diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2020-02-05 17:33:35 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2020-02-05 17:33:35 +0000 |
commit | cfb4b571e8b56b65d1a893bda5153647fda823b9 (patch) | |
tree | d507f6ab8f0eb8bc52ad7b9371d442ecafef35d4 | |
parent | 6992ca0dd017ebaa2bf8e9dcc49f1c3b7033b082 (diff) | |
parent | 55d0a513a0e202c68af2c8f4b1e923a345227bbb (diff) | |
download | linux-cfb4b571e8b56b65d1a893bda5153647fda823b9.tar.gz linux-cfb4b571e8b56b65d1a893bda5153647fda823b9.tar.bz2 linux-cfb4b571e8b56b65d1a893bda5153647fda823b9.zip |
Merge tag 's390-5.6-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux
Pull more s390 updates from Vasily Gorbik:
"The second round of s390 fixes and features for 5.6:
- Add KPROBES_ON_FTRACE support
- Add EP11 AES secure keys support
- PAES rework and prerequisites for paes-s390 ciphers selftests
- Fix page table upgrade for hugetlbfs"
* tag 's390-5.6-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux:
s390/pkey/zcrypt: Support EP11 AES secure keys
s390/zcrypt: extend EP11 card and queue sysfs attributes
s390/zcrypt: add new low level ep11 functions support file
s390/zcrypt: ep11 structs rework, export zcrypt_send_ep11_cprb
s390/zcrypt: enable card/domain autoselect on ep11 cprbs
s390/crypto: enable clear key values for paes ciphers
s390/pkey: Add support for key blob with clear key value
s390/crypto: Rework on paes implementation
s390: support KPROBES_ON_FTRACE
s390/mm: fix dynamic pagetable upgrade for hugetlbfs
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/features/debug/kprobes-on-ftrace/arch-support.txt | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/Kconfig | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c | 230 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/include/asm/kprobes.h | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/include/asm/page.h | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/pkey.h | 69 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/zcrypt.h | 32 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/kernel/ftrace.c | 80 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/kernel/kprobes.c | 61 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/kernel/mcount.S | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/mm/hugetlbpage.c | 100 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/s390/crypto/Makefile | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c | 470 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.c | 27 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.h | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.h | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cex4.c | 273 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ep11misc.c | 1293 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ep11misc.h | 124 |
19 files changed, 2494 insertions, 282 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/features/debug/kprobes-on-ftrace/arch-support.txt b/Documentation/features/debug/kprobes-on-ftrace/arch-support.txt index 4fae0464ddff..32b297295fff 100644 --- a/Documentation/features/debug/kprobes-on-ftrace/arch-support.txt +++ b/Documentation/features/debug/kprobes-on-ftrace/arch-support.txt @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ | parisc: | ok | | powerpc: | ok | | riscv: | TODO | - | s390: | TODO | + | s390: | ok | | sh: | TODO | | sparc: | TODO | | um: | TODO | diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig index 734996784d03..8abe77536d9d 100644 --- a/arch/s390/Kconfig +++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig @@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ config S390 select HAVE_KERNEL_UNCOMPRESSED select HAVE_KERNEL_XZ select HAVE_KPROBES + select HAVE_KPROBES_ON_FTRACE select HAVE_KRETPROBES select HAVE_KVM select HAVE_LIVEPATCH diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c index e2a85783f804..f3caeb17c85b 100644 --- a/arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c +++ b/arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ * s390 implementation of the AES Cipher Algorithm with protected keys. * * s390 Version: - * Copyright IBM Corp. 2017,2019 + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2017,2020 * Author(s): Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> * Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com> */ @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/cpufeature.h> #include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h> #include <crypto/xts.h> @@ -32,11 +33,11 @@ * is called. As paes can handle different kinds of key blobs * and padding is also possible, the limits need to be generous. */ -#define PAES_MIN_KEYSIZE 64 -#define PAES_MAX_KEYSIZE 256 +#define PAES_MIN_KEYSIZE 16 +#define PAES_MAX_KEYSIZE 320 static u8 *ctrblk; -static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ctrblk_lock); +static DEFINE_MUTEX(ctrblk_lock); static cpacf_mask_t km_functions, kmc_functions, kmctr_functions; @@ -53,19 +54,46 @@ struct key_blob { unsigned int keylen; }; -static inline int _copy_key_to_kb(struct key_blob *kb, - const u8 *key, - unsigned int keylen) -{ - if (keylen <= sizeof(kb->keybuf)) +static inline int _key_to_kb(struct key_blob *kb, + const u8 *key, + unsigned int keylen) +{ + struct clearkey_header { + u8 type; + u8 res0[3]; + u8 version; + u8 res1[3]; + u32 keytype; + u32 len; + } __packed * h; + + switch (keylen) { + case 16: + case 24: + case 32: + /* clear key value, prepare pkey clear key token in keybuf */ + memset(kb->keybuf, 0, sizeof(kb->keybuf)); + h = (struct clearkey_header *) kb->keybuf; + h->version = 0x02; /* TOKVER_CLEAR_KEY */ + h->keytype = (keylen - 8) >> 3; + h->len = keylen; + memcpy(kb->keybuf + sizeof(*h), key, keylen); + kb->keylen = sizeof(*h) + keylen; kb->key = kb->keybuf; - else { - kb->key = kmalloc(keylen, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!kb->key) - return -ENOMEM; + break; + default: + /* other key material, let pkey handle this */ + if (keylen <= sizeof(kb->keybuf)) + kb->key = kb->keybuf; + else { + kb->key = kmalloc(keylen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!kb->key) + return -ENOMEM; + } + memcpy(kb->key, key, keylen); + kb->keylen = keylen; + break; } - memcpy(kb->key, key, keylen); - kb->keylen = keylen; return 0; } @@ -82,16 +110,18 @@ static inline void _free_kb_keybuf(struct key_blob *kb) struct s390_paes_ctx { struct key_blob kb; struct pkey_protkey pk; + spinlock_t pk_lock; unsigned long fc; }; struct s390_pxts_ctx { struct key_blob kb[2]; struct pkey_protkey pk[2]; + spinlock_t pk_lock; unsigned long fc; }; -static inline int __paes_convert_key(struct key_blob *kb, +static inline int __paes_keyblob2pkey(struct key_blob *kb, struct pkey_protkey *pk) { int i, ret; @@ -106,22 +136,18 @@ static inline int __paes_convert_key(struct key_blob *kb, return ret; } -static int __paes_set_key(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx) +static inline int __paes_convert_key(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx) { - unsigned long fc; + struct pkey_protkey pkey; - if (__paes_convert_key(&ctx->kb, &ctx->pk)) + if (__paes_keyblob2pkey(&ctx->kb, &pkey)) return -EINVAL; - /* Pick the correct function code based on the protected key type */ - fc = (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? CPACF_KM_PAES_128 : - (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192) ? CPACF_KM_PAES_192 : - (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256) ? CPACF_KM_PAES_256 : 0; - - /* Check if the function code is available */ - ctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0; + spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + memcpy(&ctx->pk, &pkey, sizeof(pkey)); + spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); - return ctx->fc ? 0 : -EINVAL; + return 0; } static int ecb_paes_init(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) @@ -129,6 +155,7 @@ static int ecb_paes_init(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); ctx->kb.key = NULL; + spin_lock_init(&ctx->pk_lock); return 0; } @@ -140,6 +167,24 @@ static void ecb_paes_exit(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) _free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb); } +static inline int __ecb_paes_set_key(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx) +{ + unsigned long fc; + + if (__paes_convert_key(ctx)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Pick the correct function code based on the protected key type */ + fc = (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? CPACF_KM_PAES_128 : + (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192) ? CPACF_KM_PAES_192 : + (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256) ? CPACF_KM_PAES_256 : 0; + + /* Check if the function code is available */ + ctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0; + + return ctx->fc ? 0 : -EINVAL; +} + static int ecb_paes_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key, unsigned int key_len) { @@ -147,11 +192,11 @@ static int ecb_paes_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key, struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); _free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb); - rc = _copy_key_to_kb(&ctx->kb, in_key, key_len); + rc = _key_to_kb(&ctx->kb, in_key, key_len); if (rc) return rc; - return __paes_set_key(ctx); + return __ecb_paes_set_key(ctx); } static int ecb_paes_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, unsigned long modifier) @@ -161,18 +206,31 @@ static int ecb_paes_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, unsigned long modifier) struct skcipher_walk walk; unsigned int nbytes, n, k; int ret; + struct { + u8 key[MAXPROTKEYSIZE]; + } param; ret = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); + if (ret) + return ret; + + spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + memcpy(param.key, ctx->pk.protkey, MAXPROTKEYSIZE); + spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) != 0) { /* only use complete blocks */ n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1); - k = cpacf_km(ctx->fc | modifier, ctx->pk.protkey, + k = cpacf_km(ctx->fc | modifier, ¶m, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, n); if (k) ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes - k); if (k < n) { - if (__paes_set_key(ctx) != 0) + if (__paes_convert_key(ctx)) return skcipher_walk_done(&walk, -EIO); + spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + memcpy(param.key, ctx->pk.protkey, MAXPROTKEYSIZE); + spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); } } return ret; @@ -210,6 +268,7 @@ static int cbc_paes_init(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); ctx->kb.key = NULL; + spin_lock_init(&ctx->pk_lock); return 0; } @@ -221,11 +280,11 @@ static void cbc_paes_exit(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) _free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb); } -static int __cbc_paes_set_key(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx) +static inline int __cbc_paes_set_key(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx) { unsigned long fc; - if (__paes_convert_key(&ctx->kb, &ctx->pk)) + if (__paes_convert_key(ctx)) return -EINVAL; /* Pick the correct function code based on the protected key type */ @@ -246,7 +305,7 @@ static int cbc_paes_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key, struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); _free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb); - rc = _copy_key_to_kb(&ctx->kb, in_key, key_len); + rc = _key_to_kb(&ctx->kb, in_key, key_len); if (rc) return rc; @@ -268,8 +327,12 @@ static int cbc_paes_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, unsigned long modifier) ret = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); if (ret) return ret; + memcpy(param.iv, walk.iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); memcpy(param.key, ctx->pk.protkey, MAXPROTKEYSIZE); + spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) != 0) { /* only use complete blocks */ n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1); @@ -280,9 +343,11 @@ static int cbc_paes_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, unsigned long modifier) ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes - k); } if (k < n) { - if (__cbc_paes_set_key(ctx) != 0) + if (__paes_convert_key(ctx)) return skcipher_walk_done(&walk, -EIO); + spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); memcpy(param.key, ctx->pk.protkey, MAXPROTKEYSIZE); + spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); } } return ret; @@ -322,6 +387,7 @@ static int xts_paes_init(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) ctx->kb[0].key = NULL; ctx->kb[1].key = NULL; + spin_lock_init(&ctx->pk_lock); return 0; } @@ -334,12 +400,27 @@ static void xts_paes_exit(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) _free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb[1]); } -static int __xts_paes_set_key(struct s390_pxts_ctx *ctx) +static inline int __xts_paes_convert_key(struct s390_pxts_ctx *ctx) +{ + struct pkey_protkey pkey0, pkey1; + + if (__paes_keyblob2pkey(&ctx->kb[0], &pkey0) || + __paes_keyblob2pkey(&ctx->kb[1], &pkey1)) + return -EINVAL; + + spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + memcpy(&ctx->pk[0], &pkey0, sizeof(pkey0)); + memcpy(&ctx->pk[1], &pkey1, sizeof(pkey1)); + spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + + return 0; +} + +static inline int __xts_paes_set_key(struct s390_pxts_ctx *ctx) { unsigned long fc; - if (__paes_convert_key(&ctx->kb[0], &ctx->pk[0]) || - __paes_convert_key(&ctx->kb[1], &ctx->pk[1])) + if (__xts_paes_convert_key(ctx)) return -EINVAL; if (ctx->pk[0].type != ctx->pk[1].type) @@ -371,10 +452,10 @@ static int xts_paes_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key, _free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb[0]); _free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb[1]); - rc = _copy_key_to_kb(&ctx->kb[0], in_key, key_len); + rc = _key_to_kb(&ctx->kb[0], in_key, key_len); if (rc) return rc; - rc = _copy_key_to_kb(&ctx->kb[1], in_key + key_len, key_len); + rc = _key_to_kb(&ctx->kb[1], in_key + key_len, key_len); if (rc) return rc; @@ -416,15 +497,17 @@ static int xts_paes_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, unsigned long modifier) ret = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); if (ret) return ret; + keylen = (ctx->pk[0].type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? 48 : 64; offset = (ctx->pk[0].type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? 16 : 0; -retry: + memset(&pcc_param, 0, sizeof(pcc_param)); memcpy(pcc_param.tweak, walk.iv, sizeof(pcc_param.tweak)); + spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); memcpy(pcc_param.key + offset, ctx->pk[1].protkey, keylen); - cpacf_pcc(ctx->fc, pcc_param.key + offset); - memcpy(xts_param.key + offset, ctx->pk[0].protkey, keylen); + spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + cpacf_pcc(ctx->fc, pcc_param.key + offset); memcpy(xts_param.init, pcc_param.xts, 16); while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) != 0) { @@ -435,11 +518,15 @@ retry: if (k) ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes - k); if (k < n) { - if (__xts_paes_set_key(ctx) != 0) + if (__xts_paes_convert_key(ctx)) return skcipher_walk_done(&walk, -EIO); - goto retry; + spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + memcpy(xts_param.key + offset, + ctx->pk[0].protkey, keylen); + spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); } } + return ret; } @@ -476,6 +563,7 @@ static int ctr_paes_init(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); ctx->kb.key = NULL; + spin_lock_init(&ctx->pk_lock); return 0; } @@ -487,11 +575,11 @@ static void ctr_paes_exit(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) _free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb); } -static int __ctr_paes_set_key(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx) +static inline int __ctr_paes_set_key(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx) { unsigned long fc; - if (__paes_convert_key(&ctx->kb, &ctx->pk)) + if (__paes_convert_key(ctx)) return -EINVAL; /* Pick the correct function code based on the protected key type */ @@ -513,7 +601,7 @@ static int ctr_paes_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key, struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); _free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb); - rc = _copy_key_to_kb(&ctx->kb, in_key, key_len); + rc = _key_to_kb(&ctx->kb, in_key, key_len); if (rc) return rc; @@ -543,49 +631,65 @@ static int ctr_paes_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req) struct skcipher_walk walk; unsigned int nbytes, n, k; int ret, locked; - - locked = spin_trylock(&ctrblk_lock); + struct { + u8 key[MAXPROTKEYSIZE]; + } param; ret = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); + if (ret) + return ret; + + spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + memcpy(param.key, ctx->pk.protkey, MAXPROTKEYSIZE); + spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + + locked = mutex_trylock(&ctrblk_lock); + while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { n = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; if (nbytes >= 2*AES_BLOCK_SIZE && locked) n = __ctrblk_init(ctrblk, walk.iv, nbytes); ctrptr = (n > AES_BLOCK_SIZE) ? ctrblk : walk.iv; - k = cpacf_kmctr(ctx->fc, ctx->pk.protkey, walk.dst.virt.addr, + k = cpacf_kmctr(ctx->fc, ¶m, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, n, ctrptr); if (k) { if (ctrptr == ctrblk) memcpy(walk.iv, ctrptr + k - AES_BLOCK_SIZE, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); crypto_inc(walk.iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes - n); + ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes - k); } if (k < n) { - if (__ctr_paes_set_key(ctx) != 0) { + if (__paes_convert_key(ctx)) { if (locked) - spin_unlock(&ctrblk_lock); + mutex_unlock(&ctrblk_lock); return skcipher_walk_done(&walk, -EIO); } + spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + memcpy(param.key, ctx->pk.protkey, MAXPROTKEYSIZE); + spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); } } if (locked) - spin_unlock(&ctrblk_lock); + mutex_unlock(&ctrblk_lock); /* * final block may be < AES_BLOCK_SIZE, copy only nbytes */ if (nbytes) { while (1) { - if (cpacf_kmctr(ctx->fc, ctx->pk.protkey, buf, + if (cpacf_kmctr(ctx->fc, ¶m, buf, walk.src.virt.addr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, walk.iv) == AES_BLOCK_SIZE) break; - if (__ctr_paes_set_key(ctx) != 0) + if (__paes_convert_key(ctx)) return skcipher_walk_done(&walk, -EIO); + spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + memcpy(param.key, ctx->pk.protkey, MAXPROTKEYSIZE); + spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); } memcpy(walk.dst.virt.addr, buf, nbytes); crypto_inc(walk.iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, 0); + ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes); } return ret; @@ -618,12 +722,12 @@ static inline void __crypto_unregister_skcipher(struct skcipher_alg *alg) static void paes_s390_fini(void) { - if (ctrblk) - free_page((unsigned long) ctrblk); __crypto_unregister_skcipher(&ctr_paes_alg); __crypto_unregister_skcipher(&xts_paes_alg); __crypto_unregister_skcipher(&cbc_paes_alg); __crypto_unregister_skcipher(&ecb_paes_alg); + if (ctrblk) + free_page((unsigned long) ctrblk); } static int __init paes_s390_init(void) @@ -661,14 +765,14 @@ static int __init paes_s390_init(void) if (cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_128) || cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_192) || cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_256)) { - ret = crypto_register_skcipher(&ctr_paes_alg); - if (ret) - goto out_err; ctrblk = (u8 *) __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (!ctrblk) { ret = -ENOMEM; goto out_err; } + ret = crypto_register_skcipher(&ctr_paes_alg); + if (ret) + goto out_err; } return 0; diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/kprobes.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/kprobes.h index b106aa29bf55..09cdb632a490 100644 --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/kprobes.h +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/kprobes.h @@ -54,7 +54,6 @@ typedef u16 kprobe_opcode_t; struct arch_specific_insn { /* copy of original instruction */ kprobe_opcode_t *insn; - unsigned int is_ftrace_insn : 1; }; struct prev_kprobe { diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/page.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/page.h index a4d38092530a..85e944f04c70 100644 --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/page.h +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/page.h @@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ #define ARCH_HAS_PREPARE_HUGEPAGE #define ARCH_HAS_HUGEPAGE_CLEAR_FLUSH +#define HAVE_ARCH_HUGETLB_UNMAPPED_AREA + #include <asm/setup.h> #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ diff --git a/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/pkey.h b/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/pkey.h index e22f0720bbb8..d27d7d329263 100644 --- a/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/pkey.h +++ b/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/pkey.h @@ -25,10 +25,11 @@ #define MAXPROTKEYSIZE 64 /* a protected key blob may be up to 64 bytes */ #define MAXCLRKEYSIZE 32 /* a clear key value may be up to 32 bytes */ #define MAXAESCIPHERKEYSIZE 136 /* our aes cipher keys have always 136 bytes */ +#define MINEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE 256 /* min EP11 AES key blob size */ +#define MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE 320 /* max EP11 AES key blob size */ -/* Minimum and maximum size of a key blob */ +/* Minimum size of a key blob */ #define MINKEYBLOBSIZE SECKEYBLOBSIZE -#define MAXKEYBLOBSIZE MAXAESCIPHERKEYSIZE /* defines for the type field within the pkey_protkey struct */ #define PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128 1 @@ -39,6 +40,7 @@ enum pkey_key_type { PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA = (__u32) 1, PKEY_TYPE_CCA_CIPHER = (__u32) 2, + PKEY_TYPE_EP11 = (__u32) 3, }; /* the newer ioctls use a pkey_key_size enum for key size information */ @@ -200,7 +202,7 @@ struct pkey_kblob2pkey { /* * Generate secure key, version 2. - * Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. + * Generate CCA AES secure key, CCA AES cipher key or EP11 AES secure key. * There needs to be a list of apqns given with at least one entry in there. * All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns, 0xFFFF as ANY card or domain * is not supported. The implementation walks through the list of apqns and @@ -210,10 +212,13 @@ struct pkey_kblob2pkey { * (return -1 with errno ENODEV). You may use the PKEY_APQNS4KT ioctl to * generate a list of apqns based on the key type to generate. * The keygenflags argument is passed to the low level generation functions - * individual for the key type and has a key type specific meaning. Currently - * only CCA AES cipher keys react to this parameter: Use one or more of the - * PKEY_KEYGEN_* flags to widen the export possibilities. By default a cipher - * key is only exportable for CPACF (PKEY_KEYGEN_XPRT_CPAC). + * individual for the key type and has a key type specific meaning. When + * generating CCA cipher keys you can use one or more of the PKEY_KEYGEN_* + * flags to widen the export possibilities. By default a cipher key is + * only exportable for CPACF (PKEY_KEYGEN_XPRT_CPAC). + * The keygenflag argument for generating an EP11 AES key should either be 0 + * to use the defaults which are XCP_BLOB_ENCRYPT, XCP_BLOB_DECRYPT and + * XCP_BLOB_PROTKEY_EXTRACTABLE or a valid combination of XCP_BLOB_* flags. */ struct pkey_genseck2 { struct pkey_apqn __user *apqns; /* in: ptr to list of apqn targets*/ @@ -229,8 +234,8 @@ struct pkey_genseck2 { /* * Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. - * Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key - * value. + * Construct an CCA AES secure key, CCA AES cipher key or EP11 AES secure + * key from a given clear key value. * There needs to be a list of apqns given with at least one entry in there. * All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns, 0xFFFF as ANY card or domain * is not supported. The implementation walks through the list of apqns and @@ -240,10 +245,13 @@ struct pkey_genseck2 { * (return -1 with errno ENODEV). You may use the PKEY_APQNS4KT ioctl to * generate a list of apqns based on the key type to generate. * The keygenflags argument is passed to the low level generation functions - * individual for the key type and has a key type specific meaning. Currently - * only CCA AES cipher keys react to this parameter: Use one or more of the - * PKEY_KEYGEN_* flags to widen the export possibilities. By default a cipher - * key is only exportable for CPACF (PKEY_KEYGEN_XPRT_CPAC). + * individual for the key type and has a key type specific meaning. When + * generating CCA cipher keys you can use one or more of the PKEY_KEYGEN_* + * flags to widen the export possibilities. By default a cipher key is + * only exportable for CPACF (PKEY_KEYGEN_XPRT_CPAC). + * The keygenflag argument for generating an EP11 AES key should either be 0 + * to use the defaults which are XCP_BLOB_ENCRYPT, XCP_BLOB_DECRYPT and + * XCP_BLOB_PROTKEY_EXTRACTABLE or a valid combination of XCP_BLOB_* flags. */ struct pkey_clr2seck2 { struct pkey_apqn __user *apqns; /* in: ptr to list of apqn targets */ @@ -266,14 +274,19 @@ struct pkey_clr2seck2 { * with one apqn able to handle this key. * The function also checks for the master key verification patterns * of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. - * Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported. - * The flags field is updated with some additional info about the apqn mkvp + * For CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys this means to check + * the key's mkvp against the current or old mkvp of the apqns. The flags + * field is updated with some additional info about the apqn mkvp * match: If the current mkvp matches to the key's mkvp then the * PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP bit is set, if the alternate mkvp matches to * the key's mkvp the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP is set. For CCA keys the * alternate mkvp is the old master key verification pattern. * CCA AES secure keys are also checked to have the CPACF export allowed * bit enabled (XPRTCPAC) in the kmf1 field. + * EP11 keys are also supported and the wkvp of the key is checked against + * the current wkvp of the apqns. There is no alternate for this type of + * key and so on a match the flag PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP always is set. + * EP11 keys are also checked to have XCP_BLOB_PROTKEY_EXTRACTABLE set. * The ioctl returns 0 as long as the given or found apqn matches to * matches with the current or alternate mkvp to the key's mkvp. If the given * apqn does not match or there is no such apqn found, -1 with errno @@ -313,16 +326,20 @@ struct pkey_kblob2pkey2 { /* * Build a list of APQNs based on a key blob given. * Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure - * key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards - * based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys - * need a CEX5C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's - * mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp - * (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may - * be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is - * given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the - * PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to - * return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp + * key, CCA AES cipher key or EP11 AES key) and tries to find all matching + * crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES + * cipher keys need a CEX5C or higher, EP11 keys with BLOB_PKEY_EXTRACTABLE + * need a CEX7 and EP11 api version 4). The list of APQNs is further filtered + * by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp (CCA and + * EP11) or the alternate mkvp (old mkvp, CCA adapters only) of the apqns. The + * flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the + * PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is + * compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it + * is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp * matches. At least one of the matching flags needs to be given. + * The flags argument for EP11 keys has no further action and is currently + * ignored (but needs to be given as PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP) as there is only + * the wkvp from the key to match against the apqn's wkvp. * The list of matching apqns is stored into the space given by the apqns * argument and the number of stored entries goes into apqn_entries. If the list * is empty (apqn_entries is 0) the apqn_entries field is updated to the number @@ -356,6 +373,10 @@ struct pkey_apqns4key { * If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the * current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no match flag is given * (flags is 0) the mkvp values are ignored for the match process. + * For EP11 keys there is only the current wkvp. So if the apqns should also + * match to a given wkvp, then the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP flag should be + * set. The wkvp value is 32 bytes but only the leftmost 16 bytes are compared + * against the leftmost 16 byte of the wkvp of the apqn. * The list of matching apqns is stored into the space given by the apqns * argument and the number of stored entries goes into apqn_entries. If the list * is empty (apqn_entries is 0) the apqn_entries field is updated to the number diff --git a/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/zcrypt.h b/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/zcrypt.h index f9e5e1f0821d..5a2177e96e88 100644 --- a/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/zcrypt.h +++ b/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/zcrypt.h @@ -161,17 +161,17 @@ struct ica_xcRB { * @payload_len: Payload length */ struct ep11_cprb { - __u16 cprb_len; - unsigned char cprb_ver_id; - unsigned char pad_000[2]; - unsigned char flags; - unsigned char func_id[2]; - __u32 source_id; - __u32 target_id; - __u32 ret_code; - __u32 reserved1; - __u32 reserved2; - __u32 payload_len; + __u16 cprb_len; + __u8 cprb_ver_id; + __u8 pad_000[2]; + __u8 flags; + __u8 func_id[2]; + __u32 source_id; + __u32 target_id; + __u32 ret_code; + __u32 reserved1; + __u32 reserved2; + __u32 payload_len; } __attribute__((packed)); /** @@ -197,13 +197,13 @@ struct ep11_target_dev { */ struct ep11_urb { __u16 targets_num; - __u64 targets; + __u8 __user *targets; __u64 weight; __u64 req_no; __u64 req_len; - __u64 req; + __u8 __user *req; __u64 resp_len; - __u64 resp; + __u8 __user *resp; } __attribute__((packed)); /** @@ -237,7 +237,9 @@ struct zcrypt_device_matrix_ext { struct zcrypt_device_status_ext device[MAX_ZDEV_ENTRIES_EXT]; }; -#define AUTOSELECT 0xFFFFFFFF +#define AUTOSELECT 0xFFFFFFFF +#define AUTOSEL_AP ((__u16) 0xFFFF) +#define AUTOSEL_DOM ((__u16) 0xFFFF) #define ZCRYPT_IOCTL_MAGIC 'z' diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ftrace.c index 1bb85f60c0dd..4cd9b1ada834 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/ftrace.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/ftrace.c @@ -72,15 +72,6 @@ static inline void ftrace_generate_orig_insn(struct ftrace_insn *insn) #endif } -static inline int is_kprobe_on_ftrace(struct ftrace_insn *insn) -{ -#ifdef CONFIG_KPROBES - if (insn->opc == BREAKPOINT_INSTRUCTION) - return 1; -#endif - return 0; -} - static inline void ftrace_generate_kprobe_nop_insn(struct ftrace_insn *insn) { #ifdef CONFIG_KPROBES @@ -114,16 +105,6 @@ int ftrace_make_nop(struct module *mod, struct dyn_ftrace *rec, /* Initial code replacement */ ftrace_generate_orig_insn(&orig); ftrace_generate_nop_insn(&new); - } else if (is_kprobe_on_ftrace(&old)) { - /* - * If we find a breakpoint instruction, a kprobe has been - * placed at the beginning of the function. We write the - * constant KPROBE_ON_FTRACE_NOP into the remaining four - * bytes of the original instruction so that the kprobes - * handler can execute a nop, if it reaches this breakpoint. - */ - ftrace_generate_kprobe_call_insn(&orig); - ftrace_generate_kprobe_nop_insn(&new); } else { /* Replace ftrace call with a nop. */ ftrace_generate_call_insn(&orig, rec->ip); @@ -142,21 +123,10 @@ int ftrace_make_call(struct dyn_ftrace *rec, unsigned long addr) if (probe_kernel_read(&old, (void *) rec->ip, sizeof(old))) return -EFAULT; - if (is_kprobe_on_ftrace(&old)) { - /* - * If we find a breakpoint instruction, a kprobe has been - * placed at the beginning of the function. We write the - * constant KPROBE_ON_FTRACE_CALL into the remaining four - * bytes of the original instruction so that the kprobes - * handler can execute a brasl if it reaches this breakpoint. - */ - ftrace_generate_kprobe_nop_insn(&orig); - ftrace_generate_kprobe_call_insn(&new); - } else { - /* Replace nop with an ftrace call. */ - ftrace_generate_nop_insn(&orig); - ftrace_generate_call_insn(&new, rec->ip); - } + /* Replace nop with an ftrace call. */ + ftrace_generate_nop_insn(&orig); + ftrace_generate_call_insn(&new, rec->ip); + /* Verify that the to be replaced code matches what we expect. */ if (memcmp(&orig, &old, sizeof(old))) return -EINVAL; @@ -241,3 +211,45 @@ int ftrace_disable_ftrace_graph_caller(void) } #endif /* CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_KPROBES_ON_FTRACE +void kprobe_ftrace_handler(unsigned long ip, unsigned long parent_ip, + struct ftrace_ops *ops, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + struct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb; + struct kprobe *p = get_kprobe((kprobe_opcode_t *)ip); + + if (unlikely(!p) || kprobe_disabled(p)) + return; + + if (kprobe_running()) { + kprobes_inc_nmissed_count(p); + return; + } + + __this_cpu_write(current_kprobe, p); + + kcb = get_kprobe_ctlblk(); + kcb->kprobe_status = KPROBE_HIT_ACTIVE; + + instruction_pointer_set(regs, ip); + + if (!p->pre_handler || !p->pre_handler(p, regs)) { + + instruction_pointer_set(regs, ip + MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE); + + if (unlikely(p->post_handler)) { + kcb->kprobe_status = KPROBE_HIT_SSDONE; + p->post_handler(p, regs, 0); + } + } + __this_cpu_write(current_kprobe, NULL); +} +NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(kprobe_ftrace_handler); + +int arch_prepare_kprobe_ftrace(struct kprobe *p) +{ + p->ainsn.insn = NULL; + return 0; +} +#endif diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/kprobes.c b/arch/s390/kernel/kprobes.c index 6f1388391620..548d0ea9808d 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/kprobes.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/kprobes.c @@ -56,21 +56,10 @@ struct kprobe_insn_cache kprobe_s390_insn_slots = { static void copy_instruction(struct kprobe *p) { - unsigned long ip = (unsigned long) p->addr; s64 disp, new_disp; u64 addr, new_addr; - if (ftrace_location(ip) == ip) { - /* - * If kprobes patches the instruction that is morphed by - * ftrace make sure that kprobes always sees the branch - * "jg .+24" that skips the mcount block or the "brcl 0,0" - * in case of hotpatch. - */ - ftrace_generate_nop_insn((struct ftrace_insn *)p->ainsn.insn); - p->ainsn.is_ftrace_insn = 1; - } else - memcpy(p->ainsn.insn, p->addr, insn_length(*p->addr >> 8)); + memcpy(p->ainsn.insn, p->addr, insn_length(*p->addr >> 8)); p->opcode = p->ainsn.insn[0]; if (!probe_is_insn_relative_long(p->ainsn.insn)) return; @@ -136,11 +125,6 @@ int arch_prepare_kprobe(struct kprobe *p) } NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(arch_prepare_kprobe); -int arch_check_ftrace_location(struct kprobe *p) -{ - return 0; -} - struct swap_insn_args { struct kprobe *p; unsigned int arm_kprobe : 1; @@ -149,28 +133,11 @@ struct swap_insn_args { static int swap_instruction(void *data) { struct swap_insn_args *args = data; - struct ftrace_insn new_insn, *insn; struct kprobe *p = args->p; - size_t len; - - new_insn.opc = args->arm_kprobe ? BREAKPOINT_INSTRUCTION : p->opcode; - len = sizeof(new_insn.opc); - if (!p->ainsn.is_ftrace_insn) - goto skip_ftrace; - len = sizeof(new_insn); - insn = (struct ftrace_insn *) p->addr; - if (args->arm_kprobe) { - if (is_ftrace_nop(insn)) - new_insn.disp = KPROBE_ON_FTRACE_NOP; - else - new_insn.disp = KPROBE_ON_FTRACE_CALL; - } else { - ftrace_generate_call_insn(&new_insn, (unsigned long)p->addr); - if (insn->disp == KPROBE_ON_FTRACE_NOP) - ftrace_generate_nop_insn(&new_insn); - } -skip_ftrace: - s390_kernel_write(p->addr, &new_insn, len); + u16 opc; + + opc = args->arm_kprobe ? BREAKPOINT_INSTRUCTION : p->opcode; + s390_kernel_write(p->addr, &opc, sizeof(opc)); return 0; } NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(swap_instruction); @@ -464,24 +431,6 @@ static void resume_execution(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) unsigned long ip = regs->psw.addr; int fixup = probe_get_fixup_type(p->ainsn.insn); - /* Check if the kprobes location is an enabled ftrace caller */ - if (p->ainsn.is_ftrace_insn) { - struct ftrace_insn *insn = (struct ftrace_insn *) p->addr; - struct ftrace_insn call_insn; - - ftrace_generate_call_insn(&call_insn, (unsigned long) p->addr); - /* - * A kprobe on an enabled ftrace call site actually single - * stepped an unconditional branch (ftrace nop equivalent). - * Now we need to fixup things and pretend that a brasl r0,... - * was executed instead. - */ - if (insn->disp == KPROBE_ON_FTRACE_CALL) { - ip += call_insn.disp * 2 - MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE; - regs->gprs[0] = (unsigned long)p->addr + sizeof(*insn); - } - } - if (fixup & FIXUP_PSW_NORMAL) ip += (unsigned long) p->addr - (unsigned long) p->ainsn.insn; diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/mcount.S b/arch/s390/kernel/mcount.S index f942341429b1..7458dcfd6464 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/mcount.S +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/mcount.S @@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ ENTRY(ftrace_caller) .globl ftrace_regs_caller .set ftrace_regs_caller,ftrace_caller stg %r14,(__SF_GPRS+8*8)(%r15) # save traced function caller + lghi %r14,0 # save condition code + ipm %r14 # don't put any instructions + sllg %r14,%r14,16 # clobbering CC before this point lgr %r1,%r15 #if !(defined(CC_USING_HOTPATCH) || defined(CC_USING_NOP_MCOUNT)) aghi %r0,MCOUNT_RETURN_FIXUP @@ -54,6 +57,9 @@ ENTRY(ftrace_caller) # allocate pt_regs and stack frame for ftrace_trace_function aghi %r15,-STACK_FRAME_SIZE stg %r1,(STACK_PTREGS_GPRS+15*8)(%r15) + stg %r14,(STACK_PTREGS_PSW)(%r15) + lg %r14,(__SF_GPRS+8*8)(%r1) # restore original return address + stosm (STACK_PTREGS_PSW)(%r15),0 aghi %r1,-TRACED_FUNC_FRAME_SIZE stg %r1,__SF_BACKCHAIN(%r15) stg %r0,(STACK_PTREGS_PSW+8)(%r15) diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/hugetlbpage.c b/arch/s390/mm/hugetlbpage.c index b0246c705a19..5674710a4841 100644 --- a/arch/s390/mm/hugetlbpage.c +++ b/arch/s390/mm/hugetlbpage.c @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ /* * IBM System z Huge TLB Page Support for Kernel. * - * Copyright IBM Corp. 2007,2016 + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2007,2020 * Author(s): Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com> */ @@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/hugetlb.h> +#include <linux/mman.h> +#include <linux/sched/mm.h> +#include <linux/security.h> /* * If the bit selected by single-bit bitmask "a" is set within "x", move @@ -267,3 +270,98 @@ static __init int setup_hugepagesz(char *opt) return 1; } __setup("hugepagesz=", setup_hugepagesz); + +static unsigned long hugetlb_get_unmapped_area_bottomup(struct file *file, + unsigned long addr, unsigned long len, + unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags) +{ + struct hstate *h = hstate_file(file); + struct vm_unmapped_area_info info; + + info.flags = 0; + info.length = len; + info.low_limit = current->mm->mmap_base; + info.high_limit = TASK_SIZE; + info.align_mask = PAGE_MASK & ~huge_page_mask(h); + info.align_offset = 0; + return vm_unmapped_area(&info); +} + +static unsigned long hugetlb_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *file, + unsigned long addr0, unsigned long len, + unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags) +{ + struct hstate *h = hstate_file(file); + struct vm_unmapped_area_info info; + unsigned long addr; + + info.flags = VM_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN; + info.length = len; + info.low_limit = max(PAGE_SIZE, mmap_min_addr); + info.high_limit = current->mm->mmap_base; + info.align_mask = PAGE_MASK & ~huge_page_mask(h); + info.align_offset = 0; + addr = vm_unmapped_area(&info); + + /* + * A failed mmap() very likely causes application failure, + * so fall back to the bottom-up function here. This scenario + * can happen with large stack limits and large mmap() + * allocations. + */ + if (addr & ~PAGE_MASK) { + VM_BUG_ON(addr != -ENOMEM); + info.flags = 0; + info.low_limit = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE; + info.high_limit = TASK_SIZE; + addr = vm_unmapped_area(&info); + } + + return addr; +} + +unsigned long hugetlb_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, + unsigned long len, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags) +{ + struct hstate *h = hstate_file(file); + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + int rc; + + if (len & ~huge_page_mask(h)) + return -EINVAL; + if (len > TASK_SIZE - mmap_min_addr) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (flags & MAP_FIXED) { + if (prepare_hugepage_range(file, addr, len)) + return -EINVAL; + goto check_asce_limit; + } + + if (addr) { + addr = ALIGN(addr, huge_page_size(h)); + vma = find_vma(mm, addr); + if (TASK_SIZE - len >= addr && addr >= mmap_min_addr && + (!vma || addr + len <= vm_start_gap(vma))) + goto check_asce_limit; + } + + if (mm->get_unmapped_area == arch_get_unmapped_area) + addr = hugetlb_get_unmapped_area_bottomup(file, addr, len, + pgoff, flags); + else + addr = hugetlb_get_unmapped_area_topdown(file, addr, len, + pgoff, flags); + if (addr & ~PAGE_MASK) + return addr; + +check_asce_limit: + if (addr + len > current->mm->context.asce_limit && + addr + len <= TASK_SIZE) { + rc = crst_table_upgrade(mm, addr + len); + if (rc) + return (unsigned long) rc; + } + return addr; +} diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/Makefile b/drivers/s390/crypto/Makefile index 52aa95c8af4b..22d2db690cd3 100644 --- a/drivers/s390/crypto/Makefile +++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/Makefile @@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ ap-objs := ap_bus.o ap_card.o ap_queue.o obj-$(subst m,y,$(CONFIG_ZCRYPT)) += ap.o # zcrypt_api.o and zcrypt_msgtype*.o depend on ap.o zcrypt-objs := zcrypt_api.o zcrypt_card.o zcrypt_queue.o -zcrypt-objs += zcrypt_msgtype6.o zcrypt_msgtype50.o zcrypt_ccamisc.o +zcrypt-objs += zcrypt_msgtype6.o zcrypt_msgtype50.o +zcrypt-objs += zcrypt_ccamisc.o zcrypt_ep11misc.o obj-$(CONFIG_ZCRYPT) += zcrypt.o # adapter drivers depend on ap.o and zcrypt.o obj-$(CONFIG_ZCRYPT) += zcrypt_cex2c.o zcrypt_cex2a.o zcrypt_cex4.o diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c b/drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c index d78d77686d7b..71dae64ba994 100644 --- a/drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c +++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include "zcrypt_api.h" #include "zcrypt_ccamisc.h" +#include "zcrypt_ep11misc.h" MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); MODULE_AUTHOR("IBM Corporation"); @@ -71,6 +72,17 @@ struct protaeskeytoken { u8 protkey[MAXPROTKEYSIZE]; /* the protected key blob */ } __packed; +/* inside view of a clear key token (type 0x00 version 0x02) */ +struct clearaeskeytoken { + u8 type; /* 0x00 for PAES specific key tokens */ + u8 res0[3]; + u8 version; /* 0x02 for clear AES key token */ + u8 res1[3]; + u32 keytype; /* key type, one of the PKEY_KEYTYPE values */ + u32 len; /* bytes actually stored in clearkey[] */ + u8 clearkey[0]; /* clear key value */ +} __packed; + /* * Create a protected key from a clear key value. */ @@ -173,6 +185,72 @@ static int pkey_skey2pkey(const u8 *key, struct pkey_protkey *pkey) } /* + * Construct EP11 key with given clear key value. + */ +static int pkey_clr2ep11key(const u8 *clrkey, size_t clrkeylen, + u8 *keybuf, size_t *keybuflen) +{ + int i, rc; + u16 card, dom; + u32 nr_apqns, *apqns = NULL; + + /* build a list of apqns suitable for ep11 keys with cpacf support */ + rc = ep11_findcard2(&apqns, &nr_apqns, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, + ZCRYPT_CEX7, EP11_API_V, NULL); + if (rc) + goto out; + + /* go through the list of apqns and try to bild an ep11 key */ + for (rc = -ENODEV, i = 0; i < nr_apqns; i++) { + card = apqns[i] >> 16; + dom = apqns[i] & 0xFFFF; + rc = ep11_clr2keyblob(card, dom, clrkeylen * 8, + 0, clrkey, keybuf, keybuflen); + if (rc == 0) + break; + } + +out: + kfree(apqns); + if (rc) + DEBUG_DBG("%s failed rc=%d\n", __func__, rc); + return rc; +} + +/* + * Find card and transform EP11 secure key into protected key. + */ +static int pkey_ep11key2pkey(const u8 *key, struct pkey_protkey *pkey) +{ + int i, rc; + u16 card, dom; + u32 nr_apqns, *apqns = NULL; + struct ep11keyblob *kb = (struct ep11keyblob *) key; + + /* build a list of apqns suitable for this key */ + rc = ep11_findcard2(&apqns, &nr_apqns, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, + ZCRYPT_CEX7, EP11_API_V, kb->wkvp); + if (rc) + goto out; + + /* go through the list of apqns and try to derive an pkey */ + for (rc = -ENODEV, i = 0; i < nr_apqns; i++) { + card = apqns[i] >> 16; + dom = apqns[i] & 0xFFFF; + rc = ep11_key2protkey(card, dom, key, kb->head.len, + pkey->protkey, &pkey->len, &pkey->type); + if (rc == 0) + break; + } + +out: + kfree(apqns); + if (rc) + DEBUG_DBG("%s failed rc=%d\n", __func__, rc); + return rc; +} + +/* * Verify key and give back some info about the key. */ static int pkey_verifykey(const struct pkey_seckey *seckey, @@ -305,26 +383,90 @@ static int pkey_verifyprotkey(const struct pkey_protkey *protkey) static int pkey_nonccatok2pkey(const u8 *key, u32 keylen, struct pkey_protkey *protkey) { + int rc = -EINVAL; + u8 *tmpbuf = NULL; struct keytoken_header *hdr = (struct keytoken_header *)key; - struct protaeskeytoken *t; switch (hdr->version) { - case TOKVER_PROTECTED_KEY: - if (keylen != sizeof(struct protaeskeytoken)) - return -EINVAL; + case TOKVER_PROTECTED_KEY: { + struct protaeskeytoken *t; + if (keylen != sizeof(struct protaeskeytoken)) + goto out; t = (struct protaeskeytoken *)key; protkey->len = t->len; protkey->type = t->keytype; memcpy(protkey->protkey, t->protkey, sizeof(protkey->protkey)); - - return pkey_verifyprotkey(protkey); + rc = pkey_verifyprotkey(protkey); + break; + } + case TOKVER_CLEAR_KEY: { + struct clearaeskeytoken *t; + struct pkey_clrkey ckey; + union u_tmpbuf { + u8 skey[SECKEYBLOBSIZE]; + u8 ep11key[MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE]; + }; + size_t tmpbuflen = sizeof(union u_tmpbuf); + + if (keylen < sizeof(struct clearaeskeytoken)) + goto out; + t = (struct clearaeskeytoken *)key; + if (keylen != sizeof(*t) + t->len) + goto out; + if ((t->keytype == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128 && t->len == 16) + || (t->keytype == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192 && t->len == 24) + || (t->keytype == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256 && t->len == 32)) + memcpy(ckey.clrkey, t->clearkey, t->len); + else + goto out; + /* alloc temp key buffer space */ + tmpbuf = kmalloc(tmpbuflen, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!tmpbuf) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + /* try direct way with the PCKMO instruction */ + rc = pkey_clr2protkey(t->keytype, &ckey, protkey); + if (rc == 0) + break; + /* PCKMO failed, so try the CCA secure key way */ + rc = cca_clr2seckey(0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, t->keytype, + ckey.clrkey, tmpbuf); + if (rc == 0) + rc = pkey_skey2pkey(tmpbuf, protkey); + if (rc == 0) + break; + /* if the CCA way also failed, let's try via EP11 */ + rc = pkey_clr2ep11key(ckey.clrkey, t->len, + tmpbuf, &tmpbuflen); + if (rc == 0) + rc = pkey_ep11key2pkey(tmpbuf, protkey); + /* now we should really have an protected key */ + DEBUG_ERR("%s unable to build protected key from clear", + __func__); + break; + } + case TOKVER_EP11_AES: { + if (keylen < MINEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE) + goto out; + /* check ep11 key for exportable as protected key */ + rc = ep11_check_aeskeyblob(debug_info, 3, key, 0, 1); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = pkey_ep11key2pkey(key, protkey); + break; + } default: DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown/unsupported non-CCA token version %d\n", __func__, hdr->version); - return -EINVAL; + rc = -EINVAL; } + +out: + kfree(tmpbuf); + return rc; } /* @@ -403,6 +545,10 @@ static int pkey_genseckey2(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns, if (*keybufsize < SECKEYBLOBSIZE) return -EINVAL; break; + case PKEY_TYPE_EP11: + if (*keybufsize < MINEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE) + return -EINVAL; + break; default: return -EINVAL; } @@ -419,7 +565,10 @@ static int pkey_genseckey2(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns, for (i = 0, rc = -ENODEV; i < nr_apqns; i++) { card = apqns[i].card; dom = apqns[i].domain; - if (ktype == PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA) { + if (ktype == PKEY_TYPE_EP11) { + rc = ep11_genaeskey(card, dom, ksize, kflags, + keybuf, keybufsize); + } else if (ktype == PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA) { rc = cca_genseckey(card, dom, ksize, keybuf); *keybufsize = (rc ? 0 : SECKEYBLOBSIZE); } else /* TOKVER_CCA_VLSC */ @@ -450,6 +599,10 @@ static int pkey_clr2seckey2(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns, if (*keybufsize < SECKEYBLOBSIZE) return -EINVAL; break; + case PKEY_TYPE_EP11: + if (*keybufsize < MINEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE) + return -EINVAL; + break; default: return -EINVAL; } @@ -466,7 +619,10 @@ static int pkey_clr2seckey2(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns, for (i = 0, rc = -ENODEV; i < nr_apqns; i++) { card = apqns[i].card; dom = apqns[i].domain; - if (ktype == PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA) { + if (ktype == PKEY_TYPE_EP11) { + rc = ep11_clr2keyblob(card, dom, ksize, kflags, + clrkey, keybuf, keybufsize); + } else if (ktype == PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA) { rc = cca_clr2seckey(card, dom, ksize, clrkey, keybuf); *keybufsize = (rc ? 0 : SECKEYBLOBSIZE); @@ -489,11 +645,11 @@ static int pkey_verifykey2(const u8 *key, size_t keylen, u32 _nr_apqns, *_apqns = NULL; struct keytoken_header *hdr = (struct keytoken_header *)key; - if (keylen < sizeof(struct keytoken_header) || - hdr->type != TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL) + if (keylen < sizeof(struct keytoken_header)) return -EINVAL; - if (hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_AES) { + if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL + && hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_AES) { struct secaeskeytoken *t = (struct secaeskeytoken *)key; rc = cca_check_secaeskeytoken(debug_info, 3, key, 0); @@ -521,7 +677,8 @@ static int pkey_verifykey2(const u8 *key, size_t keylen, *cardnr = ((struct pkey_apqn *)_apqns)->card; *domain = ((struct pkey_apqn *)_apqns)->domain; - } else if (hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_VLSC) { + } else if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL + && hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_VLSC) { struct cipherkeytoken *t = (struct cipherkeytoken *)key; rc = cca_check_secaescipherkey(debug_info, 3, key, 0, 1); @@ -556,6 +713,29 @@ static int pkey_verifykey2(const u8 *key, size_t keylen, *cardnr = ((struct pkey_apqn *)_apqns)->card; *domain = ((struct pkey_apqn *)_apqns)->domain; + } else if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_NON_CCA + && hdr->version == TOKVER_EP11_AES) { + struct ep11keyblob *kb = (struct ep11keyblob *)key; + + rc = ep11_check_aeskeyblob(debug_info, 3, key, 0, 1); + if (rc) + goto out; + if (ktype) + *ktype = PKEY_TYPE_EP11; + if (ksize) + *ksize = kb->head.keybitlen; + + rc = ep11_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns, *cardnr, *domain, + ZCRYPT_CEX7, EP11_API_V, kb->wkvp); + if (rc) + goto out; + + if (flags) + *flags = PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP; + + *cardnr = ((struct pkey_apqn *)_apqns)->card; + *domain = ((struct pkey_apqn *)_apqns)->domain; + } else rc = -EINVAL; @@ -578,30 +758,32 @@ static int pkey_keyblob2pkey2(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns, if (keylen < sizeof(struct keytoken_header)) return -EINVAL; - switch (hdr->type) { - case TOKTYPE_NON_CCA: - return pkey_nonccatok2pkey(key, keylen, pkey); - case TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL: - switch (hdr->version) { - case TOKVER_CCA_AES: + if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL) { + if (hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_AES) { if (keylen != sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken)) return -EINVAL; if (cca_check_secaeskeytoken(debug_info, 3, key, 0)) return -EINVAL; - break; - case TOKVER_CCA_VLSC: + } else if (hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_VLSC) { if (keylen < hdr->len || keylen > MAXCCAVLSCTOKENSIZE) return -EINVAL; if (cca_check_secaescipherkey(debug_info, 3, key, 0, 1)) return -EINVAL; - break; - default: + } else { DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown CCA internal token version %d\n", __func__, hdr->version); return -EINVAL; } - break; - default: + } else if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_NON_CCA) { + if (hdr->version == TOKVER_EP11_AES) { + if (keylen < sizeof(struct ep11keyblob)) + return -EINVAL; + if (ep11_check_aeskeyblob(debug_info, 3, key, 0, 1)) + return -EINVAL; + } else { + return pkey_nonccatok2pkey(key, keylen, pkey); + } + } else { DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown/unsupported blob type %d\n", __func__, hdr->type); return -EINVAL; @@ -611,12 +793,21 @@ static int pkey_keyblob2pkey2(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns, for (i = 0, rc = -ENODEV; i < nr_apqns; i++) { card = apqns[i].card; dom = apqns[i].domain; - if (hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_AES) + if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL + && hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_AES) rc = cca_sec2protkey(card, dom, key, pkey->protkey, &pkey->len, &pkey->type); - else /* TOKVER_CCA_VLSC */ + else if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL + && hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_VLSC) rc = cca_cipher2protkey(card, dom, key, pkey->protkey, &pkey->len, &pkey->type); + else { /* EP11 AES secure key blob */ + struct ep11keyblob *kb = (struct ep11keyblob *) key; + + rc = ep11_key2protkey(card, dom, key, kb->head.len, + pkey->protkey, &pkey->len, + &pkey->type); + } if (rc == 0) break; } @@ -631,12 +822,24 @@ static int pkey_apqns4key(const u8 *key, size_t keylen, u32 flags, u32 _nr_apqns, *_apqns = NULL; struct keytoken_header *hdr = (struct keytoken_header *)key; - if (keylen < sizeof(struct keytoken_header) || - hdr->type != TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL || - flags == 0) + if (keylen < sizeof(struct keytoken_header) || flags == 0) return -EINVAL; - if (hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_AES || hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_VLSC) { + if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_NON_CCA && hdr->version == TOKVER_EP11_AES) { + int minhwtype = 0, api = 0; + struct ep11keyblob *kb = (struct ep11keyblob *) key; + + if (flags != PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP) + return -EINVAL; + if (kb->attr & EP11_BLOB_PKEY_EXTRACTABLE) { + minhwtype = ZCRYPT_CEX7; + api = EP11_API_V; + } + rc = ep11_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, + minhwtype, api, kb->wkvp); + if (rc) + goto out; + } else if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL) { int minhwtype = ZCRYPT_CEX3C; u64 cur_mkvp = 0, old_mkvp = 0; @@ -647,7 +850,7 @@ static int pkey_apqns4key(const u8 *key, size_t keylen, u32 flags, cur_mkvp = t->mkvp; if (flags & PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP) old_mkvp = t->mkvp; - } else { + } else if (hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_VLSC) { struct cipherkeytoken *t = (struct cipherkeytoken *)key; minhwtype = ZCRYPT_CEX6; @@ -655,19 +858,24 @@ static int pkey_apqns4key(const u8 *key, size_t keylen, u32 flags, cur_mkvp = t->mkvp0; if (flags & PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP) old_mkvp = t->mkvp0; + } else { + /* unknown cca internal token type */ + return -EINVAL; } rc = cca_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, minhwtype, cur_mkvp, old_mkvp, 1); if (rc) goto out; - if (apqns) { - if (*nr_apqns < _nr_apqns) - rc = -ENOSPC; - else - memcpy(apqns, _apqns, _nr_apqns * sizeof(u32)); - } - *nr_apqns = _nr_apqns; + } else + return -EINVAL; + + if (apqns) { + if (*nr_apqns < _nr_apqns) + rc = -ENOSPC; + else + memcpy(apqns, _apqns, _nr_apqns * sizeof(u32)); } + *nr_apqns = _nr_apqns; out: kfree(_apqns); @@ -695,14 +903,26 @@ static int pkey_apqns4keytype(enum pkey_key_type ktype, minhwtype, cur_mkvp, old_mkvp, 1); if (rc) goto out; - if (apqns) { - if (*nr_apqns < _nr_apqns) - rc = -ENOSPC; - else - memcpy(apqns, _apqns, _nr_apqns * sizeof(u32)); - } - *nr_apqns = _nr_apqns; + } else if (ktype == PKEY_TYPE_EP11) { + u8 *wkvp = NULL; + + if (flags & PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP) + wkvp = cur_mkvp; + rc = ep11_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, + ZCRYPT_CEX7, EP11_API_V, wkvp); + if (rc) + goto out; + + } else + return -EINVAL; + + if (apqns) { + if (*nr_apqns < _nr_apqns) + rc = -ENOSPC; + else + memcpy(apqns, _apqns, _nr_apqns * sizeof(u32)); } + *nr_apqns = _nr_apqns; out: kfree(_apqns); @@ -1357,8 +1577,9 @@ static ssize_t pkey_ccacipher_aes_attr_read(enum pkey_key_size keybits, bool is_xts, char *buf, loff_t off, size_t count) { - size_t keysize; - int rc; + int i, rc, card, dom; + u32 nr_apqns, *apqns = NULL; + size_t keysize = CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE; if (off != 0 || count < CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE) return -EINVAL; @@ -1366,22 +1587,31 @@ static ssize_t pkey_ccacipher_aes_attr_read(enum pkey_key_size keybits, if (count < 2 * CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE) return -EINVAL; - keysize = CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE; - rc = cca_gencipherkey(-1, -1, keybits, 0, buf, &keysize); + /* build a list of apqns able to generate an cipher key */ + rc = cca_findcard2(&apqns, &nr_apqns, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, + ZCRYPT_CEX6, 0, 0, 0); if (rc) return rc; - memset(buf + keysize, 0, CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE - keysize); - if (is_xts) { - keysize = CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE; - rc = cca_gencipherkey(-1, -1, keybits, 0, - buf + CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE, &keysize); + memset(buf, 0, is_xts ? 2 * keysize : keysize); + + /* simple try all apqns from the list */ + for (i = 0, rc = -ENODEV; i < nr_apqns; i++) { + card = apqns[i] >> 16; + dom = apqns[i] & 0xFFFF; + rc = cca_gencipherkey(card, dom, keybits, 0, buf, &keysize); + if (rc == 0) + break; + } if (rc) return rc; - memset(buf + CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE + keysize, 0, - CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE - keysize); - return 2 * CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE; + if (is_xts) { + keysize = CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE; + buf += CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE; + rc = cca_gencipherkey(card, dom, keybits, 0, buf, &keysize); + if (rc == 0) + return 2 * CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE; } return CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE; @@ -1457,10 +1687,134 @@ static struct attribute_group ccacipher_attr_group = { .bin_attrs = ccacipher_attrs, }; +/* + * Sysfs attribute read function for all ep11 aes key binary attributes. + * The implementation can not deal with partial reads, because a new random + * secure key blob is generated with each read. In case of partial reads + * (i.e. off != 0 or count < key blob size) -EINVAL is returned. + * This function and the sysfs attributes using it provide EP11 key blobs + * padded to the upper limit of MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE which is currently + * 320 bytes. + */ +static ssize_t pkey_ep11_aes_attr_read(enum pkey_key_size keybits, + bool is_xts, char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + int i, rc, card, dom; + u32 nr_apqns, *apqns = NULL; + size_t keysize = MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE; + + if (off != 0 || count < MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE) + return -EINVAL; + if (is_xts) + if (count < 2 * MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE) + return -EINVAL; + + /* build a list of apqns able to generate an cipher key */ + rc = ep11_findcard2(&apqns, &nr_apqns, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, + ZCRYPT_CEX7, EP11_API_V, NULL); + if (rc) + return rc; + + memset(buf, 0, is_xts ? 2 * keysize : keysize); + + /* simple try all apqns from the list */ + for (i = 0, rc = -ENODEV; i < nr_apqns; i++) { + card = apqns[i] >> 16; + dom = apqns[i] & 0xFFFF; + rc = ep11_genaeskey(card, dom, keybits, 0, buf, &keysize); + if (rc == 0) + break; + } + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (is_xts) { + keysize = MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE; + buf += MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE; + rc = ep11_genaeskey(card, dom, keybits, 0, buf, &keysize); + if (rc == 0) + return 2 * MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE; + } + + return MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE; +} + +static ssize_t ep11_aes_128_read(struct file *filp, + struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, + char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + return pkey_ep11_aes_attr_read(PKEY_SIZE_AES_128, false, buf, + off, count); +} + +static ssize_t ep11_aes_192_read(struct file *filp, + struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, + char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + return pkey_ep11_aes_attr_read(PKEY_SIZE_AES_192, false, buf, + off, count); +} + +static ssize_t ep11_aes_256_read(struct file *filp, + struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, + char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + return pkey_ep11_aes_attr_read(PKEY_SIZE_AES_256, false, buf, + off, count); +} + +static ssize_t ep11_aes_128_xts_read(struct file *filp, + struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, + char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + return pkey_ep11_aes_attr_read(PKEY_SIZE_AES_128, true, buf, + off, count); +} + +static ssize_t ep11_aes_256_xts_read(struct file *filp, + struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, + char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + return pkey_ep11_aes_attr_read(PKEY_SIZE_AES_256, true, buf, + off, count); +} + +static BIN_ATTR_RO(ep11_aes_128, MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE); +static BIN_ATTR_RO(ep11_aes_192, MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE); +static BIN_ATTR_RO(ep11_aes_256, MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE); +static BIN_ATTR_RO(ep11_aes_128_xts, 2 * MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE); +static BIN_ATTR_RO(ep11_aes_256_xts, 2 * MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE); + +static struct bin_attribute *ep11_attrs[] = { + &bin_attr_ep11_aes_128, + &bin_attr_ep11_aes_192, + &bin_attr_ep11_aes_256, + &bin_attr_ep11_aes_128_xts, + &bin_attr_ep11_aes_256_xts, + NULL +}; + +static struct attribute_group ep11_attr_group = { + .name = "ep11", + .bin_attrs = ep11_attrs, +}; + static const struct attribute_group *pkey_attr_groups[] = { &protkey_attr_group, &ccadata_attr_group, &ccacipher_attr_group, + &ep11_attr_group, NULL, }; diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.c b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.c index 9157e728a362..a42257d6c79e 100644 --- a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.c +++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.c @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ #include "zcrypt_msgtype6.h" #include "zcrypt_msgtype50.h" #include "zcrypt_ccamisc.h" +#include "zcrypt_ep11misc.h" /* * Module description. @@ -849,7 +850,7 @@ static long _zcrypt_send_cprb(struct ap_perms *perms, /* check if device is online and eligible */ if (!zq->online || !zq->ops->send_cprb || - (tdom != (unsigned short) AUTOSELECT && + (tdom != AUTOSEL_DOM && tdom != AP_QID_QUEUE(zq->queue->qid))) continue; /* check if device node has admission for this queue */ @@ -874,7 +875,7 @@ static long _zcrypt_send_cprb(struct ap_perms *perms, /* in case of auto select, provide the correct domain */ qid = pref_zq->queue->qid; - if (*domain == (unsigned short) AUTOSELECT) + if (*domain == AUTOSEL_DOM) *domain = AP_QID_QUEUE(qid); rc = pref_zq->ops->send_cprb(pref_zq, xcRB, &ap_msg); @@ -901,7 +902,7 @@ static bool is_desired_ep11_card(unsigned int dev_id, struct ep11_target_dev *targets) { while (target_num-- > 0) { - if (dev_id == targets->ap_id) + if (targets->ap_id == dev_id || targets->ap_id == AUTOSEL_AP) return true; targets++; } @@ -912,16 +913,19 @@ static bool is_desired_ep11_queue(unsigned int dev_qid, unsigned short target_num, struct ep11_target_dev *targets) { + int card = AP_QID_CARD(dev_qid), dom = AP_QID_QUEUE(dev_qid); + while (target_num-- > 0) { - if (AP_MKQID(targets->ap_id, targets->dom_id) == dev_qid) + if ((targets->ap_id == card || targets->ap_id == AUTOSEL_AP) && + (targets->dom_id == dom || targets->dom_id == AUTOSEL_DOM)) return true; targets++; } return false; } -static long zcrypt_send_ep11_cprb(struct ap_perms *perms, - struct ep11_urb *xcrb) +static long _zcrypt_send_ep11_cprb(struct ap_perms *perms, + struct ep11_urb *xcrb) { struct zcrypt_card *zc, *pref_zc; struct zcrypt_queue *zq, *pref_zq; @@ -1026,6 +1030,12 @@ out: return rc; } +long zcrypt_send_ep11_cprb(struct ep11_urb *xcrb) +{ + return _zcrypt_send_ep11_cprb(&ap_perms, xcrb); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(zcrypt_send_ep11_cprb); + static long zcrypt_rng(char *buffer) { struct zcrypt_card *zc, *pref_zc; @@ -1366,12 +1376,12 @@ static long zcrypt_unlocked_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, if (copy_from_user(&xcrb, uxcrb, sizeof(xcrb))) return -EFAULT; do { - rc = zcrypt_send_ep11_cprb(perms, &xcrb); + rc = _zcrypt_send_ep11_cprb(perms, &xcrb); } while (rc == -EAGAIN); /* on failure: retry once again after a requested rescan */ if ((rc == -ENODEV) && (zcrypt_process_rescan())) do { - rc = zcrypt_send_ep11_cprb(perms, &xcrb); + rc = _zcrypt_send_ep11_cprb(perms, &xcrb); } while (rc == -EAGAIN); if (rc) ZCRYPT_DBF(DBF_DEBUG, "ioctl ZSENDEP11CPRB rc=%d\n", rc); @@ -1885,6 +1895,7 @@ void __exit zcrypt_api_exit(void) zcrypt_msgtype6_exit(); zcrypt_msgtype50_exit(); zcrypt_ccamisc_exit(); + zcrypt_ep11misc_exit(); zcrypt_debug_exit(); } diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.h b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.h index d464618cd84f..599e68bf53f7 100644 --- a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.h +++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.h @@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ struct zcrypt_ops *zcrypt_msgtype(unsigned char *, int); int zcrypt_api_init(void); void zcrypt_api_exit(void); long zcrypt_send_cprb(struct ica_xcRB *xcRB); +long zcrypt_send_ep11_cprb(struct ep11_urb *urb); void zcrypt_device_status_mask_ext(struct zcrypt_device_status_ext *devstatus); int zcrypt_device_status_ext(int card, int queue, struct zcrypt_device_status_ext *devstatus); diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.h b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.h index 77b6cc7b8f82..3a9876d5ab0e 100644 --- a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.h +++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.h @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ /* For TOKTYPE_NON_CCA: */ #define TOKVER_PROTECTED_KEY 0x01 /* Protected key token */ +#define TOKVER_CLEAR_KEY 0x02 /* Clear key token */ /* For TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL: */ #define TOKVER_CCA_AES 0x04 /* CCA AES key token */ diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cex4.c b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cex4.c index 6fabc906114c..9a9d02e19774 100644 --- a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cex4.c +++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cex4.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include "zcrypt_error.h" #include "zcrypt_cex4.h" #include "zcrypt_ccamisc.h" +#include "zcrypt_ep11misc.h" #define CEX4A_MIN_MOD_SIZE 1 /* 8 bits */ #define CEX4A_MAX_MOD_SIZE_2K 256 /* 2048 bits */ @@ -71,11 +72,11 @@ static struct ap_device_id zcrypt_cex4_queue_ids[] = { MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(ap, zcrypt_cex4_queue_ids); /* - * CCA card addditional device attributes + * CCA card additional device attributes */ -static ssize_t serialnr_show(struct device *dev, - struct device_attribute *attr, - char *buf) +static ssize_t cca_serialnr_show(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) { struct cca_info ci; struct ap_card *ac = to_ap_card(dev); @@ -88,23 +89,25 @@ static ssize_t serialnr_show(struct device *dev, return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", ci.serial); } -static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(serialnr); + +static struct device_attribute dev_attr_cca_serialnr = + __ATTR(serialnr, 0444, cca_serialnr_show, NULL); static struct attribute *cca_card_attrs[] = { - &dev_attr_serialnr.attr, + &dev_attr_cca_serialnr.attr, NULL, }; -static const struct attribute_group cca_card_attr_group = { +static const struct attribute_group cca_card_attr_grp = { .attrs = cca_card_attrs, }; -/* - * CCA queue addditional device attributes - */ -static ssize_t mkvps_show(struct device *dev, - struct device_attribute *attr, - char *buf) + /* + * CCA queue additional device attributes + */ +static ssize_t cca_mkvps_show(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) { int n = 0; struct cca_info ci; @@ -138,17 +141,233 @@ static ssize_t mkvps_show(struct device *dev, return n; } -static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(mkvps); + +static struct device_attribute dev_attr_cca_mkvps = + __ATTR(mkvps, 0444, cca_mkvps_show, NULL); static struct attribute *cca_queue_attrs[] = { - &dev_attr_mkvps.attr, + &dev_attr_cca_mkvps.attr, NULL, }; -static const struct attribute_group cca_queue_attr_group = { +static const struct attribute_group cca_queue_attr_grp = { .attrs = cca_queue_attrs, }; +/* + * EP11 card additional device attributes + */ +static ssize_t ep11_api_ordinalnr_show(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + struct ep11_card_info ci; + struct ap_card *ac = to_ap_card(dev); + struct zcrypt_card *zc = ac->private; + + memset(&ci, 0, sizeof(ci)); + + ep11_get_card_info(ac->id, &ci, zc->online); + + if (ci.API_ord_nr > 0) + return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%u\n", ci.API_ord_nr); + else + return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "\n"); +} + +static struct device_attribute dev_attr_ep11_api_ordinalnr = + __ATTR(API_ordinalnr, 0444, ep11_api_ordinalnr_show, NULL); + +static ssize_t ep11_fw_version_show(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + struct ep11_card_info ci; + struct ap_card *ac = to_ap_card(dev); + struct zcrypt_card *zc = ac->private; + + memset(&ci, 0, sizeof(ci)); + + ep11_get_card_info(ac->id, &ci, zc->online); + + if (ci.FW_version > 0) + return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d.%d\n", + (int)(ci.FW_version >> 8), + (int)(ci.FW_version & 0xFF)); + else + return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "\n"); +} + +static struct device_attribute dev_attr_ep11_fw_version = + __ATTR(FW_version, 0444, ep11_fw_version_show, NULL); + +static ssize_t ep11_serialnr_show(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + struct ep11_card_info ci; + struct ap_card *ac = to_ap_card(dev); + struct zcrypt_card *zc = ac->private; + + memset(&ci, 0, sizeof(ci)); + + ep11_get_card_info(ac->id, &ci, zc->online); + + if (ci.serial[0]) + return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%16.16s\n", ci.serial); + else + return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "\n"); +} + +static struct device_attribute dev_attr_ep11_serialnr = + __ATTR(serialnr, 0444, ep11_serialnr_show, NULL); + +static const struct { + int mode_bit; + const char *mode_txt; +} ep11_op_modes[] = { + { 0, "FIPS2009" }, + { 1, "BSI2009" }, + { 2, "FIPS2011" }, + { 3, "BSI2011" }, + { 6, "BSICC2017" }, + { 0, NULL } +}; + +static ssize_t ep11_card_op_modes_show(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + int i, n = 0; + struct ep11_card_info ci; + struct ap_card *ac = to_ap_card(dev); + struct zcrypt_card *zc = ac->private; + + memset(&ci, 0, sizeof(ci)); + + ep11_get_card_info(ac->id, &ci, zc->online); + + for (i = 0; ep11_op_modes[i].mode_txt; i++) { + if (ci.op_mode & (1 << ep11_op_modes[i].mode_bit)) { + if (n > 0) + buf[n++] = ' '; + n += snprintf(buf + n, PAGE_SIZE - n, + "%s", ep11_op_modes[i].mode_txt); + } + } + n += snprintf(buf + n, PAGE_SIZE - n, "\n"); + + return n; +} + +static struct device_attribute dev_attr_ep11_card_op_modes = + __ATTR(op_modes, 0444, ep11_card_op_modes_show, NULL); + +static struct attribute *ep11_card_attrs[] = { + &dev_attr_ep11_api_ordinalnr.attr, + &dev_attr_ep11_fw_version.attr, + &dev_attr_ep11_serialnr.attr, + &dev_attr_ep11_card_op_modes.attr, + NULL, +}; + +static const struct attribute_group ep11_card_attr_grp = { + .attrs = ep11_card_attrs, +}; + +/* + * EP11 queue additional device attributes + */ + +static ssize_t ep11_mkvps_show(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + int n = 0; + struct ep11_domain_info di; + struct zcrypt_queue *zq = to_ap_queue(dev)->private; + static const char * const cwk_state[] = { "invalid", "valid" }; + static const char * const nwk_state[] = { "empty", "uncommitted", + "committed" }; + + memset(&di, 0, sizeof(di)); + + if (zq->online) + ep11_get_domain_info(AP_QID_CARD(zq->queue->qid), + AP_QID_QUEUE(zq->queue->qid), + &di); + + if (di.cur_wk_state == '0') { + n = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "WK CUR: %s -\n", + cwk_state[di.cur_wk_state - '0']); + } else if (di.cur_wk_state == '1') { + n = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "WK CUR: %s 0x", + cwk_state[di.cur_wk_state - '0']); + bin2hex(buf + n, di.cur_wkvp, sizeof(di.cur_wkvp)); + n += 2 * sizeof(di.cur_wkvp); + n += snprintf(buf + n, PAGE_SIZE - n, "\n"); + } else + n = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "WK CUR: - -\n"); + + if (di.new_wk_state == '0') { + n += snprintf(buf + n, PAGE_SIZE - n, "WK NEW: %s -\n", + nwk_state[di.new_wk_state - '0']); + } else if (di.new_wk_state >= '1' && di.new_wk_state <= '2') { + n += snprintf(buf + n, PAGE_SIZE - n, "WK NEW: %s 0x", + nwk_state[di.new_wk_state - '0']); + bin2hex(buf + n, di.new_wkvp, sizeof(di.new_wkvp)); + n += 2 * sizeof(di.new_wkvp); + n += snprintf(buf + n, PAGE_SIZE - n, "\n"); + } else + n += snprintf(buf + n, PAGE_SIZE - n, "WK NEW: - -\n"); + + return n; +} + +static struct device_attribute dev_attr_ep11_mkvps = + __ATTR(mkvps, 0444, ep11_mkvps_show, NULL); + +static ssize_t ep11_queue_op_modes_show(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + int i, n = 0; + struct ep11_domain_info di; + struct zcrypt_queue *zq = to_ap_queue(dev)->private; + + memset(&di, 0, sizeof(di)); + + if (zq->online) + ep11_get_domain_info(AP_QID_CARD(zq->queue->qid), + AP_QID_QUEUE(zq->queue->qid), + &di); + + for (i = 0; ep11_op_modes[i].mode_txt; i++) { + if (di.op_mode & (1 << ep11_op_modes[i].mode_bit)) { + if (n > 0) + buf[n++] = ' '; + n += snprintf(buf + n, PAGE_SIZE - n, + "%s", ep11_op_modes[i].mode_txt); + } + } + n += snprintf(buf + n, PAGE_SIZE - n, "\n"); + + return n; +} + +static struct device_attribute dev_attr_ep11_queue_op_modes = + __ATTR(op_modes, 0444, ep11_queue_op_modes_show, NULL); + +static struct attribute *ep11_queue_attrs[] = { + &dev_attr_ep11_mkvps.attr, + &dev_attr_ep11_queue_op_modes.attr, + NULL, +}; + +static const struct attribute_group ep11_queue_attr_grp = { + .attrs = ep11_queue_attrs, +}; + /** * Probe function for CEX4/CEX5/CEX6/CEX7 card device. It always * accepts the AP device since the bus_match already checked @@ -313,7 +532,12 @@ static int zcrypt_cex4_card_probe(struct ap_device *ap_dev) if (ap_test_bit(&ac->functions, AP_FUNC_COPRO)) { rc = sysfs_create_group(&ap_dev->device.kobj, - &cca_card_attr_group); + &cca_card_attr_grp); + if (rc) + zcrypt_card_unregister(zc); + } else if (ap_test_bit(&ac->functions, AP_FUNC_EP11)) { + rc = sysfs_create_group(&ap_dev->device.kobj, + &ep11_card_attr_grp); if (rc) zcrypt_card_unregister(zc); } @@ -332,7 +556,9 @@ static void zcrypt_cex4_card_remove(struct ap_device *ap_dev) struct zcrypt_card *zc = ac->private; if (ap_test_bit(&ac->functions, AP_FUNC_COPRO)) - sysfs_remove_group(&ap_dev->device.kobj, &cca_card_attr_group); + sysfs_remove_group(&ap_dev->device.kobj, &cca_card_attr_grp); + else if (ap_test_bit(&ac->functions, AP_FUNC_EP11)) + sysfs_remove_group(&ap_dev->device.kobj, &ep11_card_attr_grp); if (zc) zcrypt_card_unregister(zc); } @@ -394,7 +620,12 @@ static int zcrypt_cex4_queue_probe(struct ap_device *ap_dev) if (ap_test_bit(&aq->card->functions, AP_FUNC_COPRO)) { rc = sysfs_create_group(&ap_dev->device.kobj, - &cca_queue_attr_group); + &cca_queue_attr_grp); + if (rc) + zcrypt_queue_unregister(zq); + } else if (ap_test_bit(&aq->card->functions, AP_FUNC_EP11)) { + rc = sysfs_create_group(&ap_dev->device.kobj, + &ep11_queue_attr_grp); if (rc) zcrypt_queue_unregister(zq); } @@ -413,7 +644,9 @@ static void zcrypt_cex4_queue_remove(struct ap_device *ap_dev) struct zcrypt_queue *zq = aq->private; if (ap_test_bit(&aq->card->functions, AP_FUNC_COPRO)) - sysfs_remove_group(&ap_dev->device.kobj, &cca_queue_attr_group); + sysfs_remove_group(&ap_dev->device.kobj, &cca_queue_attr_grp); + else if (ap_test_bit(&aq->card->functions, AP_FUNC_EP11)) + sysfs_remove_group(&ap_dev->device.kobj, &ep11_queue_attr_grp); if (zq) zcrypt_queue_unregister(zq); } diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ep11misc.c b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ep11misc.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d4caf46ff9df --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ep11misc.c @@ -0,0 +1,1293 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +/* + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 + * Author(s): Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> + * + * Collection of EP11 misc functions used by zcrypt and pkey + */ + +#define KMSG_COMPONENT "zcrypt" +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KMSG_COMPONENT ": " fmt + +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/random.h> +#include <asm/zcrypt.h> +#include <asm/pkey.h> + +#include "ap_bus.h" +#include "zcrypt_api.h" +#include "zcrypt_debug.h" +#include "zcrypt_msgtype6.h" +#include "zcrypt_ep11misc.h" +#include "zcrypt_ccamisc.h" + +#define DEBUG_DBG(...) ZCRYPT_DBF(DBF_DEBUG, ##__VA_ARGS__) +#define DEBUG_INFO(...) ZCRYPT_DBF(DBF_INFO, ##__VA_ARGS__) +#define DEBUG_WARN(...) ZCRYPT_DBF(DBF_WARN, ##__VA_ARGS__) +#define DEBUG_ERR(...) ZCRYPT_DBF(DBF_ERR, ##__VA_ARGS__) + +/* default iv used here */ +static const u8 def_iv[16] = { 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, + 0x88, 0x99, 0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd, 0xee, 0xff }; + +/* ep11 card info cache */ +struct card_list_entry { + struct list_head list; + u16 cardnr; + struct ep11_card_info info; +}; +static LIST_HEAD(card_list); +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(card_list_lock); + +static int card_cache_fetch(u16 cardnr, struct ep11_card_info *ci) +{ + int rc = -ENOENT; + struct card_list_entry *ptr; + + spin_lock_bh(&card_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &card_list, list) { + if (ptr->cardnr == cardnr) { + memcpy(ci, &ptr->info, sizeof(*ci)); + rc = 0; + break; + } + } + spin_unlock_bh(&card_list_lock); + + return rc; +} + +static void card_cache_update(u16 cardnr, const struct ep11_card_info *ci) +{ + int found = 0; + struct card_list_entry *ptr; + + spin_lock_bh(&card_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &card_list, list) { + if (ptr->cardnr == cardnr) { + memcpy(&ptr->info, ci, sizeof(*ci)); + found = 1; + break; + } + } + if (!found) { + ptr = kmalloc(sizeof(*ptr), GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!ptr) { + spin_unlock_bh(&card_list_lock); + return; + } + ptr->cardnr = cardnr; + memcpy(&ptr->info, ci, sizeof(*ci)); + list_add(&ptr->list, &card_list); + } + spin_unlock_bh(&card_list_lock); +} + +static void card_cache_scrub(u16 cardnr) +{ + struct card_list_entry *ptr; + + spin_lock_bh(&card_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &card_list, list) { + if (ptr->cardnr == cardnr) { + list_del(&ptr->list); + kfree(ptr); + break; + } + } + spin_unlock_bh(&card_list_lock); +} + +static void __exit card_cache_free(void) +{ + struct card_list_entry *ptr, *pnext; + + spin_lock_bh(&card_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry_safe(ptr, pnext, &card_list, list) { + list_del(&ptr->list); + kfree(ptr); + } + spin_unlock_bh(&card_list_lock); +} + +/* + * Simple check if the key blob is a valid EP11 secure AES key. + */ +int ep11_check_aeskeyblob(debug_info_t *dbg, int dbflvl, + const u8 *key, int keybitsize, + int checkcpacfexport) +{ + struct ep11keyblob *kb = (struct ep11keyblob *) key; + +#define DBF(...) debug_sprintf_event(dbg, dbflvl, ##__VA_ARGS__) + + if (kb->head.type != TOKTYPE_NON_CCA) { + if (dbg) + DBF("%s key check failed, type 0x%02x != 0x%02x\n", + __func__, (int) kb->head.type, TOKTYPE_NON_CCA); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (kb->head.version != TOKVER_EP11_AES) { + if (dbg) + DBF("%s key check failed, version 0x%02x != 0x%02x\n", + __func__, (int) kb->head.version, TOKVER_EP11_AES); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (kb->version != EP11_STRUCT_MAGIC) { + if (dbg) + DBF("%s key check failed, magic 0x%04x != 0x%04x\n", + __func__, (int) kb->version, EP11_STRUCT_MAGIC); + return -EINVAL; + } + switch (kb->head.keybitlen) { + case 128: + case 192: + case 256: + break; + default: + if (dbg) + DBF("%s key check failed, keybitlen %d invalid\n", + __func__, (int) kb->head.keybitlen); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (keybitsize > 0 && keybitsize != (int) kb->head.keybitlen) { + DBF("%s key check failed, keybitsize %d\n", + __func__, keybitsize); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (checkcpacfexport && !(kb->attr & EP11_BLOB_PKEY_EXTRACTABLE)) { + if (dbg) + DBF("%s key check failed, PKEY_EXTRACTABLE is 0\n", + __func__); + return -EINVAL; + } +#undef DBF + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ep11_check_aeskeyblob); + +/* + * Helper function which calls zcrypt_send_ep11_cprb with + * memory management segment adjusted to kernel space + * so that the copy_from_user called within this + * function do in fact copy from kernel space. + */ +static inline int _zcrypt_send_ep11_cprb(struct ep11_urb *urb) +{ + int rc; + mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs(); + + set_fs(KERNEL_DS); + rc = zcrypt_send_ep11_cprb(urb); + set_fs(old_fs); + + return rc; +} + +/* + * Allocate and prepare ep11 cprb plus additional payload. + */ +static inline struct ep11_cprb *alloc_cprb(size_t payload_len) +{ + size_t len = sizeof(struct ep11_cprb) + payload_len; + struct ep11_cprb *cprb; + + cprb = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!cprb) + return NULL; + + memset(cprb, 0, len); + cprb->cprb_len = sizeof(struct ep11_cprb); + cprb->cprb_ver_id = 0x04; + memcpy(cprb->func_id, "T4", 2); + cprb->ret_code = 0xFFFFFFFF; + cprb->payload_len = payload_len; + + return cprb; +} + +/* + * Some helper functions related to ASN1 encoding. + * Limited to length info <= 2 byte. + */ + +#define ASN1TAGLEN(x) (2 + (x) + ((x) > 127 ? 1 : 0) + ((x) > 255 ? 1 : 0)) + +static int asn1tag_write(u8 *ptr, u8 tag, const u8 *pvalue, u16 valuelen) +{ + ptr[0] = tag; + if (valuelen > 255) { + ptr[1] = 0x82; + *((u16 *)(ptr + 2)) = valuelen; + memcpy(ptr + 4, pvalue, valuelen); + return 4 + valuelen; + } + if (valuelen > 127) { + ptr[1] = 0x81; + ptr[2] = (u8) valuelen; + memcpy(ptr + 3, pvalue, valuelen); + return 3 + valuelen; + } + ptr[1] = (u8) valuelen; + memcpy(ptr + 2, pvalue, valuelen); + return 2 + valuelen; +} + +/* EP11 payload > 127 bytes starts with this struct */ +struct pl_head { + u8 tag; + u8 lenfmt; + u16 len; + u8 func_tag; + u8 func_len; + u32 func; + u8 dom_tag; + u8 dom_len; + u32 dom; +} __packed; + +/* prep ep11 payload head helper function */ +static inline void prep_head(struct pl_head *h, + size_t pl_size, int api, int func) +{ + h->tag = 0x30; + h->lenfmt = 0x82; + h->len = pl_size - 4; + h->func_tag = 0x04; + h->func_len = sizeof(u32); + h->func = (api << 16) + func; + h->dom_tag = 0x04; + h->dom_len = sizeof(u32); +} + +/* prep urb helper function */ +static inline void prep_urb(struct ep11_urb *u, + struct ep11_target_dev *t, int nt, + struct ep11_cprb *req, size_t req_len, + struct ep11_cprb *rep, size_t rep_len) +{ + u->targets = (u8 __user *) t; + u->targets_num = nt; + u->req = (u8 __user *) req; + u->req_len = req_len; + u->resp = (u8 __user *) rep; + u->resp_len = rep_len; +} + +/* Check ep11 reply payload, return 0 or suggested errno value. */ +static int check_reply_pl(const u8 *pl, const char *func) +{ + int len; + u32 ret; + + /* start tag */ + if (*pl++ != 0x30) { + DEBUG_ERR("%s reply start tag mismatch\n", func); + return -EIO; + } + + /* payload length format */ + if (*pl < 127) { + len = *pl; + pl++; + } else if (*pl == 0x81) { + pl++; + len = *pl; + pl++; + } else if (*pl == 0x82) { + pl++; + len = *((u16 *)pl); + pl += 2; + } else { + DEBUG_ERR("%s reply start tag lenfmt mismatch 0x%02hhx\n", + func, *pl); + return -EIO; + } + + /* len should cover at least 3 fields with 32 bit value each */ + if (len < 3 * 6) { + DEBUG_ERR("%s reply length %d too small\n", func, len); + return -EIO; + } + + /* function tag, length and value */ + if (pl[0] != 0x04 || pl[1] != 0x04) { + DEBUG_ERR("%s function tag or length mismatch\n", func); + return -EIO; + } + pl += 6; + + /* dom tag, length and value */ + if (pl[0] != 0x04 || pl[1] != 0x04) { + DEBUG_ERR("%s dom tag or length mismatch\n", func); + return -EIO; + } + pl += 6; + + /* return value tag, length and value */ + if (pl[0] != 0x04 || pl[1] != 0x04) { + DEBUG_ERR("%s return value tag or length mismatch\n", func); + return -EIO; + } + pl += 2; + ret = *((u32 *)pl); + if (ret != 0) { + DEBUG_ERR("%s return value 0x%04x != 0\n", func, ret); + return -EIO; + } + + return 0; +} + + +/* + * Helper function which does an ep11 query with given query type. + */ +static int ep11_query_info(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, u32 query_type, + size_t buflen, u8 *buf) +{ + struct ep11_info_req_pl { + struct pl_head head; + u8 query_type_tag; + u8 query_type_len; + u32 query_type; + u8 query_subtype_tag; + u8 query_subtype_len; + u32 query_subtype; + } __packed * req_pl; + struct ep11_info_rep_pl { + struct pl_head head; + u8 rc_tag; + u8 rc_len; + u32 rc; + u8 data_tag; + u8 data_lenfmt; + u16 data_len; + } __packed * rep_pl; + struct ep11_cprb *req = NULL, *rep = NULL; + struct ep11_target_dev target; + struct ep11_urb *urb = NULL; + int api = 1, rc = -ENOMEM; + + /* request cprb and payload */ + req = alloc_cprb(sizeof(struct ep11_info_req_pl)); + if (!req) + goto out; + req_pl = (struct ep11_info_req_pl *) (((u8 *) req) + sizeof(*req)); + prep_head(&req_pl->head, sizeof(*req_pl), api, 38); /* get xcp info */ + req_pl->query_type_tag = 0x04; + req_pl->query_type_len = sizeof(u32); + req_pl->query_type = query_type; + req_pl->query_subtype_tag = 0x04; + req_pl->query_subtype_len = sizeof(u32); + + /* reply cprb and payload */ + rep = alloc_cprb(sizeof(struct ep11_info_rep_pl) + buflen); + if (!rep) + goto out; + rep_pl = (struct ep11_info_rep_pl *) (((u8 *) rep) + sizeof(*rep)); + + /* urb and target */ + urb = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ep11_urb), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!urb) + goto out; + target.ap_id = cardnr; + target.dom_id = domain; + prep_urb(urb, &target, 1, + req, sizeof(*req) + sizeof(*req_pl), + rep, sizeof(*rep) + sizeof(*rep_pl) + buflen); + + rc = _zcrypt_send_ep11_cprb(urb); + if (rc) { + DEBUG_ERR( + "%s zcrypt_send_ep11_cprb(card=%d dom=%d) failed, rc=%d\n", + __func__, (int) cardnr, (int) domain, rc); + goto out; + } + + rc = check_reply_pl((u8 *)rep_pl, __func__); + if (rc) + goto out; + if (rep_pl->data_tag != 0x04 || rep_pl->data_lenfmt != 0x82) { + DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown reply data format\n", __func__); + rc = -EIO; + goto out; + } + if (rep_pl->data_len > buflen) { + DEBUG_ERR("%s mismatch between reply data len and buffer len\n", + __func__); + rc = -ENOSPC; + goto out; + } + + memcpy(buf, ((u8 *) rep_pl) + sizeof(*rep_pl), rep_pl->data_len); + +out: + kfree(req); + kfree(rep); + kfree(urb); + return rc; +} + +/* + * Provide information about an EP11 card. + */ +int ep11_get_card_info(u16 card, struct ep11_card_info *info, int verify) +{ + int rc; + struct ep11_module_query_info { + u32 API_ord_nr; + u32 firmware_id; + u8 FW_major_vers; + u8 FW_minor_vers; + u8 CSP_major_vers; + u8 CSP_minor_vers; + u8 fwid[32]; + u8 xcp_config_hash[32]; + u8 CSP_config_hash[32]; + u8 serial[16]; + u8 module_date_time[16]; + u64 op_mode; + u32 PKCS11_flags; + u32 ext_flags; + u32 domains; + u32 sym_state_bytes; + u32 digest_state_bytes; + u32 pin_blob_bytes; + u32 SPKI_bytes; + u32 priv_key_blob_bytes; + u32 sym_blob_bytes; + u32 max_payload_bytes; + u32 CP_profile_bytes; + u32 max_CP_index; + } __packed * pmqi = NULL; + + rc = card_cache_fetch(card, info); + if (rc || verify) { + pmqi = kmalloc(sizeof(*pmqi), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pmqi) + return -ENOMEM; + rc = ep11_query_info(card, AUTOSEL_DOM, + 0x01 /* module info query */, + sizeof(*pmqi), (u8 *) pmqi); + if (rc) { + if (rc == -ENODEV) + card_cache_scrub(card); + goto out; + } + memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info)); + info->API_ord_nr = pmqi->API_ord_nr; + info->FW_version = + (pmqi->FW_major_vers << 8) + pmqi->FW_minor_vers; + memcpy(info->serial, pmqi->serial, sizeof(info->serial)); + info->op_mode = pmqi->op_mode; + card_cache_update(card, info); + } + +out: + kfree(pmqi); + return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ep11_get_card_info); + +/* + * Provide information about a domain within an EP11 card. + */ +int ep11_get_domain_info(u16 card, u16 domain, struct ep11_domain_info *info) +{ + int rc; + struct ep11_domain_query_info { + u32 dom_index; + u8 cur_WK_VP[32]; + u8 new_WK_VP[32]; + u32 dom_flags; + u64 op_mode; + } __packed * p_dom_info; + + p_dom_info = kmalloc(sizeof(*p_dom_info), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!p_dom_info) + return -ENOMEM; + + rc = ep11_query_info(card, domain, 0x03 /* domain info query */, + sizeof(*p_dom_info), (u8 *) p_dom_info); + if (rc) + goto out; + + memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info)); + info->cur_wk_state = '0'; + info->new_wk_state = '0'; + if (p_dom_info->dom_flags & 0x10 /* left imprint mode */) { + if (p_dom_info->dom_flags & 0x02 /* cur wk valid */) { + info->cur_wk_state = '1'; + memcpy(info->cur_wkvp, p_dom_info->cur_WK_VP, 32); + } + if (p_dom_info->dom_flags & 0x04 /* new wk present */ + || p_dom_info->dom_flags & 0x08 /* new wk committed */) { + info->new_wk_state = + p_dom_info->dom_flags & 0x08 ? '2' : '1'; + memcpy(info->new_wkvp, p_dom_info->new_WK_VP, 32); + } + } + info->op_mode = p_dom_info->op_mode; + +out: + kfree(p_dom_info); + return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ep11_get_domain_info); + +/* + * Default EP11 AES key generate attributes, used when no keygenflags given: + * XCP_BLOB_ENCRYPT | XCP_BLOB_DECRYPT | XCP_BLOB_PROTKEY_EXTRACTABLE + */ +#define KEY_ATTR_DEFAULTS 0x00200c00 + +int ep11_genaeskey(u16 card, u16 domain, u32 keybitsize, u32 keygenflags, + u8 *keybuf, size_t *keybufsize) +{ + struct keygen_req_pl { + struct pl_head head; + u8 var_tag; + u8 var_len; + u32 var; + u8 keybytes_tag; + u8 keybytes_len; + u32 keybytes; + u8 mech_tag; + u8 mech_len; + u32 mech; + u8 attr_tag; + u8 attr_len; + u32 attr_header; + u32 attr_bool_mask; + u32 attr_bool_bits; + u32 attr_val_len_type; + u32 attr_val_len_value; + u8 pin_tag; + u8 pin_len; + } __packed * req_pl; + struct keygen_rep_pl { + struct pl_head head; + u8 rc_tag; + u8 rc_len; + u32 rc; + u8 data_tag; + u8 data_lenfmt; + u16 data_len; + u8 data[512]; + } __packed * rep_pl; + struct ep11_cprb *req = NULL, *rep = NULL; + struct ep11_target_dev target; + struct ep11_urb *urb = NULL; + struct ep11keyblob *kb; + int api, rc = -ENOMEM; + + switch (keybitsize) { + case 128: + case 192: + case 256: + break; + default: + DEBUG_ERR( + "%s unknown/unsupported keybitsize %d\n", + __func__, keybitsize); + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + /* request cprb and payload */ + req = alloc_cprb(sizeof(struct keygen_req_pl)); + if (!req) + goto out; + req_pl = (struct keygen_req_pl *) (((u8 *) req) + sizeof(*req)); + api = (!keygenflags || keygenflags & 0x00200000) ? 4 : 1; + prep_head(&req_pl->head, sizeof(*req_pl), api, 21); /* GenerateKey */ + req_pl->var_tag = 0x04; + req_pl->var_len = sizeof(u32); + req_pl->keybytes_tag = 0x04; + req_pl->keybytes_len = sizeof(u32); + req_pl->keybytes = keybitsize / 8; + req_pl->mech_tag = 0x04; + req_pl->mech_len = sizeof(u32); + req_pl->mech = 0x00001080; /* CKM_AES_KEY_GEN */ + req_pl->attr_tag = 0x04; + req_pl->attr_len = 5 * sizeof(u32); + req_pl->attr_header = 0x10010000; + req_pl->attr_bool_mask = keygenflags ? keygenflags : KEY_ATTR_DEFAULTS; + req_pl->attr_bool_bits = keygenflags ? keygenflags : KEY_ATTR_DEFAULTS; + req_pl->attr_val_len_type = 0x00000161; /* CKA_VALUE_LEN */ + req_pl->attr_val_len_value = keybitsize / 8; + req_pl->pin_tag = 0x04; + + /* reply cprb and payload */ + rep = alloc_cprb(sizeof(struct keygen_rep_pl)); + if (!rep) + goto out; + rep_pl = (struct keygen_rep_pl *) (((u8 *) rep) + sizeof(*rep)); + + /* urb and target */ + urb = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ep11_urb), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!urb) + goto out; + target.ap_id = card; + target.dom_id = domain; + prep_urb(urb, &target, 1, + req, sizeof(*req) + sizeof(*req_pl), + rep, sizeof(*rep) + sizeof(*rep_pl)); + + rc = _zcrypt_send_ep11_cprb(urb); + if (rc) { + DEBUG_ERR( + "%s zcrypt_send_ep11_cprb(card=%d dom=%d) failed, rc=%d\n", + __func__, (int) card, (int) domain, rc); + goto out; + } + + rc = check_reply_pl((u8 *)rep_pl, __func__); + if (rc) + goto out; + if (rep_pl->data_tag != 0x04 || rep_pl->data_lenfmt != 0x82) { + DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown reply data format\n", __func__); + rc = -EIO; + goto out; + } + if (rep_pl->data_len > *keybufsize) { + DEBUG_ERR("%s mismatch reply data len / key buffer len\n", + __func__); + rc = -ENOSPC; + goto out; + } + + /* copy key blob and set header values */ + memcpy(keybuf, rep_pl->data, rep_pl->data_len); + *keybufsize = rep_pl->data_len; + kb = (struct ep11keyblob *) keybuf; + kb->head.type = TOKTYPE_NON_CCA; + kb->head.len = rep_pl->data_len; + kb->head.version = TOKVER_EP11_AES; + kb->head.keybitlen = keybitsize; + +out: + kfree(req); + kfree(rep); + kfree(urb); + return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ep11_genaeskey); + +static int ep11_cryptsingle(u16 card, u16 domain, + u16 mode, u32 mech, const u8 *iv, + const u8 *key, size_t keysize, + const u8 *inbuf, size_t inbufsize, + u8 *outbuf, size_t *outbufsize) +{ + struct crypt_req_pl { + struct pl_head head; + u8 var_tag; + u8 var_len; + u32 var; + u8 mech_tag; + u8 mech_len; + u32 mech; + /* + * maybe followed by iv data + * followed by key tag + key blob + * followed by plaintext tag + plaintext + */ + } __packed * req_pl; + struct crypt_rep_pl { + struct pl_head head; + u8 rc_tag; + u8 rc_len; + u32 rc; + u8 data_tag; + u8 data_lenfmt; + /* data follows */ + } __packed * rep_pl; + struct ep11_cprb *req = NULL, *rep = NULL; + struct ep11_target_dev target; + struct ep11_urb *urb = NULL; + size_t req_pl_size, rep_pl_size; + int n, api = 1, rc = -ENOMEM; + u8 *p; + + /* the simple asn1 coding used has length limits */ + if (keysize > 0xFFFF || inbufsize > 0xFFFF) + return -EINVAL; + + /* request cprb and payload */ + req_pl_size = sizeof(struct crypt_req_pl) + (iv ? 16 : 0) + + ASN1TAGLEN(keysize) + ASN1TAGLEN(inbufsize); + req = alloc_cprb(req_pl_size); + if (!req) + goto out; + req_pl = (struct crypt_req_pl *) (((u8 *) req) + sizeof(*req)); + prep_head(&req_pl->head, req_pl_size, api, (mode ? 20 : 19)); + req_pl->var_tag = 0x04; + req_pl->var_len = sizeof(u32); + /* mech is mech + mech params (iv here) */ + req_pl->mech_tag = 0x04; + req_pl->mech_len = sizeof(u32) + (iv ? 16 : 0); + req_pl->mech = (mech ? mech : 0x00001085); /* CKM_AES_CBC_PAD */ + p = ((u8 *) req_pl) + sizeof(*req_pl); + if (iv) { + memcpy(p, iv, 16); + p += 16; + } + /* key and input data */ + p += asn1tag_write(p, 0x04, key, keysize); + p += asn1tag_write(p, 0x04, inbuf, inbufsize); + + /* reply cprb and payload, assume out data size <= in data size + 32 */ + rep_pl_size = sizeof(struct crypt_rep_pl) + ASN1TAGLEN(inbufsize + 32); + rep = alloc_cprb(rep_pl_size); + if (!rep) + goto out; + rep_pl = (struct crypt_rep_pl *) (((u8 *) rep) + sizeof(*rep)); + + /* urb and target */ + urb = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ep11_urb), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!urb) + goto out; + target.ap_id = card; + target.dom_id = domain; + prep_urb(urb, &target, 1, + req, sizeof(*req) + req_pl_size, + rep, sizeof(*rep) + rep_pl_size); + + rc = _zcrypt_send_ep11_cprb(urb); + if (rc) { + DEBUG_ERR( + "%s zcrypt_send_ep11_cprb(card=%d dom=%d) failed, rc=%d\n", + __func__, (int) card, (int) domain, rc); + goto out; + } + + rc = check_reply_pl((u8 *)rep_pl, __func__); + if (rc) + goto out; + if (rep_pl->data_tag != 0x04) { + DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown reply data format\n", __func__); + rc = -EIO; + goto out; + } + p = ((u8 *) rep_pl) + sizeof(*rep_pl); + if (rep_pl->data_lenfmt <= 127) + n = rep_pl->data_lenfmt; + else if (rep_pl->data_lenfmt == 0x81) + n = *p++; + else if (rep_pl->data_lenfmt == 0x82) { + n = *((u16 *) p); + p += 2; + } else { + DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown reply data length format 0x%02hhx\n", + __func__, rep_pl->data_lenfmt); + rc = -EIO; + goto out; + } + if (n > *outbufsize) { + DEBUG_ERR("%s mismatch reply data len %d / output buffer %zu\n", + __func__, n, *outbufsize); + rc = -ENOSPC; + goto out; + } + + memcpy(outbuf, p, n); + *outbufsize = n; + +out: + kfree(req); + kfree(rep); + kfree(urb); + return rc; +} + +static int ep11_unwrapkey(u16 card, u16 domain, + const u8 *kek, size_t keksize, + const u8 *enckey, size_t enckeysize, + u32 mech, const u8 *iv, + u32 keybitsize, u32 keygenflags, + u8 *keybuf, size_t *keybufsize) +{ + struct uw_req_pl { + struct pl_head head; + u8 attr_tag; + u8 attr_len; + u32 attr_header; + u32 attr_bool_mask; + u32 attr_bool_bits; + u32 attr_key_type; + u32 attr_key_type_value; + u32 attr_val_len; + u32 attr_val_len_value; + u8 mech_tag; + u8 mech_len; + u32 mech; + /* + * maybe followed by iv data + * followed by kek tag + kek blob + * followed by empty mac tag + * followed by empty pin tag + * followed by encryted key tag + bytes + */ + } __packed * req_pl; + struct uw_rep_pl { + struct pl_head head; + u8 rc_tag; + u8 rc_len; + u32 rc; + u8 data_tag; + u8 data_lenfmt; + u16 data_len; + u8 data[512]; + } __packed * rep_pl; + struct ep11_cprb *req = NULL, *rep = NULL; + struct ep11_target_dev target; + struct ep11_urb *urb = NULL; + struct ep11keyblob *kb; + size_t req_pl_size; + int api, rc = -ENOMEM; + u8 *p; + + /* request cprb and payload */ + req_pl_size = sizeof(struct uw_req_pl) + (iv ? 16 : 0) + + ASN1TAGLEN(keksize) + 4 + ASN1TAGLEN(enckeysize); + req = alloc_cprb(req_pl_size); + if (!req) + goto out; + req_pl = (struct uw_req_pl *) (((u8 *) req) + sizeof(*req)); + api = (!keygenflags || keygenflags & 0x00200000) ? 4 : 1; + prep_head(&req_pl->head, req_pl_size, api, 34); /* UnwrapKey */ + req_pl->attr_tag = 0x04; + req_pl->attr_len = 7 * sizeof(u32); + req_pl->attr_header = 0x10020000; + req_pl->attr_bool_mask = keygenflags ? keygenflags : KEY_ATTR_DEFAULTS; + req_pl->attr_bool_bits = keygenflags ? keygenflags : KEY_ATTR_DEFAULTS; + req_pl->attr_key_type = 0x00000100; /* CKA_KEY_TYPE */ + req_pl->attr_key_type_value = 0x0000001f; /* CKK_AES */ + req_pl->attr_val_len = 0x00000161; /* CKA_VALUE_LEN */ + req_pl->attr_val_len_value = keybitsize / 8; + /* mech is mech + mech params (iv here) */ + req_pl->mech_tag = 0x04; + req_pl->mech_len = sizeof(u32) + (iv ? 16 : 0); + req_pl->mech = (mech ? mech : 0x00001085); /* CKM_AES_CBC_PAD */ + p = ((u8 *) req_pl) + sizeof(*req_pl); + if (iv) { + memcpy(p, iv, 16); + p += 16; + } + /* kek */ + p += asn1tag_write(p, 0x04, kek, keksize); + /* empty mac key tag */ + *p++ = 0x04; + *p++ = 0; + /* empty pin tag */ + *p++ = 0x04; + *p++ = 0; + /* encrytped key value tag and bytes */ + p += asn1tag_write(p, 0x04, enckey, enckeysize); + + /* reply cprb and payload */ + rep = alloc_cprb(sizeof(struct uw_rep_pl)); + if (!rep) + goto out; + rep_pl = (struct uw_rep_pl *) (((u8 *) rep) + sizeof(*rep)); + + /* urb and target */ + urb = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ep11_urb), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!urb) + goto out; + target.ap_id = card; + target.dom_id = domain; + prep_urb(urb, &target, 1, + req, sizeof(*req) + req_pl_size, + rep, sizeof(*rep) + sizeof(*rep_pl)); + + rc = _zcrypt_send_ep11_cprb(urb); + if (rc) { + DEBUG_ERR( + "%s zcrypt_send_ep11_cprb(card=%d dom=%d) failed, rc=%d\n", + __func__, (int) card, (int) domain, rc); + goto out; + } + + rc = check_reply_pl((u8 *)rep_pl, __func__); + if (rc) + goto out; + if (rep_pl->data_tag != 0x04 || rep_pl->data_lenfmt != 0x82) { + DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown reply data format\n", __func__); + rc = -EIO; + goto out; + } + if (rep_pl->data_len > *keybufsize) { + DEBUG_ERR("%s mismatch reply data len / key buffer len\n", + __func__); + rc = -ENOSPC; + goto out; + } + + /* copy key blob and set header values */ + memcpy(keybuf, rep_pl->data, rep_pl->data_len); + *keybufsize = rep_pl->data_len; + kb = (struct ep11keyblob *) keybuf; + kb->head.type = TOKTYPE_NON_CCA; + kb->head.len = rep_pl->data_len; + kb->head.version = TOKVER_EP11_AES; + kb->head.keybitlen = keybitsize; + +out: + kfree(req); + kfree(rep); + kfree(urb); + return rc; +} + +static int ep11_wrapkey(u16 card, u16 domain, + const u8 *key, size_t keysize, + u32 mech, const u8 *iv, + u8 *databuf, size_t *datasize) +{ + struct wk_req_pl { + struct pl_head head; + u8 var_tag; + u8 var_len; + u32 var; + u8 mech_tag; + u8 mech_len; + u32 mech; + /* + * followed by iv data + * followed by key tag + key blob + * followed by dummy kek param + * followed by dummy mac param + */ + } __packed * req_pl; + struct wk_rep_pl { + struct pl_head head; + u8 rc_tag; + u8 rc_len; + u32 rc; + u8 data_tag; + u8 data_lenfmt; + u16 data_len; + u8 data[512]; + } __packed * rep_pl; + struct ep11_cprb *req = NULL, *rep = NULL; + struct ep11_target_dev target; + struct ep11_urb *urb = NULL; + struct ep11keyblob *kb; + size_t req_pl_size; + int api, rc = -ENOMEM; + u8 *p; + + /* request cprb and payload */ + req_pl_size = sizeof(struct wk_req_pl) + (iv ? 16 : 0) + + ASN1TAGLEN(keysize) + 4; + req = alloc_cprb(req_pl_size); + if (!req) + goto out; + if (!mech || mech == 0x80060001) + req->flags |= 0x20; /* CPACF_WRAP needs special bit */ + req_pl = (struct wk_req_pl *) (((u8 *) req) + sizeof(*req)); + api = (!mech || mech == 0x80060001) ? 4 : 1; /* CKM_IBM_CPACF_WRAP */ + prep_head(&req_pl->head, req_pl_size, api, 33); /* WrapKey */ + req_pl->var_tag = 0x04; + req_pl->var_len = sizeof(u32); + /* mech is mech + mech params (iv here) */ + req_pl->mech_tag = 0x04; + req_pl->mech_len = sizeof(u32) + (iv ? 16 : 0); + req_pl->mech = (mech ? mech : 0x80060001); /* CKM_IBM_CPACF_WRAP */ + p = ((u8 *) req_pl) + sizeof(*req_pl); + if (iv) { + memcpy(p, iv, 16); + p += 16; + } + /* key blob */ + p += asn1tag_write(p, 0x04, key, keysize); + /* maybe the key argument needs the head data cleaned out */ + kb = (struct ep11keyblob *)(p - keysize); + if (kb->head.version == TOKVER_EP11_AES) + memset(&kb->head, 0, sizeof(kb->head)); + /* empty kek tag */ + *p++ = 0x04; + *p++ = 0; + /* empty mac tag */ + *p++ = 0x04; + *p++ = 0; + + /* reply cprb and payload */ + rep = alloc_cprb(sizeof(struct wk_rep_pl)); + if (!rep) + goto out; + rep_pl = (struct wk_rep_pl *) (((u8 *) rep) + sizeof(*rep)); + + /* urb and target */ + urb = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ep11_urb), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!urb) + goto out; + target.ap_id = card; + target.dom_id = domain; + prep_urb(urb, &target, 1, + req, sizeof(*req) + req_pl_size, + rep, sizeof(*rep) + sizeof(*rep_pl)); + + rc = _zcrypt_send_ep11_cprb(urb); + if (rc) { + DEBUG_ERR( + "%s zcrypt_send_ep11_cprb(card=%d dom=%d) failed, rc=%d\n", + __func__, (int) card, (int) domain, rc); + goto out; + } + + rc = check_reply_pl((u8 *)rep_pl, __func__); + if (rc) + goto out; + if (rep_pl->data_tag != 0x04 || rep_pl->data_lenfmt != 0x82) { + DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown reply data format\n", __func__); + rc = -EIO; + goto out; + } + if (rep_pl->data_len > *datasize) { + DEBUG_ERR("%s mismatch reply data len / data buffer len\n", + __func__); + rc = -ENOSPC; + goto out; + } + + /* copy the data from the cprb to the data buffer */ + memcpy(databuf, rep_pl->data, rep_pl->data_len); + *datasize = rep_pl->data_len; + +out: + kfree(req); + kfree(rep); + kfree(urb); + return rc; +} + +int ep11_clr2keyblob(u16 card, u16 domain, u32 keybitsize, u32 keygenflags, + const u8 *clrkey, u8 *keybuf, size_t *keybufsize) +{ + int rc; + struct ep11keyblob *kb; + u8 encbuf[64], *kek = NULL; + size_t clrkeylen, keklen, encbuflen = sizeof(encbuf); + + if (keybitsize == 128 || keybitsize == 192 || keybitsize == 256) + clrkeylen = keybitsize / 8; + else { + DEBUG_ERR( + "%s unknown/unsupported keybitsize %d\n", + __func__, keybitsize); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* allocate memory for the temp kek */ + keklen = MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE; + kek = kmalloc(keklen, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!kek) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + /* Step 1: generate AES 256 bit random kek key */ + rc = ep11_genaeskey(card, domain, 256, + 0x00006c00, /* EN/DECRYTP, WRAP/UNWRAP */ + kek, &keklen); + if (rc) { + DEBUG_ERR( + "%s generate kek key failed, rc=%d\n", + __func__, rc); + goto out; + } + kb = (struct ep11keyblob *) kek; + memset(&kb->head, 0, sizeof(kb->head)); + + /* Step 2: encrypt clear key value with the kek key */ + rc = ep11_cryptsingle(card, domain, 0, 0, def_iv, kek, keklen, + clrkey, clrkeylen, encbuf, &encbuflen); + if (rc) { + DEBUG_ERR( + "%s encrypting key value with kek key failed, rc=%d\n", + __func__, rc); + goto out; + } + + /* Step 3: import the encrypted key value as a new key */ + rc = ep11_unwrapkey(card, domain, kek, keklen, + encbuf, encbuflen, 0, def_iv, + keybitsize, 0, keybuf, keybufsize); + if (rc) { + DEBUG_ERR( + "%s importing key value as new key failed,, rc=%d\n", + __func__, rc); + goto out; + } + +out: + kfree(kek); + return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ep11_clr2keyblob); + +int ep11_key2protkey(u16 card, u16 dom, const u8 *key, size_t keylen, + u8 *protkey, u32 *protkeylen, u32 *protkeytype) +{ + int rc = -EIO; + u8 *wkbuf = NULL; + size_t wkbuflen = 256; + struct wk_info { + u16 version; + u8 res1[16]; + u32 pkeytype; + u32 pkeybitsize; + u64 pkeysize; + u8 res2[8]; + u8 pkey[0]; + } __packed * wki; + + /* alloc temp working buffer */ + wkbuf = kmalloc(wkbuflen, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!wkbuf) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* ep11 secure key -> protected key + info */ + rc = ep11_wrapkey(card, dom, key, keylen, + 0, def_iv, wkbuf, &wkbuflen); + if (rc) { + DEBUG_ERR( + "%s rewrapping ep11 key to pkey failed, rc=%d\n", + __func__, rc); + goto out; + } + wki = (struct wk_info *) wkbuf; + + /* check struct version and pkey type */ + if (wki->version != 1 || wki->pkeytype != 1) { + DEBUG_ERR("%s wk info version %d or pkeytype %d mismatch.\n", + __func__, (int) wki->version, (int) wki->pkeytype); + rc = -EIO; + goto out; + } + + /* copy the tanslated protected key */ + switch (wki->pkeysize) { + case 16+32: + /* AES 128 protected key */ + if (protkeytype) + *protkeytype = PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128; + break; + case 24+32: + /* AES 192 protected key */ + if (protkeytype) + *protkeytype = PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192; + break; + case 32+32: + /* AES 256 protected key */ + if (protkeytype) + *protkeytype = PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256; + break; + default: + DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown/unsupported pkeysize %d\n", + __func__, (int) wki->pkeysize); + rc = -EIO; + goto out; + } + memcpy(protkey, wki->pkey, wki->pkeysize); + if (protkeylen) + *protkeylen = (u32) wki->pkeysize; + rc = 0; + +out: + kfree(wkbuf); + return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ep11_key2protkey); + +int ep11_findcard2(u32 **apqns, u32 *nr_apqns, u16 cardnr, u16 domain, + int minhwtype, int minapi, const u8 *wkvp) +{ + struct zcrypt_device_status_ext *device_status; + u32 *_apqns = NULL, _nr_apqns = 0; + int i, card, dom, rc = -ENOMEM; + struct ep11_domain_info edi; + struct ep11_card_info eci; + + /* fetch status of all crypto cards */ + device_status = kmalloc_array(MAX_ZDEV_ENTRIES_EXT, + sizeof(struct zcrypt_device_status_ext), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!device_status) + return -ENOMEM; + zcrypt_device_status_mask_ext(device_status); + + /* allocate 1k space for up to 256 apqns */ + _apqns = kmalloc_array(256, sizeof(u32), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!_apqns) { + kfree(device_status); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + /* walk through all the crypto apqnss */ + for (i = 0; i < MAX_ZDEV_ENTRIES_EXT; i++) { + card = AP_QID_CARD(device_status[i].qid); + dom = AP_QID_QUEUE(device_status[i].qid); + /* check online state */ + if (!device_status[i].online) + continue; + /* check for ep11 functions */ + if (!(device_status[i].functions & 0x01)) + continue; + /* check cardnr */ + if (cardnr != 0xFFFF && card != cardnr) + continue; + /* check domain */ + if (domain != 0xFFFF && dom != domain) + continue; + /* check min hardware type */ + if (minhwtype && device_status[i].hwtype < minhwtype) + continue; + /* check min api version if given */ + if (minapi > 0) { + if (ep11_get_card_info(card, &eci, 0)) + continue; + if (minapi > eci.API_ord_nr) + continue; + } + /* check wkvp if given */ + if (wkvp) { + if (ep11_get_domain_info(card, dom, &edi)) + continue; + if (edi.cur_wk_state != '1') + continue; + if (memcmp(wkvp, edi.cur_wkvp, 16)) + continue; + } + /* apqn passed all filtering criterons, add to the array */ + if (_nr_apqns < 256) + _apqns[_nr_apqns++] = (((u16)card) << 16) | ((u16) dom); + } + + /* nothing found ? */ + if (!_nr_apqns) { + kfree(_apqns); + rc = -ENODEV; + } else { + /* no re-allocation, simple return the _apqns array */ + *apqns = _apqns; + *nr_apqns = _nr_apqns; + rc = 0; + } + + kfree(device_status); + return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ep11_findcard2); + +void __exit zcrypt_ep11misc_exit(void) +{ + card_cache_free(); +} diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ep11misc.h b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ep11misc.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e3ed5ed1de86 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ep11misc.h @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */ +/* + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 + * Author(s): Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> + * + * Collection of EP11 misc functions used by zcrypt and pkey + */ + +#ifndef _ZCRYPT_EP11MISC_H_ +#define _ZCRYPT_EP11MISC_H_ + +#include <asm/zcrypt.h> +#include <asm/pkey.h> + +#define TOKVER_EP11_AES 0x03 /* EP11 AES key blob */ + +#define EP11_API_V 4 /* highest known and supported EP11 API version */ + +#define EP11_STRUCT_MAGIC 0x1234 +#define EP11_BLOB_PKEY_EXTRACTABLE 0x200000 + +/* inside view of an EP11 secure key blob */ +struct ep11keyblob { + union { + u8 session[32]; + struct { + u8 type; /* 0x00 (TOKTYPE_NON_CCA) */ + u8 res0; /* unused */ + u16 len; /* total length in bytes of this blob */ + u8 version; /* 0x06 (TOKVER_EP11_AES) */ + u8 res1; /* unused */ + u16 keybitlen; /* clear key bit len, 0 for unknown */ + } head; + }; + u8 wkvp[16]; /* wrapping key verification pattern */ + u64 attr; /* boolean key attributes */ + u64 mode; /* mode bits */ + u16 version; /* 0x1234, EP11_STRUCT_MAGIC */ + u8 iv[14]; + u8 encrypted_key_data[144]; + u8 mac[32]; +} __packed; + +/* + * Simple check if the key blob is a valid EP11 secure AES key. + * If keybitsize is given, the bitsize of the key is also checked. + * If checkcpacfexport is enabled, the key is also checked for the + * attributes needed to export this key for CPACF use. + * Returns 0 on success or errno value on failure. + */ +int ep11_check_aeskeyblob(debug_info_t *dbg, int dbflvl, + const u8 *key, int keybitsize, + int checkcpacfexport); + +/* EP11 card info struct */ +struct ep11_card_info { + u32 API_ord_nr; /* API ordinal number */ + u16 FW_version; /* Firmware major and minor version */ + char serial[16]; /* serial number string (16 ascii, no 0x00 !) */ + u64 op_mode; /* card operational mode(s) */ +}; + +/* EP11 domain info struct */ +struct ep11_domain_info { + char cur_wk_state; /* '0' invalid, '1' valid */ + char new_wk_state; /* '0' empty, '1' uncommitted, '2' committed */ + u8 cur_wkvp[32]; /* current wrapping key verification pattern */ + u8 new_wkvp[32]; /* new wrapping key verification pattern */ + u64 op_mode; /* domain operational mode(s) */ +}; + +/* + * Provide information about an EP11 card. + */ +int ep11_get_card_info(u16 card, struct ep11_card_info *info, int verify); + +/* + * Provide information about a domain within an EP11 card. + */ +int ep11_get_domain_info(u16 card, u16 domain, struct ep11_domain_info *info); + +/* + * Generate (random) EP11 AES secure key. + */ +int ep11_genaeskey(u16 card, u16 domain, u32 keybitsize, u32 keygenflags, + u8 *keybuf, size_t *keybufsize); + +/* + * Generate EP11 AES secure key with given clear key value. + */ +int ep11_clr2keyblob(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, u32 keybitsize, u32 keygenflags, + const u8 *clrkey, u8 *keybuf, size_t *keybufsize); + +/* + * Derive proteced key from EP11 AES secure key blob. + */ +int ep11_key2protkey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, const u8 *key, size_t keylen, + u8 *protkey, u32 *protkeylen, u32 *protkeytype); + +/* + * Build a list of ep11 apqns meeting the following constrains: + * - apqn is online and is in fact an EP11 apqn + * - if cardnr is not FFFF only apqns with this cardnr + * - if domain is not FFFF only apqns with this domainnr + * - if minhwtype > 0 only apqns with hwtype >= minhwtype + * - if minapi > 0 only apqns with API_ord_nr >= minapi + * - if wkvp != NULL only apqns where the wkvp (EP11_WKVPLEN bytes) matches + * to the first EP11_WKVPLEN bytes of the wkvp of the current wrapping + * key for this domain. When a wkvp is given there will aways be a re-fetch + * of the domain info for the potential apqn - so this triggers an request + * reply to each apqn eligible. + * The array of apqn entries is allocated with kmalloc and returned in *apqns; + * the number of apqns stored into the list is returned in *nr_apqns. One apqn + * entry is simple a 32 bit value with 16 bit cardnr and 16 bit domain nr and + * may be casted to struct pkey_apqn. The return value is either 0 for success + * or a negative errno value. If no apqn meeting the criterias is found, + * -ENODEV is returned. + */ +int ep11_findcard2(u32 **apqns, u32 *nr_apqns, u16 cardnr, u16 domain, + int minhwtype, int minapi, const u8 *wkvp); + +void zcrypt_ep11misc_exit(void); + +#endif /* _ZCRYPT_EP11MISC_H_ */ |