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authorCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>2014-04-03 16:17:32 +0100
committerCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>2014-05-09 15:53:36 +0100
commitbc07c2c6e9ed125d362af0214b6313dca180cb08 (patch)
treea5a63f1272c11e321999145b8b7e8135b094aaaa /arch/arm64/kernel
parent15af1942dd61ee236a48b3de14d6f31c0b9e8116 (diff)
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arm64: Introduce execute-only page access permissions
The ARMv8 architecture allows execute-only user permissions by clearing the PTE_UXN and PTE_USER bits. The kernel, however, can still access such page, so execute-only page permission does not protect against read(2)/write(2) etc. accesses. Systems requiring such protection must implement/enable features like SECCOMP. This patch changes the arm64 __P100 and __S100 protection_map[] macros to the new __PAGE_EXECONLY attributes. A side effect is that pte_valid_user() no longer triggers for __PAGE_EXECONLY since PTE_USER isn't set. To work around this, the check is done on the PTE_NG bit via the pte_valid_ng() macro. VM_READ is also checked now for page faults. Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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