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* Merge tag 'v6.8-rc4' into x86/percpu, to resolve conflicts and refresh the ↵Ingo Molnar2024-02-141-1/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | branch Conflicts: arch/x86/include/asm/percpu.h arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
| * x86/entry: Convert INT 0x80 emulation to IDTENTRYThomas Gleixner2023-12-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is no real reason to have a separate ASM entry point implementation for the legacy INT 0x80 syscall emulation on 64-bit. IDTENTRY provides all the functionality needed with the only difference that it does not: - save the syscall number (AX) into pt_regs::orig_ax - set pt_regs::ax to -ENOSYS Both can be done safely in the C code of an IDTENTRY before invoking any of the syscall related functions which depend on this convention. Aside of ASM code reduction this prepares for detecting and handling a local APIC injected vector 0x80. [ kirill.shutemov: More verbose comments ] Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.0+
* | x86/percpu, xen: Correct PER_CPU_VAR() usage to include symbol and its addendUros Bizjak2023-10-201-5/+5
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The PER_CPU_VAR() macro should be applied to a symbol and its addend. Inconsistent usage is currently harmless, but needs to be corrected before %rip-relative addressing is introduced to the PER_CPU_VAR() macro. No functional changes intended. Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
* x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handlerRick Edgecombe2023-08-021-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints. For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy on the shadow stack. There already exists a control-protection fault handler for handling kernel IBT faults. Refactor this fault handler into separate user and kernel handlers, like the page fault handler. Add a control-protection handler for usermode. To avoid ifdeffery, put them both in a new file cet.c, which is compiled in the case of either of the two CET features supported in the kernel: kernel IBT or user mode shadow stack. Move some static inline functions from traps.c into a header so they can be used in cet.c. Opportunistically fix a comment in the kernel IBT part of the fault handler that is on the end of the line instead of preceding it. Keep the same behavior for the kernel side of the fault handler, except for converting a BUG to a WARN in the case of a #CP happening when the feature is missing. This unifies the behavior with the new shadow stack code, and also prevents the kernel from crashing under this situation which is potentially recoverable. The control-protection fault handler works in a similar way as the general protection fault handler. It provides the si_code SEGV_CPERR to the signal handler. Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-28-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
* x86,objtool: Split UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY in twoJosh Poimboeuf2023-03-231-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Mark reported that the ORC unwinder incorrectly marks an unwind as reliable when the unwind terminates prematurely in the dark corners of return_to_handler() due to lack of information about the next frame. The problem is UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY is used in two different situations: 1) The end of the kernel stack unwind before hitting user entry, boot code, or fork entry 2) A blind spot in ORC coverage where the unwinder has to bail due to lack of information about the next frame The ORC unwinder has no way to tell the difference between the two. When it encounters an undefined stack state with 'end=1', it blindly marks the stack reliable, which can break the livepatch consistency model. Fix it by splitting UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY into UNWIND_HINT_UNDEFINED and UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK. Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/fd6212c8b450d3564b855e1cb48404d6277b4d9f.1677683419.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
* x86: Remove __USER32_DSBrian Gerst2022-10-191-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | Replace all users with the equivalent __USER_DS, which will make merging native and compat code simpler. Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220606203802.158958-5-brgerst@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
* objtool: Add entry UNRET validationPeter Zijlstra2022-06-271-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since entry asm is tricky, add a validation pass that ensures the retbleed mitigation has been done before the first actual RET instruction. Entry points are those that either have UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY, which acts as UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY but marks the instruction as an entry point, or those that have UWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS at +0. This is basically a variant of validate_branch() that is intra-function and it will simply follow all branches from marked entry points and ensures that all paths lead to ANNOTATE_UNRET_END. If a path hits RET or an indirection the path is a fail and will be reported. There are 3 ANNOTATE_UNRET_END instances: - UNTRAIN_RET itself - exception from-kernel; this path doesn't need UNTRAIN_RET - all early exceptions; these also don't need UNTRAIN_RET Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
* x86/xen: Rename SYS* entry pointsPeter Zijlstra2022-06-271-10/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | Native SYS{CALL,ENTER} entry points are called entry_SYS{CALL,ENTER}_{64,compat}, make sure the Xen versions are named consistently. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
* x86/ibt,xen: Sprinkle the ENDBRPeter Zijlstra2022-03-151-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | Even though Xen currently doesn't advertise IBT, prepare for when it will eventually do so and sprinkle the ENDBR dust accordingly. Even though most of the entry points are IRET like, the CPL0 Hypervisor can set WAIT-FOR-ENDBR and demand ENDBR at these sites. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220308154317.873919996@infradead.org
* x86/entry,xen: Early rewrite of restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel()Peter Zijlstra2022-03-151-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | By doing an early rewrite of 'jmp native_iret` in restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel() we can get rid of the last INTERRUPT_RETURN user and paravirt_iret. Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220308154317.815039833@infradead.org
* x86: Prepare asm files for straight-line-speculationPeter Zijlstra2021-12-081-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace all ret/retq instructions with RET in preparation of making RET a macro. Since AS is case insensitive it's a big no-op without RET defined. find arch/x86/ -name \*.S | while read file do sed -i 's/\<ret[q]*\>/RET/' $file done Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211204134907.905503893@infradead.org
* x86/xen: Add xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode()Lai Jiangshan2021-12-031-0/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In the native case, PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp0) is the trampoline stack. But XEN pv doesn't use trampoline stack, so PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp0) is also the kernel stack. In that case, source and destination stacks are identical, which means that reusing swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode() in XEN pv would cause %rsp to move up to the top of the kernel stack and leave the IRET frame below %rsp. This is dangerous as it can be corrupted if #NMI / #MC hit as either of these events occurring in the middle of the stack pushing would clobber data on the (original) stack. And, with XEN pv, swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode() pushing the IRET frame on to the original address is useless and error-prone when there is any future attempt to modify the code. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Fixes: 7f2590a110b8 ("x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries") Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211126101209.8613-4-jiangshanlai@gmail.com
* x86/xen: Make irq_disable() noinstrPeter Zijlstra2021-09-171-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: pv_ops[31]: native_irq_disable vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: pv_ops[31]: __raw_callee_save_xen_irq_disable vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: pv_ops[31]: xen_irq_disable_direct vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: lock_is_held_type()+0x5b: call to pv_ops[31]() leaves .noinstr.text section Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210624095148.933869441@infradead.org
* x86/xen: Make irq_enable() noinstrPeter Zijlstra2021-09-171-28/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: pv_ops[32]: native_irq_enable vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: pv_ops[32]: __raw_callee_save_xen_irq_enable vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: pv_ops[32]: xen_irq_enable_direct vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: lock_is_held_type()+0xfe: call to pv_ops[32]() leaves .noinstr.text section Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210624095148.872254932@infradead.org
* x86/xen: Make save_fl() noinstrPeter Zijlstra2021-09-171-16/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: pv_ops[30]: native_save_fl vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: pv_ops[30]: __raw_callee_save_xen_save_fl vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: pv_ops[30]: xen_save_fl_direct vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: lockdep_hardirqs_off()+0x73: call to pv_ops[30]() leaves .noinstr.text section Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210624095148.749712274@infradead.org
* x86/xen: Make read_cr2() noinstrPeter Zijlstra2021-09-171-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: pv_ops[41]: native_read_cr2 vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: pv_ops[41]: xen_read_cr2 vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: pv_ops[41]: xen_read_cr2_direct vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: exc_double_fault()+0x15: call to pv_ops[41]() leaves .noinstr.text section Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210624095148.500331616@infradead.org
* Merge tag 'objtool-core-2021-02-23' of ↵Linus Torvalds2021-02-231-10/+18
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull objtool updates from Thomas Gleixner: - Make objtool work for big-endian cross compiles - Make stack tracking via stack pointer memory operations match push/pop semantics to prepare for architectures w/o PUSH/POP instructions. - Add support for analyzing alternatives - Improve retpoline detection and handling - Improve assembly code coverage on x86 - Provide support for inlined stack switching * tag 'objtool-core-2021-02-23' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (33 commits) objtool: Support stack-swizzle objtool,x86: Additionally decode: mov %rsp, (%reg) x86/unwind/orc: Change REG_SP_INDIRECT x86/power: Support objtool validation in hibernate_asm_64.S x86/power: Move restore_registers() to top of the file x86/power: Annotate indirect branches as safe x86/acpi: Support objtool validation in wakeup_64.S x86/acpi: Annotate indirect branch as safe x86/ftrace: Support objtool vmlinux.o validation in ftrace_64.S x86/xen/pvh: Annotate indirect branch as safe x86/xen: Support objtool vmlinux.o validation in xen-head.S x86/xen: Support objtool validation in xen-asm.S objtool: Add xen_start_kernel() to noreturn list objtool: Combine UNWIND_HINT_RET_OFFSET and UNWIND_HINT_FUNC objtool: Add asm version of STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD objtool: Assume only ELF functions do sibling calls x86/ftrace: Add UNWIND_HINT_FUNC annotation for ftrace_stub objtool: Support retpoline jump detection for vmlinux.o objtool: Fix ".cold" section suffix check for newer versions of GCC objtool: Fix retpoline detection in asm code ...
| * x86/xen: Support objtool validation in xen-asm.SJosh Poimboeuf2021-01-261-10/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD annotation is used to tell objtool to ignore a file. File-level ignores won't work when validating vmlinux.o. Tweak the ELF metadata and unwind hints to allow objtool to follow the code. Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8b042a09c69e8645f3b133ef6653ba28f896807d.1611263462.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
* | x86/pv: Rework arch_local_irq_restore() to not use popfJuergen Gross2021-02-101-28/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | POPF is a rather expensive operation, so don't use it for restoring irq flags. Instead, test whether interrupts are enabled in the flags parameter and enable interrupts via STI in that case. This results in the restore_fl paravirt op to be no longer needed. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210120135555.32594-7-jgross@suse.com
* | x86/xen: Drop USERGS_SYSRET64 paravirt callJuergen Gross2021-02-101-20/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | USERGS_SYSRET64 is used to return from a syscall via SYSRET, but a Xen PV guest will nevertheless use the IRET hypercall, as there is no sysret PV hypercall defined. So instead of testing all the prerequisites for doing a sysret and then mangling the stack for Xen PV again for doing an iret just use the iret exit from the beginning. This can easily be done via an ALTERNATIVE like it is done for the sysenter compat case already. It should be noted that this drops the optimization in Xen for not restoring a few registers when returning to user mode, but it seems as if the saved instructions in the kernel more than compensate for this drop (a kernel build in a Xen PV guest was slightly faster with this patch applied). While at it remove the stale sysret32 remnants. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210120135555.32594-6-jgross@suse.com
* | x86/xen: Use specific Xen pv interrupt entry for DFJuergen Gross2021-02-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Xen PV guests don't use IST. For double fault interrupts, switch to the same model as NMI. Correct a typo in a comment while copying it. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210120135555.32594-4-jgross@suse.com
* | x86/xen: Use specific Xen pv interrupt entry for MCEJuergen Gross2021-02-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Xen PV guests don't use IST. For machine check interrupts, switch to the same model as debug interrupts. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210120135555.32594-3-jgross@suse.com
* | x86/xen: avoid warning in Xen pv guest with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT enabledJuergen Gross2021-01-271-0/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When booting a kernel which has been built with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT enabled as a Xen pv guest a warning is issued for each processor: [ 5.964347] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 5.968314] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at /home/gross/linux/head/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c:660 get_trap_addr+0x59/0x90 [ 5.972321] Modules linked in: [ 5.976313] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 5.11.0-rc5-default #75 [ 5.980313] Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 9020/0PC5F7, BIOS A05 12/05/2013 [ 5.984313] RIP: e030:get_trap_addr+0x59/0x90 [ 5.988313] Code: 42 10 83 f0 01 85 f6 74 04 84 c0 75 1d b8 01 00 00 00 c3 48 3d 00 80 83 82 72 08 48 3d 20 81 83 82 72 0c b8 01 00 00 00 eb db <0f> 0b 31 c0 c3 48 2d 00 80 83 82 48 ba 72 1c c7 71 1c c7 71 1c 48 [ 5.992313] RSP: e02b:ffffc90040033d38 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 5.996313] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffffff82a141d0 RCX: ffffffff8222ec38 [ 6.000312] RDX: ffffffff8222ec38 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: ffffc90040033d40 [ 6.004313] RBP: ffff8881003984a0 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: ffff888100398000 [ 6.008312] R10: 0000000000000007 R11: ffffc90040246000 R12: ffff8884082182a8 [ 6.012313] R13: 0000000000000100 R14: 000000000000001d R15: ffff8881003982d0 [ 6.016316] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888408200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 6.020313] CS: e030 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 6.024313] CR2: ffffc900020ef000 CR3: 000000000220a000 CR4: 0000000000050660 [ 6.028314] Call Trace: [ 6.032313] cvt_gate_to_trap.part.7+0x3f/0x90 [ 6.036313] ? asm_exc_double_fault+0x30/0x30 [ 6.040313] xen_convert_trap_info+0x87/0xd0 [ 6.044313] xen_pv_cpu_up+0x17a/0x450 [ 6.048313] bringup_cpu+0x2b/0xc0 [ 6.052313] ? cpus_read_trylock+0x50/0x50 [ 6.056313] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x80/0x4c0 [ 6.060313] _cpu_up+0xa7/0x140 [ 6.064313] cpu_up+0x98/0xd0 [ 6.068313] bringup_nonboot_cpus+0x4f/0x60 [ 6.072313] smp_init+0x26/0x79 [ 6.076313] kernel_init_freeable+0x103/0x258 [ 6.080313] ? rest_init+0xd0/0xd0 [ 6.084313] kernel_init+0xa/0x110 [ 6.088313] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 6.092313] ---[ end trace be9ecf17dceeb4f3 ]--- Reason is that there is no Xen pv trap entry for X86_TRAP_VC. Fix that by adding a generic trap handler for unknown traps and wire all unknown bare metal handlers to this generic handler, which will just crash the system in case such a trap will ever happen. Fixes: 0786138c78e793 ("x86/sev-es: Add a Runtime #VC Exception Handler") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.10 Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
* x86/xen: eliminate xen-asm_64.SJuergen Gross2020-08-111-1/+179
| | | | | | | | | With 32-bit pv-guest support removed xen-asm_64.S can be merged with xen-asm.S Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
* x86/xen: remove 32-bit Xen PV guest supportJuergen Gross2020-08-111-14/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Xen is requiring 64-bit machines today and since Xen 4.14 it can be built without 32-bit PV guest support. There is no need to carry the burden of 32-bit PV guest support in the kernel any longer, as new guests can be either HVM or PVH, or they can use a 64 bit kernel. Remove the 32-bit Xen PV support from the kernel. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
* x86/asm: Change all ENTRY+ENDPROC to SYM_FUNC_*Jiri Slaby2019-10-181-14/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | These are all functions which are invoked from elsewhere, so annotate them as global using the new SYM_FUNC_START and their ENDPROC's by SYM_FUNC_END. Make sure ENTRY/ENDPROC is not defined on X86_64, given these were the last users. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> [hibernate] Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> [xen bits] Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> [crypto] Cc: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy@infradead.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl> Cc: Cao jin <caoj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: kvm ML <kvm@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> Cc: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Cc: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191011115108.12392-25-jslaby@suse.cz
* x86/paravirt: Make read_cr2() CALLEE_SAVEPeter Zijlstra2019-07-171-0/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The one paravirt read_cr2() implementation (Xen) is actually quite trivial and doesn't need to clobber anything other than the return register. Making read_cr2() CALLEE_SAVE avoids all the PUSH/POP nonsense and allows more convenient use from assembly. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: luto@kernel.org Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Cc: zhe.he@windriver.com Cc: joel@joelfernandes.org Cc: devel@etsukata.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190711114335.887392493@infradead.org
* License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no licenseGreg Kroah-Hartman2017-11-021-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/paravirt/xen: Remove xen_patch()Juergen Gross2017-08-241-20/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Xen's paravirt patch function xen_patch() does some special casing for irq_ops functions to apply relocations when those functions can be patched inline instead of calls. Unfortunately none of the special case function replacements is small enough to be patched inline, so the special case never applies. As xen_patch() will call paravirt_patch_default() in all cases it can be just dropped. xen-asm.h doesn't seem necessary without xen_patch() as the only thing left in it would be the definition of XEN_EFLAGS_NMI used only once. So move that definition and remove xen-asm.h. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com Cc: lguest@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: rusty@rustcorp.com.au Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170816173157.8633-2-jgross@suse.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* x86/asm/xen: Create stack frames in xen-asm.SJosh Poimboeuf2016-02-241-1/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | xen_irq_enable_direct(), xen_restore_fl_direct(), and check_events() are callable non-leaf functions which don't honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, which can result in bad stack traces. Create stack frames for them when CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is enabled. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com> Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com> Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a8340ad3fc72ba9ed34da9b3af9cdd6f1a896e17.1453405861.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* xen: correctly check for pending events when restoring irq flagsDavid Vrabel2012-04-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In xen_restore_fl_direct(), xen_force_evtchn_callback() was being called even if no events were pending. This resulted in (depending on workload) about a 100 times as many xen_version hypercalls as necessary. Fix this by correcting the sense of the conditional jump. This seems to give a significant performance benefit for some workloads. There is some subtle tricksy "..since the check here is trying to check both pending and masked in a single cmpw, but I think this is correct. It will call check_events now only when the combined mask+pending word is 0x0001 (aka unmasked, pending)." (Ian) CC: stable@kernel.org Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
* x86: style cleanups for xen assembliesTejun Heo2009-02-051-38/+40
| | | | | | | | | | | Make the following style cleanups: * drop unnecessary //#include from xen-asm_32.S * compulsive adding of space after comma * reformat multiline comments Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
* xen: make direct versions of irq_enable/disable/save/restore to common codeJeremy Fitzhardinge2009-02-041-0/+140
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that x86-64 has directly accessible percpu variables, it can also implement the direct versions of these operations, which operate on a vcpu_info structure directly embedded in the percpu area. In fact, the 64-bit versions are more or less identical, and so can be shared. The only two differences are: 1. xen_restore_fl_direct takes its argument in eax on 32-bit, and rdi on 64-bit. Unfortunately it isn't possible to directly refer to the 2nd lsb of rdi directly (as you can with %ah), so the code isn't quite as dense. 2. check_events needs to variants to save different registers. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
* xen64: add 64-bit assemblerJeremy Fitzhardinge2008-07-161-305/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | Split xen-asm into 32- and 64-bit files, and implement the 64-bit variants. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stephen Tweedie <sct@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Cc: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
* xen: fold xen_sysexit into xen_iretJeremy Fitzhardinge2008-04-241-56/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | xen_sysexit and xen_iret were doing essentially the same thing. Rather than having a separate implementation for xen_sysexit, we can just strip the stack back to an iret frame and jump into xen_iret. This removes a lot of code and complexity - specifically, another critical region. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
* xen: jump to iret fixupJeremy Fitzhardinge2008-04-241-13/+9
| | | | | | | | | | Use jmp rather than call for the iret fixup, so its consistent with the sysexit fixup, and it simplifies the stack (which is already complex). Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
* xen: support sysenter/sysexit if hypervisor doesJeremy Fitzhardinge2008-04-241-0/+56
| | | | | | | | | | | 64-bit Xen supports sysenter for 32-bit guests, so support its use. (sysenter is faster than int $0x80 in 32-on-64.) sysexit is still not supported, so we fake it up using iret. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
* xen: make sure iret faults are trappedJeremy Fitzhardinge2008-04-241-1/+5
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
* xen: use iret instruction all the timeJeremy Fitzhardinge2008-04-171-8/+3
| | | | | | | | Change iret implementation to not be dependent on direct-access vcpu structure. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
* xen: fix RMW when unmasking eventsJeremy Fitzhardinge2008-03-271-2/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | xen_irq_enable_direct and xen_sysexit were using "andw $0x00ff, XEN_vcpu_info_pending(vcpu)" to unmask events and test for pending ones in one instuction. Unfortunately, the pending flag must be modified with a locked operation since it can be set by another CPU, and the unlocked form of this operation was causing the pending flag to get lost, allowing the processor to return to usermode with pending events and ultimately deadlock. The simple fix would be to make it a locked operation, but that's rather costly and unnecessary. The fix here is to split the mask-clearing and pending-testing into two instructions; the interrupt window between them is of no concern because either way pending or new events will be processed. This should fix lingering bugs in using direct vcpu structure access too. [ Stable: needed in 2.6.24.x ] Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
* i386: move xenThomas Gleixner2007-10-111-0/+291
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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