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* Merge tag 'fsnotify_hsm_for_v6.14-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2025-01-231-1/+2
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs Pull fsnotify pre-content notification support from Jan Kara: "This introduces a new fsnotify event (FS_PRE_ACCESS) that gets generated before a file contents is accessed. The event is synchronous so if there is listener for this event, the kernel waits for reply. On success the execution continues as usual, on failure we propagate the error to userspace. This allows userspace to fill in file content on demand from slow storage. The context in which the events are generated has been picked so that we don't hold any locks and thus there's no risk of a deadlock for the userspace handler. The new pre-content event is available only for users with global CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability (similarly to other parts of fanotify functionality) and it is an administrator responsibility to make sure the userspace event handler doesn't do stupid stuff that can DoS the system. Based on your feedback from the last submission, fsnotify code has been improved and now file->f_mode encodes whether pre-content event needs to be generated for the file so the fast path when nobody wants pre-content event for the file just grows the additional file->f_mode check. As a bonus this also removes the checks whether the old FS_ACCESS event needs to be generated from the fast path. Also the place where the event is generated during page fault has been moved so now filemap_fault() generates the event if and only if there is no uptodate folio in the page cache. Also we have dropped FS_PRE_MODIFY event as current real-world users of the pre-content functionality don't really use it so let's start with the minimal useful feature set" * tag 'fsnotify_hsm_for_v6.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs: (21 commits) fanotify: Fix crash in fanotify_init(2) fs: don't block write during exec on pre-content watched files fs: enable pre-content events on supported file systems ext4: add pre-content fsnotify hook for DAX faults btrfs: disable defrag on pre-content watched files xfs: add pre-content fsnotify hook for DAX faults fsnotify: generate pre-content permission event on page fault mm: don't allow huge faults for files with pre content watches fanotify: disable readahead if we have pre-content watches fanotify: allow to set errno in FAN_DENY permission response fanotify: report file range info with pre-content events fanotify: introduce FAN_PRE_ACCESS permission event fsnotify: generate pre-content permission event on truncate fsnotify: pass optional file access range in pre-content event fsnotify: introduce pre-content permission events fanotify: reserve event bit of deprecated FAN_DIR_MODIFY fanotify: rename a misnamed constant fanotify: don't skip extra event info if no info_mode is set fsnotify: check if file is actually being watched for pre-content events on open fsnotify: opt-in for permission events at file open time ...
| * fsnotify: introduce pre-content permission eventsAmir Goldstein2024-12-101-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The new FS_PRE_ACCESS permission event is similar to FS_ACCESS_PERM, but it meant for a different use case of filling file content before access to a file range, so it has slightly different semantics. Generate FS_PRE_ACCESS/FS_ACCESS_PERM as two seperate events, so content scanners could inspect the content filled by pre-content event handler. Unlike FS_ACCESS_PERM, FS_PRE_ACCESS is also called before a file is modified by syscalls as write() and fallocate(). FS_ACCESS_PERM is reported also on blockdev and pipes, but the new pre-content events are only reported for regular files and dirs. The pre-content events are meant to be used by hierarchical storage managers that want to fill the content of files on first access. There are some specific requirements from filesystems that could be used with pre-content events, so add a flag for fs to opt-in for pre-content events explicitly before they can be used. Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/b934c5e3af205abc4e0e4709f6486815937ddfdf.1731684329.git.josef@toxicpanda.com
* | Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20250121' of ↵Linus Torvalds2025-01-2120-165/+165
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: - Extended permissions supported in conditional policy The SELinux extended permissions, aka "xperms", allow security admins to target individuals ioctls, and recently netlink messages, with their SELinux policy. Adding support for conditional policies allows admins to toggle the granular xperms using SELinux booleans, helping pave the way for greater use of xperms in general purpose SELinux policies. This change bumps the maximum SELinux policy version to 34. - Fix a SCTP/SELinux error return code inconsistency Depending on the loaded SELinux policy, specifically it's EXTSOCKCLASS support, the bind(2) LSM/SELinux hook could return different error codes due to the SELinux code checking the socket's SELinux object class (which can vary depending on EXTSOCKCLASS) and not the socket's sk_protocol field. We fix this by doing the obvious, and looking at the sock->sk_protocol field instead of the object class. - Makefile fixes to properly cleanup av_permissions.h Add av_permissions.h to "targets" so that it is properly cleaned up using the kbuild infrastructure. - A number of smaller improvements by Christian Göttsche A variety of straightforward changes to reduce code duplication, reduce pointer lookups, migrate void pointers to defined types, simplify code, constify function parameters, and correct iterator types. * tag 'selinux-pr-20250121' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: make more use of str_read() when loading the policy selinux: avoid unnecessary indirection in struct level_datum selinux: use known type instead of void pointer selinux: rename comparison functions for clarity selinux: rework match_ipv6_addrmask() selinux: constify and reconcile function parameter names selinux: avoid using types indicating user space interaction selinux: supply missing field initializers selinux: add netlink nlmsg_type audit message selinux: add support for xperms in conditional policies selinux: Fix SCTP error inconsistency in selinux_socket_bind() selinux: use native iterator types selinux: add generated av_permissions.h to targets
| * | selinux: make more use of str_read() when loading the policyChristian Göttsche2025-01-073-22/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Simplify the call sites, and enable future string validation in a single place. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> [PM: subject tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | selinux: avoid unnecessary indirection in struct level_datumChristian Göttsche2025-01-073-17/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Store the owned member of type struct mls_level directly in the parent struct instead of an extra heap allocation. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | selinux: use known type instead of void pointerChristian Göttsche2025-01-078-74/+77
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Improve type safety and readability by using the known type. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | selinux: rename comparison functions for clarityChristian Göttsche2025-01-077-16/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The functions context_cmp(), mls_context_cmp() and ebitmap_cmp() are not traditional C style compare functions returning -1, 0, and 1 for less than, equal, and greater than; they only return whether their arguments are equal. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | selinux: rework match_ipv6_addrmask()Christian Göttsche2025-01-071-7/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Constify parameters, add size hints, and simplify control flow. According to godbolt the same assembly is generated. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | selinux: constify and reconcile function parameter namesChristian Göttsche2025-01-074-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Align the parameter names between declarations and definitions, and constify read-only parameters. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> [PM: tweak the subject line] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | selinux: avoid using types indicating user space interactionChristian Göttsche2025-01-072-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Integer types starting with a double underscore, like __u32, are intended for usage of variables interacting with user-space. Just use the plain variant. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | selinux: supply missing field initializersChristian Göttsche2025-01-072-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Please clang by supplying the missing field initializers in the secclass_map variable and sel_fill_super() function. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> [PM: tweak subj and commit description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | selinux: add netlink nlmsg_type audit messageThiébaud Weksteen2024-12-151-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a new audit message type to capture nlmsg-related information. This is similar to LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP which was added for the other SELinux extended permission (ioctl). Adding a new type is preferred to adding to the existing lsm_network_audit structure which contains irrelevant information for the netlink sockets (i.e., dport, sport). Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com> [PM: change "nlnk-msgtype" to "nl-msgtype" as discussed] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | selinux: add support for xperms in conditional policiesChristian Göttsche2024-12-136-9/+26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add support for extended permission rules in conditional policies. Currently the kernel accepts such rules already, but evaluating a security decision will hit a BUG() in services_compute_xperms_decision(). Thus reject extended permission rules in conditional policies for current policy versions. Add a new policy version for this feature. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | selinux: Fix SCTP error inconsistency in selinux_socket_bind()Mikhail Ivanov2024-12-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Check sk->sk_protocol instead of security class to recognize SCTP socket. SCTP socket is initialized with SECCLASS_SOCKET class if policy does not support EXTSOCKCLASS capability. In this case bind(2) hook wrongfully return EAFNOSUPPORT instead of EINVAL. The inconsistency was detected with help of Landlock tests: https://lore.kernel.org/all/b58680ca-81b2-7222-7287-0ac7f4227c3c@huawei-partners.com/ Fixes: 0f8db8cc73df ("selinux: add AF_UNSPEC and INADDR_ANY checks to selinux_socket_bind()") Signed-off-by: Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | selinux: use native iterator typesChristian Göttsche2024-12-113-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Use types for iterators equal to the type of the to be compared values. Reported by clang: ../ss/sidtab.c:126:2: warning: comparison of integers of different signs: 'int' and 'unsigned long' 126 | hash_for_each_rcu(sidtab->context_to_sid, i, entry, list) { | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ../hashtable.h:139:51: note: expanded from macro 'hash_for_each_rcu' 139 | for (... ; obj == NULL && (bkt) < HASH_SIZE(name);\ | ~~~ ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ../selinuxfs.c:1520:23: warning: comparison of integers of different signs: 'int' and 'unsigned int' 1520 | for (cpu = *idx; cpu < nr_cpu_ids; ++cpu) { | ~~~ ^ ~~~~~~~~~~ ../hooks.c:412:16: warning: comparison of integers of different signs: 'int' and 'unsigned long' 412 | for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) { | ~ ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> [PM: munged the clang output due to line length concerns] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | selinux: add generated av_permissions.h to targetsThomas Weißschuh2024-12-111-4/+3
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | av_permissions.h was not declared as a target and therefore not cleaned up automatically by kbuild. Suggested-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAK7LNATUnCPt03BRFSKh1EH=+Sy0Q48wE4ER0BZdJqOb_44L8w@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20250121' of ↵Linus Torvalds2025-01-211-15/+34
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore: - Improved handling of LSM "secctx" strings through lsm_context struct The LSM secctx string interface is from an older time when only one LSM was supported, migrate over to the lsm_context struct to better support the different LSMs we now have and make it easier to support new LSMs in the future. These changes explain the Rust, VFS, and networking changes in the diffstat. - Only build lsm_audit.c if CONFIG_SECURITY and CONFIG_AUDIT are enabled Small tweak to be a bit smarter about when we build the LSM's common audit helpers. - Check for absurdly large policies from userspace in SafeSetID SafeSetID policies rules are fairly small, basically just "UID:UID", it easy to impose a limit of KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE on policy writes which helps quiet a number of syzbot related issues. While work is being done to address the syzbot issues through other mechanisms, this is a trivial and relatively safe fix that we can do now. - Various minor improvements and cleanups A collection of improvements to the kernel selftests, constification of some function parameters, removing redundant assignments, and local variable renames to improve readability. * tag 'lsm-pr-20250121' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: lockdown: initialize local array before use to quiet static analysis safesetid: check size of policy writes net: corrections for security_secid_to_secctx returns lsm: rename variable to avoid shadowing lsm: constify function parameters security: remove redundant assignment to return variable lsm: Only build lsm_audit.c if CONFIG_SECURITY and CONFIG_AUDIT are set selftests: refactor the lsm `flags_overset_lsm_set_self_attr` test binder: initialize lsm_context structure rust: replace lsm context+len with lsm_context lsm: secctx provider check on release lsm: lsm_context in security_dentry_init_security lsm: use lsm_context in security_inode_getsecctx lsm: replace context+len with lsm_context lsm: ensure the correct LSM context releaser
| * | lsm: secctx provider check on releaseCasey Schaufler2024-12-041-8/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Verify that the LSM releasing the secctx is the LSM that allocated it. This was not necessary when only one LSM could create a secctx, but once there can be more than one it is. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: subject tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | lsm: lsm_context in security_dentry_init_securityCasey Schaufler2024-12-041-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single lsm_context pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier along with the context and context length. This allows security_release_secctx() to know how to release the context. Callers have been modified to use or save the returned data from the new structure. Cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: subject tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | lsm: use lsm_context in security_inode_getsecctxCasey Schaufler2024-12-041-4/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Change the security_inode_getsecctx() interface to fill a lsm_context structure instead of data and length pointers. This provides the information about which LSM created the context so that security_release_secctx() can use the correct hook. Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: subject tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | lsm: replace context+len with lsm_contextCasey Schaufler2024-12-041-5/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single lsm_context pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier along with the context and context length. This allows security_release_secctx() to know how to release the context. Callers have been modified to use or save the returned data from the new structure. security_secid_to_secctx() and security_lsmproc_to_secctx() will now return the length value on success instead of 0. Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: subject tweak, kdoc fix, signedness fix from Dan Carpenter] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | lsm: ensure the correct LSM context releaserCasey Schaufler2024-12-041-2/+9
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a new lsm_context data structure to hold all the information about a "security context", including the string, its size and which LSM allocated the string. The allocation information is necessary because LSMs have different policies regarding the lifecycle of these strings. SELinux allocates and destroys them on each use, whereas Smack provides a pointer to an entry in a list that never goes away. Update security_release_secctx() to use the lsm_context instead of a (char *, len) pair. Change its callers to do likewise. The LSMs supporting this hook have had comments added to remind the developer that there is more work to be done. The BPF security module provides all LSM hooks. While there has yet to be a known instance of a BPF configuration that uses security contexts, the possibility is real. In the existing implementation there is potential for multiple frees in that case. Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org To: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: subject tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20250107' of ↵Linus Torvalds2025-01-075-38/+65
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux fix from Paul Moore: "A single SELinux patch to address a problem with a single domain using multiple xperm classes" * tag 'selinux-pr-20250107' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: match extended permissions to their base permissions
| * | selinux: match extended permissions to their base permissionsThiébaud Weksteen2025-01-045-38/+65
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In commit d1d991efaf34 ("selinux: Add netlink xperm support") a new extended permission was added ("nlmsg"). This was the second extended permission implemented in selinux ("ioctl" being the first one). Extended permissions are associated with a base permission. It was found that, in the access vector cache (avc), the extended permission did not keep track of its base permission. This is an issue for a domain that is using both extended permissions (i.e., a domain calling ioctl() on a netlink socket). In this case, the extended permissions were overlapping. Keep track of the base permission in the cache. A new field "base_perm" is added to struct extended_perms_decision to make sure that the extended permission refers to the correct policy permission. A new field "base_perms" is added to struct extended_perms to quickly decide if extended permissions apply. While it is in theory possible to retrieve the base permission from the access vector, the same base permission may not be mapped to the same bit for each class (e.g., "nlmsg" is mapped to a different bit for "netlink_route_socket" and "netlink_audit_socket"). Instead, use a constant (AVC_EXT_IOCTL or AVC_EXT_NLMSG) provided by the caller. Fixes: d1d991efaf34 ("selinux: Add netlink xperm support") Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | | Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20241217' of ↵Linus Torvalds2024-12-181-2/+6
|\| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux fix from Paul Moore: "One small SELinux patch to get rid improve our handling of unknown extended permissions by safely ignoring them. Not only does this make it easier to support newer SELinux policy on older kernels in the future, it removes to BUG() calls from the SELinux code." * tag 'selinux-pr-20241217' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: ignore unknown extended permissions
| * | selinux: ignore unknown extended permissionsThiébaud Weksteen2024-12-151-2/+6
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When evaluating extended permissions, ignore unknown permissions instead of calling BUG(). This commit ensures that future permissions can be added without interfering with older kernels. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls") Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* / selinux: use sk_to_full_sk() in selinux_ip_output()Eric Dumazet2024-11-301-1/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In blamed commit, TCP started to attach timewait sockets to some skbs. syzbot reported that selinux_ip_output() was not expecting them yet. Note that using sk_to_full_sk() is still allowing the following sk_listener() check to work as before. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in selinux_sock security/selinux/include/objsec.h:207 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in selinux_ip_output+0x1e0/0x1f0 security/selinux/hooks.c:5761 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88804e86e758 by task syz-executor347/5894 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5894 Comm: syz-executor347 Not tainted 6.12.0-syzkaller-05480-gfcc79e1714e8 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/30/2024 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0xc3/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0xd9/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:601 selinux_sock security/selinux/include/objsec.h:207 [inline] selinux_ip_output+0x1e0/0x1f0 security/selinux/hooks.c:5761 nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:154 [inline] nf_hook_slow+0xbb/0x200 net/netfilter/core.c:626 nf_hook+0x386/0x6d0 include/linux/netfilter.h:269 __ip_local_out+0x339/0x640 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:119 ip_local_out net/ipv4/ip_output.c:128 [inline] ip_send_skb net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1505 [inline] ip_push_pending_frames+0xa0/0x5b0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1525 ip_send_unicast_reply+0xd0e/0x1650 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1672 tcp_v4_send_ack+0x976/0x13f0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1024 tcp_v4_timewait_ack net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1077 [inline] tcp_v4_rcv+0x2f96/0x4390 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2428 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xba/0x4c0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x316/0x570 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline] ip_local_deliver+0x18e/0x1f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254 dst_input include/net/dst.h:460 [inline] ip_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:447 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline] ip_rcv+0x2c3/0x5d0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:567 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x199/0x1e0 net/core/dev.c:5672 __netif_receive_skb+0x1d/0x160 net/core/dev.c:5785 process_backlog+0x443/0x15f0 net/core/dev.c:6117 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0xb7/0x550 net/core/dev.c:6877 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6946 [inline] net_rx_action+0xa94/0x1010 net/core/dev.c:7068 handle_softirqs+0x213/0x8f0 kernel/softirq.c:554 do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:455 [inline] do_softirq+0xb2/0xf0 kernel/softirq.c:442 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x100/0x120 kernel/softirq.c:382 local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline] rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:919 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x8af/0x43e0 net/core/dev.c:4461 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3168 [inline] neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:523 [inline] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:537 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0xc6c/0x2150 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:236 __ip_finish_output net/ipv4/ip_output.c:314 [inline] __ip_finish_output+0x49e/0x950 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:296 ip_finish_output+0x35/0x380 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:324 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline] ip_output+0x13b/0x2a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:434 dst_output include/net/dst.h:450 [inline] ip_local_out+0x33e/0x4a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:130 __ip_queue_xmit+0x777/0x1970 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:536 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x2b39/0x3df0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1466 tcp_transmit_skb net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1484 [inline] tcp_write_xmit+0x12b1/0x8560 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2827 __tcp_push_pending_frames+0xaf/0x390 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3010 tcp_send_fin+0x154/0xc70 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3616 __tcp_close+0x96b/0xff0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3130 tcp_close+0x28/0x120 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3221 inet_release+0x13c/0x280 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:435 __sock_release net/socket.c:640 [inline] sock_release+0x8e/0x1d0 net/socket.c:668 smc_clcsock_release+0xb7/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:34 __smc_release+0x5c2/0x880 net/smc/af_smc.c:301 smc_release+0x1fc/0x5f0 net/smc/af_smc.c:344 __sock_release+0xb0/0x270 net/socket.c:640 sock_close+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:1408 __fput+0x3f8/0xb60 fs/file_table.c:450 __fput_sync+0xa1/0xc0 fs/file_table.c:535 __do_sys_close fs/open.c:1550 [inline] __se_sys_close fs/open.c:1535 [inline] __x64_sys_close+0x86/0x100 fs/open.c:1535 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f6814c9ae10 Code: ff f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 80 3d b1 e2 07 00 00 74 17 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 48 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 83 ec 18 89 7c RSP: 002b:00007fffb2389758 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007f6814c9ae10 RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000000f4240 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fffb23897b0 R13: 00000000000141c3 R14: 00007fffb238977c R15: 00007fffb2389790 </TASK> Fixes: 79636038d37e ("ipv4: tcp: give socket pointer to control skbs") Reported-by: syzbot+2d9f5f948c31dcb7745e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/6745e1a2.050a0220.1286eb.001c.GAE@google.com/T/#u Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241126145911.4187198-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
* Merge tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2024-11-24-02-05' of ↵Linus Torvalds2024-11-251-1/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Pull non-MM updates from Andrew Morton: - The series "resource: A couple of cleanups" from Andy Shevchenko performs some cleanups in the resource management code - The series "Improve the copy of task comm" from Yafang Shao addresses possible race-induced overflows in the management of task_struct.comm[] - The series "Remove unnecessary header includes from {tools/}lib/list_sort.c" from Kuan-Wei Chiu adds some cleanups and a small fix to the list_sort library code and to its selftest - The series "Enhance min heap API with non-inline functions and optimizations" also from Kuan-Wei Chiu optimizes and cleans up the min_heap library code - The series "nilfs2: Finish folio conversion" from Ryusuke Konishi finishes off nilfs2's folioification - The series "add detect count for hung tasks" from Lance Yang adds more userspace visibility into the hung-task detector's activity - Apart from that, singelton patches in many places - please see the individual changelogs for details * tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2024-11-24-02-05' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (71 commits) gdb: lx-symbols: do not error out on monolithic build kernel/reboot: replace sprintf() with sysfs_emit() lib: util_macros_kunit: add kunit test for util_macros.h util_macros.h: fix/rework find_closest() macros Improve consistency of '#error' directive messages ocfs2: fix uninitialized value in ocfs2_file_read_iter() hung_task: add docs for hung_task_detect_count hung_task: add detect count for hung tasks dma-buf: use atomic64_inc_return() in dma_buf_getfile() fs/proc/kcore.c: fix coccinelle reported ERROR instances resource: avoid unnecessary resource tree walking in __region_intersects() ocfs2: remove unused errmsg function and table ocfs2: cluster: fix a typo lib/scatterlist: use sg_phys() helper checkpatch: always parse orig_commit in fixes tag nilfs2: convert metadata aops from writepage to writepages nilfs2: convert nilfs_recovery_copy_block() to take a folio nilfs2: convert nilfs_page_count_clean_buffers() to take a folio nilfs2: remove nilfs_writepage nilfs2: convert checkpoint file to be folio-based ...
| * security: replace memcpy() with get_task_comm()Yafang Shao2024-11-051-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quoted from Linus [0]: selinux never wanted a lock, and never wanted any kind of *consistent* result, it just wanted a *stable* result. Using get_task_comm() to read the task comm ensures that the name is always NUL-terminated, regardless of the source string. This approach also facilitates future extensions to the task comm. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241007144911.27693-4-laoar.shao@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHk-=wivfrF0_zvf+oj6==Sh=-npJooP8chLPEfaFV0oNYTTBA@mail.gmail.com/ [0] Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Cc: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Cc: David Airlie <airlied@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Matus Jokay <matus.jokay@stuba.sk> Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org> Cc: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org> Cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
* | Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20241112' of ↵Linus Torvalds2024-11-183-22/+38
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore: "Thirteen patches, all focused on moving away from the current 'secid' LSM identifier to a richer 'lsm_prop' structure. This move will help reduce the translation that is necessary in many LSMs, offering better performance, and make it easier to support different LSMs in the future" * tag 'lsm-pr-20241112' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: lsm: remove lsm_prop scaffolding netlabel,smack: use lsm_prop for audit data audit: change context data from secid to lsm_prop lsm: create new security_cred_getlsmprop LSM hook audit: use an lsm_prop in audit_names lsm: use lsm_prop in security_inode_getsecid lsm: use lsm_prop in security_current_getsecid audit: update shutdown LSM data lsm: use lsm_prop in security_ipc_getsecid audit: maintain an lsm_prop in audit_context lsm: add lsmprop_to_secctx hook lsm: use lsm_prop in security_audit_rule_match lsm: add the lsm_prop data structure
| * | lsm: remove lsm_prop scaffoldingCasey Schaufler2024-10-112-21/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove the scaffold member from the lsm_prop. Remove the remaining places it is being set. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: subj line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | lsm: create new security_cred_getlsmprop LSM hookCasey Schaufler2024-10-111-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Create a new LSM hook security_cred_getlsmprop() which, like security_cred_getsecid(), fetches LSM specific attributes from the cred structure. The associated data elements in the audit sub-system are changed from a secid to a lsm_prop to accommodate multiple possible LSM audit users. Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: subj line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | lsm: use lsm_prop in security_inode_getsecidCasey Schaufler2024-10-111-6/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Change the security_inode_getsecid() interface to fill in a lsm_prop structure instead of a u32 secid. This allows for its callers to gather data from all registered LSMs. Data is provided for IMA and audit. Change the name to security_inode_getlsmprop(). Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: subj line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | lsm: use lsm_prop in security_current_getsecidCasey Schaufler2024-10-111-6/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Change the security_current_getsecid_subj() and security_task_getsecid_obj() interfaces to fill in a lsm_prop structure instead of a u32 secid. Audit interfaces will need to collect all possible security data for possible reporting. Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | lsm: use lsm_prop in security_ipc_getsecidCasey Schaufler2024-10-111-3/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There may be more than one LSM that provides IPC data for auditing. Change security_ipc_getsecid() to fill in a lsm_prop structure instead of the u32 secid. Change the name to security_ipc_getlsmprop() to reflect the change. Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | lsm: add lsmprop_to_secctx hookCasey Schaufler2024-10-112-3/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a new hook security_lsmprop_to_secctx() and its LSM specific implementations. The LSM specific code will use the lsm_prop element allocated for that module. This allows for the possibility that more than one module may be called upon to translate a secid to a string, as can occur in the audit code. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | lsm: use lsm_prop in security_audit_rule_matchCasey Schaufler2024-10-112-5/+9
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match to a lsm_prop structure pointer. Pass the entry from the lsm_prop structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook. Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the lsm_prop instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmprop_init() fills the structure with the value of the old secid, ensuring that it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(), will be converted to use the lsm_prop structure later in the series. At that point the use of lsmprop_init() is dropped. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | selinux: Deprecate /sys/fs/selinux/userStephen Smalley2024-10-071-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The only known user of this interface was libselinux and its internal usage of this interface for get_ordered_context_list(3) was removed in Feb 2020, with a deprecation warning added to security_compute_user(3) at the same time. Add a deprecation warning to the kernel and schedule it for final removal in 2025. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | selinux: apply clang format to security/selinux/nlmsgtab.cPaul Moore2024-10-071-118/+118
| | | | | | | | | | | | Update nlmsgtab.c to better adhere to the kernel coding style guidelines. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | selinux: streamline selinux_nlmsg_lookup()Paul Moore2024-10-071-50/+38
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Streamline the code in selinux_nlmsg_lookup() to improve the code flow, readability, and remove the unnecessary local variables. Tested-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | selinux: Add netlink xperm supportThiébaud Weksteen2024-10-078-51/+126
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Reuse the existing extended permissions infrastructure to support policies based on the netlink message types. A new policy capability "netlink_xperm" is introduced. When disabled, the previous behaviour is preserved. That is, netlink_send will rely on the permission mappings defined in nlmsgtab.c (e.g, nlmsg_read for RTM_GETADDR on NETLINK_ROUTE). When enabled, the mappings are ignored and the generic "nlmsg" permission is used instead. The new "nlmsg" permission is an extended permission. The 16 bits of the extended permission are mapped to the nlmsg_type field. Example policy on Android, preventing regular apps from accessing the device's MAC address and ARP table, but allowing this access to privileged apps, looks as follows: allow netdomain self:netlink_route_socket { create read getattr write setattr lock append connect getopt setopt shutdown nlmsg }; allowxperm netdomain self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg ~{ RTM_GETLINK RTM_GETNEIGH RTM_GETNEIGHTBL }; allowxperm priv_app self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg { RTM_GETLINK RTM_GETNEIGH RTM_GETNEIGHTBL }; The constants in the example above (e.g., RTM_GETLINK) are explicitly defined in the policy. It is possible to generate policies to support kernels that may or may not have the capability enabled by generating a rule for each scenario. For instance: allow domain self:netlink_audit_socket nlmsg_read; allow domain self:netlink_audit_socket nlmsg; allowxperm domain self:netlink_audit_socket nlmsg { AUDIT_GET }; The approach of defining a new permission ("nlmsg") instead of relying on the existing permissions (e.g., "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_readpriv" or "nlmsg_tty_audit") has been preferred because: 1. This is similar to the other extended permission ("ioctl"); 2. With the new extended permission, the coarse-grained mapping is not necessary anymore. It could eventually be removed, which would be impossible if the extended permission was defined below these. 3. Having a single extra extended permission considerably simplifies the implementation here and in libselinux. Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com> Signed-off-by: Bram Bonné <brambonne@google.com> [PM: manual merge fixes for sock_skip_has_perm()] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | selinux: move genheaders to security/selinux/Masahiro Yamada2024-10-033-2/+160
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This tool is only used in security/selinux/Makefile. Move it to security/selinux/ so that 'make clean' can clean it up. Please note 'make clean' does not clean scripts/ because tools under scripts/ are often used for external module builds. Obviously, genheaders is not the case here. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | selinux: do not include <linux/*.h> headers from host programsMasahiro Yamada2024-10-032-3/+12
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The header, security/selinux/include/classmap.h, is included not only from kernel space but also from host programs. It includes <linux/capability.h> and <linux/socket.h>, which pull in more <linux/*.h> headers. This makes the host programs less portable, specifically causing build errors on macOS. Those headers are included for the following purposes: - <linux/capability.h> for checking CAP_LAST_CAP - <linux/socket.h> for checking PF_MAX These checks can be guarded by __KERNEL__ so they are skipped when building host programs. Testing them when building the kernel should be sufficient. The header, security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h, includes <linux/stddef.h> for the NULL definition, but this is not portable either. Instead, <stddef.h> should be included for host programs. Reported-by: Daniel Gomez <da.gomez@samsung.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240807-macos-build-support-v1-6-4cd1ded85694@samsung.com/ Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240807-macos-build-support-v1-7-4cd1ded85694@samsung.com/ Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* Merge tag 'bpf-next-6.12-struct-fd' of ↵Linus Torvalds2024-09-241-1/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next Pull bpf 'struct fd' updates from Alexei Starovoitov: "This includes struct_fd BPF changes from Al and Andrii" * tag 'bpf-next-6.12-struct-fd' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: bpf: convert bpf_token_create() to CLASS(fd, ...) security,bpf: constify struct path in bpf_token_create() LSM hook bpf: more trivial fdget() conversions bpf: trivial conversions for fdget() bpf: switch maps to CLASS(fd, ...) bpf: factor out fetching bpf_map from FD and adding it to used_maps list bpf: switch fdget_raw() uses to CLASS(fd_raw, ...) bpf: convert __bpf_prog_get() to CLASS(fd, ...)
| * security,bpf: constify struct path in bpf_token_create() LSM hookAndrii Nakryiko2024-09-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is no reason why struct path pointer shouldn't be const-qualified when being passed into bpf_token_create() LSM hook. Add that const. Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (LSM/SELinux) Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
* | Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240923' of ↵Linus Torvalds2024-09-241-1/+1
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm Pull LSM fixes from Paul Moore: - Add a missing security_mmap_file() check to the remap_file_pages() syscall - Properly reference the SELinux and Smack LSM blobs in the security_watch_key() LSM hook - Fix a random IPE selftest crash caused by a missing list terminator in the test * tag 'lsm-pr-20240923' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: ipe: Add missing terminator to list of unit tests selinux,smack: properly reference the LSM blob in security_watch_key() mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()
| * | selinux,smack: properly reference the LSM blob in security_watch_key()Paul Moore2024-09-191-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Unfortunately when we migrated the lifecycle management of the key LSM blob to the LSM framework we forgot to convert the security_watch_key() callbacks for SELinux and Smack. This patch corrects this by making use of the selinux_key() and smack_key() helper functions respectively. This patch also removes some input checking in the Smack callback as it is no longer needed. Fixes: 5f8d28f6d7d5 ("lsm: infrastructure management of the key security blob") Reported-by: syzbot+044fdf24e96093584232@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Tested-by: syzbot+044fdf24e96093584232@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | | Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240911' of ↵Linus Torvalds2024-09-163-127/+100
|\| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore: - Move the LSM framework to static calls This transitions the vast majority of the LSM callbacks into static calls. Those callbacks which haven't been converted were left as-is due to the general ugliness of the changes required to support the static call conversion; we can revisit those callbacks at a future date. - Add the Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) LSM This adds a new LSM, Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE). There is plenty of documentation about IPE in this patches, so I'll refrain from going into too much detail here, but the basic motivation behind IPE is to provide a mechanism such that administrators can restrict execution to only those binaries which come from integrity protected storage, e.g. a dm-verity protected filesystem. You will notice that IPE requires additional LSM hooks in the initramfs, dm-verity, and fs-verity code, with the associated patches carrying ACK/review tags from the associated maintainers. We couldn't find an obvious maintainer for the initramfs code, but the IPE patchset has been widely posted over several years. Both Deven Bowers and Fan Wu have contributed to IPE's development over the past several years, with Fan Wu agreeing to serve as the IPE maintainer moving forward. Once IPE is accepted into your tree, I'll start working with Fan to ensure he has the necessary accounts, keys, etc. so that he can start submitting IPE pull requests to you directly during the next merge window. - Move the lifecycle management of the LSM blobs to the LSM framework Management of the LSM blobs (the LSM state buffers attached to various kernel structs, typically via a void pointer named "security" or similar) has been mixed, some blobs were allocated/managed by individual LSMs, others were managed by the LSM framework itself. Starting with this pull we move management of all the LSM blobs, minus the XFRM blob, into the framework itself, improving consistency across LSMs, and reducing the amount of duplicated code across LSMs. Due to some additional work required to migrate the XFRM blob, it has been left as a todo item for a later date; from a practical standpoint this omission should have little impact as only SELinux provides a XFRM LSM implementation. - Fix problems with the LSM's handling of F_SETOWN The LSM hook for the fcntl(F_SETOWN) operation had a couple of problems: it was racy with itself, and it was disconnected from the associated DAC related logic in such a way that the LSM state could be updated in cases where the DAC state would not. We fix both of these problems by moving the security_file_set_fowner() hook into the same section of code where the DAC attributes are updated. Not only does this resolve the DAC/LSM synchronization issue, but as that code block is protected by a lock, it also resolve the race condition. - Fix potential problems with the security_inode_free() LSM hook Due to use of RCU to protect inodes and the placement of the LSM hook associated with freeing the inode, there is a bit of a challenge when it comes to managing any LSM state associated with an inode. The VFS folks are not open to relocating the LSM hook so we have to get creative when it comes to releasing an inode's LSM state. Traditionally we have used a single LSM callback within the hook that is triggered when the inode is "marked for death", but not actually released due to RCU. Unfortunately, this causes problems for LSMs which want to take an action when the inode's associated LSM state is actually released; so we add an additional LSM callback, inode_free_security_rcu(), that is called when the inode's LSM state is released in the RCU free callback. - Refactor two LSM hooks to better fit the LSM return value patterns The vast majority of the LSM hooks follow the "return 0 on success, negative values on failure" pattern, however, there are a small handful that have unique return value behaviors which has caused confusion in the past and makes it difficult for the BPF verifier to properly vet BPF LSM programs. This includes patches to convert two of these"special" LSM hooks to the common 0/-ERRNO pattern. - Various cleanups and improvements A handful of patches to remove redundant code, better leverage the IS_ERR_OR_NULL() helper, add missing "static" markings, and do some minor style fixups. * tag 'lsm-pr-20240911' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (40 commits) security: Update file_set_fowner documentation fs: Fix file_set_fowner LSM hook inconsistencies lsm: Use IS_ERR_OR_NULL() helper function lsm: remove LSM_COUNT and LSM_CONFIG_COUNT ipe: Remove duplicated include in ipe.c lsm: replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls lsm: count the LSMs enabled at compile time kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling init/main.c: Initialize early LSMs after arch code, static keys and calls. MAINTAINERS: add IPE entry with Fan Wu as maintainer documentation: add IPE documentation ipe: kunit test for parser scripts: add boot policy generation program ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs lsm: add security_inode_setintegrity() hook ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider dm-verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs block,lsm: add LSM blob and new LSM hooks for block devices ipe: add permissive toggle ...
| * | lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_copy_up_xattrXu Kuohai2024-07-311-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | To be consistent with most LSM hooks, convert the return value of hook inode_copy_up_xattr to 0 or a negative error code. Before: - Hook inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 when accepting xattr, 1 when discarding xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know xattr, or any other negative error code otherwise. After: - Hook inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 when accepting xattr, *-ECANCELED* when discarding xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know xattr, or any other negative error code otherwise. Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook vm_enough_memoryXu Kuohai2024-07-311-11/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | To be consistent with most LSM hooks, convert the return value of hook vm_enough_memory to 0 or a negative error code. Before: - Hook vm_enough_memory returns 1 if permission is granted, 0 if not. - LSM_RET_DEFAULT(vm_enough_memory_mm) is 1. After: - Hook vm_enough_memory reutrns 0 if permission is granted, negative error code if not. - LSM_RET_DEFAULT(vm_enough_memory_mm) is 0. Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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