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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-03-27 10:17:23 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-03-27 10:17:23 -0700
commit7001052160d172f6de06adeffde24dde9935ece8 (patch)
tree65fbc9c0df5a2989b68882ce1d893a0d78134c6a /kernel/livepatch
parentf022814633e1c600507b3a99691b4d624c2813f0 (diff)
parent3986f65d4f408ce9d0a361e3226a3246a5fb701c (diff)
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Merge tag 'x86_core_for_5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 CET-IBT (Control-Flow-Integrity) support from Peter Zijlstra: "Add support for Intel CET-IBT, available since Tigerlake (11th gen), which is a coarse grained, hardware based, forward edge Control-Flow-Integrity mechanism where any indirect CALL/JMP must target an ENDBR instruction or suffer #CP. Additionally, since Alderlake (12th gen)/Sapphire-Rapids, speculation is limited to 2 instructions (and typically fewer) on branch targets not starting with ENDBR. CET-IBT also limits speculation of the next sequential instruction after the indirect CALL/JMP [1]. CET-IBT is fundamentally incompatible with retpolines, but provides, as described above, speculation limits itself" [1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/branch-history-injection.html * tag 'x86_core_for_5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (53 commits) kvm/emulate: Fix SETcc emulation for ENDBR x86/Kconfig: Only allow CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT with ld.lld >= 14.0.0 x86/Kconfig: Only enable CONFIG_CC_HAS_IBT for clang >= 14.0.0 kbuild: Fixup the IBT kbuild changes x86/Kconfig: Do not allow CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI=y with llvm-objcopy x86: Remove toolchain check for X32 ABI capability x86/alternative: Use .ibt_endbr_seal to seal indirect calls objtool: Find unused ENDBR instructions objtool: Validate IBT assumptions objtool: Add IBT/ENDBR decoding objtool: Read the NOENDBR annotation x86: Annotate idtentry_df() x86,objtool: Move the ASM_REACHABLE annotation to objtool.h x86: Annotate call_on_stack() objtool: Rework ASM_REACHABLE x86: Mark __invalid_creds() __noreturn exit: Mark do_group_exit() __noreturn x86: Mark stop_this_cpu() __noreturn objtool: Ignore extra-symbol code objtool: Rename --duplicate to --lto ...
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/livepatch')
-rw-r--r--kernel/livepatch/patch.c19
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/livepatch/patch.c b/kernel/livepatch/patch.c
index fe316c021d73..c172bf92b576 100644
--- a/kernel/livepatch/patch.c
+++ b/kernel/livepatch/patch.c
@@ -124,19 +124,6 @@ unlock:
ftrace_test_recursion_unlock(bit);
}
-/*
- * Convert a function address into the appropriate ftrace location.
- *
- * Usually this is just the address of the function, but on some architectures
- * it's more complicated so allow them to provide a custom behaviour.
- */
-#ifndef klp_get_ftrace_location
-static unsigned long klp_get_ftrace_location(unsigned long faddr)
-{
- return faddr;
-}
-#endif
-
static void klp_unpatch_func(struct klp_func *func)
{
struct klp_ops *ops;
@@ -153,8 +140,7 @@ static void klp_unpatch_func(struct klp_func *func)
if (list_is_singular(&ops->func_stack)) {
unsigned long ftrace_loc;
- ftrace_loc =
- klp_get_ftrace_location((unsigned long)func->old_func);
+ ftrace_loc = ftrace_location((unsigned long)func->old_func);
if (WARN_ON(!ftrace_loc))
return;
@@ -186,8 +172,7 @@ static int klp_patch_func(struct klp_func *func)
if (!ops) {
unsigned long ftrace_loc;
- ftrace_loc =
- klp_get_ftrace_location((unsigned long)func->old_func);
+ ftrace_loc = ftrace_location((unsigned long)func->old_func);
if (!ftrace_loc) {
pr_err("failed to find location for function '%s'\n",
func->old_name);