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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-01-04 12:56:09 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-01-04 12:56:09 -0800
commit594cc251fdd0d231d342d88b2fdff4bc42fb0690 (patch)
tree259269a399e6504a7cf8739201cf172d1cbb197a /kernel/compat.c
parent0b2c8f8b6b0c7530e2866c95862546d0da2057b0 (diff)
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make 'user_access_begin()' do 'access_ok()'
Originally, the rule used to be that you'd have to do access_ok() separately, and then user_access_begin() before actually doing the direct (optimized) user access. But experience has shown that people then decide not to do access_ok() at all, and instead rely on it being implied by other operations or similar. Which makes it very hard to verify that the access has actually been range-checked. If you use the unsafe direct user accesses, hardware features (either SMAP - Supervisor Mode Access Protection - on x86, or PAN - Privileged Access Never - on ARM) do force you to use user_access_begin(). But nothing really forces the range check. By putting the range check into user_access_begin(), we actually force people to do the right thing (tm), and the range check vill be visible near the actual accesses. We have way too long a history of people trying to avoid them. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/compat.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/compat.c6
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/compat.c b/kernel/compat.c
index 705d4ae6c018..f01affa17e22 100644
--- a/kernel/compat.c
+++ b/kernel/compat.c
@@ -354,10 +354,9 @@ long compat_get_bitmap(unsigned long *mask, const compat_ulong_t __user *umask,
bitmap_size = ALIGN(bitmap_size, BITS_PER_COMPAT_LONG);
nr_compat_longs = BITS_TO_COMPAT_LONGS(bitmap_size);
- if (!access_ok(umask, bitmap_size / 8))
+ if (!user_access_begin(umask, bitmap_size / 8))
return -EFAULT;
- user_access_begin();
while (nr_compat_longs > 1) {
compat_ulong_t l1, l2;
unsafe_get_user(l1, umask++, Efault);
@@ -384,10 +383,9 @@ long compat_put_bitmap(compat_ulong_t __user *umask, unsigned long *mask,
bitmap_size = ALIGN(bitmap_size, BITS_PER_COMPAT_LONG);
nr_compat_longs = BITS_TO_COMPAT_LONGS(bitmap_size);
- if (!access_ok(umask, bitmap_size / 8))
+ if (!user_access_begin(umask, bitmap_size / 8))
return -EFAULT;
- user_access_begin();
while (nr_compat_longs > 1) {
unsigned long m = *mask++;
unsafe_put_user((compat_ulong_t)m, umask++, Efault);