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author | Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> | 2022-06-14 23:15:59 +0200 |
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committer | Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> | 2022-06-27 10:33:59 +0200 |
commit | 9bb2ec608a209018080ca262f771e6a9ff203b6f (patch) | |
tree | be33da1675577b06894f7b15e7617cdd041afc49 | |
parent | bf5835bcdb9635c97f85120dba9bfa21e111130f (diff) | |
download | linux-9bb2ec608a209018080ca262f771e6a9ff203b6f.tar.gz linux-9bb2ec608a209018080ca262f771e6a9ff203b6f.tar.bz2 linux-9bb2ec608a209018080ca262f771e6a9ff203b6f.zip |
objtool: Update Retpoline validation
Update retpoline validation with the new CONFIG_RETPOLINE requirement of
not having bare naked RET instructions.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tools/objtool/check.c | 19 |
4 files changed, 22 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index ce1acb557162..455d79c6c2f3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -76,6 +76,12 @@ .endm /* + * (ab)use RETPOLINE_SAFE on RET to annotate away 'bare' RET instructions + * vs RETBleed validation. + */ +#define ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE + +/* * JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple * indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2 * attack. diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S index d94dea450fa6..9de3d900bc92 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(sme_encrypt_execute) pop %rbp /* Offset to __x86_return_thunk would be wrong here */ + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE ret int3 SYM_FUNC_END(sme_encrypt_execute) @@ -154,6 +155,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__enc_copy) pop %r15 /* Offset to __x86_return_thunk would be wrong here */ + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE ret int3 .L__enc_copy_end: diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S index 3a2cd93bf059..fa884fc73e07 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S +++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(hypercall_page) .rept (PAGE_SIZE / 32) UNWIND_HINT_FUNC ANNOTATE_NOENDBR + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE ret /* * Xen will write the hypercall page, and sort out ENDBR. diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index 4252cd05dfc4..7dc378156a63 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -2115,8 +2115,9 @@ static int read_retpoline_hints(struct objtool_file *file) } if (insn->type != INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC && - insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC) { - WARN_FUNC("retpoline_safe hint not an indirect jump/call", + insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC && + insn->type != INSN_RETURN) { + WARN_FUNC("retpoline_safe hint not an indirect jump/call/ret", insn->sec, insn->offset); return -1; } @@ -3526,7 +3527,8 @@ static int validate_retpoline(struct objtool_file *file) for_each_insn(file, insn) { if (insn->type != INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC && - insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC) + insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC && + insn->type != INSN_RETURN) continue; if (insn->retpoline_safe) @@ -3541,9 +3543,14 @@ static int validate_retpoline(struct objtool_file *file) if (!strcmp(insn->sec->name, ".init.text") && !opts.module) continue; - WARN_FUNC("indirect %s found in RETPOLINE build", - insn->sec, insn->offset, - insn->type == INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC ? "jump" : "call"); + if (insn->type == INSN_RETURN) { + WARN_FUNC("'naked' return found in RETPOLINE build", + insn->sec, insn->offset); + } else { + WARN_FUNC("indirect %s found in RETPOLINE build", + insn->sec, insn->offset, + insn->type == INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC ? "jump" : "call"); + } warnings++; } |