MIN - 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, s16, S64_MAX, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, s32, S32_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, s32, S32_MIN, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, s32, (s64)S32_MAX + 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, s32, (s64)S32_MIN - 1, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, s32, S64_MAX, true);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, s64, S64_MAX, false);
+	TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(s64, s64, S64_MIN, false);
+#endif
+
+	/* Check for macro side-effects. */
+	var = INT_MAX - 1;
+	__TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(__overflows_type, var++, int, false);
+	__TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(__overflows_type, var++, int, false);
+	__TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(__overflows_type, var++, int, true);
+	var = INT_MAX - 1;
+	__TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(overflows_type, var++, int, false);
+	__TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(overflows_type, var++, int, false);
+	__TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE(overflows_type, var++, int, true);
+
+	kunit_info(test, "%d overflows_type() tests finished\n", count);
+#undef TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE
+#undef __TEST_OVERFLOWS_TYPE
+}
+
+static void same_type_test(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	int count = 0;
+	int var;
+
+#define TEST_SAME_TYPE(t1, t2, same)			do {	\
+	typeof(t1) __t1h = type_max(t1);			\
+	typeof(t1) __t1l = type_min(t1);			\
+	typeof(t2) __t2h = type_max(t2);			\
+	typeof(t2) __t2l = type_min(t2);			\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, true, __same_type(t1, __t1h));	\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, true, __same_type(t1, __t1l));	\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, true, __same_type(__t1h, t1));	\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, true, __same_type(__t1l, t1));	\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, true, __same_type(t2, __t2h));	\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, true, __same_type(t2, __t2l));	\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, true, __same_type(__t2h, t2));	\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, true, __same_type(__t2l, t2));	\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, same, __same_type(t1, t2));	\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, same, __same_type(t2, __t1h));	\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, same, __same_type(t2, __t1l));	\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, same, __same_type(__t1h, t2));	\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, same, __same_type(__t1l, t2));	\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, same, __same_type(t1, __t2h));	\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, same, __same_type(t1, __t2l));	\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, same, __same_type(__t2h, t1));	\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, same, __same_type(__t2l, t1));	\
+} while (0)
+
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+# define TEST_SAME_TYPE64(base, t, m)	TEST_SAME_TYPE(base, t, m)
+#else
+# define TEST_SAME_TYPE64(base, t, m)	do { } while (0)
+#endif
+
+#define TEST_TYPE_SETS(base, mu8, mu16, mu32, ms8, ms16, ms32, mu64, ms64) \
+do {									\
+	TEST_SAME_TYPE(base,  u8,  mu8);				\
+	TEST_SAME_TYPE(base, u16, mu16);				\
+	TEST_SAME_TYPE(base, u32, mu32);				\
+	TEST_SAME_TYPE(base,  s8,  ms8);				\
+	TEST_SAME_TYPE(base, s16, ms16);				\
+	TEST_SAME_TYPE(base, s32, ms32);				\
+	TEST_SAME_TYPE64(base, u64, mu64);				\
+	TEST_SAME_TYPE64(base, s64, ms64);				\
+} while (0)
+
+	TEST_TYPE_SETS(u8,   true, false, false, false, false, false, false, false);
+	TEST_TYPE_SETS(u16, false,  true, false, false, false, false, false, false);
+	TEST_TYPE_SETS(u32, false, false,  true, false, false, false, false, false);
+	TEST_TYPE_SETS(s8,  false, false, false,  true, false, false, false, false);
+	TEST_TYPE_SETS(s16, false, false, false, false,  true, false, false, false);
+	TEST_TYPE_SETS(s32, false, false, false, false, false,  true, false, false);
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+	TEST_TYPE_SETS(u64, false, false, false, false, false, false,  true, false);
+	TEST_TYPE_SETS(s64, false, false, false, false, false, false, false,  true);
+#endif
+
+	/* Check for macro side-effects. */
+	var = 4;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, var, 4);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, __same_type(var++, int));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, var, 4);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, __same_type(int, var++));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, var, 4);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, __same_type(var++, var++));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, var, 4);
+
+	kunit_info(test, "%d __same_type() tests finished\n", count);
+
+#undef TEST_TYPE_SETS
+#undef TEST_SAME_TYPE64
+#undef TEST_SAME_TYPE
+}
+
+static void castable_to_type_test(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	int count = 0;
+
+#define TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(arg1, arg2, pass)	do {	\
+	bool __pass = castable_to_type(arg1, arg2);		\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test, __pass, pass,			\
+		"expected castable_to_type(" #arg1 ", " #arg2 ") to%s pass\n",\
+		pass ? "" : " not");				\
+	count++;						\
+} while (0)
+
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(16, u8, true);
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(16, u16, true);
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(16, u32, true);
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(16, s8, true);
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(16, s16, true);
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(16, s32, true);
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(-16, s8, true);
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(-16, s16, true);
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(-16, s32, true);
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(16, u64, true);
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(-16, s64, true);
+#endif
+
+#define TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE_VAR(width)	do {				\
+	u ## width u ## width ## var = 0;					\
+	s ## width s ## width ## var = 0;					\
+										\
+	/* Constant expressions that fit types. */				\
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(type_max(u ## width), u ## width, true);		\
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(type_min(u ## width), u ## width, true);		\
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(type_max(u ## width), u ## width ## var, true);	\
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(type_min(u ## width), u ## width ## var, true);	\
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(type_max(s ## width), s ## width, true);		\
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(type_min(s ## width), s ## width, true);		\
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(type_max(s ## width), s ## width ## var, true);	\
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(type_min(u ## width), s ## width ## var, true);	\
+	/* Constant expressions that do not fit types. */			\
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(type_max(u ## width), s ## width, false);		\
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(type_max(u ## width), s ## width ## var, false);	\
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(type_min(s ## width), u ## width, false);		\
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(type_min(s ## width), u ## width ## var, false);	\
+	/* Non-constant expression with mismatched type. */			\
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(s ## width ## var, u ## width, false);		\
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(u ## width ## var, s ## width, false);		\
+} while (0)
+
+#define TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE_RANGE(width)	do {				\
+	unsigned long big = U ## width ## _MAX;					\
+	signed long small = S ## width ## _MIN;					\
+	u ## width u ## width ## var = 0;					\
+	s ## width s ## width ## var = 0;					\
+										\
+	/* Constant expression in range. */					\
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(U ## width ## _MAX, u ## width, true);		\
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(U ## width ## _MAX, u ## width ## var, true);	\
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(S ## width ## _MIN, s ## width, true);		\
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(S ## width ## _MIN, s ## width ## var, true);	\
+	/* Constant expression out of range. */					\
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE((unsigned long)U ## width ## _MAX + 1, u ## width, false); \
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE((unsigned long)U ## width ## _MAX + 1, u ## width ## var, false); \
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE((signed long)S ## width ## _MIN - 1, s ## width, false); \
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE((signed long)S ## width ## _MIN - 1, s ## width ## var, false); \
+	/* Non-constant expression with mismatched type. */			\
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(big, u ## width, false);				\
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(big, u ## width ## var, false);			\
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(small, s ## width, false);			\
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE(small, s ## width ## var, false);			\
+} while (0)
+
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE_VAR(8);
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE_VAR(16);
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE_VAR(32);
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE_VAR(64);
+#endif
+
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE_RANGE(8);
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE_RANGE(16);
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+	TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE_RANGE(32);
+#endif
+	kunit_info(test, "%d castable_to_type() tests finished\n", count);
+
+#undef TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE_RANGE
+#undef TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE_VAR
+#undef TEST_CASTABLE_TO_TYPE
+}
+
 static struct kunit_case overflow_test_cases[] = {
 	KUNIT_CASE(u8_u8__u8_overflow_test),
 	KUNIT_CASE(s8_s8__s8_overflow_test),
@@ -755,6 +1133,9 @@ static struct kunit_case overflow_test_cases[] = {
 	KUNIT_CASE(shift_nonsense_test),
 	KUNIT_CASE(overflow_allocation_test),
 	KUNIT_CASE(overflow_size_helpers_test),
+	KUNIT_CASE(overflows_type_test),
+	KUNIT_CASE(same_type_test),
+	KUNIT_CASE(castable_to_type_test),
 	{}
 };
 
diff --git a/lib/test_siphash.c b/lib/siphash_kunit.c
index a96788d0141d..a3c697e8be35 100644
--- a/lib/test_siphash.c
+++ b/lib/siphash_kunit.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
 
+#include <kunit/test.h>
 #include <linux/siphash.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
@@ -109,114 +110,88 @@ static const u32 test_vectors_hsiphash[64] = {
 };
 #endif
 
-static int __init siphash_test_init(void)
+#define chk(hash, vector, fmt...)			\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test, hash, vector, fmt)
+
+static void siphash_test(struct kunit *test)
 {
 	u8 in[64] __aligned(SIPHASH_ALIGNMENT);
 	u8 in_unaligned[65] __aligned(SIPHASH_ALIGNMENT);
 	u8 i;
-	int ret = 0;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < 64; ++i) {
 		in[i] = i;
 		in_unaligned[i + 1] = i;
-		if (siphash(in, i, &test_key_siphash) !=
-						test_vectors_siphash[i]) {
-			pr_info("siphash self-test aligned %u: FAIL\n", i + 1);
-			ret = -EINVAL;
-		}
-		if (siphash(in_unaligned + 1, i, &test_key_siphash) !=
-						test_vectors_siphash[i]) {
-			pr_info("siphash self-test unaligned %u: FAIL\n", i + 1);
-			ret = -EINVAL;
-		}
-		if (hsiphash(in, i, &test_key_hsiphash) !=
-						test_vectors_hsiphash[i]) {
-			pr_info("hsiphash self-test aligned %u: FAIL\n", i + 1);
-			ret = -EINVAL;
-		}
-		if (hsiphash(in_unaligned + 1, i, &test_key_hsiphash) !=
-						test_vectors_hsiphash[i]) {
-			pr_info("hsiphash self-test unaligned %u: FAIL\n", i + 1);
-			ret = -EINVAL;
-		}
-	}
-	if (siphash_1u64(0x0706050403020100ULL, &test_key_siphash) !=
-						test_vectors_siphash[8]) {
-		pr_info("siphash self-test 1u64: FAIL\n");
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-	}
-	if (siphash_2u64(0x0706050403020100ULL, 0x0f0e0d0c0b0a0908ULL,
-			 &test_key_siphash) != test_vectors_siphash[16]) {
-		pr_info("siphash self-test 2u64: FAIL\n");
-		ret = -EINVAL;
+		chk(siphash(in, i, &test_key_siphash),
+		    test_vectors_siphash[i],
+		    "siphash self-test aligned %u: FAIL", i + 1);
+		chk(siphash(in_unaligned + 1, i, &test_key_siphash),
+		    test_vectors_siphash[i],
+		    "siphash self-test unaligned %u: FAIL", i + 1);
+		chk(hsiphash(in, i, &test_key_hsiphash),
+		    test_vectors_hsiphash[i],
+		    "hsiphash self-test aligned %u: FAIL", i + 1);
+		chk(hsiphash(in_unaligned + 1, i, &test_key_hsiphash),
+		    test_vectors_hsiphash[i],
+		    "hsiphash self-test unaligned %u: FAIL", i + 1);
 	}
-	if (siphash_3u64(0x0706050403020100ULL, 0x0f0e0d0c0b0a0908ULL,
-			 0x1716151413121110ULL, &test_key_siphash) !=
-						test_vectors_siphash[24]) {
-		pr_info("siphash self-test 3u64: FAIL\n");
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-	}
-	if (siphash_4u64(0x0706050403020100ULL, 0x0f0e0d0c0b0a0908ULL,
+	chk(siphash_1u64(0x0706050403020100ULL, &test_key_siphash),
+	    test_vectors_siphash[8],
+	    "siphash self-test 1u64: FAIL");
+	chk(siphash_2u64(0x0706050403020100ULL, 0x0f0e0d0c0b0a0908ULL,
+			 &test_key_siphash),
+	    test_vectors_siphash[16],
+	    "siphash self-test 2u64: FAIL");
+	chk(siphash_3u64(0x0706050403020100ULL, 0x0f0e0d0c0b0a0908ULL,
+			 0x1716151413121110ULL, &test_key_siphash),
+	    test_vectors_siphash[24],
+	    "siphash self-test 3u64: FAIL");
+	chk(siphash_4u64(0x0706050403020100ULL, 0x0f0e0d0c0b0a0908ULL,
 			 0x1716151413121110ULL, 0x1f1e1d1c1b1a1918ULL,
-			 &test_key_siphash) != test_vectors_siphash[32]) {
-		pr_info("siphash self-test 4u64: FAIL\n");
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-	}
-	if (siphash_1u32(0x03020100U, &test_key_siphash) !=
-						test_vectors_siphash[4]) {
-		pr_info("siphash self-test 1u32: FAIL\n");
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-	}
-	if (siphash_2u32(0x03020100U, 0x07060504U, &test_key_siphash) !=
-						test_vectors_siphash[8]) {
-		pr_info("siphash self-test 2u32: FAIL\n");
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-	}
-	if (siphash_3u32(0x03020100U, 0x07060504U,
-			 0x0b0a0908U, &test_key_siphash) !=
-						test_vectors_siphash[12]) {
-		pr_info("siphash self-test 3u32: FAIL\n");
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-	}
-	if (siphash_4u32(0x03020100U, 0x07060504U,
-			 0x0b0a0908U, 0x0f0e0d0cU, &test_key_siphash) !=
-						test_vectors_siphash[16]) {
-		pr_info("siphash self-test 4u32: FAIL\n");
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-	}
-	if (hsiphash_1u32(0x03020100U, &test_key_hsiphash) !=
-						test_vectors_hsiphash[4]) {
-		pr_info("hsiphash self-test 1u32: FAIL\n");
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-	}
-	if (hsiphash_2u32(0x03020100U, 0x07060504U, &test_key_hsiphash) !=
-						test_vectors_hsiphash[8]) {
-		pr_info("hsiphash self-test 2u32: FAIL\n");
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-	}
-	if (hsiphash_3u32(0x03020100U, 0x07060504U,
-			  0x0b0a0908U, &test_key_hsiphash) !=
-						test_vectors_hsiphash[12]) {
-		pr_info("hsiphash self-test 3u32: FAIL\n");
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-	}
-	if (hsiphash_4u32(0x03020100U, 0x07060504U,
-			  0x0b0a0908U, 0x0f0e0d0cU, &test_key_hsiphash) !=
-						test_vectors_hsiphash[16]) {
-		pr_info("hsiphash self-test 4u32: FAIL\n");
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-	}
-	if (!ret)
-		pr_info("self-tests: pass\n");
-	return ret;
+			 &test_key_siphash),
+	    test_vectors_siphash[32],
+	    "siphash self-test 4u64: FAIL");
+	chk(siphash_1u32(0x03020100U, &test_key_siphash),
+	    test_vectors_siphash[4],
+	    "siphash self-test 1u32: FAIL");
+	chk(siphash_2u32(0x03020100U, 0x07060504U, &test_key_siphash),
+	    test_vectors_siphash[8],
+	    "siphash self-test 2u32: FAIL");
+	chk(siphash_3u32(0x03020100U, 0x07060504U,
+			 0x0b0a0908U, &test_key_siphash),
+	    test_vectors_siphash[12],
+	    "siphash self-test 3u32: FAIL");
+	chk(siphash_4u32(0x03020100U, 0x07060504U,
+			 0x0b0a0908U, 0x0f0e0d0cU, &test_key_siphash),
+	    test_vectors_siphash[16],
+	    "siphash self-test 4u32: FAIL");
+	chk(hsiphash_1u32(0x03020100U, &test_key_hsiphash),
+	    test_vectors_hsiphash[4],
+	    "hsiphash self-test 1u32: FAIL");
+	chk(hsiphash_2u32(0x03020100U, 0x07060504U, &test_key_hsiphash),
+	    test_vectors_hsiphash[8],
+	    "hsiphash self-test 2u32: FAIL");
+	chk(hsiphash_3u32(0x03020100U, 0x07060504U,
+			  0x0b0a0908U, &test_key_hsiphash),
+	    test_vectors_hsiphash[12],
+	    "hsiphash self-test 3u32: FAIL");
+	chk(hsiphash_4u32(0x03020100U, 0x07060504U,
+			  0x0b0a0908U, 0x0f0e0d0cU, &test_key_hsiphash),
+	    test_vectors_hsiphash[16],
+	    "hsiphash self-test 4u32: FAIL");
 }
 
-static void __exit siphash_test_exit(void)
-{
-}
+static struct kunit_case siphash_test_cases[] = {
+	KUNIT_CASE(siphash_test),
+	{}
+};
+
+static struct kunit_suite siphash_test_suite = {
+	.name = "siphash",
+	.test_cases = siphash_test_cases,
+};
 
-module_init(siphash_test_init);
-module_exit(siphash_test_exit);
+kunit_test_suite(siphash_test_suite);
 
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>");
 MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL");
diff --git a/lib/string.c b/lib/string.c
index 3371d26a0e39..4fb566ea610f 100644
--- a/lib/string.c
+++ b/lib/string.c
@@ -76,11 +76,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(strcasecmp);
 #endif
 
 #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRCPY
-/**
- * strcpy - Copy a %NUL terminated string
- * @dest: Where to copy the string to
- * @src: Where to copy the string from
- */
 char *strcpy(char *dest, const char *src)
 {
 	char *tmp = dest;
@@ -93,19 +88,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(strcpy);
 #endif
 
 #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRNCPY
-/**
- * strncpy - Copy a length-limited, C-string
- * @dest: Where to copy the string to
- * @src: Where to copy the string from
- * @count: The maximum number of bytes to copy
- *
- * The result is not %NUL-terminated if the source exceeds
- * @count bytes.
- *
- * In the case where the length of @src is less than  that  of
- * count, the remainder of @dest will be padded with %NUL.
- *
- */
 char *strncpy(char *dest, const char *src, size_t count)
 {
 	char *tmp = dest;
@@ -122,17 +104,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(strncpy);
 #endif
 
 #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRLCPY
-/**
- * strlcpy - Copy a C-string into a sized buffer
- * @dest: Where to copy the string to
- * @src: Where to copy the string from
- * @size: size of destination buffer
- *
- * Compatible with ``*BSD``: the result is always a valid
- * NUL-terminated string that fits in the buffer (unless,
- * of course, the buffer size is zero). It does not pad
- * out the result like strncpy() does.
- */
 size_t strlcpy(char *dest, const char *src, size_t size)
 {
 	size_t ret = strlen(src);
@@ -148,30 +119,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(strlcpy);
 #endif
 
 #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRSCPY
-/**
- * strscpy - Copy a C-string into a sized buffer
- * @dest: Where to copy the string to
- * @src: Where to copy the string from
- * @count: Size of destination buffer
- *
- * Copy the string, or as much of it as fits, into the dest buffer.  The
- * behavior is undefined if the string buffers overlap.  The destination
- * buffer is always NUL terminated, unless it's zero-sized.
- *
- * Preferred to strlcpy() since the API doesn't require reading memory
- * from the src string beyond the specified "count" bytes, and since
- * the return value is easier to error-check than strlcpy()'s.
- * In addition, the implementation is robust to the string changing out
- * from underneath it, unlike the current strlcpy() implementation.
- *
- * Preferred to strncpy() since it always returns a valid string, and
- * doesn't unnecessarily force the tail of the destination buffer to be
- * zeroed.  If zeroing is desired please use strscpy_pad().
- *
- * Returns:
- * * The number of characters copied (not including the trailing %NUL)
- * * -E2BIG if count is 0 or @src was truncated.
- */
 ssize_t strscpy(char *dest, const char *src, size_t count)
 {
 	const struct word_at_a_time constants = WORD_AT_A_TIME_CONSTANTS;
@@ -266,11 +213,6 @@ char *stpcpy(char *__restrict__ dest, const char *__restrict__ src)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(stpcpy);
 
 #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRCAT
-/**
- * strcat - Append one %NUL-terminated string to another
- * @dest: The string to be appended to
- * @src: The string to append to it
- */
 char *strcat(char *dest, const char *src)
 {
 	char *tmp = dest;
@@ -285,15 +227,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(strcat);
 #endif
 
 #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRNCAT
-/**
- * strncat - Append a length-limited, C-string to another
- * @dest: The string to be appended to
- * @src: The string to append to it
- * @count: The maximum numbers of bytes to copy
- *
- * Note that in contrast to strncpy(), strncat() ensures the result is
- * terminated.
- */
 char *strncat(char *dest, const char *src, size_t count)
 {
 	char *tmp = dest;
@@ -314,12 +247,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(strncat);
 #endif
 
 #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRLCAT
-/**
- * strlcat - Append a length-limited, C-string to another
- * @dest: The string to be appended to
- * @src: The string to append to it
- * @count: The size of the destination buffer.
- */
 size_t strlcat(char *dest, const char *src, size_t count)
 {
 	size_t dsize = strlen(dest);
@@ -484,10 +411,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(strnchr);
 #endif
 
 #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRLEN
-/**
- * strlen - Find the length of a string
- * @s: The string to be sized
- */
 size_t strlen(const char *s)
 {
 	const char *sc;
@@ -500,11 +423,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(strlen);
 #endif
 
 #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRNLEN
-/**
- * strnlen - Find the length of a length-limited string
- * @s: The string to be sized
- * @count: The maximum number of bytes to search
- */
 size_t strnlen(const char *s, size_t count)
 {
 	const char *sc;
diff --git a/lib/strscpy_kunit.c b/lib/strscpy_kunit.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a6b6344354ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/strscpy_kunit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Kernel module for testing 'strscpy' family of functions.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <kunit/test.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+/*
+ * tc() - Run a specific test case.
+ * @src: Source string, argument to strscpy_pad()
+ * @count: Size of destination buffer, argument to strscpy_pad()
+ * @expected: Expected return value from call to strscpy_pad()
+ * @terminator: 1 if there should be a terminating null byte 0 otherwise.
+ * @chars: Number of characters from the src string expected to be
+ *         written to the dst buffer.
+ * @pad: Number of pad characters expected (in the tail of dst buffer).
+ *       (@pad does not include the null terminator byte.)
+ *
+ * Calls strscpy_pad() and verifies the return value and state of the
+ * destination buffer after the call returns.
+ */
+static void tc(struct kunit *test, char *src, int count, int expected,
+	       int chars, int terminator, int pad)
+{
+	int nr_bytes_poison;
+	int max_expected;
+	int max_count;
+	int written;
+	char buf[6];
+	int index, i;
+	const char POISON = 'z';
+
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_TRUE_MSG(test, src != NULL,
+			      "null source string not supported");
+
+	memset(buf, POISON, sizeof(buf));
+	/* Future proofing test suite, validate args */
+	max_count = sizeof(buf) - 2; /* Space for null and to verify overflow */
+	max_expected = count - 1;    /* Space for the null */
+
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_LE_MSG(test, count, max_count,
+		"count (%d) is too big (%d) ... aborting", count, max_count);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_LE_MSG(test, expected, max_expected,
+		"expected (%d) is bigger than can possibly be returned (%d)",
+		expected, max_expected);
+
+	written = strscpy_pad(buf, src, count);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, written, expected);
+
+	if (count && written == -E2BIG) {
+		KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ_MSG(test, 0, strncmp(buf, src, count - 1),
+			"buffer state invalid for -E2BIG");
+		KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ_MSG(test, buf[count - 1], '\0',
+			"too big string is not null terminated correctly");
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++)
+		KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ_MSG(test, buf[i], src[i],
+			"buf[i]==%c != src[i]==%c", buf[i], src[i]);
+
+	if (terminator)
+		KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ_MSG(test, buf[count - 1], '\0',
+			"string is not null terminated correctly");
+
+	for (i = 0; i < pad; i++) {
+		index = chars + terminator + i;
+		KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ_MSG(test, buf[index], '\0',
+			"padding missing at index: %d", i);
+	}
+
+	nr_bytes_poison = sizeof(buf) - chars - terminator - pad;
+	for (i = 0; i < nr_bytes_poison; i++) {
+		index = sizeof(buf) - 1 - i; /* Check from the end back */
+		KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ_MSG(test, buf[index], POISON,
+			"poison value missing at index: %d", i);
+	}
+}
+
+static void strscpy_test(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char dest[8];
+
+	/*
+	 * tc() uses a destination buffer of size 6 and needs at
+	 * least 2 characters spare (one for null and one to check for
+	 * overflow).  This means we should only call tc() with
+	 * strings up to a maximum of 4 characters long and 'count'
+	 * should not exceed 4.  To test with longer strings increase
+	 * the buffer size in tc().
+	 */
+
+	/* tc(test, src, count, expected, chars, terminator, pad) */
+	tc(test, "a", 0, -E2BIG, 0, 0, 0);
+	tc(test, "",  0, -E2BIG, 0, 0, 0);
+
+	tc(test, "a", 1, -E2BIG, 0, 1, 0);
+	tc(test, "",  1, 0,	 0, 1, 0);
+
+	tc(test, "ab", 2, -E2BIG, 1, 1, 0);
+	tc(test, "a",  2, 1,	  1, 1, 0);
+	tc(test, "",   2, 0,	  0, 1, 1);
+
+	tc(test, "abc", 3, -E2BIG, 2, 1, 0);
+	tc(test, "ab",  3, 2,	   2, 1, 0);
+	tc(test, "a",   3, 1,	   1, 1, 1);
+	tc(test, "",    3, 0,	   0, 1, 2);
+
+	tc(test, "abcd", 4, -E2BIG, 3, 1, 0);
+	tc(test, "abc",  4, 3,	    3, 1, 0);
+	tc(test, "ab",   4, 2,	    2, 1, 1);
+	tc(test, "a",    4, 1,	    1, 1, 2);
+	tc(test, "",     4, 0,	    0, 1, 3);
+
+	/* Compile-time-known source strings. */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, strscpy(dest, "", ARRAY_SIZE(dest)), 0);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, strscpy(dest, "", 3), 0);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, strscpy(dest, "", 1), 0);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, strscpy(dest, "", 0), -E2BIG);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, strscpy(dest, "Fixed", ARRAY_SIZE(dest)), 5);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, strscpy(dest, "Fixed", 3), -E2BIG);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, strscpy(dest, "Fixed", 1), -E2BIG);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, strscpy(dest, "Fixed", 0), -E2BIG);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, strscpy(dest, "This is too long", ARRAY_SIZE(dest)), -E2BIG);
+}
+
+static struct kunit_case strscpy_test_cases[] = {
+	KUNIT_CASE(strscpy_test),
+	{}
+};
+
+static struct kunit_suite strscpy_test_suite = {
+	.name = "strscpy",
+	.test_cases = strscpy_test_cases,
+};
+
+kunit_test_suite(strscpy_test_suite);
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Tobin C. Harding <tobin@kernel.org>");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/lib/test_strscpy.c b/lib/test_strscpy.c
deleted file mode 100644
index a827f94601f5..000000000000
--- a/lib/test_strscpy.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,150 +0,0 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
-
-#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
-
-#include <linux/string.h>
-
-#include "../tools/testing/selftests/kselftest_module.h"
-
-/*
- * Kernel module for testing 'strscpy' family of functions.
- */
-
-KSTM_MODULE_GLOBALS();
-
-/*
- * tc() - Run a specific test case.
- * @src: Source string, argument to strscpy_pad()
- * @count: Size of destination buffer, argument to strscpy_pad()
- * @expected: Expected return value from call to strscpy_pad()
- * @terminator: 1 if there should be a terminating null byte 0 otherwise.
- * @chars: Number of characters from the src string expected to be
- *         written to the dst buffer.
- * @pad: Number of pad characters expected (in the tail of dst buffer).
- *       (@pad does not include the null terminator byte.)
- *
- * Calls strscpy_pad() and verifies the return value and state of the
- * destination buffer after the call returns.
- */
-static int __init tc(char *src, int count, int expected,
-		     int chars, int terminator, int pad)
-{
-	int nr_bytes_poison;
-	int max_expected;
-	int max_count;
-	int written;
-	char buf[6];
-	int index, i;
-	const char POISON = 'z';
-
-	total_tests++;
-
-	if (!src) {
-		pr_err("null source string not supported\n");
-		return -1;
-	}
-
-	memset(buf, POISON, sizeof(buf));
-	/* Future proofing test suite, validate args */
-	max_count = sizeof(buf) - 2; /* Space for null and to verify overflow */
-	max_expected = count - 1;    /* Space for the null */
-	if (count > max_count) {
-		pr_err("count (%d) is too big (%d) ... aborting", count, max_count);
-		return -1;
-	}
-	if (expected > max_expected) {
-		pr_warn("expected (%d) is bigger than can possibly be returned (%d)",
-			expected, max_expected);
-	}
-
-	written = strscpy_pad(buf, src, count);
-	if ((written) != (expected)) {
-		pr_err("%d != %d (written, expected)\n", written, expected);
-		goto fail;
-	}
-
-	if (count && written == -E2BIG) {
-		if (strncmp(buf, src, count - 1) != 0) {
-			pr_err("buffer state invalid for -E2BIG\n");
-			goto fail;
-		}
-		if (buf[count - 1] != '\0') {
-			pr_err("too big string is not null terminated correctly\n");
-			goto fail;
-		}
-	}
-
-	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
-		if (buf[i] != src[i]) {
-			pr_err("buf[i]==%c != src[i]==%c\n", buf[i], src[i]);
-			goto fail;
-		}
-	}
-
-	if (terminator) {
-		if (buf[count - 1] != '\0') {
-			pr_err("string is not null terminated correctly\n");
-			goto fail;
-		}
-	}
-
-	for (i = 0; i < pad; i++) {
-		index = chars + terminator + i;
-		if (buf[index] != '\0') {
-			pr_err("padding missing at index: %d\n", i);
-			goto fail;
-		}
-	}
-
-	nr_bytes_poison = sizeof(buf) - chars - terminator - pad;
-	for (i = 0; i < nr_bytes_poison; i++) {
-		index = sizeof(buf) - 1 - i; /* Check from the end back */
-		if (buf[index] != POISON) {
-			pr_err("poison value missing at index: %d\n", i);
-			goto fail;
-		}
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-fail:
-	failed_tests++;
-	return -1;
-}
-
-static void __init selftest(void)
-{
-	/*
-	 * tc() uses a destination buffer of size 6 and needs at
-	 * least 2 characters spare (one for null and one to check for
-	 * overflow).  This means we should only call tc() with
-	 * strings up to a maximum of 4 characters long and 'count'
-	 * should not exceed 4.  To test with longer strings increase
-	 * the buffer size in tc().
-	 */
-
-	/* tc(src, count, expected, chars, terminator, pad) */
-	KSTM_CHECK_ZERO(tc("a", 0, -E2BIG, 0, 0, 0));
-	KSTM_CHECK_ZERO(tc("", 0, -E2BIG, 0, 0, 0));
-
-	KSTM_CHECK_ZERO(tc("a", 1, -E2BIG, 0, 1, 0));
-	KSTM_CHECK_ZERO(tc("", 1, 0, 0, 1, 0));
-
-	KSTM_CHECK_ZERO(tc("ab", 2, -E2BIG, 1, 1, 0));
-	KSTM_CHECK_ZERO(tc("a", 2, 1, 1, 1, 0));
-	KSTM_CHECK_ZERO(tc("", 2, 0, 0, 1, 1));
-
-	KSTM_CHECK_ZERO(tc("abc", 3, -E2BIG, 2, 1, 0));
-	KSTM_CHECK_ZERO(tc("ab", 3, 2, 2, 1, 0));
-	KSTM_CHECK_ZERO(tc("a", 3, 1, 1, 1, 1));
-	KSTM_CHECK_ZERO(tc("", 3, 0, 0, 1, 2));
-
-	KSTM_CHECK_ZERO(tc("abcd", 4, -E2BIG, 3, 1, 0));
-	KSTM_CHECK_ZERO(tc("abc", 4, 3, 3, 1, 0));
-	KSTM_CHECK_ZERO(tc("ab", 4, 2, 2, 1, 1));
-	KSTM_CHECK_ZERO(tc("a", 4, 1, 1, 1, 2));
-	KSTM_CHECK_ZERO(tc("", 4, 0, 0, 1, 3));
-}
-
-KSTM_MODULE_LOADERS(test_strscpy);
-MODULE_AUTHOR("Tobin C. Harding <tobin@kernel.org>");
-MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/lib/ubsan.c b/lib/ubsan.c
index 36bd75e33426..60c7099857a0 100644
--- a/lib/ubsan.c
+++ b/lib/ubsan.c
@@ -154,8 +154,7 @@ static void ubsan_epilogue(void)
 
 	current->in_ubsan--;
 
-	if (panic_on_warn)
-		panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
+	check_panic_on_warn("UBSAN");
 }
 
 void __ubsan_handle_divrem_overflow(void *_data, void *lhs, void *rhs)
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan_test.c b/mm/kasan/kasan_test.c
index d1439669d6bc..74cd80c12b25 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan_test.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan_test.c
@@ -825,23 +825,30 @@ static void kasan_global_oob_left(struct kunit *test)
 	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, *(volatile char *)p);
 }
 
-/* Check that ksize() makes the whole object accessible. */
+/* Check that ksize() does NOT unpoison whole object. */
 static void ksize_unpoisons_memory(struct kunit *test)
 {
 	char *ptr;
-	size_t size = 123, real_size;
+	size_t size = 128 - KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 5;
+	size_t real_size;
 
 	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
 	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
 	real_size = ksize(ptr);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_GT(test, real_size, size);
 
 	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr);
 
-	/* This access shouldn't trigger a KASAN report. */
-	ptr[size] = 'x';
+	/* These accesses shouldn't trigger a KASAN report. */
+	ptr[0] = 'x';
+	ptr[size - 1] = 'x';
 
-	/* This one must. */
-	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[real_size]);
+	/* These must trigger a KASAN report. */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
+		KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[size]);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[size + 5]);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[real_size - 1]);
 
 	kfree(ptr);
 }
diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
index f2db8605ee0f..1d02757e90a3 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/report.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
@@ -186,8 +186,8 @@ static void end_report(unsigned long *flags, void *addr)
 				       (unsigned long)addr);
 	pr_err("==================================================================\n");
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&report_lock, *flags);
-	if (panic_on_warn && !test_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags))
-		panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
+	if (!test_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags))
+		check_panic_on_warn("KASAN");
 	if (kasan_arg_fault == KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC)
 		panic("kasan.fault=panic set ...\n");
 	add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
diff --git a/mm/kfence/report.c b/mm/kfence/report.c
index 46ecea18c4ca..60205f1257ef 100644
--- a/mm/kfence/report.c
+++ b/mm/kfence/report.c
@@ -273,8 +273,7 @@ void kfence_report_error(unsigned long address, bool is_write, struct pt_regs *r
 
 	lockdep_on();
 
-	if (panic_on_warn)
-		panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
+	check_panic_on_warn("KFENCE");
 
 	/* We encountered a memory safety error, taint the kernel! */
 	add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index 3e49bb830060..1cba98acc486 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -1348,11 +1348,11 @@ __do_krealloc(const void *p, size_t new_size, gfp_t flags)
 	void *ret;
 	size_t ks;
 
-	/* Don't use instrumented ksize to allow precise KASAN poisoning. */
+	/* Check for double-free before calling ksize. */
 	if (likely(!ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(p))) {
 		if (!kasan_check_byte(p))
 			return NULL;
-		ks = kfence_ksize(p) ?: __ksize(p);
+		ks = ksize(p);
 	} else
 		ks = 0;
 
@@ -1420,21 +1420,21 @@ void kfree_sensitive(const void *p)
 	void *mem = (void *)p;
 
 	ks = ksize(mem);
-	if (ks)
+	if (ks) {
+		kasan_unpoison_range(mem, ks);
 		memzero_explicit(mem, ks);
+	}
 	kfree(mem);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(kfree_sensitive);
 
 size_t ksize(const void *objp)
 {
-	size_t size;
-
 	/*
-	 * We need to first check that the pointer to the object is valid, and
-	 * only then unpoison the memory. The report printed from ksize() is
-	 * more useful, then when it's printed later when the behaviour could
-	 * be undefined due to a potential use-after-free or double-free.
+	 * We need to first check that the pointer to the object is valid.
+	 * The KASAN report printed from ksize() is more useful, then when
+	 * it's printed later when the behaviour could be undefined due to
+	 * a potential use-after-free or double-free.
 	 *
 	 * We use kasan_check_byte(), which is supported for the hardware
 	 * tag-based KASAN mode, unlike kasan_check_read/write().
@@ -1448,13 +1448,7 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp)
 	if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(objp)) || !kasan_check_byte(objp))
 		return 0;
 
-	size = kfence_ksize(objp) ?: __ksize(objp);
-	/*
-	 * We assume that ksize callers could use whole allocated area,
-	 * so we need to unpoison this area.
-	 */
-	kasan_unpoison_range(objp, size);
-	return size;
+	return kfence_ksize(objp) ?: __ksize(objp);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ksize);
 
diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
index 3aced951d5ab..01e54b46ae0b 100644
--- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
+++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ static int __init init_dns_resolver(void)
 	 * this is used to prevent malicious redirections from being installed
 	 * with add_key().
 	 */
-	cred = prepare_kernel_cred(NULL);
+	cred = prepare_kernel_cred(&init_task);
 	if (!cred)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
diff --git a/scripts/kernel-doc b/scripts/kernel-doc
index bd3c61f023c6..54b0893cae66 100755
--- a/scripts/kernel-doc
+++ b/scripts/kernel-doc
@@ -1461,6 +1461,8 @@ sub create_parameterlist($$$$) {
     foreach my $arg (split($splitter, $args)) {
 	# strip comments
 	$arg =~ s/\/\*.*\*\///;
+	# ignore argument attributes
+	$arg =~ s/\sPOS0?\s/ /;
 	# strip leading/trailing spaces
 	$arg =~ s/^\s*//;
 	$arg =~ s/\s*$//;
@@ -1670,6 +1672,7 @@ sub dump_function($$) {
     $prototype =~ s/^__inline +//;
     $prototype =~ s/^__always_inline +//;
     $prototype =~ s/^noinline +//;
+    $prototype =~ s/^__FORTIFY_INLINE +//;
     $prototype =~ s/__init +//;
     $prototype =~ s/__init_or_module +//;
     $prototype =~ s/__deprecated +//;
@@ -1679,7 +1682,8 @@ sub dump_function($$) {
     $prototype =~ s/__weak +//;
     $prototype =~ s/__sched +//;
     $prototype =~ s/__printf\s*\(\s*\d*\s*,\s*\d*\s*\) +//;
-    $prototype =~ s/__alloc_size\s*\(\s*\d+\s*(?:,\s*\d+\s*)?\) +//;
+    $prototype =~ s/__(?:re)?alloc_size\s*\(\s*\d+\s*(?:,\s*\d+\s*)?\) +//;
+    $prototype =~ s/__diagnose_as\s*\(\s*\S+\s*(?:,\s*\d+\s*)*\) +//;
     my $define = $prototype =~ s/^#\s*define\s+//; #ak added
     $prototype =~ s/__attribute_const__ +//;
     $prototype =~ s/__attribute__\s*\(\(