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* x86: fix user address masking non-canonical speculation issueLinus Torvalds2024-10-251-2/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It turns out that AMD has a "Meltdown Lite(tm)" issue with non-canonical accesses in kernel space. And so using just the high bit to decide whether an access is in user space or kernel space ends up with the good old "leak speculative data" if you have the right gadget using the result: CVE-2020-12965 “Transient Execution of Non-Canonical Accesses“ Now, the kernel surrounds the access with a STAC/CLAC pair, and those instructions end up serializing execution on older Zen architectures, which closes the speculation window. But that was true only up until Zen 5, which renames the AC bit [1]. That improves performance of STAC/CLAC a lot, but also means that the speculation window is now open. Note that this affects not just the new address masking, but also the regular valid_user_address() check used by access_ok(), and the asm version of the sign bit check in the get_user() helpers. It does not affect put_user() or clear_user() variants, since there's no speculative result to be used in a gadget for those operations. Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/80d94591-1297-4afb-b510-c665efd37f10@citrix.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241023094448.GAZxjFkEOOF_DM83TQ@fat_crate.local/ [1] Link: https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1010.html Link: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2108.10771 Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Tested-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@intel.com> # LAM case Fixes: 2865baf54077 ("x86: support user address masking instead of non-speculative conditional") Fixes: 6014bc27561f ("x86-64: make access_ok() independent of LAM") Fixes: b19b74bc99b1 ("x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user()") Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* x86/uaccess: Zero the 8-byte get_range case on failure on 32-bitDavid Gow2024-08-011-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While zeroing the upper 32 bits of an 8-byte getuser on 32-bit x86 was fixed by commit 8c860ed825cb ("x86/uaccess: Fix missed zeroing of ia32 u64 get_user() range checking") it was broken again in commit 8a2462df1547 ("x86/uaccess: Improve the 8-byte getuser() case"). This is because the register which holds the upper 32 bits (%ecx) is being cleared _after_ the check_range, so if the range check fails, %ecx is never cleared. This can be reproduced with: ./tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py run --arch i386 usercopy Instead, clear %ecx _before_ check_range in the 8-byte case. This reintroduces a bit of the ugliness we were trying to avoid by adding another #ifndef CONFIG_X86_64, but at least keeps check_range from needing a separate bad_get_user_8 jump. Fixes: 8a2462df1547 ("x86/uaccess: Improve the 8-byte getuser() case") Signed-off-by: David Gow <davidgow@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240731073031.4045579-1-davidgow@google.com
* x86/uaccess: Improve the 8-byte getuser() caseLinus Torvalds2024-06-191-49/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | Streamline the 8-byte case and drop the special handling. Use a macro which hides the exception handling. No functional changes. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=whYb2L_atsRk9pBiFiVLGe5wNZLHhRinA69yu6FiKvDsw@mail.gmail.com
* x86/uaccess: Fix missed zeroing of ia32 u64 get_user() range checkingKees Cook2024-06-111-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When reworking the range checking for get_user(), the get_user_8() case on 32-bit wasn't zeroing the high register. (The jump to bad_get_user_8 was accidentally dropped.) Restore the correct error handling destination (and rename the jump to using the expected ".L" prefix). While here, switch to using a named argument ("size") for the call template ("%c4" to "%c[size]") as already used in the other call templates in this file. Found after moving the usercopy selftests to KUnit: # usercopy_test_invalid: EXPECTATION FAILED at lib/usercopy_kunit.c:278 Expected val_u64 == 0, but val_u64 == -60129542144 (0xfffffff200000000) Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CABVgOSn=tb=Lj9SxHuT4_9MTjjKVxsq-ikdXC4kGHO4CfKVmGQ@mail.gmail.com Fixes: b19b74bc99b1 ("x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user()") Reported-by: David Gow <davidgow@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Tested-by: David Gow <davidgow@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240610210213.work.143-kees%40kernel.org
* x86/lib: Revert to _ASM_EXTABLE_UA() for {get,put}_user() fixupsQiuxu Zhuo2024-01-291-12/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | During memory error injection test on kernels >= v6.4, the kernel panics like below. However, this issue couldn't be reproduced on kernels <= v6.3. mce: [Hardware Error]: CPU 296: Machine Check Exception: f Bank 1: bd80000000100134 mce: [Hardware Error]: RIP 10:<ffffffff821b9776> {__get_user_nocheck_4+0x6/0x20} mce: [Hardware Error]: TSC 411a93533ed ADDR 346a8730040 MISC 86 mce: [Hardware Error]: PROCESSOR 0:a06d0 TIME 1706000767 SOCKET 1 APIC 211 microcode 80001490 mce: [Hardware Error]: Run the above through 'mcelog --ascii' mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check: Data load in unrecoverable area of kernel Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal local machine check The MCA code can recover from an in-kernel #MC if the fixup type is EX_TYPE_UACCESS, explicitly indicating that the kernel is attempting to access userspace memory. However, if the fixup type is EX_TYPE_DEFAULT the only thing that is raised for an in-kernel #MC is a panic. ex_handler_uaccess() would warn if users gave a non-canonical addresses (with bit 63 clear) to {get, put}_user(), which was unexpected. Therefore, commit b19b74bc99b1 ("x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user()") replaced _ASM_EXTABLE_UA() with _ASM_EXTABLE() for {get, put}_user() fixups. However, the new fixup type EX_TYPE_DEFAULT results in a panic. Commit 6014bc27561f ("x86-64: make access_ok() independent of LAM") added the check gp_fault_address_ok() right before the WARN_ONCE() in ex_handler_uaccess() to not warn about non-canonical user addresses due to LAM. With that in place, revert back to _ASM_EXTABLE_UA() for {get,put}_user() exception fixups in order to be able to handle in-kernel MCEs correctly again. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Fixes: b19b74bc99b1 ("x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user()") Signed-off-by: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240129063842.61584-1-qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com
* x86/headers: Replace #include <asm/export.h> with #include <linux/export.h>Masahiro Yamada2023-10-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The following commit: ddb5cdbafaaa ("kbuild: generate KSYMTAB entries by modpost") deprecated <asm/export.h>, which is now a wrapper of <linux/export.h>. Use <linux/export.h> in *.S as well as in *.c files. After all the <asm/export.h> lines are replaced, <asm/export.h> and <asm-generic/export.h> will be removed. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230806145958.380314-2-masahiroy@kernel.org
* x86/lib: Make get/put_user() exception handling a visible symbolNadav Amit2023-06-021-16/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The .L-prefixed exception handling symbols of get_user() and put_user() do get discarded from the symbol table of the final kernel image. This confuses tools which parse that symbol table and try to map the chunk of code to a symbol. And, in general, from toolchain perspective, it is a good practice to have all code belong to a symbol, and the correct one at that. ( Currently, objdump displays that exception handling chunk as part of the previous symbol which is a "fallback" of sorts and not correct. ) While at it, rename them to something more descriptive. [ bp: Rewrite commit message, rename symbols. ] Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230525184244.2311-1-namit@vmware.com
* x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user()Kirill A. Shutemov2023-03-161-52/+31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The functions get_user() and put_user() check that the target address range resides in the user space portion of the virtual address space. In order to perform this check, the functions compare the end of the range against TASK_SIZE_MAX. For kernels compiled with CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL, this process requires some additional trickery using ALTERNATIVE, as TASK_SIZE_MAX depends on the paging mode in use. Linus suggested that this check could be simplified for 64-bit kernels. It is sufficient to check bit 63 of the address to ensure that the range belongs to user space. Additionally, the use of branches can be avoided by setting the target address to all ones if bit 63 is set. There's no need to check the end of the access range as there's huge gap between end of userspace range and start of the kernel range. The gap consists of canonical hole and unused ranges on both kernel and userspace sides. If an address with bit 63 set is passed down, it will trigger a #GP exception. _ASM_EXTABLE_UA() complains about this. Replace it with plain _ASM_EXTABLE() as it is expected behaviour now. The updated get_user() and put_user() checks are also compatible with Linear Address Masking, which allows user space to encode metadata in the upper bits of pointers and eliminates the need to untag the address before handling it. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230312112612.31869-2-kirill.shutemov%40linux.intel.com
* x86: Prepare asm files for straight-line-speculationPeter Zijlstra2021-12-081-11/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace all ret/retq instructions with RET in preparation of making RET a macro. Since AS is case insensitive it's a big no-op without RET defined. find arch/x86/ -name \*.S | while read file do sed -i 's/\<ret[q]*\>/RET/' $file done Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211204134907.905503893@infradead.org
* Merge branch 'work.set_fs' of ↵Linus Torvalds2020-10-221-23/+24
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull initial set_fs() removal from Al Viro: "Christoph's set_fs base series + fixups" * 'work.set_fs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: fs: Allow a NULL pos pointer to __kernel_read fs: Allow a NULL pos pointer to __kernel_write powerpc: remove address space overrides using set_fs() powerpc: use non-set_fs based maccess routines x86: remove address space overrides using set_fs() x86: make TASK_SIZE_MAX usable from assembly code x86: move PAGE_OFFSET, TASK_SIZE & friends to page_{32,64}_types.h lkdtm: remove set_fs-based tests test_bitmap: remove user bitmap tests uaccess: add infrastructure for kernel builds with set_fs() fs: don't allow splice read/write without explicit ops fs: don't allow kernel reads and writes without iter ops sysctl: Convert to iter interfaces proc: add a read_iter method to proc proc_ops proc: cleanup the compat vs no compat file ops proc: remove a level of indentation in proc_get_inode
| * x86: remove address space overrides using set_fs()Christoph Hellwig2020-09-081-23/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Stop providing the possibility to override the address space using set_fs() now that there is no need for that any more. To properly handle the TASK_SIZE_MAX checking for 4 vs 5-level page tables on x86 a new alternative is introduced, which just like the one in entry_64.S has to use the hardcoded virtual address bits to escape the fact that TASK_SIZE_MAX isn't actually a constant when 5-level page tables are enabled. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | x86: Make __get_user() generate an out-of-line callLinus Torvalds2020-10-121-0/+60
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of inlining the whole stac/lfence/mov/clac sequence (which also requires individual exception table entries and several asm instruction alternatives entries), just generate "call __get_user_nocheck_X" for the __get_user() cases. We can use all the same infrastructure that we already do for the regular "get_user()", and the end result is simpler source code, and much simpler code generation. It also means that when I introduce asm goto with input for "unsafe_get_user()", there are no nasty interactions with the __get_user() code. Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* x86/asm: Change all ENTRY+ENDPROC to SYM_FUNC_*Jiri Slaby2019-10-181-8/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | These are all functions which are invoked from elsewhere, so annotate them as global using the new SYM_FUNC_START and their ENDPROC's by SYM_FUNC_END. Make sure ENTRY/ENDPROC is not defined on X86_64, given these were the last users. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> [hibernate] Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> [xen bits] Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> [crypto] Cc: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy@infradead.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl> Cc: Cao jin <caoj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: kvm ML <kvm@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> Cc: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Cc: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191011115108.12392-25-jslaby@suse.cz
* x86/asm: Annotate local pseudo-functionsJiri Slaby2019-10-181-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Use the newly added SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL* to annotate beginnings of all pseudo-functions (those ending with END until now) which do not have ".globl" annotation. This is needed to balance END for tools that generate debuginfo. Note that ENDs are switched to SYM_CODE_END too so that everybody can see the pairing. C-like functions (which handle frame ptr etc.) are not annotated here, hence SYM_CODE_* macros are used here, not SYM_FUNC_*. Note that the 32bit version of early_idt_handler_common already had ENDPROC -- switch that to SYM_CODE_END for the same reason as above (and to be the same as 64bit). While early_idt_handler_common is LOCAL, it's name is not prepended with ".L" as it happens to appear in call traces. bad_get_user*, and bad_put_user are now aligned, as they are separate functions. They do not mind to be aligned -- no need to be compact there. early_idt_handler_common is aligned now too, as it is after early_idt_handler_array, so as well no need to be compact there. verify_cpu is self-standing and included in other .S files, so align it too. The others have alignment preserved to what it used to be (using the _NOALIGN variant of macros). Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com> Cc: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Cao jin <caoj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Maran Wilson <maran.wilson@oracle.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191011115108.12392-6-jslaby@suse.cz
* x86/asm: Make some functions local labelsJiri Slaby2019-09-061-8/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Boris suggests to make a local label (prepend ".L") to these functions to eliminate them from the symbol table. These are functions with very local names and really should not be visible anywhere. Note that objtool won't see these functions anymore (to generate ORC debug info). But all the functions are not annotated with ENDPROC, so they won't have objtool's attention anyway. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Cao jin <caoj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Steve Winslow <swinslow@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190906075550.23435-2-jslaby@suse.cz
* x86/uaccess: Remove redundant CLACs in getuser/putuser error pathsJosh Poimboeuf2019-07-181-10/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The same getuser/putuser error paths are used regardless of whether AC is set. In non-exception failure cases, this results in an unnecessary CLAC. Fixes the following warnings: arch/x86/lib/getuser.o: warning: objtool: .altinstr_replacement+0x18: redundant UACCESS disable arch/x86/lib/putuser.o: warning: objtool: .altinstr_replacement+0x18: redundant UACCESS disable Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/bc14ded2755ae75bd9010c446079e113dbddb74b.1563413318.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
* x86/extable: Introduce _ASM_EXTABLE_UA for uaccess fixupsJann Horn2018-09-031-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, most fixups for attempting to access userspace memory are handled using _ASM_EXTABLE, which is also used for various other types of fixups (e.g. safe MSR access, IRET failures, and a bunch of other things). In order to make it possible to add special safety checks to uaccess fixups (in particular, checking whether the fault address is actually in userspace), introduce a new exception table handler ex_handler_uaccess() and wire it up to all the user access fixups (excluding ones that already use _ASM_EXTABLE_EX). Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: dvyukov@google.com Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: "Naveen N. Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180828201421.157735-5-jannh@google.com
* x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculationDan Williams2018-01-301-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quoting Linus: I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends, but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_ accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache. Unlike the __get_user() case get_user() includes the address limit check near the pointer de-reference. With that locality the speculation can be mitigated with pointer narrowing rather than a barrier, i.e. array_index_nospec(). Where the narrowing is performed by: cmp %limit, %ptr sbb %mask, %mask and %mask, %ptr With respect to speculation the value of %ptr is either less than %limit or NULL. Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727417469.33451.11804043010080838495.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
* License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no licenseGreg Kroah-Hartman2017-11-021-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86: move exports to actual definitionsAl Viro2016-08-071-0/+5
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* x86/uaccess: Move thread_info::addr_limit to thread_structAndy Lutomirski2016-07-151-10/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | struct thread_info is a legacy mess. To prepare for its partial removal, move thread_info::addr_limit out. As an added benefit, this way is simpler. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/15bee834d09402b47ac86f2feccdf6529f9bc5b0.1468527351.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* x86/debug: Remove perpetually broken, unmaintainable dwarf annotationsIngo Molnar2015-06-021-13/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | So the dwarf2 annotations in low level assembly code have become an increasing hindrance: unreadable, messy macros mixed into some of the most security sensitive code paths of the Linux kernel. These debug info annotations don't even buy the upstream kernel anything: dwarf driven stack unwinding has caused problems in the past so it's out of tree, and the upstream kernel only uses the much more robust framepointers based stack unwinding method. In addition to that there's a steady, slow bitrot going on with these annotations, requiring frequent fixups. There's no tooling and no functionality upstream that keeps it correct. So burn down the sick forest, allowing new, healthier growth: 27 files changed, 350 insertions(+), 1101 deletions(-) Someone who has the willingness and time to do this properly can attempt to reintroduce dwarf debuginfo in x86 assembly code plus dwarf unwinding from first principles, with the following conditions: - it should be maximally readable, and maximally low-key to 'ordinary' code reading and maintenance. - find a build time method to insert dwarf annotations automatically in the most common cases, for pop/push instructions that manipulate the stack pointer. This could be done for example via a preprocessing step that just looks for common patterns - plus special annotations for the few cases where we want to depart from the default. We have hundreds of CFI annotations, so automating most of that makes sense. - it should come with build tooling checks that ensure that CFI annotations are sensible. We've seen such efforts from the framepointer side, and there's no reason it couldn't be done on the dwarf side. Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Frédéric Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* x86: Be consistent with data size in getuser.SH. Peter Anvin2013-02-111-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | Consistently use the data register by name and use a sized assembly instruction in getuser.S. There is never any reason to macroize it, and being inconsistent in the same file is just annoying. No actual code change. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
* x86-32: Add support for 64bit get_user()Ville Syrjälä2013-02-071-5/+32
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Implement __get_user_8() for x86-32. It will return the 64-bit result in edx:eax register pair, and ecx is used to pass in the address and return the error value. For consistency, change the register assignment for all other __get_user_x() variants, so that address is passed in ecx/rcx, the error value is returned in ecx/rcx, and eax/rax contains the actual value. [ hpa: I modified the patch so that it does NOT change the calling conventions for the existing callsites, this also means that the code is completely unchanged for 64 bits. Instead, continue to use eax for address input/error output and use the ecx:edx register pair for the output. ] This is a partial refresh of a patch [1] by Jamie Lokier from 2004. Only the minimal changes to implement 64bit get_user() were picked from the original patch. [1] http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/198823 Originally-by: Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org> Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1355312043-11467-1-git-send-email-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
* x86, smap: Add STAC and CLAC instructions to control user space accessH. Peter Anvin2012-09-211-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) is enabled, access to userspace from the kernel is controlled by the AC flag. To make the performance of manipulating that flag acceptable, there are two new instructions, STAC and CLAC, to set and clear it. This patch adds those instructions, via alternative(), when the SMAP feature is enabled. It also adds X86_EFLAGS_AC unconditionally to the SYSCALL entry mask; there is simply no reason to make that one conditional. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1348256595-29119-9-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com
* x86, extable: Remove open-coded exception table entries in ↵H. Peter Anvin2012-04-201-5/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | arch/x86/lib/getuser.S Remove open-coded exception table entries in arch/x86/lib/getuser.S, and replace them with _ASM_EXTABLE() macros; this will allow us to change the format and type of the exception table entries. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA%2B55aFyijf43qSu3N9nWHEBwaGbb7T2Oq9A=9EyR=Jtyqfq_cQ@mail.gmail.com
* x86: use _types.h headers in asm where availableJeremy Fitzhardinge2009-02-131-1/+1
| | | | | | | In general, the only definitions that assembly files can use are in _types.S headers (where available), so convert them. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
* x86: merge getuser asm functions.Glauber Costa2008-07-091-0/+104
getuser_32.S and getuser_64.S are merged into getuser.S. Signed-off-by: Glauber Costa <gcosta@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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