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authorHoria Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>2019-06-10 16:30:58 +0300
committerHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>2019-06-20 14:18:33 +0800
commit059d73eea6409873446a858dd64a5bec9bf68b70 (patch)
tree64bcd3c478e63f213731115d7f132d9e42cd0a0b /drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi.c
parent1fa6d053b2a53b1979fc12000be41646be379503 (diff)
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crypto: caam - use len instead of nents for bulding HW S/G table
Currently, conversion of SW S/G table into HW S/G layout relies on nents returned by sg_nents_for_len(sg, len). However this leaves the possibility of HW S/G referencing more data then needed: since buffer length in HW S/G entries is filled using sg_dma_len(sg), the last entry in HW S/G table might have a length that is bigger than needed for the crypto request. This way of S/G table conversion is fine, unless after converting a table more entries have to be appended to the HW S/G table. In this case, crypto engine would access data from the S/G entry having the incorrect length, instead of advancing in the S/G table. This situation doesn't exist, but the upcoming implementation of IV update for skcipher algorithms needs to add a S/G entry after req->dst S/G (corresponding to output IV). Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi.c')
-rw-r--r--drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi.c36
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 19 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi.c
index 490a2bbdbb93..cec54344787c 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi.c
@@ -917,6 +917,7 @@ static struct aead_edesc *aead_edesc_alloc(struct aead_request *req,
gfp_t flags = (req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) ?
GFP_KERNEL : GFP_ATOMIC;
int src_nents, mapped_src_nents, dst_nents = 0, mapped_dst_nents = 0;
+ int src_len, dst_len = 0;
struct aead_edesc *edesc;
dma_addr_t qm_sg_dma, iv_dma = 0;
int ivsize = 0;
@@ -938,13 +939,13 @@ static struct aead_edesc *aead_edesc_alloc(struct aead_request *req,
}
if (likely(req->src == req->dst)) {
- src_nents = sg_nents_for_len(req->src, req->assoclen +
- req->cryptlen +
- (encrypt ? authsize : 0));
+ src_len = req->assoclen + req->cryptlen +
+ (encrypt ? authsize : 0);
+
+ src_nents = sg_nents_for_len(req->src, src_len);
if (unlikely(src_nents < 0)) {
dev_err(qidev, "Insufficient bytes (%d) in src S/G\n",
- req->assoclen + req->cryptlen +
- (encrypt ? authsize : 0));
+ src_len);
qi_cache_free(edesc);
return ERR_PTR(src_nents);
}
@@ -957,23 +958,21 @@ static struct aead_edesc *aead_edesc_alloc(struct aead_request *req,
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
} else {
- src_nents = sg_nents_for_len(req->src, req->assoclen +
- req->cryptlen);
+ src_len = req->assoclen + req->cryptlen;
+ dst_len = src_len + (encrypt ? authsize : (-authsize));
+
+ src_nents = sg_nents_for_len(req->src, src_len);
if (unlikely(src_nents < 0)) {
dev_err(qidev, "Insufficient bytes (%d) in src S/G\n",
- req->assoclen + req->cryptlen);
+ src_len);
qi_cache_free(edesc);
return ERR_PTR(src_nents);
}
- dst_nents = sg_nents_for_len(req->dst, req->assoclen +
- req->cryptlen +
- (encrypt ? authsize :
- (-authsize)));
+ dst_nents = sg_nents_for_len(req->dst, dst_len);
if (unlikely(dst_nents < 0)) {
dev_err(qidev, "Insufficient bytes (%d) in dst S/G\n",
- req->assoclen + req->cryptlen +
- (encrypt ? authsize : (-authsize)));
+ dst_len);
qi_cache_free(edesc);
return ERR_PTR(dst_nents);
}
@@ -1082,12 +1081,11 @@ static struct aead_edesc *aead_edesc_alloc(struct aead_request *req,
dma_to_qm_sg_one(sg_table + qm_sg_index, iv_dma, ivsize, 0);
qm_sg_index++;
}
- sg_to_qm_sg_last(req->src, mapped_src_nents, sg_table + qm_sg_index, 0);
+ sg_to_qm_sg_last(req->src, src_len, sg_table + qm_sg_index, 0);
qm_sg_index += mapped_src_nents;
if (mapped_dst_nents > 1)
- sg_to_qm_sg_last(req->dst, mapped_dst_nents, sg_table +
- qm_sg_index, 0);
+ sg_to_qm_sg_last(req->dst, dst_len, sg_table + qm_sg_index, 0);
qm_sg_dma = dma_map_single(qidev, sg_table, qm_sg_bytes, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (dma_mapping_error(qidev, qm_sg_dma)) {
@@ -1340,10 +1338,10 @@ static struct skcipher_edesc *skcipher_edesc_alloc(struct skcipher_request *req,
edesc->drv_req.drv_ctx = drv_ctx;
dma_to_qm_sg_one(sg_table, iv_dma, ivsize, 0);
- sg_to_qm_sg_last(req->src, mapped_src_nents, sg_table + 1, 0);
+ sg_to_qm_sg_last(req->src, req->cryptlen, sg_table + 1, 0);
if (mapped_dst_nents > 1)
- sg_to_qm_sg_last(req->dst, mapped_dst_nents, sg_table +
+ sg_to_qm_sg_last(req->dst, req->cryptlen, sg_table +
dst_sg_idx, 0);
edesc->qm_sg_dma = dma_map_single(qidev, sg_table, edesc->qm_sg_bytes,