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authorDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2016-04-06 16:14:24 +0100
committerDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2016-04-06 16:14:24 +0100
commitbda850cd214e90b1be0cc25bc48c4f6ac53eb543 (patch)
treeacb936239ac766592c557295aec265ec9a2d04fb /crypto
parente68503bd6836ba765dc8e0ee77ea675fedc07e41 (diff)
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PKCS#7: Make trust determination dependent on contents of trust keyring
Make the determination of the trustworthiness of a key dependent on whether a key that can verify it is present in the supplied ring of trusted keys rather than whether or not the verifying key has KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED set. verify_pkcs7_signature() will return -ENOKEY if the PKCS#7 message trust chain cannot be verified. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h1
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c18
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h1
5 files changed, 5 insertions, 19 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
index ab9bf5363ecd..3b92523882e5 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static int pkcs7_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
return verify_pkcs7_signature(NULL, 0,
prep->data, prep->datalen,
- NULL, -ENOKEY, usage,
+ NULL, usage,
pkcs7_view_content, prep);
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
index d5eec31e95b6..f4e81074f5e0 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ struct pkcs7_signed_info {
struct pkcs7_signed_info *next;
struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Signing certificate (in msg->certs) */
unsigned index;
- bool trusted;
bool unsupported_crypto; /* T if not usable due to missing crypto */
/* Message digest - the digest of the Content Data (or NULL) */
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
index b9a5487cd82d..36e77cb07bd0 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
struct public_key_signature *sig = sinfo->sig;
struct x509_certificate *x509, *last = NULL, *p;
struct key *key;
- bool trusted;
int ret;
kenter(",%u,", sinfo->index);
@@ -42,10 +41,8 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
for (x509 = sinfo->signer; x509; x509 = x509->signer) {
if (x509->seen) {
- if (x509->verified) {
- trusted = x509->trusted;
+ if (x509->verified)
goto verified;
- }
kleave(" = -ENOKEY [cached]");
return -ENOKEY;
}
@@ -122,7 +119,6 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
matched:
ret = verify_signature(key, sig);
- trusted = test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED, &key->flags);
key_put(key);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ret == -ENOMEM)
@@ -134,12 +130,9 @@ matched:
verified:
if (x509) {
x509->verified = true;
- for (p = sinfo->signer; p != x509; p = p->signer) {
+ for (p = sinfo->signer; p != x509; p = p->signer)
p->verified = true;
- p->trusted = trusted;
- }
}
- sinfo->trusted = trusted;
kleave(" = 0");
return 0;
}
@@ -148,7 +141,6 @@ verified:
* pkcs7_validate_trust - Validate PKCS#7 trust chain
* @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 certificate to validate
* @trust_keyring: Signing certificates to use as starting points
- * @_trusted: Set to true if trustworth, false otherwise
*
* Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message intersects
* keys we already know and trust.
@@ -170,16 +162,13 @@ verified:
* May also return -ENOMEM.
*/
int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
- struct key *trust_keyring,
- bool *_trusted)
+ struct key *trust_keyring)
{
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
struct x509_certificate *p;
int cached_ret = -ENOKEY;
int ret;
- *_trusted = false;
-
for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next)
p->seen = false;
@@ -193,7 +182,6 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
cached_ret = -ENOPKG;
continue;
case 0:
- *_trusted |= sinfo->trusted;
cached_ret = 0;
continue;
default:
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
index 265351075b0e..672a94c2c3ff 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(NULL, 0,
pebuf + ctx.sig_offset, ctx.sig_len,
- trusted_keys, -EKEYREJECTED, usage,
+ trusted_keys, usage,
mscode_parse, &ctx);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index f24f4d808e7f..05eef1c68881 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ struct x509_certificate {
unsigned index;
bool seen; /* Infinite recursion prevention */
bool verified;
- bool trusted;
bool self_signed; /* T if self-signed (check unsupported_sig too) */
bool unsupported_key; /* T if key uses unsupported crypto */
bool unsupported_sig; /* T if signature uses unsupported crypto */