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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2024-05-15 08:43:02 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2024-05-15 08:43:02 -0700 |
commit | 353ad6c0839431146fdee3ff16f9dd17a2809ee4 (patch) | |
tree | 5509e6bab7847132990755796bafc7611a779593 /security/selinux | |
parent | ccae19c6239ae810242d2edc03b02bdcc12fc5ab (diff) | |
parent | 9fa8e76250082a45d0d3dad525419ab98bd01658 (diff) | |
download | linux-353ad6c0839431146fdee3ff16f9dd17a2809ee4.tar.gz linux-353ad6c0839431146fdee3ff16f9dd17a2809ee4.tar.bz2 linux-353ad6c0839431146fdee3ff16f9dd17a2809ee4.zip |
Merge tag 'integrity-v6.10' of ssh://ra.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Two IMA changes, one EVM change, a use after free bug fix, and a code
cleanup to address "-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end" warnings:
- The existing IMA {ascii, binary}_runtime_measurements lists include
a hard coded SHA1 hash. To address this limitation, define per TPM
enabled hash algorithm {ascii, binary}_runtime_measurements lists
- Close an IMA integrity init_module syscall measurement gap by
defining a new critical-data record
- Enable (partial) EVM support on stacked filesystems (overlayfs).
Only EVM portable & immutable file signatures are copied up, since
they do not contain filesystem specific metadata"
* tag 'integrity-v6.10' of ssh://ra.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: add crypto agility support for template-hash algorithm
evm: Rename is_unsupported_fs to is_unsupported_hmac_fs
fs: Rename SB_I_EVM_UNSUPPORTED to SB_I_EVM_HMAC_UNSUPPORTED
evm: Enforce signatures on unsupported filesystem for EVM_INIT_X509
ima: re-evaluate file integrity on file metadata change
evm: Store and detect metadata inode attributes changes
ima: Move file-change detection variables into new structure
evm: Use the metadata inode to calculate metadata hash
evm: Implement per signature type decision in security_inode_copy_up_xattr
security: allow finer granularity in permitting copy-up of security xattrs
ima: Rename backing_inode to real_inode
integrity: Avoid -Wflex-array-member-not-at-end warnings
ima: define an init_module critical data record
ima: Fix use-after-free on a dentry's dname.name
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index e92061019bea..7eed331e90f0 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3526,7 +3526,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) return 0; } -static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) +static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) { /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower |