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authorTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>2016-06-02 23:43:21 -0500
committerJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>2016-06-06 20:16:18 +1000
commit98f368e9e2630a3ce3e80fb10fb2e02038cf9578 (patch)
treeae14325043192683972bc25ca35c8b7ceb8b8241 /kernel/capability.c
parent2885c1e3e0c29e4a1915214ddc9673925f538299 (diff)
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kernel: Add noaudit variant of ns_capable()
When checking the current cred for a capability in a specific user namespace, it isn't always desirable to have the LSMs audit the check. This patch adds a noaudit variant of ns_capable() for when those situations arise. The common logic between ns_capable() and the new ns_capable_noaudit() is moved into a single, shared function to keep duplicated code to a minimum and ease maintainability. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/capability.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/capability.c46
1 files changed, 36 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 45432b54d5c6..00411c82dac5 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -361,6 +361,24 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
}
+static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit)
+{
+ int capable;
+
+ if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) {
+ pr_crit("capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
+ BUG();
+ }
+
+ capable = audit ? security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) :
+ security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), ns, cap);
+ if (capable == 0) {
+ current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
/**
* ns_capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
* @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in
@@ -374,19 +392,27 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
*/
bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
{
- if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) {
- pr_crit("capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
- BUG();
- }
-
- if (security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) == 0) {
- current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
- return true;
- }
- return false;
+ return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, true);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
+/**
+ * ns_capable_noaudit - Determine if the current task has a superior capability
+ * (unaudited) in effect
+ * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
+ * available for use, false if not.
+ *
+ * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
+ * assumption that it's about to be used.
+ */
+bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
+{
+ return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, false);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable_noaudit);
/**
* capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect