summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorAlexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>2019-07-11 20:59:19 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-07-12 11:05:46 -0700
commit6471384af2a6530696fc0203bafe4de41a23c9ef (patch)
treea9c8465080fa6745e4fe9311297816f564124b87
parentba5c5e4a5da443e80a3722e67515de5e37375b18 (diff)
downloadlinux-6471384af2a6530696fc0203bafe4de41a23c9ef.tar.gz
linux-6471384af2a6530696fc0203bafe4de41a23c9ef.tar.bz2
linux-6471384af2a6530696fc0203bafe4de41a23c9ef.zip
mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options
Patch series "add init_on_alloc/init_on_free boot options", v10. Provide init_on_alloc and init_on_free boot options. These are aimed at preventing possible information leaks and making the control-flow bugs that depend on uninitialized values more deterministic. Enabling either of the options guarantees that the memory returned by the page allocator and SL[AU]B is initialized with zeroes. SLOB allocator isn't supported at the moment, as its emulation of kmem caches complicates handling of SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU caches correctly. Enabling init_on_free also guarantees that pages and heap objects are initialized right after they're freed, so it won't be possible to access stale data by using a dangling pointer. As suggested by Michal Hocko, right now we don't let the heap users to disable initialization for certain allocations. There's not enough evidence that doing so can speed up real-life cases, and introducing ways to opt-out may result in things going out of control. This patch (of 2): The new options are needed to prevent possible information leaks and make control-flow bugs that depend on uninitialized values more deterministic. This is expected to be on-by-default on Android and Chrome OS. And it gives the opportunity for anyone else to use it under distros too via the boot args. (The init_on_free feature is regularly requested by folks where memory forensics is included in their threat models.) init_on_alloc=1 makes the kernel initialize newly allocated pages and heap objects with zeroes. Initialization is done at allocation time at the places where checks for __GFP_ZERO are performed. init_on_free=1 makes the kernel initialize freed pages and heap objects with zeroes upon their deletion. This helps to ensure sensitive data doesn't leak via use-after-free accesses. Both init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 guarantee that the allocator returns zeroed memory. The two exceptions are slab caches with constructors and SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU flag. Those are never zero-initialized to preserve their semantics. Both init_on_alloc and init_on_free default to zero, but those defaults can be overridden with CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON and CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON. If either SLUB poisoning or page poisoning is enabled, those options take precedence over init_on_alloc and init_on_free: initialization is only applied to unpoisoned allocations. Slowdown for the new features compared to init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0: hackbench, init_on_free=1: +7.62% sys time (st.err 0.74%) hackbench, init_on_alloc=1: +7.75% sys time (st.err 2.14%) Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1: +8.38% wall time (st.err 0.39%) Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1: +24.42% sys time (st.err 0.52%) Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: -0.13% wall time (st.err 0.42%) Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: +0.57% sys time (st.err 0.40%) The slowdown for init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0 compared to the baseline is within the standard error. The new features are also going to pave the way for hardware memory tagging (e.g. arm64's MTE), which will require both on_alloc and on_free hooks to set the tags for heap objects. With MTE, tagging will have the same cost as memory initialization. Although init_on_free is rather costly, there are paranoid use-cases where in-memory data lifetime is desired to be minimized. There are various arguments for/against the realism of the associated threat models, but given that we'll need the infrastructure for MTE anyway, and there are people who want wipe-on-free behavior no matter what the performance cost, it seems reasonable to include it in this series. [glider@google.com: v8] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190626121943.131390-2-glider@google.com [glider@google.com: v9] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190627130316.254309-2-glider@google.com [glider@google.com: v10] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190628093131.199499-2-glider@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617151050.92663-2-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> [page and dmapool parts Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>] Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@android.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-rw-r--r--Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt9
-rw-r--r--drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_ioctl.c2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/mm.h24
-rw-r--r--mm/dmapool.c4
-rw-r--r--mm/page_alloc.c71
-rw-r--r--mm/slab.c16
-rw-r--r--mm/slab.h20
-rw-r--r--mm/slub.c40
-rw-r--r--net/core/sock.c2
-rw-r--r--security/Kconfig.hardening29
10 files changed, 199 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index aa4e7e7b87c2..099c5a4be95b 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1668,6 +1668,15 @@
initrd= [BOOT] Specify the location of the initial ramdisk
+ init_on_alloc= [MM] Fill newly allocated pages and heap objects with
+ zeroes.
+ Format: 0 | 1
+ Default set by CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON.
+
+ init_on_free= [MM] Fill freed pages and heap objects with zeroes.
+ Format: 0 | 1
+ Default set by CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON.
+
init_pkru= [x86] Specify the default memory protection keys rights
register contents for all processes. 0x55555554 by
default (disallow access to all but pkey 0). Can
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_ioctl.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_ioctl.c
index 829b0c6944d8..61758201d9b2 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_ioctl.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_ioctl.c
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ __malloc void *_uverbs_alloc(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *bundle, size_t size,
res = (void *)pbundle->internal_buffer + pbundle->internal_used;
pbundle->internal_used =
ALIGN(new_used, sizeof(*pbundle->internal_buffer));
- if (flags & __GFP_ZERO)
+ if (want_init_on_alloc(flags))
memset(res, 0, size);
return res;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index bb242ad810eb..f88f0eabcc5e 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -2700,6 +2700,30 @@ static inline void kernel_poison_pages(struct page *page, int numpages,
int enable) { }
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(init_on_alloc);
+#else
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(init_on_alloc);
+#endif
+static inline bool want_init_on_alloc(gfp_t flags)
+{
+ if (static_branch_unlikely(&init_on_alloc) &&
+ !page_poisoning_enabled())
+ return true;
+ return flags & __GFP_ZERO;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(init_on_free);
+#else
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(init_on_free);
+#endif
+static inline bool want_init_on_free(void)
+{
+ return static_branch_unlikely(&init_on_free) &&
+ !page_poisoning_enabled();
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC_ENABLE_DEFAULT
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(_debug_pagealloc_enabled);
#else
diff --git a/mm/dmapool.c b/mm/dmapool.c
index 8c94c89a6f7e..fe5d33060415 100644
--- a/mm/dmapool.c
+++ b/mm/dmapool.c
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ void *dma_pool_alloc(struct dma_pool *pool, gfp_t mem_flags,
#endif
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pool->lock, flags);
- if (mem_flags & __GFP_ZERO)
+ if (want_init_on_alloc(mem_flags))
memset(retval, 0, pool->size);
return retval;
@@ -428,6 +428,8 @@ void dma_pool_free(struct dma_pool *pool, void *vaddr, dma_addr_t dma)
}
offset = vaddr - page->vaddr;
+ if (want_init_on_free())
+ memset(vaddr, 0, pool->size);
#ifdef DMAPOOL_DEBUG
if ((dma - page->dma) != offset) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pool->lock, flags);
diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c
index 3a555ce69006..dbd0d5cbbcbb 100644
--- a/mm/page_alloc.c
+++ b/mm/page_alloc.c
@@ -135,6 +135,55 @@ unsigned long totalcma_pages __read_mostly;
int percpu_pagelist_fraction;
gfp_t gfp_allowed_mask __read_mostly = GFP_BOOT_MASK;
+#ifdef CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(init_on_alloc);
+#else
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(init_on_alloc);
+#endif
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(init_on_alloc);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(init_on_free);
+#else
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(init_on_free);
+#endif
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(init_on_free);
+
+static int __init early_init_on_alloc(char *buf)
+{
+ int ret;
+ bool bool_result;
+
+ if (!buf)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ ret = kstrtobool(buf, &bool_result);
+ if (bool_result && page_poisoning_enabled())
+ pr_info("mem auto-init: CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING is on, will take precedence over init_on_alloc\n");
+ if (bool_result)
+ static_branch_enable(&init_on_alloc);
+ else
+ static_branch_disable(&init_on_alloc);
+ return ret;
+}
+early_param("init_on_alloc", early_init_on_alloc);
+
+static int __init early_init_on_free(char *buf)
+{
+ int ret;
+ bool bool_result;
+
+ if (!buf)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ ret = kstrtobool(buf, &bool_result);
+ if (bool_result && page_poisoning_enabled())
+ pr_info("mem auto-init: CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING is on, will take precedence over init_on_free\n");
+ if (bool_result)
+ static_branch_enable(&init_on_free);
+ else
+ static_branch_disable(&init_on_free);
+ return ret;
+}
+early_param("init_on_free", early_init_on_free);
/*
* A cached value of the page's pageblock's migratetype, used when the page is
@@ -1067,6 +1116,14 @@ out:
return ret;
}
+static void kernel_init_free_pages(struct page *page, int numpages)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < numpages; i++)
+ clear_highpage(page + i);
+}
+
static __always_inline bool free_pages_prepare(struct page *page,
unsigned int order, bool check_free)
{
@@ -1118,6 +1175,9 @@ static __always_inline bool free_pages_prepare(struct page *page,
PAGE_SIZE << order);
}
arch_free_page(page, order);
+ if (want_init_on_free())
+ kernel_init_free_pages(page, 1 << order);
+
kernel_poison_pages(page, 1 << order, 0);
if (debug_pagealloc_enabled())
kernel_map_pages(page, 1 << order, 0);
@@ -2019,8 +2079,8 @@ static inline int check_new_page(struct page *page)
static inline bool free_pages_prezeroed(void)
{
- return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO) &&
- page_poisoning_enabled();
+ return (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO) &&
+ page_poisoning_enabled()) || want_init_on_free();
}
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
@@ -2090,13 +2150,10 @@ inline void post_alloc_hook(struct page *page, unsigned int order,
static void prep_new_page(struct page *page, unsigned int order, gfp_t gfp_flags,
unsigned int alloc_flags)
{
- int i;
-
post_alloc_hook(page, order, gfp_flags);
- if (!free_pages_prezeroed() && (gfp_flags & __GFP_ZERO))
- for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++)
- clear_highpage(page + i);
+ if (!free_pages_prezeroed() && want_init_on_alloc(gfp_flags))
+ kernel_init_free_pages(page, 1 << order);
if (order && (gfp_flags & __GFP_COMP))
prep_compound_page(page, order);
diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c
index e9d90b0da47b..9df370558e5d 100644
--- a/mm/slab.c
+++ b/mm/slab.c
@@ -1811,6 +1811,14 @@ static bool set_objfreelist_slab_cache(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
cachep->num = 0;
+ /*
+ * If slab auto-initialization on free is enabled, store the freelist
+ * off-slab, so that its contents don't end up in one of the allocated
+ * objects.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(cachep)))
+ return false;
+
if (cachep->ctor || flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU)
return false;
@@ -3248,7 +3256,7 @@ slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, int nodeid,
local_irq_restore(save_flags);
ptr = cache_alloc_debugcheck_after(cachep, flags, ptr, caller);
- if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO) && ptr)
+ if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(flags, cachep)) && ptr)
memset(ptr, 0, cachep->object_size);
slab_post_alloc_hook(cachep, flags, 1, &ptr);
@@ -3305,7 +3313,7 @@ slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller)
objp = cache_alloc_debugcheck_after(cachep, flags, objp, caller);
prefetchw(objp);
- if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO) && objp)
+ if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(flags, cachep)) && objp)
memset(objp, 0, cachep->object_size);
slab_post_alloc_hook(cachep, flags, 1, &objp);
@@ -3426,6 +3434,8 @@ void ___cache_free(struct kmem_cache *cachep, void *objp,
struct array_cache *ac = cpu_cache_get(cachep);
check_irq_off();
+ if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(cachep)))
+ memset(objp, 0, cachep->object_size);
kmemleak_free_recursive(objp, cachep->flags);
objp = cache_free_debugcheck(cachep, objp, caller);
@@ -3513,7 +3523,7 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size,
cache_alloc_debugcheck_after_bulk(s, flags, size, p, _RET_IP_);
/* Clear memory outside IRQ disabled section */
- if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO))
+ if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(flags, s)))
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
memset(p[i], 0, s->object_size);
diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h
index a62372d0f271..9057b8056b07 100644
--- a/mm/slab.h
+++ b/mm/slab.h
@@ -607,4 +607,24 @@ static inline int cache_random_seq_create(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
static inline void cache_random_seq_destroy(struct kmem_cache *cachep) { }
#endif /* CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM */
+static inline bool slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfp_t flags, struct kmem_cache *c)
+{
+ if (static_branch_unlikely(&init_on_alloc)) {
+ if (c->ctor)
+ return false;
+ if (c->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON))
+ return flags & __GFP_ZERO;
+ return true;
+ }
+ return flags & __GFP_ZERO;
+}
+
+static inline bool slab_want_init_on_free(struct kmem_cache *c)
+{
+ if (static_branch_unlikely(&init_on_free))
+ return !(c->ctor ||
+ (c->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON)));
+ return false;
+}
+
#endif /* MM_SLAB_H */
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index c9541a480627..e6c030e47364 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -1279,6 +1279,10 @@ check_slabs:
if (*str == ',')
slub_debug_slabs = str + 1;
out:
+ if ((static_branch_unlikely(&init_on_alloc) ||
+ static_branch_unlikely(&init_on_free)) &&
+ (slub_debug & SLAB_POISON))
+ pr_info("mem auto-init: SLAB_POISON will take precedence over init_on_alloc/init_on_free\n");
return 1;
}
@@ -1422,6 +1426,28 @@ static __always_inline bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x)
static inline bool slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s,
void **head, void **tail)
{
+
+ void *object;
+ void *next = *head;
+ void *old_tail = *tail ? *tail : *head;
+ int rsize;
+
+ if (slab_want_init_on_free(s))
+ do {
+ object = next;
+ next = get_freepointer(s, object);
+ /*
+ * Clear the object and the metadata, but don't touch
+ * the redzone.
+ */
+ memset(object, 0, s->object_size);
+ rsize = (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) ? s->red_left_pad
+ : 0;
+ memset((char *)object + s->inuse, 0,
+ s->size - s->inuse - rsize);
+ set_freepointer(s, object, next);
+ } while (object != old_tail);
+
/*
* Compiler cannot detect this function can be removed if slab_free_hook()
* evaluates to nothing. Thus, catch all relevant config debug options here.
@@ -1431,9 +1457,7 @@ static inline bool slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s,
defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_FREE) || \
defined(CONFIG_KASAN)
- void *object;
- void *next = *head;
- void *old_tail = *tail ? *tail : *head;
+ next = *head;
/* Head and tail of the reconstructed freelist */
*head = NULL;
@@ -2729,8 +2753,14 @@ redo:
prefetch_freepointer(s, next_object);
stat(s, ALLOC_FASTPATH);
}
+ /*
+ * If the object has been wiped upon free, make sure it's fully
+ * initialized by zeroing out freelist pointer.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(s)) && object)
+ memset(object + s->offset, 0, sizeof(void *));
- if (unlikely(gfpflags & __GFP_ZERO) && object)
+ if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfpflags, s)) && object)
memset(object, 0, s->object_size);
slab_post_alloc_hook(s, gfpflags, 1, &object);
@@ -3151,7 +3181,7 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size,
local_irq_enable();
/* Clear memory outside IRQ disabled fastpath loop */
- if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO)) {
+ if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(flags, s))) {
int j;
for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index 3e073ca6138f..d57b0cc995a0 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -1597,7 +1597,7 @@ static struct sock *sk_prot_alloc(struct proto *prot, gfp_t priority,
sk = kmem_cache_alloc(slab, priority & ~__GFP_ZERO);
if (!sk)
return sk;
- if (priority & __GFP_ZERO)
+ if (want_init_on_alloc(priority))
sk_prot_clear_nulls(sk, prot->obj_size);
} else
sk = kmalloc(prot->obj_size, priority);
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
index c6cb2d9b2905..a1ffe2eb4d5f 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
+++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -160,6 +160,35 @@ config STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
runtime to control kernel stack erasing for kernels built with
CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK.
+config INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON
+ bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on allocation by default"
+ help
+ This has the effect of setting "init_on_alloc=1" on the kernel
+ command line. This can be disabled with "init_on_alloc=0".
+ When "init_on_alloc" is enabled, all page allocator and slab
+ allocator memory will be zeroed when allocated, eliminating
+ many kinds of "uninitialized heap memory" flaws, especially
+ heap content exposures. The performance impact varies by
+ workload, but most cases see <1% impact. Some synthetic
+ workloads have measured as high as 7%.
+
+config INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON
+ bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on free by default"
+ help
+ This has the effect of setting "init_on_free=1" on the kernel
+ command line. This can be disabled with "init_on_free=0".
+ Similar to "init_on_alloc", when "init_on_free" is enabled,
+ all page allocator and slab allocator memory will be zeroed
+ when freed, eliminating many kinds of "uninitialized heap memory"
+ flaws, especially heap content exposures. The primary difference
+ with "init_on_free" is that data lifetime in memory is reduced,
+ as anything freed is wiped immediately, making live forensics or
+ cold boot memory attacks unable to recover freed memory contents.
+ The performance impact varies by workload, but is more expensive
+ than "init_on_alloc" due to the negative cache effects of
+ touching "cold" memory areas. Most cases see 3-5% impact. Some
+ synthetic workloads have measured as high as 8%.
+
endmenu
endmenu