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author | Patrick Bellasi <derkling@google.com> | 2025-02-05 14:04:41 +0000 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2025-02-11 10:07:52 -0800 |
commit | 318e8c339c9a0891c389298bb328ed0762a9935e (patch) | |
tree | 39624dc8ec1fadc68bdf5b01619a1e59cf55088d /arch/arm | |
parent | febbc555cf0fff895546ddb8ba2c9a523692fb55 (diff) | |
download | linux-318e8c339c9a0891c389298bb328ed0762a9935e.tar.gz linux-318e8c339c9a0891c389298bb328ed0762a9935e.tar.bz2 linux-318e8c339c9a0891c389298bb328ed0762a9935e.zip |
x86/cpu/kvm: SRSO: Fix possible missing IBPB on VM-Exit
In [1] the meaning of the synthetic IBPB flags has been redefined for a
better separation of concerns:
- ENTRY_IBPB -- issue IBPB on entry only
- IBPB_ON_VMEXIT -- issue IBPB on VM-Exit only
and the Retbleed mitigations have been updated to match this new
semantics.
Commit [2] was merged shortly before [1], and their interaction was not
handled properly. This resulted in IBPB not being triggered on VM-Exit
in all SRSO mitigation configs requesting an IBPB there.
Specifically, an IBPB on VM-Exit is triggered only when
X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT is set. However:
- X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT is not set for "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb",
because before [1] having X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB was enough. Hence,
an IBPB is triggered on entry but the expected IBPB on VM-exit is
not.
- X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT is not set also when
"spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb-vmexit" if X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB is
already set.
That's because before [1] this was effectively redundant. Hence, e.g.
a "retbleed=ibpb spec_rstack_overflow=bpb-vmexit" config mistakenly
reports the machine still vulnerable to SRSO, despite an IBPB being
triggered both on entry and VM-Exit, because of the Retbleed selected
mitigation config.
- UNTRAIN_RET_VM won't still actually do anything unless
CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY is set.
For "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb", enable IBPB on both entry and VM-Exit
and clear X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT which is made superfluous by
X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT. This effectively makes this mitigation
option similar to the one for 'retbleed=ibpb', thus re-order the code
for the RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB option to be less confusing by having
all features enabling before the disabling of the not needed ones.
For "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb-vmexit", guard this mitigation setting
with CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY to ensure UNTRAIN_RET_VM sequence is
effectively compiled in. Drop instead the CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO guard,
since none of the SRSO compile cruft is required in this configuration.
Also, check only that the required microcode is present to effectively
enabled the IBPB on VM-Exit.
Finally, update the KConfig description for CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
to list also all SRSO config settings enabled by this guard.
Fixes: 864bcaa38ee4 ("x86/cpu/kvm: Provide UNTRAIN_RET_VM") [1]
Fixes: d893832d0e1e ("x86/srso: Add IBPB on VMEXIT") [2]
Reported-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Bellasi <derkling@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions