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author | Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> | 2020-02-10 13:00:12 +0000 |
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committer | Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> | 2020-02-27 23:21:52 -0500 |
commit | 5cbe0f13b51ac2fb2fd55902cff8d0077fc084c0 (patch) | |
tree | 7ac004926a2a07309afa3fca58702ea376a742c4 /drivers/char | |
parent | f8788d86ab28f61f7b46eb6be375f8a726783636 (diff) | |
download | linux-5cbe0f13b51ac2fb2fd55902cff8d0077fc084c0.tar.gz linux-5cbe0f13b51ac2fb2fd55902cff8d0077fc084c0.tar.bz2 linux-5cbe0f13b51ac2fb2fd55902cff8d0077fc084c0.zip |
random: split primary/secondary crng init paths
Currently crng_initialize() is used for both the primary CRNG and
secondary CRNGs. While we wish to share common logic, we need to do a
number of additional things for the primary CRNG, and this would be
easier to deal with were these handled in separate functions.
This patch splits crng_initialize() into crng_initialize_primary() and
crng_initialize_secondary(), with common logic factored out into a
crng_init_try_arch() helper.
There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210130015.17664-2-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/random.c | 34 |
1 files changed, 22 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index c7f9584de2c8..62d32e62f2da 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -781,27 +781,37 @@ static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg) } early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu); -static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng) +static bool crng_init_try_arch(struct crng_state *crng) { int i; - int arch_init = 1; + bool arch_init = true; unsigned long rv; - memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16); - if (crng == &primary_crng) - _extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4], - sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0); - else - _get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12); for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) { if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) { rv = random_get_entropy(); - arch_init = 0; + arch_init = false; } crng->state[i] ^= rv; } - if (trust_cpu && arch_init && crng == &primary_crng) { + + return arch_init; +} + +static void crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng) +{ + memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16); + _get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12); + crng_init_try_arch(crng); + crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1; +} + +static void __init crng_initialize_primary(struct crng_state *crng) +{ + memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16); + _extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0); + if (crng_init_try_arch(crng) && trust_cpu) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); numa_crng_init(); crng_init = 2; @@ -822,7 +832,7 @@ static void do_numa_crng_init(struct work_struct *work) crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i); spin_lock_init(&crng->lock); - crng_initialize(crng); + crng_initialize_secondary(crng); pool[i] = crng; } mb(); @@ -1771,7 +1781,7 @@ static void __init init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r) int __init rand_initialize(void) { init_std_data(&input_pool); - crng_initialize(&primary_crng); + crng_initialize_primary(&primary_crng); crng_global_init_time = jiffies; if (ratelimit_disable) { urandom_warning.interval = 0; |