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authorGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>2018-10-16 12:16:45 +0200
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2018-10-17 20:57:55 +0200
commit9ae24af3669111d418242caec8dd4ebd9ba26860 (patch)
tree8101ff2b63f87ade850be0cd1424b5b493ccf69d
parent665c365a77fbfeabe52694aedf3446d5f2f1ce42 (diff)
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usb: gadget: storage: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
num can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c:3177 fsg_lun_make() warn: potential spectre issue 'fsg_opts->common->luns' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing num before using it to index fsg_opts->common->luns Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-rw-r--r--drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c3
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c
index ca8a4b53c59f..1074cb82ec17 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c
@@ -221,6 +221,8 @@
#include <linux/usb/gadget.h>
#include <linux/usb/composite.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
#include "configfs.h"
@@ -3152,6 +3154,7 @@ static struct config_group *fsg_lun_make(struct config_group *group,
fsg_opts = to_fsg_opts(&group->cg_item);
if (num >= FSG_MAX_LUNS)
return ERR_PTR(-ERANGE);
+ num = array_index_nospec(num, FSG_MAX_LUNS);
mutex_lock(&fsg_opts->lock);
if (fsg_opts->refcnt || fsg_opts->common->luns[num]) {