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authorTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>2021-01-07 12:48:25 -0600
committermergify[bot] <37929162+mergify[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>2021-01-07 19:34:39 +0000
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OvfmPkg/VmgExitLib: Validate #VC MMIO is to un-encrypted memory
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108 When SEV-ES is active, and MMIO operation will trigger a #VC and the VmgExitLib exception handler will process this MMIO operation. A malicious hypervisor could try to extract information from encrypted memory by setting a reserved bit in the guests nested page tables for a non-MMIO area. This can result in the encrypted data being copied into the GHCB shared buffer area and accessed by the hypervisor. Prevent this by ensuring that the MMIO source/destination is un-encrypted memory. For the APIC register space, access is allowed in general. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Message-Id: <0cf28470ad5e694af45f7f0b35296628f819567d.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
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