summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/MdeModulePkg/Library
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorDandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>2019-09-05 15:06:13 +0800
committerHao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>2019-09-25 10:03:57 +0800
commitf7fdd620e81dd590414184e562b9058f95480b0e (patch)
tree55a9cbf0d2f3a08613b479cdb0138002147ad8da /MdeModulePkg/Library
parent51a3985cbbe17257b7a5db71842960b76e20e1d6 (diff)
downloadedk2-f7fdd620e81dd590414184e562b9058f95480b0e.tar.gz
edk2-f7fdd620e81dd590414184e562b9058f95480b0e.tar.bz2
edk2-f7fdd620e81dd590414184e562b9058f95480b0e.zip
MdeModulePkg/UefiBootManager: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. This follows UEFI Spec. But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly for the callers in UefiBootManagerLib which don't have the policy to defer the execution of the image. Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com> Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com> REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992 Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'MdeModulePkg/Library')
-rw-r--r--MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c9
-rw-r--r--MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c14
-rw-r--r--MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c14
3 files changed, 33 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
index 952033fc82..760d7647b8 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
@@ -1862,6 +1862,15 @@ EfiBootManagerBoot (
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
//
+ // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
+ // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
+ // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
+ // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
+ //
+ if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
+ gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
+ }
+ //
// Report Status Code with the failure status to indicate that the failure to load boot option
//
BmReportLoadFailure (EFI_SW_DXE_BS_EC_BOOT_OPTION_LOAD_ERROR, Status);
diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
index 07592f8ebd..89372b3b97 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/** @file
Load option library functions which relate with creating and processing load options.
-Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
(C) Copyright 2015-2018 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
@@ -1411,7 +1411,17 @@ EfiBootManagerProcessLoadOption (
);
FreePool (FileBuffer);
- if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ //
+ // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
+ // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
+ // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
+ // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
+ //
+ if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
+ gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
+ }
+ } else {
Status = gBS->HandleProtocol (ImageHandle, &gEfiLoadedImageProtocolGuid, (VOID **)&ImageInfo);
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
index 6b8fb4d924..89595747af 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/** @file
Misc library functions.
-Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
(C) Copyright 2016 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
@@ -493,7 +493,17 @@ EfiBootManagerDispatchDeferredImages (
0,
&ImageHandle
);
- if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ //
+ // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
+ // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
+ // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
+ // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
+ //
+ if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
+ gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
+ }
+ } else {
LoadCount++;
//
// Before calling the image, enable the Watchdog Timer for