diff options
| author | Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> | 2019-04-02 08:03:11 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> | 2019-04-16 15:37:36 +0200 |
| commit | 9ec19493fb86d6d5fbf9286b94ff21e56ef66376 (patch) | |
| tree | 3de9d350da3033b6ba31a107b6b05cc73cbdafa8 /arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | |
| parent | c5833c7a43a66bfe2f36439cb2f1281a588668af (diff) | |
| download | linux-9ec19493fb86d6d5fbf9286b94ff21e56ef66376.tar.gz linux-9ec19493fb86d6d5fbf9286b94ff21e56ef66376.tar.bz2 linux-9ec19493fb86d6d5fbf9286b94ff21e56ef66376.zip | |
KVM: x86: clear SMM flags before loading state while leaving SMM
RSM emulation is currently broken on VMX when the interrupted guest has
CR4.VMXE=1. Stop dancing around the issue of HF_SMM_MASK being set when
loading SMSTATE into architectural state, e.g. by toggling it for
problematic flows, and simply clear HF_SMM_MASK prior to loading
architectural state (from SMRAM save state area).
Reported-by: Jon Doron <arilou@gmail.com>
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Fixes: 5bea5123cbf0 ("KVM: VMX: check nested state and CR4.VMXE against SMM")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Tested-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 12 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c index a6b282853253..f526acee2eed 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c @@ -2571,6 +2571,12 @@ static int em_rsm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE; + if ((ctxt->ops->get_hflags(ctxt) & X86EMUL_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK) == 0) + ctxt->ops->set_nmi_mask(ctxt, false); + + ctxt->ops->set_hflags(ctxt, ctxt->ops->get_hflags(ctxt) & + ~(X86EMUL_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK | X86EMUL_SMM_MASK)); + /* * Get back to real mode, to prepare a safe state in which to load * CR0/CR3/CR4/EFER. It's all a bit more complicated if the vCPU @@ -2624,12 +2630,6 @@ static int em_rsm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE; } - if ((ctxt->ops->get_hflags(ctxt) & X86EMUL_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK) == 0) - ctxt->ops->set_nmi_mask(ctxt, false); - - ctxt->ops->set_hflags(ctxt, ctxt->ops->get_hflags(ctxt) & - ~(X86EMUL_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK | X86EMUL_SMM_MASK)); - ctxt->ops->post_leave_smm(ctxt); return X86EMUL_CONTINUE; |