diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 10 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 14 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 5 |
4 files changed, 28 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 6f2b8352573a..939f53d02627 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -602,6 +602,7 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) * ima_read_file - pre-measure/appraise hook decision based on policy * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit * @read_id: caller identifier + * @contents: whether a subsequent call will be made to ima_post_read_file() * * Permit reading a file based on policy. The policy rules are written * in terms of the policy identifier. Appraising the integrity of @@ -609,8 +610,15 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) * * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES. */ -int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) +int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, + bool contents) { + /* Reject all partial reads during appraisal. */ + if (!contents) { + if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) + return -EACCES; + } + /* * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the * firmware being accessible to the device prior to the completion diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c index 28782412febb..b12f7d986b1e 100644 --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c @@ -118,11 +118,21 @@ static void loadpin_sb_free_security(struct super_block *mnt_sb) } } -static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) +static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, + bool contents) { struct super_block *load_root; const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id); + /* + * If we will not know that we'll be seeing the full contents + * then we cannot trust a load will be complete and unchanged + * off disk. Treat all contents=false hooks as if there were + * no associated file struct. + */ + if (!contents) + file = NULL; + /* If the file id is excluded, ignore the pinning. */ if ((unsigned int)id < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) && ignore_read_file_id[id]) { @@ -179,7 +189,7 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) { - return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id); + return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id, contents); } static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 531b855826fc..a28045dc9e7f 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1672,14 +1672,15 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name); } -int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) +int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, + bool contents) { int ret; - ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id); + ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents); if (ret) return ret; - return ima_read_file(file, id); + return ima_read_file(file, id, contents); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 558beee97d8d..dec654d52b68 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -4003,13 +4003,14 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file) } static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, - enum kernel_read_file_id id) + enum kernel_read_file_id id, + bool contents) { int rc = 0; switch (id) { case READING_MODULE: - rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(file); + rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(contents ? file : NULL); break; default: break; |