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* ecryptfs: kthread: Demote file header and provide description for 'cred'Lee Jones2021-04-191-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Fixes the following W=1 kernel build warning(s): fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c:16: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'struct ecryptfs_open_req ' fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c:120: warning: Function parameter or member 'cred' not described in 'ecryptfs_privileged_open' Cc: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com> Cc: "Michael A. Halcrow" <mahalcro@us.ibm.com> Cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
* treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 156Thomas Gleixner2019-05-301-15/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at your option any later version this program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license for more details you should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along with this program if not write to the free software foundation inc 59 temple place suite 330 boston ma 02111 1307 usa extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 1334 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana <rfontana@redhat.com> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070033.113240726@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* scripts/spelling.txt: add "againt" pattern and fix typo instancesMasahiro Yamada2017-02-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix typos and add the following to the scripts/spelling.txt: againt||against While we are here, fix the "capabilites" as well in the touched hunk in drivers/gpu/drm/drm_probe_helper.c. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1481573103-11329-13-git-send-email-yamada.masahiro@socionext.com Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Revert "ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler"Jeff Mahoney2016-07-071-11/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit 2f36db71009304b3f0b95afacd8eba1f9f046b87. It fixed a local root exploit but also introduced a dependency on the lower file system implementing an mmap operation just to open a file, which is a bit of a heavy hammer. The right fix is to have mmap depend on the existence of the mmap handler instead. Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
* ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handlerJann Horn2016-06-101-2/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | This prevents users from triggering a stack overflow through a recursive invocation of pagefault handling that involves mapping procfs files into virtual memory. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* VFS: normal filesystems (and lustre): d_inode() annotationsDavid Howells2015-04-151-1/+1
| | | | | | | that's the bulk of filesystem drivers dealing with inodes of their own Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* eCryptfs: fix to use list_for_each_entry_safe() when delete itemsWei Yongjun2012-12-181-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | Since we will be removing items off the list using list_del() we need to use a safer version of the list_for_each_entry() macro aptly named list_for_each_entry_safe(). We should use the safe macro if the loop involves deletions of items. Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn> [tyhicks: Fixed compiler err - missing list_for_each_entry_safe() param] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
* switch dentry_open() to struct path, make it grab references itselfAl Viro2012-07-231-13/+8
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* ecryptfs: don't reinvent the wheels, please - use struct completionAl Viro2012-07-231-46/+26
| | | | | | ... and keep the sodding requests on stack - they are small enough. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* eCryptfs: Properly check for O_RDONLY flag before doing privileged openTyler Hicks2012-07-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If the first attempt at opening the lower file read/write fails, eCryptfs will retry using a privileged kthread. However, the privileged retry should not happen if the lower file's inode is read-only because a read/write open will still be unsuccessful. The check for determining if the open should be retried was intended to be based on the access mode of the lower file's open flags being O_RDONLY, but the check was incorrectly performed. This would cause the open to be retried by the privileged kthread, resulting in a second failed open of the lower file. This patch corrects the check to determine if the open request should be handled by the privileged kthread. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
* eCryptfs: Add reference counting to lower filesTyler Hicks2011-04-251-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For any given lower inode, eCryptfs keeps only one lower file open and multiplexes all eCryptfs file operations through that lower file. The lower file was considered "persistent" and stayed open from the first lookup through the lifetime of the inode. This patch keeps the notion of a single, per-inode lower file, but adds reference counting around the lower file so that it is closed when not currently in use. If the reference count is at 0 when an operation (such as open, create, etc.) needs to use the lower file, a new lower file is opened. Since the file is no longer persistent, all references to the term persistent file are changed to lower file. Locking is added around the sections of code that opens the lower file and assign the pointer in the inode info, as well as the code the fputs the lower file when all eCryptfs users are done with it. This patch is needed to fix issues, when mounted on top of the NFSv3 client, where the lower file is left silly renamed until the eCryptfs inode is destroyed. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* ecryptfs: properly mark init functionsJerome Marchand2010-08-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | Some ecryptfs init functions are not prefixed by __init and thus not freed after initialization. This patch saved about 1kB in ecryptfs module. Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking ↵Tejun Heo2010-03-301-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
* eCryptfs: Check for O_RDONLY lower inodes when opening lower filesTyler Hicks2009-09-231-16/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If the lower inode is read-only, don't attempt to open the lower file read/write and don't hand off the open request to the privileged eCryptfs kthread for opening it read/write. Instead, only try an unprivileged, read-only open of the file and give up if that fails. This patch fixes an oops when eCryptfs is mounted on top of a read-only mount. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <esandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* CRED: Pass credentials through dentry_open()David Howells2008-11-141-4/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Pass credentials through dentry_open() so that the COW creds patch can have SELinux's flush_unauthorized_files() pass the appropriate creds back to itself when it opens its null chardev. The security_dentry_open() call also now takes a creds pointer, as does the dentry_open hook in struct security_operations. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* eCryptfs: Privileged kthread for lower file opensMichael Halcrow2008-07-241-0/+203
eCryptfs would really like to have read-write access to all files in the lower filesystem. Right now, the persistent lower file may be opened read-only if the attempt to open it read-write fails. One way to keep from having to do that is to have a privileged kthread that can open the lower persistent file on behalf of the user opening the eCryptfs file; this patch implements this functionality. This patch will properly allow a less-privileged user to open the eCryptfs file, followed by a more-privileged user opening the eCryptfs file, with the first user only being able to read and the second user being able to both read and write. eCryptfs currently does this wrong; it will wind up calling vfs_write() on a file that was opened read-only. This is fixed in this patch. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>