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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-01-14 18:36:33 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-01-14 18:36:33 -0800
commitc49c41a4134679cecb77362e7f6b59acb6320aa7 (patch)
tree45e690c036ca5846a48c8be67945d1d841b2d96d /security/commoncap.c
parent892d208bcf79e4e1058707786a7b6d486697cd78 (diff)
parentf423e5ba76e7e4a6fcb4836b4f072d1fdebba8b5 (diff)
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Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security
* 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security: capabilities: remove __cap_full_set definition security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable() ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat capabilities: remove task_ns_* functions capabitlies: ns_capable can use the cap helpers rather than lsm call capabilities: style only - move capable below ns_capable capabilites: introduce new has_ns_capabilities_noaudit capabilities: call has_ns_capability from has_capability capabilities: remove all _real_ interfaces capabilities: introduce security_capable_noaudit capabilities: reverse arguments to security_capable capabilities: remove the task from capable LSM hook entirely selinux: sparse fix: fix several warnings in the security server cod selinux: sparse fix: fix warnings in netlink code selinux: sparse fix: eliminate warnings for selinuxfs selinux: sparse fix: declare selinux_disable() in security.h selinux: sparse fix: move selinux_complete_init selinux: sparse fix: make selinux_secmark_refcount static SELinux: Fix RCU deref check warning in sel_netport_insert() Manually fix up a semantic mis-merge wrt security_netlink_recv(): - the interface was removed in commit fd7784615248 ("security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()") - a new user of it appeared in commit a38f7907b926 ("crypto: Add userspace configuration API") causing no automatic merge conflict, but Eric Paris pointed out the issue.
Diffstat (limited to 'security/commoncap.c')
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c24
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index ee4f8486e5f5..7ce191ea29a0 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -56,17 +56,8 @@ int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
return 0;
}
-int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
-{
- if (!cap_raised(current_cap(), cap))
- return -EPERM;
- return 0;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
-
/**
* cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
- * @tsk: The task to query
* @cred: The credentials to use
* @ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability
* @cap: The capability to check for
@@ -80,8 +71,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
* cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
* kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
*/
-int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
- struct user_namespace *targ_ns, int cap, int audit)
+int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
+ int cap, int audit)
{
for (;;) {
/* The creator of the user namespace has all caps. */
@@ -222,9 +213,8 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
/* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
* capability
*/
- if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(),
- current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
- SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
+ if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user->user_ns,
+ CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
@@ -874,7 +864,7 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
& (new->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/
|| ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
|| (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
- || (cap_capable(current, current_cred(),
+ || (cap_capable(current_cred(),
current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/
/*
@@ -940,7 +930,7 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
int cap_sys_admin = 0;
- if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+ if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
@@ -967,7 +957,7 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
int ret = 0;
if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) {
- ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
+ ret = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
/* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
if (ret == 0)