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| author | Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> | 2020-05-01 10:16:52 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> | 2020-05-07 17:25:54 +1000 |
| commit | fa4f3f56ccd28ac031ab275e673ed4098855fed4 (patch) | |
| tree | 82f32d7e2dc20a7ed61c556e6831627ec3ed0e73 /arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | |
| parent | c44dc6323cd49d8d742c37e234b952e822c35de4 (diff) | |
| download | linux-fa4f3f56ccd28ac031ab275e673ed4098855fed4.tar.gz linux-fa4f3f56ccd28ac031ab275e673ed4098855fed4.tar.bz2 linux-fa4f3f56ccd28ac031ab275e673ed4098855fed4.zip | |
powerpc/ima: Fix secure boot rules in ima arch policy
To prevent verifying the kernel module appended signature
twice (finit_module), once by the module_sig_check() and again by IMA,
powerpc secure boot rules define an IMA architecture specific policy
rule only if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE is not enabled. This,
unfortunately, does not take into account the ability of enabling
"sig_enforce" on the boot command line (module.sig_enforce=1).
Including the IMA module appraise rule results in failing the
finit_module syscall, unless the module signing public key is loaded
onto the IMA keyring.
This patch fixes secure boot policy rules to be based on
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG instead.
Fixes: 4238fad366a6 ("powerpc/ima: Add support to initialize ima policy rules")
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1588342612-14532-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c index e34116255ced..957abd592075 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c @@ -19,12 +19,12 @@ bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void) * to be stored as an xattr or as an appended signature. * * To avoid duplicate signature verification as much as possible, the IMA - * policy rule for module appraisal is added only if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE + * policy rule for module appraisal is added only if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG * is not enabled. */ static const char *const secure_rules[] = { "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig", -#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE +#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig", #endif NULL @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static const char *const secure_and_trusted_rules[] = { "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK template=ima-modsig", "measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig", "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig", -#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE +#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig", #endif NULL |