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| author | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2017-08-02 15:00:40 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2017-08-14 13:46:42 -0700 |
| commit | deb4de8b31bc5bf21efb6ac31150a01a631cd647 (patch) | |
| tree | 71ba73a95233cd80446c01105e5242598d22feb2 /kernel | |
| parent | f3f6e30669c048f47d51ea59df9946a91f551c4c (diff) | |
| download | linux-deb4de8b31bc5bf21efb6ac31150a01a631cd647.tar.gz linux-deb4de8b31bc5bf21efb6ac31150a01a631cd647.tar.bz2 linux-deb4de8b31bc5bf21efb6ac31150a01a631cd647.zip | |
seccomp: Provide matching filter for introspection
Both the upcoming logging improvements and changes to RET_KILL will need
to know which filter a given seccomp return value originated from. In
order to delay logic processing of result until after the seccomp loop,
this adds a single pointer assignment on matches. This will allow both
log and RET_KILL logic to work off the filter rather than doing more
expensive tests inside the time-critical run_filters loop.
Running tight cycles of getpid() with filters attached shows no measurable
difference in speed.
Suggested-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/seccomp.c | 18 |
1 files changed, 15 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index 98b59b5db90b..1f3347fc2605 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -171,10 +171,14 @@ static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen) /** * seccomp_run_filters - evaluates all seccomp filters against @sd * @sd: optional seccomp data to be passed to filters + * @match: stores struct seccomp_filter that resulted in the return value, + * unless filter returned SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, in which case it will + * be unchanged. * * Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes. */ -static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd) +static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd, + struct seccomp_filter **match) { struct seccomp_data sd_local; u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW; @@ -198,8 +202,10 @@ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd) for (; f; f = f->prev) { u32 cur_ret = BPF_PROG_RUN(f->prog, sd); - if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION)) + if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION)) { ret = cur_ret; + *match = f; + } } return ret; } @@ -566,6 +572,7 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd, const bool recheck_after_trace) { u32 filter_ret, action; + struct seccomp_filter *match = NULL; int data; /* @@ -574,7 +581,7 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd, */ rmb(); - filter_ret = seccomp_run_filters(sd); + filter_ret = seccomp_run_filters(sd, &match); data = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA; action = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION; @@ -638,6 +645,11 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd, return 0; case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW: + /* + * Note that the "match" filter will always be NULL for + * this action since SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW is the starting + * state in seccomp_run_filters(). + */ return 0; case SECCOMP_RET_KILL: |