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| author | Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> | 2018-11-30 23:23:27 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> | 2018-12-11 11:19:24 +0100 |
| commit | 16877a5570e0c5f4270d5b17f9bab427bcae9514 (patch) | |
| tree | b915b29ee748f254aa810b46fa33119434c0e55a /arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c | |
| parent | ac3e233d29f7f77f28243af0132057d378d3ea58 (diff) | |
| download | linux-16877a5570e0c5f4270d5b17f9bab427bcae9514.tar.gz linux-16877a5570e0c5f4270d5b17f9bab427bcae9514.tar.bz2 linux-16877a5570e0c5f4270d5b17f9bab427bcae9514.zip | |
x86/mm: Fix guard hole handling
There is a guard hole at the beginning of the kernel address space, also
used by hypervisors. It occupies 16 PGD entries.
This reserved range is not defined explicitely, it is calculated relative
to other entities: direct mapping and user space ranges.
The calculation got broken by recent changes of the kernel memory layout:
LDT remap range is now mapped before direct mapping and makes the
calculation invalid.
The breakage leads to crash on Xen dom0 boot[1].
Define the reserved range explicitely. It's part of kernel ABI (hypervisors
expect it to be stable) and must not depend on changes in the rest of
kernel memory layout.
[1] https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2018-11/msg03313.html
Fixes: d52888aa2753 ("x86/mm: Move LDT remap out of KASLR region on 5-level paging")
Reported-by: Hans van Kranenburg <hans.van.kranenburg@mendix.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Hans van Kranenburg <hans.van.kranenburg@mendix.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
Cc: bhe@redhat.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181130202328.65359-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c | 11 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c index a5d7ed125337..0f4fe206dcc2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c @@ -648,19 +648,20 @@ static int __xen_pgd_walk(struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long limit) { int i, nr, flush = 0; - unsigned hole_low, hole_high; + unsigned hole_low = 0, hole_high = 0; /* The limit is the last byte to be touched */ limit--; BUG_ON(limit >= FIXADDR_TOP); +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 /* * 64-bit has a great big hole in the middle of the address - * space, which contains the Xen mappings. On 32-bit these - * will end up making a zero-sized hole and so is a no-op. + * space, which contains the Xen mappings. */ - hole_low = pgd_index(USER_LIMIT); - hole_high = pgd_index(PAGE_OFFSET); + hole_low = pgd_index(GUARD_HOLE_BASE_ADDR); + hole_high = pgd_index(GUARD_HOLE_END_ADDR); +#endif nr = pgd_index(limit) + 1; for (i = 0; i < nr; i++) { |