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| author | Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> | 2020-06-06 01:52:42 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | mergify[bot] <37929162+mergify[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> | 2020-06-09 20:19:04 +0000 |
| commit | dafce295e6f447ed8905db4e29241e2c6c2a4389 (patch) | |
| tree | 2b1f8e0b2015611815526308a5094ff2d052a53a /MdeModulePkg | |
| parent | 82e0b2f043c17bdb3d5ada7d9fe2bc13624cef27 (diff) | |
| download | edk2-dafce295e6f447ed8905db4e29241e2c6c2a4389.tar.gz edk2-dafce295e6f447ed8905db4e29241e2c6c2a4389.tar.bz2 edk2-dafce295e6f447ed8905db4e29241e2c6c2a4389.zip | |
OvmfPkg/X86QemuLoadImageLib: handle EFI_ACCESS_DENIED from LoadImage()
When an image fails Secure Boot validation, LoadImage() returns
EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION if the platform policy is
DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION.
If the platform policy is DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION, then
LoadImage() returns EFI_ACCESS_DENIED (and the image does not remain
loaded).
(Before <https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129>, this
difference would be masked, as DxeImageVerificationLib would incorrectly
return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION for DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION as
well.)
In X86QemuLoadImageLib, proceed to the legacy Linux/x86 Boot Protocol upon
seeing EFI_ACCESS_DENIED too.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2785
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200605235242.32442-1-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'MdeModulePkg')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions