Merge branch 'cpuidle-fix' into fixes

4 files changed, 34 insertions, 60 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/Kconfig b/arch/x86/xen/Kconfig
index 218acbd5c7a0..afc1da68b06d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/Kconfig
@@ -26,6 +26,19 @@ config XEN_PV
 	help
 	  Support running as a Xen PV guest.
 
+config XEN_512GB
+	bool "Limit Xen pv-domain memory to 512GB"
+	depends on XEN_PV
+	default y
+	help
+	  Limit paravirtualized user domains to 512GB of RAM.
+
+	  The Xen tools and crash dump analysis tools might not support
+	  pv-domains with more than 512 GB of RAM. This option controls the
+	  default setting of the kernel to use only up to 512 GB or more.
+	  It is always possible to change the default via specifying the
+	  boot parameter "xen_512gb_limit".
+
 config XEN_PV_SMP
 	def_bool y
 	depends on XEN_PV && SMP
@@ -39,28 +52,19 @@ config XEN_DOM0
 	  Support running as a Xen PV Dom0 guest.
 
 config XEN_PVHVM
-	bool "Xen PVHVM guest support"
-	default y
-	depends on XEN && PCI && X86_LOCAL_APIC
-	help
-	  Support running as a Xen PVHVM guest.
+	def_bool y
+	depends on XEN && X86_LOCAL_APIC
 
 config XEN_PVHVM_SMP
 	def_bool y
 	depends on XEN_PVHVM && SMP
 
-config XEN_512GB
-	bool "Limit Xen pv-domain memory to 512GB"
-	depends on XEN_PV
+config XEN_PVHVM_GUEST
+	bool "Xen PVHVM guest support"
 	default y
+	depends on XEN_PVHVM && PCI
 	help
-	  Limit paravirtualized user domains to 512GB of RAM.
-
-	  The Xen tools and crash dump analysis tools might not support
-	  pv-domains with more than 512 GB of RAM. This option controls the
-	  default setting of the kernel to use only up to 512 GB or more.
-	  It is always possible to change the default via specifying the
-	  boot parameter "xen_512gb_limit".
+	  Support running as a Xen PVHVM guest.
 
 config XEN_SAVE_RESTORE
 	bool
@@ -76,7 +80,9 @@ config XEN_DEBUG_FS
 	  Enabling this option may incur a significant performance overhead.
 
 config XEN_PVH
-	bool "Support for running as a Xen PVH guest"
+	bool "Xen PVH guest support"
 	depends on XEN && XEN_PVHVM && ACPI
 	select PVH
 	def_bool n
+	help
+	  Support for running as a Xen PVH guest.
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/apic.c b/arch/x86/xen/apic.c
index e82fd1910dae..0d46cc283cf5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/apic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/apic.c
@@ -148,15 +148,12 @@ static struct apic xen_pv_apic = {
 	.apic_id_valid 			= xen_id_always_valid,
 	.apic_id_registered 		= xen_id_always_registered,
 
-	/* .irq_delivery_mode - used in native_compose_msi_msg only */
-	/* .irq_dest_mode     - used in native_compose_msi_msg only */
+	/* .delivery_mode and .dest_mode_logical not used by XENPV */
 
 	.disable_esr			= 0,
-	/* .dest_logical      -  default_send_IPI_ use it but we use our own. */
-	.check_apicid_used		= default_check_apicid_used, /* Used on 32-bit */
 
+	.check_apicid_used		= default_check_apicid_used, /* Used on 32-bit */
 	.init_apic_ldr			= xen_noop, /* setup_local_APIC calls it */
-
 	.ioapic_phys_id_map		= default_ioapic_phys_id_map, /* Used on 32-bit */
 	.setup_apic_routing		= NULL,
 	.cpu_present_to_apicid		= xen_cpu_present_to_apicid,
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/efi.c b/arch/x86/xen/efi.c
index 205a9bc981b0..7d7ffb9c826a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/efi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/efi.c
@@ -93,37 +93,22 @@ static efi_system_table_t __init *xen_efi_probe(void)
 
 /*
  * Determine whether we're in secure boot mode.
- *
- * Please keep the logic in sync with
- * drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c:efi_get_secureboot().
  */
 static enum efi_secureboot_mode xen_efi_get_secureboot(void)
 {
-	static efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
 	static efi_guid_t shim_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
+	enum efi_secureboot_mode mode;
 	efi_status_t status;
-	u8 moksbstate, secboot, setupmode;
+	u8 moksbstate;
 	unsigned long size;
 
-	size = sizeof(secboot);
-	status = efi.get_variable(L"SecureBoot", &efi_variable_guid,
-				  NULL, &size, &secboot);
-
-	if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
-		return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
-
-	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-		goto out_efi_err;
-
-	size = sizeof(setupmode);
-	status = efi.get_variable(L"SetupMode", &efi_variable_guid,
-				  NULL, &size, &setupmode);
-
-	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-		goto out_efi_err;
-
-	if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1)
-		return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+	mode = efi_get_secureboot_mode(efi.get_variable);
+	if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unknown) {
+		pr_err("Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
+		return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
+	}
+	if (mode != efi_secureboot_mode_enabled)
+		return mode;
 
 	/* See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. */
 	size = sizeof(moksbstate);
@@ -140,10 +125,6 @@ static enum efi_secureboot_mode xen_efi_get_secureboot(void)
  secure_boot_enabled:
 	pr_info("UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
 	return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled;
-
- out_efi_err:
-	pr_err("Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
-	return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
 }
 
 void __init xen_efi_init(struct boot_params *boot_params)
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/p2m.c b/arch/x86/xen/p2m.c
index be4151f42611..3301875dd196 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/p2m.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/p2m.c
@@ -795,17 +795,7 @@ static int p2m_dump_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int p2m_dump_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
-{
-	return single_open(filp, p2m_dump_show, NULL);
-}
-
-static const struct file_operations p2m_dump_fops = {
-	.open		= p2m_dump_open,
-	.read		= seq_read,
-	.llseek		= seq_lseek,
-	.release	= single_release,
-};
+DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE(p2m_dump);
 
 static struct dentry *d_mmu_debug;