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author | Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com> | 2024-01-26 05:54:55 +0800 |
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committer | mergify[bot] <37929162+mergify[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> | 2024-02-06 19:24:26 +0000 |
commit | fac297724e6cc343430cd0104e55cd7a96d1151e (patch) | |
tree | a8c130ed25a77a6c6c7c9a68e978c19a338e816d /NetworkPkg/NetworkBuildOptions.dsc.inc | |
parent | 7f04c7a253621956ba59a121c6e8658256788f40 (diff) | |
download | edk2-fac297724e6cc343430cd0104e55cd7a96d1151e.tar.gz edk2-fac297724e6cc343430cd0104e55cd7a96d1151e.tar.bz2 edk2-fac297724e6cc343430cd0104e55cd7a96d1151e.zip |
NetworkPkg: UefiPxeBcDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45235 Patch
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4540
Bug Details:
PixieFail Bug #7
CVE-2023-45235
CVSS 8.3 : CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H
CWE-119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of
a Memory Buffer
Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy
Advertise message
Change Overview:
Performs two checks
1. Checks that the length of the duid is accurate
> + //
> + // Check that the minimum and maximum requirements are met
> + //
> + if ((OpLen < PXEBC_MIN_SIZE_OF_DUID) ||
(OpLen > PXEBC_MAX_SIZE_OF_DUID)) {
> + Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
> + goto ON_ERROR;
> + }
2. Ensures that the amount of data written to the buffer is tracked and
never exceeds that
> + //
> + // Check that the option length is valid.
> + //
> + if ((DiscoverLen + OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN)
> DiscoverLenNeeded) {
> + Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
> + goto ON_ERROR;
> + }
Additional code clean up and fix for memory leak in case Option was NULL
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'NetworkPkg/NetworkBuildOptions.dsc.inc')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions