diff options
| author | Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> | 2018-12-09 01:57:05 +0530 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> | 2018-12-12 22:09:33 -0500 |
| commit | d7cecb676dd364b28a5a8f5e4a30ce2e9cfdfcc3 (patch) | |
| tree | 8119e0996f551cbb0a7e6c2568f5986d40f1effc /security | |
| parent | 386b49f51dc24d1f9139eb11f49aa075eeb35363 (diff) | |
| download | linux-d7cecb676dd364b28a5a8f5e4a30ce2e9cfdfcc3.tar.gz linux-d7cecb676dd364b28a5a8f5e4a30ce2e9cfdfcc3.tar.bz2 linux-d7cecb676dd364b28a5a8f5e4a30ce2e9cfdfcc3.zip | |
ima: Support platform keyring for kernel appraisal
On secure boot enabled systems, the bootloader verifies the kernel
image and possibly the initramfs signatures based on a set of keys. A
soft reboot(kexec) of the system, with the same kernel image and
initramfs, requires access to the original keys to verify the
signatures.
This patch allows IMA-appraisal access to those original keys, now
loaded on the platform keyring, needed for verifying the kernel image
and initramfs signatures.
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: only use platform keyring if it's enabled (Thiago)]
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 14 |
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index deec1804a00a..f6ac405daabb 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -289,12 +289,22 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, - (const char *)xattr_value, rc, + (const char *)xattr_value, + xattr_len, iint->ima_hash->digest, iint->ima_hash->length); if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) { status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; - } else if (rc) { + break; + } + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) && rc && + func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK) + rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM, + (const char *)xattr_value, + xattr_len, + iint->ima_hash->digest, + iint->ima_hash->length); + if (rc) { cause = "invalid-signature"; status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; } else { |