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author | Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> | 2019-02-08 22:25:54 -0800 |
---|---|---|
committer | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> | 2019-02-10 19:37:41 -0800 |
commit | 5f4566498dee5e38e36a015a968c22ed21568f0b (patch) | |
tree | 83f3881b3cbf2e3ee2498e7b3f2b7a417368a64f /kernel/bpf | |
parent | 28bbfc3a25dd7b4ed8c14836cee7ec256ad345fd (diff) | |
download | linux-5f4566498dee5e38e36a015a968c22ed21568f0b.tar.gz linux-5f4566498dee5e38e36a015a968c22ed21568f0b.tar.bz2 linux-5f4566498dee5e38e36a015a968c22ed21568f0b.zip |
bpf: Fix narrow load on a bpf_sock returned from sk_lookup()
By adding this test to test_verifier:
{
"reference tracking: access sk->src_ip4 (narrow load)",
.insns = {
BPF_SK_LOOKUP,
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_0),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 3),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_H, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, src_ip4) + 2),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_release),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
The above test loads 2 bytes from sk->src_ip4 where
sk is obtained by bpf_sk_lookup_tcp().
It hits an internal verifier error from convert_ctx_accesses():
[root@arch-fb-vm1 bpf]# ./test_verifier 665 665
Failed to load prog 'Invalid argument'!
0: (b7) r2 = 0
1: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -8) = r2
2: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r2
3: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -24) = r2
4: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -32) = r2
5: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r2
6: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -48) = r2
7: (bf) r2 = r10
8: (07) r2 += -48
9: (b7) r3 = 36
10: (b7) r4 = 0
11: (b7) r5 = 0
12: (85) call bpf_sk_lookup_tcp#84
13: (bf) r6 = r0
14: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+3
R0=sock(id=1,off=0,imm=0) R6=sock(id=1,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0,call_-1 fp-8=????0000 fp-16=0000mmmm fp-24=mmmmmmmm fp-32=mmmmmmmm fp-40=mmmmmmmm fp-48=mmmmmmmm refs=1
15: (69) r2 = *(u16 *)(r0 +26)
16: (bf) r1 = r6
17: (85) call bpf_sk_release#86
18: (95) exit
from 14 to 18: safe
processed 20 insns (limit 131072), stack depth 48
bpf verifier is misconfigured
Summary: 0 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 1 FAILED
The bpf_sock_is_valid_access() is expecting src_ip4 can be narrowly
loaded (meaning load any 1 or 2 bytes of the src_ip4) by
marking info->ctx_field_size. However, this marked
ctx_field_size is not used. This patch fixes it.
Due to the recent refactoring in test_verifier,
this new test will be added to the bpf-next branch
(together with the bpf_tcp_sock patchset)
to avoid merge conflict.
Fixes: c64b7983288e ("bpf: Add PTR_TO_SOCKET verifier type")
Cc: Joe Stringer <joe@wand.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: Joe Stringer <joe@wand.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 11 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index b63bc77af2d1..516dfc6d78de 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -1640,12 +1640,13 @@ static int check_flow_keys_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off, return 0; } -static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, - int size, enum bpf_access_type t) +static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, + u32 regno, int off, int size, + enum bpf_access_type t) { struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; - struct bpf_insn_access_aux info; + struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = {}; if (reg->smin_value < 0) { verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", @@ -1659,6 +1660,8 @@ static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, return -EACCES; } + env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = info.ctx_field_size; + return 0; } @@ -2055,7 +2058,7 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn verbose(env, "cannot write into socket\n"); return -EACCES; } - err = check_sock_access(env, regno, off, size, t); + err = check_sock_access(env, insn_idx, regno, off, size, t); if (!err && value_regno >= 0) mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); } else { |