arm/mm: Convert to using lock_mm_and_find_vma()

arm has an additional check for address < FIRST_USER_ADDRESS before
expanding the stack.  Since FIRST_USER_ADDRESS is defined everywhere
(generally as 0), move that check to the generic expand_downwards().

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

3 files changed, 16 insertions, 50 deletions

diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
index 0fb4b218f665..9ed7f03ba15a 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ config ARM
 	select HAVE_UID16
 	select HAVE_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_GEN
 	select IRQ_FORCED_THREADING
+	select LOCK_MM_AND_FIND_VMA
 	select MODULES_USE_ELF_REL
 	select NEED_DMA_MAP_STATE
 	select OF_EARLY_FLATTREE if OF
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
index 2418f1efabd8..0860eeba8bd3 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
@@ -232,37 +232,11 @@ static inline bool is_permission_fault(unsigned int fsr)
 	return false;
 }
 
-static vm_fault_t __kprobes
-__do_page_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, unsigned int flags,
-		unsigned long vma_flags, struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
-	struct vm_area_struct *vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
-	if (unlikely(!vma))
-		return VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
-
-	if (unlikely(vma->vm_start > addr)) {
-		if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
-			return VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
-		if (addr < FIRST_USER_ADDRESS)
-			return VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
-		if (expand_stack(vma, addr))
-			return VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, check the
-	 * permissions on the VMA allow for the fault which occurred.
-	 */
-	if (!(vma->vm_flags & vma_flags))
-		return VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
-
-	return handle_mm_fault(vma, addr & PAGE_MASK, flags, regs);
-}
-
 static int __kprobes
 do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
 	int sig, code;
 	vm_fault_t fault;
 	unsigned int flags = FAULT_FLAG_DEFAULT;
@@ -301,31 +275,21 @@ do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
 
 	perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, addr);
 
-	/*
-	 * As per x86, we may deadlock here.  However, since the kernel only
-	 * validly references user space from well defined areas of the code,
-	 * we can bug out early if this is from code which shouldn't.
-	 */
-	if (!mmap_read_trylock(mm)) {
-		if (!user_mode(regs) && !search_exception_tables(regs->ARM_pc))
-			goto no_context;
 retry:
-		mmap_read_lock(mm);
-	} else {
-		/*
-		 * The above down_read_trylock() might have succeeded in
-		 * which case, we'll have missed the might_sleep() from
-		 * down_read()
-		 */
-		might_sleep();
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
-		if (!user_mode(regs) &&
-		    !search_exception_tables(regs->ARM_pc))
-			goto no_context;
-#endif
+	vma = lock_mm_and_find_vma(mm, addr, regs);
+	if (unlikely(!vma)) {
+		fault = VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
+		goto bad_area;
 	}
 
-	fault = __do_page_fault(mm, addr, flags, vm_flags, regs);
+	/*
+	 * ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, check the
+	 * permissions on the VMA allow for the fault which occurred.
+	 */
+	if (!(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags))
+		fault = VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
+	else
+		fault = handle_mm_fault(vma, addr & PAGE_MASK, flags, regs);
 
 	/* If we need to retry but a fatal signal is pending, handle the
 	 * signal first. We do not need to release the mmap_lock because
@@ -356,6 +320,7 @@ retry:
 	if (likely(!(fault & (VM_FAULT_ERROR | VM_FAULT_BADMAP | VM_FAULT_BADACCESS))))
 		return 0;
 
+bad_area:
 	/*
 	 * If we are in kernel mode at this point, we
 	 * have no context to handle this fault with.
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index d600404580b2..6d120bf1d0bc 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -2036,7 +2036,7 @@ int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address)
 	int error = 0;
 
 	address &= PAGE_MASK;
-	if (address < mmap_min_addr)
+	if (address < mmap_min_addr || address < FIRST_USER_ADDRESS)
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/* Enforce stack_guard_gap */