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| author | Petr Vaganov <p.vaganov@ideco.ru> | 2024-10-08 14:02:58 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> | 2024-10-11 09:00:03 +0200 |
| commit | 6889cd2a93e1e3606b3f6e958aa0924e836de4d2 (patch) | |
| tree | 62f37a206ae6f84cff3cce7ad8ea64f640298dcb /net/xfrm | |
| parent | 3f0ab59e6537c6a8f9e1b355b48f9c05a76e8563 (diff) | |
| download | linux-6889cd2a93e1e3606b3f6e958aa0924e836de4d2.tar.gz linux-6889cd2a93e1e3606b3f6e958aa0924e836de4d2.tar.bz2 linux-6889cd2a93e1e3606b3f6e958aa0924e836de4d2.zip | |
xfrm: fix one more kernel-infoleak in algo dumping
During fuzz testing, the following issue was discovered:
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x598/0x2a30
_copy_to_iter+0x598/0x2a30
__skb_datagram_iter+0x168/0x1060
skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x5b/0x220
netlink_recvmsg+0x362/0x1700
sock_recvmsg+0x2dc/0x390
__sys_recvfrom+0x381/0x6d0
__x64_sys_recvfrom+0x130/0x200
x64_sys_call+0x32c8/0x3cc0
do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x1c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x79/0x81
Uninit was stored to memory at:
copy_to_user_state_extra+0xcc1/0x1e00
dump_one_state+0x28c/0x5f0
xfrm_state_walk+0x548/0x11e0
xfrm_dump_sa+0x1e0/0x840
netlink_dump+0x943/0x1c40
__netlink_dump_start+0x746/0xdb0
xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x429/0xc00
netlink_rcv_skb+0x613/0x780
xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x77/0xc0
netlink_unicast+0xe90/0x1280
netlink_sendmsg+0x126d/0x1490
__sock_sendmsg+0x332/0x3d0
____sys_sendmsg+0x863/0xc30
___sys_sendmsg+0x285/0x3e0
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x2d6/0x560
x64_sys_call+0x1316/0x3cc0
do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x1c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x79/0x81
Uninit was created at:
__kmalloc+0x571/0xd30
attach_auth+0x106/0x3e0
xfrm_add_sa+0x2aa0/0x4230
xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x832/0xc00
netlink_rcv_skb+0x613/0x780
xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x77/0xc0
netlink_unicast+0xe90/0x1280
netlink_sendmsg+0x126d/0x1490
__sock_sendmsg+0x332/0x3d0
____sys_sendmsg+0x863/0xc30
___sys_sendmsg+0x285/0x3e0
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x2d6/0x560
x64_sys_call+0x1316/0x3cc0
do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x1c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x79/0x81
Bytes 328-379 of 732 are uninitialized
Memory access of size 732 starts at ffff88800e18e000
Data copied to user address 00007ff30f48aff0
CPU: 2 PID: 18167 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.8.11 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Fixes copying of xfrm algorithms where some random
data of the structure fields can end up in userspace.
Padding in structures may be filled with random (possibly sensitve)
data and should never be given directly to user-space.
A similar issue was resolved in the commit
8222d5910dae ("xfrm: Zero padding when dumping algos and encap")
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
Fixes: c7a5899eb26e ("xfrm: redact SA secret with lockdown confidentiality")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Co-developed-by: Boris Tonofa <b.tonofa@ideco.ru>
Signed-off-by: Boris Tonofa <b.tonofa@ideco.ru>
Signed-off-by: Petr Vaganov <p.vaganov@ideco.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/xfrm')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c index 8d06a37adbd9..eb146f574bbd 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -1102,7 +1102,9 @@ static int copy_to_user_auth(struct xfrm_algo_auth *auth, struct sk_buff *skb) if (!nla) return -EMSGSIZE; ap = nla_data(nla); - memcpy(ap, auth, sizeof(struct xfrm_algo_auth)); + strscpy_pad(ap->alg_name, auth->alg_name, sizeof(ap->alg_name)); + ap->alg_key_len = auth->alg_key_len; + ap->alg_trunc_len = auth->alg_trunc_len; if (redact_secret && auth->alg_key_len) memset(ap->alg_key, 0, (auth->alg_key_len + 7) / 8); else |