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author | Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> | 2018-06-13 15:48:27 -0700 |
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committer | Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> | 2018-06-20 19:10:01 +0200 |
commit | 42e4089c7890725fcd329999252dc489b72f2921 (patch) | |
tree | 5fea1d094b1d98e1d2cab24acc1f380824259200 /arch/x86 | |
parent | 17dbca119312b4e8173d4e25ff64262119fcef38 (diff) | |
download | linux-42e4089c7890725fcd329999252dc489b72f2921.tar.gz linux-42e4089c7890725fcd329999252dc489b72f2921.tar.bz2 linux-42e4089c7890725fcd329999252dc489b72f2921.zip |
x86/speculation/l1tf: Disallow non privileged high MMIO PROT_NONE mappings
For L1TF PROT_NONE mappings are protected by inverting the PFN in the page
table entry. This sets the high bits in the CPU's address space, thus
making sure to point to not point an unmapped entry to valid cached memory.
Some server system BIOSes put the MMIO mappings high up in the physical
address space. If such an high mapping was mapped to unprivileged users
they could attack low memory by setting such a mapping to PROT_NONE. This
could happen through a special device driver which is not access
protected. Normal /dev/mem is of course access protected.
To avoid this forbid PROT_NONE mappings or mprotect for high MMIO mappings.
Valid page mappings are allowed because the system is then unsafe anyways.
It's not expected that users commonly use PROT_NONE on MMIO. But to
minimize any impact this is only enforced if the mapping actually refers to
a high MMIO address (defined as the MAX_PA-1 bit being set), and also skip
the check for root.
For mmaps this is straight forward and can be handled in vm_insert_pfn and
in remap_pfn_range().
For mprotect it's a bit trickier. At the point where the actual PTEs are
accessed a lot of state has been changed and it would be difficult to undo
on an error. Since this is a uncommon case use a separate early page talk
walk pass for MMIO PROT_NONE mappings that checks for this condition
early. For non MMIO and non PROT_NONE there are no changes.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 21 |
2 files changed, 29 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h index a9c89cb1a9c5..6a090a76fdca 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h @@ -1338,6 +1338,14 @@ static inline bool pud_access_permitted(pud_t pud, bool write) return __pte_access_permitted(pud_val(pud), write); } +#define __HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED 1 +extern bool pfn_modify_allowed(unsigned long pfn, pgprot_t prot); + +static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void) +{ + return boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF); +} + #include <asm-generic/pgtable.h> #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c index 48c591251600..f40ab8185d94 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c @@ -240,3 +240,24 @@ int valid_mmap_phys_addr_range(unsigned long pfn, size_t count) return phys_addr_valid(addr + count - 1); } + +/* + * Only allow root to set high MMIO mappings to PROT_NONE. + * This prevents an unpriv. user to set them to PROT_NONE and invert + * them, then pointing to valid memory for L1TF speculation. + * + * Note: for locked down kernels may want to disable the root override. + */ +bool pfn_modify_allowed(unsigned long pfn, pgprot_t prot) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF)) + return true; + if (!__pte_needs_invert(pgprot_val(prot))) + return true; + /* If it's real memory always allow */ + if (pfn_valid(pfn)) + return true; + if (pfn > l1tf_pfn_limit() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return false; + return true; +} |