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authorSteve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>2007-04-19 10:28:21 -0400
committerAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>2007-05-11 05:38:26 -0400
commit0a4ff8c2598b72f2fa9d50aae9e1809e684dbf41 (patch)
tree309f2b2b5874692302862534cd9052a1d96018ba /kernel/auditsc.c
parent5712e88f2b0f626a4857c24128810bbf8ce09537 (diff)
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[PATCH] Abnormal End of Processes
Hi, I have been working on some code that detects abnormal events based on audit system events. One kind of event that we currently have no visibility for is when a program terminates due to segfault - which should never happen on a production machine. And if it did, you'd want to investigate it. Attached is a patch that collects these events and sends them into the audit system. Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/auditsc.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/auditsc.c39
1 files changed, 39 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 5276b7ef05f1..e36481ed61b4 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2037,3 +2037,42 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
return 0;
}
+
+/**
+ * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
+ * @sig: signal value
+ *
+ * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
+ * should record the event for investigation.
+ */
+void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
+{
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ u32 sid;
+
+ if (!audit_enabled)
+ return;
+
+ if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
+ return;
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u",
+ audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context),
+ current->uid, current->gid);
+ selinux_get_task_sid(current, &sid);
+ if (sid) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+
+ if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len))
+ audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
+ else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ }
+ audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+}