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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2014-04-03 09:26:18 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2014-04-03 09:26:18 -0700 |
commit | bea803183e12a1c78a12ec70907174d13d958333 (patch) | |
tree | 56a720b1eb02bb15ce5135078d9bbcbf06b74235 /security/selinux | |
parent | cd6362befe4cc7bf589a5236d2a780af2d47bcc9 (diff) | |
parent | f64410ec665479d7b4b77b7519e814253ed0f686 (diff) | |
download | linux-bea803183e12a1c78a12ec70907174d13d958333.tar.gz linux-bea803183e12a1c78a12ec70907174d13d958333.tar.bz2 linux-bea803183e12a1c78a12ec70907174d13d958333.zip |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Apart from reordering the SELinux mmap code to ensure DAC is called
before MAC, these are minor maintenance updates"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits)
selinux: correctly label /proc inodes in use before the policy is loaded
selinux: put the mmap() DAC controls before the MAC controls
selinux: fix the output of ./scripts/get_maintainer.pl for SELinux
evm: enable key retention service automatically
ima: skip memory allocation for empty files
evm: EVM does not use MD5
ima: return d_name.name if d_path fails
integrity: fix checkpatch errors
ima: fix erroneous removal of security.ima xattr
security: integrity: Use a more current logging style
MAINTAINERS: email updates and other misc. changes
ima: reduce memory usage when a template containing the n field is used
ima: restore the original behavior for sending data with ima template
Integrity: Pass commname via get_task_comm()
fs: move i_readcount
ima: use static const char array definitions
security: have cap_dentry_init_security return error
ima: new helper: file_inode(file)
kernel: Mark function as static in kernel/seccomp.c
capability: Use current logging styles
...
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 60 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 2 |
2 files changed, 38 insertions, 24 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index b332e2cc0954..869c2f1e0da1 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ int selinux_enforcing; static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str) { unsigned long enforcing; - if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing)) + if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing)) selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0; return 1; } @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str) { unsigned long enabled; - if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled)) + if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled)) selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0; return 1; } @@ -1418,15 +1418,33 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent isec->sid = sbsec->sid; if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) { - if (opt_dentry) { - isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); - rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry, - isec->sclass, - &sid); - if (rc) - goto out_unlock; - isec->sid = sid; - } + /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on + * procfs inodes */ + if (opt_dentry) + /* Called from d_instantiate or + * d_splice_alias. */ + dentry = dget(opt_dentry); + else + /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to + * find a dentry. */ + dentry = d_find_alias(inode); + /* + * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed + * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we + * may find inodes that have no dentry on the + * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as + * these will get fixed up the next time we go through + * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes + * could be used again by userspace. + */ + if (!dentry) + goto out_unlock; + isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); + rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass, &sid); + dput(dentry); + if (rc) + goto out_unlock; + isec->sid = sid; } break; } @@ -3205,24 +3223,20 @@ error: static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) { - int rc = 0; - u32 sid = current_sid(); + int rc; + + /* do DAC check on address space usage */ + rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr); + if (rc) + return rc; - /* - * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before - * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt - * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even - * if DAC would have also denied the operation. - */ if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) { + u32 sid = current_sid(); rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT, MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL); - if (rc) - return rc; } - /* do DAC check on address space usage */ - return cap_mmap_addr(addr); + return rc; } static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index d60c0ee66387..c71737f6d1cc 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE; static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str) { unsigned long checkreqprot; - if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) + if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) selinux_checkreqprot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0; return 1; } |