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-rw-r--r--include/uapi/linux/landlock.h87
1 files changed, 57 insertions, 30 deletions
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
index d9d0cb827117..f030adc462ee 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
@@ -53,43 +53,70 @@ struct landlock_ruleset_attr {
__u64 scoped;
};
-/*
- * sys_landlock_create_ruleset() flags:
+/**
+ * DOC: landlock_create_ruleset_flags
+ *
+ * **Flags**
*
- * - %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION: Get the highest supported Landlock ABI
- * version.
- * - %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_ERRATA: Get a bitmask of fixed issues.
+ * %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION
+ * Get the highest supported Landlock ABI version (starting at 1).
+ *
+ * %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_ERRATA
+ * Get a bitmask of fixed issues for the current Landlock ABI version.
*/
/* clang-format off */
#define LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION (1U << 0)
#define LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_ERRATA (1U << 1)
/* clang-format on */
-/*
- * sys_landlock_restrict_self() flags:
- *
- * - %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF: Do not create any log related to the
- * enforced restrictions. This should only be set by tools launching unknown
- * or untrusted programs (e.g. a sandbox tool, container runtime, system
- * service manager). Because programs sandboxing themselves should fix any
- * denied access, they should not set this flag to be aware of potential
- * issues reported by system's logs (i.e. audit).
- * - %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON: Explicitly ask to continue
- * logging denied access requests even after an :manpage:`execve(2)` call.
- * This flag should only be set if all the programs than can legitimately be
- * executed will not try to request a denied access (which could spam audit
- * logs).
- * - %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF: Do not create any log related
- * to the enforced restrictions coming from future nested domains created by
- * the caller or its descendants. This should only be set according to a
- * runtime configuration (i.e. not hardcoded) by programs launching other
- * unknown or untrusted programs that may create their own Landlock domains
- * and spam logs. The main use case is for container runtimes to enable users
- * to mute buggy sandboxed programs for a specific container image. Other use
- * cases include sandboxer tools and init systems. Unlike
- * %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF,
- * %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF does not impact the requested
- * restriction (if any) but only the future nested domains.
+/**
+ * DOC: landlock_restrict_self_flags
+ *
+ * **Flags**
+ *
+ * By default, denied accesses originating from programs that sandbox themselves
+ * are logged via the audit subsystem. Such events typically indicate unexpected
+ * behavior, such as bugs or exploitation attempts. However, to avoid excessive
+ * logging, access requests denied by a domain not created by the originating
+ * program are not logged by default. The rationale is that programs should know
+ * their own behavior, but not necessarily the behavior of other programs. This
+ * default configuration is suitable for most programs that sandbox themselves.
+ * For specific use cases, the following flags allow programs to modify this
+ * default logging behavior.
+ *
+ * The %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF and
+ * %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON flags apply to the newly created
+ * Landlock domain.
+ *
+ * %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF
+ * Disables logging of denied accesses originating from the thread creating
+ * the Landlock domain, as well as its children, as long as they continue
+ * running the same executable code (i.e., without an intervening
+ * :manpage:`execve(2)` call). This is intended for programs that execute
+ * unknown code without invoking :manpage:`execve(2)`, such as script
+ * interpreters. Programs that only sandbox themselves should not set this
+ * flag, so users can be notified of unauthorized access attempts via system
+ * logs.
+ *
+ * %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON
+ * Enables logging of denied accesses after an :manpage:`execve(2)` call,
+ * providing visibility into unauthorized access attempts by newly executed
+ * programs within the created Landlock domain. This flag is recommended
+ * only when all potential executables in the domain are expected to comply
+ * with the access restrictions, as excessive audit log entries could make
+ * it more difficult to identify critical events.
+ *
+ * %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF
+ * Disables logging of denied accesses originating from nested Landlock
+ * domains created by the caller or its descendants. This flag should be set
+ * according to runtime configuration, not hardcoded, to avoid suppressing
+ * important security events. It is useful for container runtimes or
+ * sandboxing tools that may launch programs which themselves create
+ * Landlock domains and could otherwise generate excessive logs. Unlike
+ * ``LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF``, this flag only affects
+ * future nested domains, not the one being created. It can also be used
+ * with a @ruleset_fd value of -1 to mute subdomain logs without creating a
+ * domain.
*/
/* clang-format off */
#define LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF (1U << 0)