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authorMarc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>2018-02-22 19:10:03 +0100
committerLaszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>2018-03-09 18:10:49 +0100
commitd5a002aba0aa4ea89396e389106ca718b870be2f (patch)
tree01e02c8b4f643b0960c5c736956f04a6c6ca123b /OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc
parent0c0a50d6b3ffe6ed81121ba1e58b887b9a060d8b (diff)
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OvmfPkg: plug DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib into SecurityStubDxe
The library registers a security management handler, to measure images that are not measure in PEI phase. For example with the qemu PXE rom: Loading driver at 0x0003E6C2000 EntryPoint=0x0003E6C9076 8086100e.efi And the following binary_bios_measurements log entry seems to be added: PCR: 2 type: EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER size: 0x4e digest: 70a22475e9f18806d2ed9193b48d80d26779d9a4 The following order of operations ensures that 3rd party UEFI modules, such as PCI option ROMs and other modules possibly loaded from outside of firmware volumes, are measured into the TPM: (1) Tcg2Dxe is included in DXEFV, therefore it produces the TCG2 protocol sometime in the DXE phase (assuming a TPM2 chip is present, reported via PcdTpmInstanceGuid). (2) The DXE core finds that no more drivers are left to dispatch from DXEFV, and we enter the BDS phase. (3) OVMF's PlatformBootManagerLib connects all PCI root bridges non-recursively, producing PciIo instances and discovering PCI oproms. (4) The dispatching of images that don't originate from FVs is deferred at this point, by "MdeModulePkg/Universal/SecurityStubDxe/Defer3rdPartyImageLoad.c". (5) OVMF's PlatformBootManagerLib signals EndOfDxe. (6) OVMF's PlatformBootManagerLib calls EfiBootManagerDispatchDeferredImages() -- the images deferred in step (4) are now dispatched. (7) Image dispatch invokes the Security / Security2 Arch protocols (produced by SecurityStubDxe). In this patch, we hook DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib into SecurityStubDxe, therefore image dispatch will try to locate the TCG2 protocol, and measure the image into the TPM2 chip with the protocol. Because of step (1), the TCG2 protocol will always be found and used (assuming a TPM2 chip is present). Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc')
-rw-r--r--OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc3
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc
index f80fb50d4a..92c8c560a0 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc
@@ -645,6 +645,9 @@
!if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE
NULL|SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.inf
!endif
+!if $(TPM2_ENABLE) == TRUE
+ NULL|SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.inf
+!endif
}
MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcDxe.inf