Merge tag 'x86-urgent-2020-03-15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Two fixes for x86:

   - Map EFI runtime service data as encrypted when SEV is enabled.

     Otherwise e.g. SMBIOS data cannot be properly decoded by dmidecode.

   - Remove the warning in the vector management code which triggered
     when a managed interrupt affinity changed outside of a CPU hotplug
     operation.

     The warning was correct until the recent core code change that
     introduced a CPU isolation feature which needs to migrate managed
     interrupts away from online CPUs under certain conditions to
     achieve the isolation"

* tag 'x86-urgent-2020-03-15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/vector: Remove warning on managed interrupt migration
  x86/ioremap: Map EFI runtime services data as encrypted for SEV

2 files changed, 26 insertions, 6 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c
index 2c5676b0a6e7..48293d15f1e1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c
@@ -838,13 +838,15 @@ static void free_moved_vector(struct apic_chip_data *apicd)
 	bool managed = apicd->is_managed;
 
 	/*
-	 * This should never happen. Managed interrupts are not
-	 * migrated except on CPU down, which does not involve the
-	 * cleanup vector. But try to keep the accounting correct
-	 * nevertheless.
+	 * Managed interrupts are usually not migrated away
+	 * from an online CPU, but CPU isolation 'managed_irq'
+	 * can make that happen.
+	 * 1) Activation does not take the isolation into account
+	 *    to keep the code simple
+	 * 2) Migration away from an isolated CPU can happen when
+	 *    a non-isolated CPU which is in the calculated
+	 *    affinity mask comes online.
 	 */
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(managed);
-
 	trace_vector_free_moved(apicd->irq, cpu, vector, managed);
 	irq_matrix_free(vector_matrix, cpu, vector, managed);
 	per_cpu(vector_irq, cpu)[vector] = VECTOR_UNUSED;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 44e4beb4239f..935a91e1fd77 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -106,6 +106,19 @@ static unsigned int __ioremap_check_encrypted(struct resource *res)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * The EFI runtime services data area is not covered by walk_mem_res(), but must
+ * be mapped encrypted when SEV is active.
+ */
+static void __ioremap_check_other(resource_size_t addr, struct ioremap_desc *desc)
+{
+	if (!sev_active())
+		return;
+
+	if (efi_mem_type(addr) == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA)
+		desc->flags |= IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED;
+}
+
 static int __ioremap_collect_map_flags(struct resource *res, void *arg)
 {
 	struct ioremap_desc *desc = arg;
@@ -124,6 +137,9 @@ static int __ioremap_collect_map_flags(struct resource *res, void *arg)
  * To avoid multiple resource walks, this function walks resources marked as
  * IORESOURCE_MEM and IORESOURCE_BUSY and looking for system RAM and/or a
  * resource described not as IORES_DESC_NONE (e.g. IORES_DESC_ACPI_TABLES).
+ *
+ * After that, deal with misc other ranges in __ioremap_check_other() which do
+ * not fall into the above category.
  */
 static void __ioremap_check_mem(resource_size_t addr, unsigned long size,
 				struct ioremap_desc *desc)
@@ -135,6 +151,8 @@ static void __ioremap_check_mem(resource_size_t addr, unsigned long size,
 	memset(desc, 0, sizeof(struct ioremap_desc));
 
 	walk_mem_res(start, end, desc, __ioremap_collect_map_flags);
+
+	__ioremap_check_other(addr, desc);
 }
 
 /*