ima: Move to LSM infrastructure

Move hardcoded IMA function calls (not appraisal-specific functions) from
various places in the kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a
new LSM named 'ima' (at the end of the LSM list and always enabled like
'integrity').

Having IMA before EVM in the Makefile is sufficient to preserve the
relative order of the new 'ima' LSM in respect to the upcoming 'evm' LSM,
and thus the order of IMA and EVM function calls as when they were
hardcoded.

Make moved functions as static (except ima_post_key_create_or_update(),
which is not in ima_main.c), and register them as implementation of the
respective hooks in the new function init_ima_lsm().

Select CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH, to ensure that the path-based LSM hook
path_post_mknod is always available and ima_post_path_mknod() is always
executed to mark files as new, as before the move.

A slight difference is that IMA and EVM functions registered for the
inode_post_setattr, inode_post_removexattr, path_post_mknod,
inode_post_create_tmpfile, inode_post_set_acl and inode_post_remove_acl
won't be executed for private inodes. Since those inodes are supposed to be
fs-internal, they should not be of interest to IMA or EVM. The S_PRIVATE
flag is used for anonymous inodes, hugetlbfs, reiserfs xattrs, XFS scrub
and kernel-internal tmpfs files.

Conditionally register ima_post_key_create_or_update() if
CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled. Also, conditionally register
ima_kernel_module_request() if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled.

Finally, add the LSM_ID_IMA case in lsm_list_modules_test.c.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

7 files changed, 79 insertions, 80 deletions

diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile
index d0ffe37dc1d6..92b63039c654 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/Makefile
@@ -18,5 +18,6 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o
 integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_PPC_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \
                                      platform_certs/load_powerpc.o \
                                      platform_certs/keyring_handler.o
+# The relative order of the 'ima' and 'evm' LSMs depends on the order below.
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA)			+= ima/
 obj-$(CONFIG_EVM)			+= evm/
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index b98bfe9efd0c..475c32615006 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ config IMA
 	select CRYPTO_HMAC
 	select CRYPTO_SHA1
 	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
+	select SECURITY_PATH
 	select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM
 	select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86
 	select TCG_CRB if TCG_TPM && ACPI
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index c29db699c996..c0412100023e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -127,6 +127,12 @@ void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void);
 static inline void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void) {}
 #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
+				   const void *payload, size_t plen,
+				   unsigned long flags, bool create);
+#endif
+
 /*
  * The default binary_runtime_measurements list format is defined as the
  * platform native format.  The canonical format is defined as little-endian.
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 3891b83efdb3..d0826e864c29 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
  *
  * Flag files that changed, based on i_version
  */
-void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
+static void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
@@ -427,8 +427,8 @@ out:
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-		  unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+static int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+			 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
 {
 	u32 secid;
 	int ret;
@@ -466,8 +466,8 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
  *
  * On mprotect change success, return 0.  On failure, return -EACESS.
  */
-int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
-		      unsigned long prot)
+static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
+			     unsigned long prot)
 {
 	struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL;
 	struct file *file;
@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	int ret;
 	u32 secid;
@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
+static int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	u32 secid;
 
@@ -560,7 +560,6 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
 					   MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
 
 static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, char *buf,
 			    size_t buf_size)
@@ -685,8 +684,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_inode_hash);
  * Skip calling process_measurement(), but indicate which newly, created
  * tmpfiles are in policy.
  */
-void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-			     struct inode *inode)
+static void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				    struct inode *inode)
+
 {
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
 	int must_appraise;
@@ -717,8 +717,7 @@ void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
  * Mark files created via the mknodat syscall as new, so that the
  * file data can be written later.
  */
-void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-			 struct dentry *dentry)
+static void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
@@ -753,8 +752,8 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
  *
  * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
-		  bool contents)
+static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
+			 bool contents)
 {
 	enum ima_hooks func;
 	u32 secid;
@@ -803,8 +802,8 @@ const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
-		       enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
+static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
+			      enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
 {
 	enum ima_hooks func;
 	u32 secid;
@@ -837,7 +836,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
  *
  * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
+static int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
 {
 	bool ima_enforce, sig_enforce;
 
@@ -891,9 +890,9 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
-		       enum kernel_load_data_id load_id,
-		       char *description)
+static int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
+			      enum kernel_load_data_id load_id,
+			      char *description)
 {
 	if (load_id == LOADING_FIRMWARE) {
 		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
@@ -1114,7 +1113,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_measure_critical_data);
  *
  * Return: Zero if it is safe to load the kernel module, -EINVAL otherwise.
  */
-int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
+static int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 {
 	if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -1155,4 +1154,41 @@ static int __init init_ima(void)
 	return error;
 }
 
+static struct security_hook_list ima_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, ima_bprm_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_post_open, ima_file_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_create_tmpfile, ima_post_create_tmpfile),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_release, ima_file_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, ima_file_mmap),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, ima_file_mprotect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, ima_load_data),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_load_data, ima_post_load_data),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, ima_read_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_read_file, ima_post_read_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_post_mknod, ima_post_path_mknod),
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_post_create_or_update, ima_post_key_create_or_update),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, ima_kernel_module_request),
+#endif
+};
+
+static const struct lsm_id ima_lsmid = {
+	.name = "ima",
+	.id = LSM_ID_IMA,
+};
+
+static int __init init_ima_lsm(void)
+{
+	security_add_hooks(ima_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ima_hooks), &ima_lsmid);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_LSM(ima) = {
+	.name = "ima",
+	.init = init_ima_lsm,
+	.order = LSM_ORDER_LAST,
+};
+
 late_initcall(init_ima);	/* Start IMA after the TPM is available */
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 9561db7cf6b4..59eaddd84434 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include <linux/key.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 
 /* iint action cache flags */
 #define IMA_MEASURE		0x00000001
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 31a8b9408b7c..560790038329 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
 #include <linux/random.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
@@ -932,8 +931,6 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 
 	security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen, flags,
 					   true);
-	ima_post_key_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen,
-				      flags, true);
 
 	key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref));
 
@@ -965,13 +962,9 @@ error:
 
 	key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep);
 
-	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
 		security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen,
 						   flags, false);
-		ima_post_key_create_or_update(keyring, key,
-					      payload, plen,
-					      flags, false);
-	}
 
 	goto error_free_prep;
 }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index bc3c6790aeaf..8495890a5a37 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -50,7 +50,8 @@
 	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) ? 1 : 0) + \
 	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \
 	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \
-	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0))
+	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0) + \
+	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA) ? 1 : 0))
 
 /*
  * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the
@@ -1182,12 +1183,7 @@ int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *
  */
 int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
+	return call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2895,13 +2891,8 @@ static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
 		       unsigned long flags)
 {
-	unsigned long prot_adj = mmap_prot(file, prot);
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, prot_adj, flags);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_file_mmap(file, prot, prot_adj, flags);
+	return call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, mmap_prot(file, prot),
+			     flags);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2930,12 +2921,7 @@ int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 			   unsigned long prot)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
+	return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3244,12 +3230,7 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
  */
 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3265,12 +3246,7 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
 			      bool contents)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_read_file(file, id, contents);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
 
@@ -3290,12 +3266,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
 int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 				   enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
 
@@ -3310,12 +3281,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
  */
 int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_load_data(id, contents);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data);
 
@@ -3337,13 +3303,8 @@ int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
 				   enum kernel_load_data_id id,
 				   char *description)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id,
-			    description);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_post_load_data(buf, size, id, description);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id,
+			     description);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data);