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author | Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> | 2016-09-28 10:54:32 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2016-09-29 01:35:35 -0400 |
commit | 484611357c19f9e19ef742ebef4505a07d243cc9 (patch) | |
tree | 34f14c2b2ac71d0bf0a53cab096960e7c91ae87f /include | |
parent | 7836667cec5e02ed2ae3eb09b88047b5b5f2343a (diff) | |
download | linux-484611357c19f9e19ef742ebef4505a07d243cc9.tar.gz linux-484611357c19f9e19ef742ebef4505a07d243cc9.tar.bz2 linux-484611357c19f9e19ef742ebef4505a07d243cc9.zip |
bpf: allow access into map value arrays
Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this
struct foo {
unsigned iter;
int array[SOME_CONSTANT];
};
You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of
foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't
go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start
for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum
value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we
try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that
region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as
this
unsigned index = 0;
if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT)
foo->iter = index;
else
index = foo->iter++;
foo->array[index] = bar;
would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and
SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra
check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %=
SOME_CONSTANT.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'include')
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/bpf.h | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 12 |
2 files changed, 19 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h index 5691fdc83819..c201017b5730 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h @@ -139,6 +139,13 @@ enum bpf_reg_type { */ PTR_TO_PACKET, PTR_TO_PACKET_END, /* skb->data + headlen */ + + /* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ is used for doing pointer math inside of a map + * elem value. We only allow this if we can statically verify that + * access from this register are going to fall within the size of the + * map element. + */ + PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ, }; struct bpf_prog; diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h index c5cb661712c9..7035b997aaa5 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h @@ -10,8 +10,19 @@ #include <linux/bpf.h> /* for enum bpf_reg_type */ #include <linux/filter.h> /* for MAX_BPF_STACK */ + /* Just some arbitrary values so we can safely do math without overflowing and + * are obviously wrong for any sort of memory access. + */ +#define BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE (1024 * 1024 * 1024) +#define BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE -(1024 * 1024 * 1024) + struct bpf_reg_state { enum bpf_reg_type type; + /* + * Used to determine if any memory access using this register will + * result in a bad access. + */ + u64 min_value, max_value; union { /* valid when type == CONST_IMM | PTR_TO_STACK | UNKNOWN_VALUE */ s64 imm; @@ -81,6 +92,7 @@ struct bpf_verifier_env { u32 id_gen; /* used to generate unique reg IDs */ bool allow_ptr_leaks; bool seen_direct_write; + bool varlen_map_value_access; struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux_data; /* array of per-insn state */ }; |